World Press on Age of the Warlord in Afghanistan, Post-Lukashenka Belarus: New Age Islam's Selection, 7 October 2020
By New Age Islam Edit Bureau
7 October 2020
•
The Age of the Warlord Is Coming to an End in Afghanistan
By
Johnathan Krause
•
Post-Lukashenka Belarus: Close Ties to Moscow but Improved Relationship With the
West?
By Grigory Ioffe
•
China Turning Russia’s Taiga Into a Desert, Enriching Moscow but Outraging
Siberians
By
Paul Goble
•
Can Turmoil in Belarus and Karabakh Inspire a New Patriotic Surge in Russia?
By
Kseniya Kirillova
-----
The
Age of the Warlord Is Coming to an End in Afghanistan
By Johnathan Krause
October 2, 2018
Memorial of warlord Ahmad
Shah Masood (Source: al-Jazeera)
----
The age of warlords in Afghanistan may
finally be ending. The beginning of the end started before Afghanistan
attracted the world’s attention on September 11, 2001: thus, September 9, 2018,
marked the death, 17 years ago, of Ahmad Shah Masoud, a Tajik commander who was
assassinated by members of al-Qaeda posing as journalists (Tolo News, September
9, 2018). And as a bookend of sorts for this period, Jalaluddin Haqqani,
another commander, died earlier last month, on September 3, 2018.
Both men were important figures in the war
against the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Haqqani rose to
prominence as a beneficiary of support from the United States’ Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Saudi government, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) (Afghanistan Online, September 18, 2008). Whereas, Massoud
repeatedly thwarted Soviet plans to invade the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul
(Afghanistan Online, November 18, 2007).
Although the two men were affiliated with
national groups like the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, respectively, they
were also quasi-independent warlords with their own following. During the
Soviet occupation and subsequent Afghan Civil War in the 1990s, Massoud built
up a personal army of fighters loyal to him (Afghanistan Analyst Network, May
30, 2014). Haqqani similarly built up his own network. In 1996, the latter man
became an ally of the Taliban and provided this militant group with an
important base in southeastern Afghanistan, where few of its members had connections
(Afghan Analysis Network, September 20, 2012).
The two men’s deaths are representative of
a long-term shift occurring in Afghanistan: throughout the country, warlords
are becoming obsolete. Over the past two years, the Afghan government has acted
against them, including the dismissal and forced exile of important northern
commanders. General Abdul Rashid Dostum left Afghanistan for Turkey last year,
after allegations of kidnapping and assault on a political rival (Tolo News,
August 13, 2018). The Afghan Attorney
General’s Office filed charges against him in court for the offense (Tolo News,
July 28, 2017). And Atta Mohammad Noor, dubbed the “King of the North” for
ruling Balkh Province as governor for 14 years, reached an agreement with the
Afghan government to step down (Gandhara, March 21, 2018). President Ashraf
Ghani ordered Noor to vacate the governor’s office in December 2017, but Noor
initially refused to leave his power base (Tolo News, March 21). Abdul Karim
Khudam, a Noor ally and member of a powerful political party, likewise refused
to step down after being sacked by Ghani (Tolo News, February 19).
Nevertheless, he eventually resigned days later after an agreement between his
political party (Jamiat), and the national government (Tolo News, February 20).
It is noteworthy that two northern governors were dismissed within months of
each other.
The country’s remaining warlords are also
losing their grip on power due to factionalism and their inability to control
it. Although General Dostum returned to Afghanistan recently this year, he has
lost control of his own political party. Dissidents from his faction, Jombesh,
formed their own political grouping, New Jombesh, last year (Afghanistan
Analysis Network, July 19, 2017). This formation is significant because Dostum
had previously reacted violently to dissent within Jombesh. In one instance,
his militia kidnapped and tortured another political rival who was preparing to
mount a challenge to Dostum’s leadership within the party (Afghanistan Analysis
Network, July 19, 2017). The only reaction to the break between old and new
Jombesh has been public scorn from the former against the latter. Dostum
supporters and “old” Jombesh members called the new party “Agents of the
Palace” and accused them of being “affiliated with the government” (Afghanistan
Analysis Network, July 19, 2017).
Independent agencies in Afghanistan have
also contributed to the demise of the warlords by taking away an important
source of their power—national office. Afghan warlords were once considered
among the country’s most influential elites, having gained access to government
facilities and jobs in the bureaucracies (Asia Times, May 14, 2018).
Nonetheless, the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IECC) recently
announced that warlords will not be allowed to stand for elections (Tolo News,
July 26). Already 25 candidates with links to non-governmental armed groups
were removed from the list of parliamentary candidates (Tolo News, August 4).
Lastly, international organizations and
European states have stepped up calls for justice against Afghanistan’s warlord
class. In mid-August, the ambassadors for the European Union and Norway in
Kabul said, in a joint conference, that the case against Dostum (for the
assault on a political rival mentioned above) should be concluded via legal
channels since he returned to Afghanistan (Tolo News, August 13). They added
that “nobody should be above the law” and it is important that all Afghans work
together peace, stability, and democracy throughout the country, based on full
respect for the rule of law of all citizens (Tolo News, August 4, 2018).
The above actions are a dramatic turnaround
in the government’s previous policy toward the warlords. Heretofore, the Afghan
state utilized indigenous warlords as powerful allies against the Islamist
insurgency. Thomas Rutting, a co-director of the Afghan Analysts Network, noted
that private militias and strong men have flourished in modern Afghanistan
because of their usefulness in the war against the Taliban (Afghan Analysts
Network, March 20, 2015). Warlords were given money, governorships, cabinet
positions, and even vice presidencies. In addition, they were afforded access
to government facilities and jobs, as mentioned above.
The decline of warlordism is helping to
strengthen state sovereignty and boosting President Ghani’s domestic authority.
Last year, he pledged that his people will celebrate the sovereignty of law.
The law is not sovereign when certain officials consider themselves untouchable
or beholden only to the power of the gun, Ghani pointed out (Tolo News, March
15, 2017). The removal of Dostum, Noor and Khadim thus offers him an
opportunity to appoint new loyal government officials who will contribute to
consolidating Kabul’s control over the wider country. Now, there are fewer
strongmen with militias and guns to prevent the writ of the government,
especially in former warlord-held areas.
The end of the warlords will almost
certainly impact the civilian population the most, promising to dramatically
increase overall security. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) noted, in its 2014 “Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict,” that there was a 194 percent increase in civilian deaths
caused by warlord militia groups from the previous year (Afghan News Network,
March 4, 2015). Most of those casualties were caused by fighting between rival
pro-government militias (Afghan News Network, March 4, 2015). The UNAMA also
noted the “impunity enjoyed by pro-government armed groups, which permitted
them to commit criminal acts including assault, intimidation, and lack of
protection for civilians and communities” (Afghan News Network, March 4,
2015).”
With the Ghani administration determined to
remove warlords from power and the IECC’s use of legal tools to prevent them
from gaining power at the national level, the chapter on Afghanistan’s warlords
seems to be closing. Once powerful actors, they are increasingly being held
accountable for their actions and can no longer wholly ignore the writ of the
government or the chorus for justice by the international community. The recent
twin deaths of Ahmad Shah Masoud and Jalaluddin Haqqani may thus come to
symbolize the end of an era.
https://jamestown.org/the-age-of-the-warlord-is-coming-to-an-end-in-afghanistan/
----
Post-Lukashenka
Belarus: Close Ties to Moscow but Improved Relationship with the West?
By Grigory
Ioffe
October 6, 2020
(Source: Reuters)
----
Arriving at some clarity regarding the
situation in Belarus has become harder than ever before. An unstable
equilibrium begets a cacophony of opinions that do not lend themselves to
generalization or to teasing out a common idea. Alexander Klaskovsky of Belapan
writes, “[Presidents Alyaksandr] Lukashenka [of Belarus] and [Vladimir] Putin
[of Russia] are sitting in the same anti-Western trench” (Naviny, September
29). Arseny Sivitsky of the Minsk-based Center for Strategic Studies argues,
“[French President] Emmanuel Macron’s statement that Lukashenka has to go and
Macron’s meeting with [Lukashenka’s chief rival in the August presidential
elections] Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in Vilnius not only derive from Minsk’s
reluctance to communicate with the West but also constitute a position Macron
reconciled during his phone talk with Vladimir Putin; this position reflects
attitudes in the Kremlin” (Forstrategy, September 29). Finally, in an interview
with Current Time TV, Arkady Dubnov, a liberal Moscow-based political analyst,
posited, “Moscow may turn out to be late installing its creature that would
replace Lukashenka, and in that case, it would have to negotiate with
Tikhanovskaya, too” (Current Time, September 28).
What
nobody calls into question is that the Belarusian political regime has survived
the street protests and, despite a few widely publicized acts of disobedience,
the entire power vertical, especially law enforcement, retained the appearance
of a monolith. It is also becoming exceedingly clear that although the social
base of the protest movement may be fairly wide, President Lukashenka’s base of
support is not that narrow either and extends beyond the habitual formula of
“country and small-town folks, retirees and the less educated.”
Opinions about Lukashenka’s legitimacy vary.
As Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba put it, “Lukashenka does not have
legitimacy anymore, but the opposition does not enjoy enough of it yet”
(Tut.by, September 30). However, according to philosopher Viacheslav Bobrovich
of Belarusian State University, if Lukashenka has lost legitimacy in the eyes
of a critical mass of the Belarusian public, it is only in a narrowly defined
political sense. His administration remains orderly and performs its functions
vital for everyday life reasonably well, and it is not awash in corruption (Facebook.com/vbobrovich,
September 26). Kirill Koktysh, a Minsk-born professor at Russia’s MGiMO
University, observes that Belarus witnessed the third recent failed color
revolution, following those in Venezuela and Hong Kong (Author’s interview,
October 2).
Arguably, a tentative consensus has developed
suggesting that the “unstable equilibrium” in Belarus is not so much because of
continuing protests but due to the uncertain actions of the Kremlin. Actors on
all sides of the Belarusian political divide seem to stress the necessity of
reaching out to Russia. “We do have contacts with Moscow,” acknowledged Pavel
Latushko, one of the exiled leaders of the protest movement, in an interview
with Radio Liberty (Svaboda.org, September 29). Against this backdrop, the
European Union’s sanctions imposed on Minsk do not elicit a serious reaction.
About 40 Belarusian officials and security service authorities—but not
Lukashenka himself—are now personae non gratae in the EU (BBC News—Russian
service, October 1). The reputable Minsk-based analyst Artyom Shraibman
describes Western sanctions as pro forma a demonstration of Europe’s
self-respect but thoroughly impotent in terms of exerting any influence. Yet he
suggests that a miniature Marshall Plan for Belarus could eventually begin to
matter in the eyes of the Belarusian nomenklatura, if Moscow does not depose
Lukashenka but the economy sharply declines (T.me/shraibman, October 2).
In
contrast to the EU sanctions, Minsk’s responses prove more important, as these
actions will further reduce Belarus’s exposure to Western influence. For
example, Minsk demanded that the Lithuanian embassy to Belarus reduce its
personnel from 25 to 14 diplomats and the Polish embassy from 50 to 18. The
Belarusian government claims this order was prompted by “destructive activity”
carried out by these countries inside Belarus (Svaboda.org, October 2). Since
the Baltic States’ travel sanctions on Belarus target many more people than the
EU’s and include Lukashenka, Belarus announced symmetrical restrictions
(Tut.by, September 29). On October 2, Minsk annulled the accreditation of all
foreign media correspondents. Reaccreditation commenced three days later,
prioritizing journalists who are citizens of the countries that their
respective media outlets represent. This strategy may let down quite a few
Belarusian citizens representing these foreign media outlets (Svaboda.org,
October 2).
Concerning the Vilnius meeting between Macron
and Tikhanovskaya, the Belarusian foreign ministry caustically called the
exiled opposition leader an “attraction” in the Lithuanian capital that foreign
visitors are now mandated to visit (BelTA, September 29). Whereas Lukashenka,
as a “politician with experience,” issued advice to the “immature” Macron to
stay away from Belarus and preoccupy himself with his own country’s problems.
The Belarusian leader even crudely counseled his French counterpart against
paying too much attention to the former presidential candidate in Vilnius lest
Macron wind up with personal problems simply because that candidate, Ms.
Tikhanovskaya, happens to be a woman (Tut.by, September 29).
Multiple publications have declared the
ultimate failure of Belarus’s multi-vector foreign policy; some have
fatalistically entertained the idea of shutting down the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which would hardly be needed if Minsk is not allowed to maintain
relations with any foreign powers besides Moscow (Naviny, September 22). Andrei
Savinykh, a former diplomat who chairs the Foreign Affairs Commission of Belarus’s
House of Representative (lower chamber of parliament), has been particularly
vocal in repudiating Minsk’s multi-vectoralism: in the current geopolitical
situation, the West has demonstrated its irrelevance and hostility toward
Belarus, whereas Russia embodies all hope (BelTA, September 29).
Clearly, however, not all inside Belarus or in
the West agree. Thus, in their article aimed at the Western audience, Yauheni
Preiherman of the Minsk Dialogue Council and Thomas Graham of the United States
Council on Foreign Relations, suggest that contacts with Minsk should be
retained at all costs and a US ambassador should quickly be sent to Minsk.
After all, talking about Belarus only with Moscow over Minsk’s head will show
Belarusian society that it does not matter in the eyes of the West. “A
post-Lukashenko Belarus, with close ties to Moscow but an improved relationship
with the West, remains a possible medium-term outcome of the current crisis. It
might not be the one many in the West had hoped for, but it is still a good
alternative and perhaps the best option in the current climate. Well-crafted
policy could make it a reality,” the two analysts conclude (Foreign Affairs,
October 2).
https://jamestown.org/program/post-lukashenka-belarus-close-ties-to-moscow-but-improved-relationship-with-the-west/
-----
China
Turning Russia’s Taiga into a Desert, Enriching Moscow but Outraging Siberians
By Paul Goble
October 6, 2020
Logging in Siberia (Source:
RT)
-----
Since Vladimir Putin became president,
Russia’s forests have declined in size by 45 million hectares, some 6 percent
of the country’s total. The shrinking forest cover has been the result of the
spread of uncontrolled forest fires (80 percent) as well as increased
harvesting (20 percent), much of that for export. That distinction between
losses from fires and regular cutting, however, is less sharp than one might
expect: many Russians allege that some of the fires, especially in Siberia and
the Russian Far East, were set deliberately to conceal illegal cutting
(Newizv.ru, September 9). True or not, the issue is becoming ever more
political for two reasons. First, a large part of the new logging operations
are being carried out by Chinese firms or Russian subcontractors working for
them. And second, the profits from exports of wood (processed and unprocessed)
to China are going almost exclusively to oligarchs in Moscow rather than to
people in the regions that are being left without forests and more at risk of
fires and flooding than ever before.
The
main drivers of this development, Russian experts say, lie in the new legal
code governing forests, the Putin government’s commitment to supply China with
lumber both to earn money and to cement ties between the two Eurasian giants,
as well as the fact that in the most-affected regions, the governors are not
local people but appointed outsiders. Those Kremlin-imposed non-local governors
tend to show less concern for putting the interests of their federal subjects
first (Rusmonitor.com, October 2).
Both
Soviet legislation and Russian laws adopted in the 1990s provided significant
protection to Russian forests. But the forestry code adopted under Putin’s
tenure eliminated most restrictions on the use of forests, shut down fire-watch
and fire-fighting centers, and handed over large segments of the country’s
seemingly endless forests to businessmen, whose only interest has been to
profit from them even if stripping the timber increased the chronic risk of
catastrophic fires and floods. The Kremlin took these steps to ensure that it
would continue to enrich itself and its private-sector allies as well as to
please Beijing, which looks north to Siberia and the Russian Far East for wood
and pulp. China is currently responsible for logging and exporting 90 percent
of all timber products from those regions for its own needs. This conversion of
areas forested from time immemorial into what some call “lunar landscapes” is
becoming a political issue, with local politicians demanding a return of local
control over the use of forest, while Moscow plays defense.
One
Russian commentator, Vladimir Vorsobin, says that this has sparked “a small
civil war” between those engaged in logging and profiting from it and the
surrounding populations (Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 2). Some of the
protesters in Khabarovsk, in the Russian Far East (see EDM, August 3, 4), have
raised this issue. But the most dramatic engagement in this “war” came last
week (October 2), when Vorsobin published an open letter to President Putin
summing up the anger of Russians living along the Russian-Chinese border and
demanding that he change course. In fact, the commentator writes, Russians are
outraged that Putin has promised to limit Chinese exploitation of Russian
forests repeatedly but, in fact, has continued to profit from the sale of
timber to Beijing. From their point of view, he continues, Russians now believe
Putin is selling out the interests of the people of Siberia and the Russian Far
East for profit, a view that combines class and regional anger at Moscow and is
becoming the foundation for a serious political challenge to the center.
At a
meeting in early October, Putin promised that he would take steps to regulate
the situation, especially after officials said that much of the money from
sales to China is going into the coffers not of the central government but into
shadowy illegal firms. Opponents of the current approach to forest management
were hopeful when business people were excluded from the meeting; but they were
troubled by Putin’s failure to take a tough line and even more by the
subsequent absence on the Kremlin website of any details regarding what might
be done. Some observers have concluded that nothing serious is likely to
happen—banning the export of raw lumber, the main announcement Putin did make,
will mean that the Chinese will simply process the felled wood in Russia and
use its own workers to do so, further outraging local Russian residents.
Instead, the Russian taiga will continue to disappear into Chinese hands, and
any profit from it will flow out of the local regions (Newizv.ru, October 2).
The
conflict over this issue between the central government and business on the one
side and the people on the other has not been limited to blog posts, however.
Some activists in the Russian Far East have set fire to lumber already
harvested and set to be exported to China. “Local bloggers,” one Russian
commentator, Aleksandr Nemets, says, “are calling this a partisan war” against
both Beijing and Moscow, which supports the Chinese enterprises. Activists have
organized large protest gatherings, including in Khabarovsk, whereas Moscow has
removed regional officials, including the Communist governor in Irkutsk, who
tried to block the export of wood to China (Kasparov.ru, January 9).
According to Nemets, who resides in the United
States though closely tracks developments in Asiatic Russia, he does not know
how things will develop in the Russian Far East. China remains in a very strong
position and has Moscow’s backing. “But obviously, the southeastern regions [of
the Russian Far East] have already passed the point of no return,” he concludes
(Kasparov.ru, January 9). If this assertion proves true, the Kremlin will
eventually face much bigger problems east of the Urals than fires, floods and
critical internet posts.
https://jamestown.org/program/china-turning-russias-taiga-into-a-desert-enriching-moscow-but-outraging-siberians/
-----
Can
Turmoil In Belarus And Karabakh Inspire A New Patriotic Surge In Russia?
By Kseniya Kirillova
October 6, 2020
(Source: Kremlin.ru)
----
Protests in Belarus and the fighting in
Karabakh have upended relations between the Russian authorities and the leaders
of Minsk and Yerevan. In the past, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka
and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, despite generally acting in
conjunction with Moscow, have nonetheless tried to distance themselves from
Russia as much as possible and periodically sided with the West in condemning
certain Kremlin actions (Ukrinform, September 7, 2018). However, in recent
months, each of them, for his own reasons, has had to turn to Russia for help.
Lukashenka, rejected by what appears to be a majority of his own people and not
recognized by the West as the legitimate president (Eeas.europa.eu, September
15), began to seek Vladimir Putin’s support. He has sought to affirm his
absolute loyalty to the Kremlin and prove Belarus’s irreplaceable role in
protecting Russia “from Western aggression” (YouTube, September 9). Similarly,
Pashinyan, in seeking Moscow’s support in Armenia’s war against Turkish-backed
Azerbaijan, also promised his loyalty (Gazeta.ru, September 30).
All
this encouraged the Russian authorities in recent weeks to launch a new round
of pro-imperialistic propaganda. Using the statements of the leaders of Belarus
and Armenia, the media began to promote the idea that only Russia can help its
neighbors, which automatically demonstrates the Russian Federation’s status as
a great power (Svobodnaya Pressa, September 30). At the same time, Russian
propaganda emphasizes that the only way for the post-Soviet states to survive
is to abandon their “multi-vector” approaches and fulfill a number of
conditions set by the Kremlin, including recognizing Crimea as part of Russia,
integrating more deeply with the Eurasian Economic Union, lobbying for the
lifting of anti-Russian sanctions, reducing the United States’ influence and
banning a number of pro-Western non-governmental organizations (NGO), and so on
(T.me/russica2, September 28). The general editor of RT, Margarita Simonyan,
notably stated, “Armenia is either doomed to return to Russia or simply doomed”
(Twitter, September 28). Various Russian observers argue that Armenia cannot
survive without becoming part of Russia.
Nevertheless, independent economists and
sociologists are inclined to believe that, unlike in 2014, the Russian
authorities will not succeed in sparking a new “patriotic surge” within Russian
society based on neo-imperial ideas. Economist and the director of the Center
for Post-Industrial Society Studies, Vladislav Inozemtsev, believes the
military conflict in Karabakh is worrisome for representatives of the Armenian
and Azerbaijani diasporas in Russia, but not for ordinary Russians. “In
addition, people understand quite well that the leaders of neighboring
countries only turn to Russia for financial support, and nothing more,” he said
(Author’s interview, September 29).
Elena Galkina, a political analyst and
doctor of historical sciences, agrees. “Imperial propaganda is accompanied by
another devaluation of the ruble and, accordingly, a rise in prices, which
today worries Russians much more than foreign policy influence. As for Belarus,
ordinary Russians will rather regret that Belarusian sausage and milk will
disappear in stores, which will certainly happen if Belarus is absorbed by
Russia,” the expert suggests (Author’s interview, September 29).
These analysts’ conclusions are supported
by sociological data. Based on the results of an August poll, the deputy
director of the Levada Center, Denis Volkov, noted that although the majority
of Russians support the further development of economic cooperation between
Moscow and Minsk, the desire to “annex Belarus” and “include it in Russia” is
marginal—only a small number of elderly respondents express support for such
unification (Forbes.ru, September 6).
The continuing decline in economic
well-being also does not contribute to the readiness of Russians to make new
sacrifices for the sake of the “greatness of the empire.” According to the
state pollster Rosstat, every fourth child in Russia lives below the poverty
line (Deutsche Welle—Russian service, August 7). Experts argue that the
government is unable to solve the problem of declining incomes; by the end of
2020, 16 percent of the working-age population may live below the poverty line
(Gazeta.ru, June 3). Such a situation does not lead to an increase in
patriotism but, on the contrary, to a feeling of dissatisfaction with life and
distrust of the authorities (see EDM, July 8).
For now at least, the Belarusian street
demonstrations against Lukashenka are incapable of inspiring Russians to
increase their own protest activities. “Russian media are sending contradictory
signals to the domestic audience, hinting that the situation [in Minsk] is
under control. Only if a successful political revolution really takes place in
Belarus, will it be able to influence Russians,” Galkina believes. “Many
[ordinary Russians] stand in solidarity with the Belarusian opposition, but
they hardly think about replicating its experience,” Inozemtsev clarified
(Author’s interview, September 29).
At
the same time, Russian sociologists note that the country’s liberal opposition
is extremely divided and does not have a clear program of economic reforms or
understanding of issues of state structure. According to Sergei Belanovsky and
Anastasia Nikolskaya, the prevailing feeling among the opposition manifests
itself in “an atmosphere of expectation of a social miracle that will
supposedly come true when the existing regime is replaced by a democratic one.”
The two experts contended that “there is a gap between the real programs of state
and economic reforms and ideas about these reforms among the democratic
opposition.” And yet the supporters of liberal reforms, despite their lack of
professional knowledge, are not ready to cooperate with “latent dissidents”
among the lower and middle-level professional officials (Riddle, September 6).
Belanovsky and Nikolskaya fear the Russian
opposition may fragment if an opportunity to democratically transform the
country suddenly presents itself. This breakup could, in turn, lead to a stream
of insoluble political conflicts that will again revive a desire within Russian
society to “return to the idea of a ‘strong hand’ that will restore order”
(Riddle, September 6). However, even in such a case, the Russian people only
appear inclined to support authoritarianism as the “lesser evil” compared to
anarchy—not as a result of imperial nostalgia and a desire to “save”
neighboring countries.
https://jamestown.org/program/can-turmoil-in-belarus-and-karabakh-inspire-a-new-patriotic-surge-in-russia/
----
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