Saudi Arabia and Russia Are Not Foes By Salman Al-Dosary: New Age Islam's Selection, 07 October 2017
New Age Islam Edit Bureau
07 October 2017
• Saudi Arabia and Russia Are Not Foes
By Salman Al-Dosary
• Turkey, Iran and Iraq: An Alliance Or Just Cooperation?
By Sinem Cengiz
• Kurdish Secession and the Mysteries of Identity
By Amir Taheri
• Threats to Kurds Made Independence Referendum Inevitable
By Huda Al-Husseini
• Las Vegas Massacre Reveals A Troublesome, Global Truth
By Iain Overton
• Why Has Qatar Chosen The Option Of Defiance?
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
• Saudi-Russian Arms Agreements Signal A Hedging Of Bets
By Dr. Naser Al-Tamimi
• A Reset in Turkey-EU Ties Requires Ankara’s Return to Democratic Reforms
By Serkan Demirtas
Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau
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Saudi Arabia and Russia Are Not Foes
By Salman al-Dosary
6 October 2017
With steady steps, Russia returned over the past decade to the Middle Eastern arena. This coincides with the development of its relations with Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, the Syrian regime, and surely Iran.
However, Moscow’s relations with Saudi Arabia were going through rocky roads after which tensions became high following different positions on the Syrian crisis.
The first thing that comes to mind when discussing the relations between the two countries is the Syrian issue. It remained a complicated point of disagreement between both countries and a barrier to the development of the bilateral relations despite several attempts.
Also read: Historic summit cements ties between Riyadh and Moscow
However, after decades of discords, June 2015 was crucial in restoring the Saudi-Russian relations during the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Russia under the directives of King Salman.
Riyadh and Moscow reached an inevitable result in their future relations that they would rather focus more on common interests available in promising fields rather than disagreeing on issues that affected them negatively.
One can say that Riyadh succeeded back then in breaking the ice in its relations with Moscow.
Prince Mohammed’s visit was reflected in the country’s success to overcome the Syrian crisis. They both realized that what brings them together is much more important than disparities.
A Decisive Development
King Salman’s current visit to Russia is a decisive development in the course of Saudi-Russian relations. The visit aims to eliminate elements that affected the relations, or as the Russian Ambassador in Saudi Arabia said that some parties are trying to target the Saudi-Russian relations through the Syrian issue.
Through King Salman’s visit to Russia, a new phase of a coalition began based on joint interests that will be reflected on the region’s stability and security which is a strategic goal both Riyadh and Moscow aim to reach.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia continues to present itself as a regional and international player that is indispensable. Saudi foreign policymakers are credited for taking into consideration long-term planning in their relations with Russia through a packet of strategic relations.
Side differences or even special relations with the West can’t hinder the success of the Saudi-Russian partnership. Saudis are also credited for adopting a balanced foreign policy based on diverse options through openness to Russia as well as other international forces.
Saudi policy aims to diversify its activity with different partners which grant it the ability to manage the international relations on common interests. Needless to say that as soon as this partnership is activated economically, commercially, and militarily Moscow will have to balance its complicated relationship with Iran.
Kremlin’s maze
Architects of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy are aware of this aspect especially after Tehran took advantage that Riyadh steered clear of Kremlin’s maze.
Indeed, Riyadh disagrees with Moscow on the Syrian issue. But, at the time it is adopting a realistic policy aimed at establishing partners and not allies on the basis of exchanged interests, Saudi Arabia realizes that there is a lot to be achieved from strong relations with Russia.
With 60 percent of Russia’s budget revenues from oil imports, the kingdom is aware that Moscow prioritizes a sort of coordination and agreement with Riyadh on oil prices and production.
For the first time, the two countries succeeded in leading the international oil market out of the most critical crisis. They managed to leave the bottleneck and reach a price close to $60 after it fell below $28 two years ago.
During an energy forum in Moscow attended by several OPEC oil ministers, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday: “Everyone is interested in a stable market. What we did with OPEC, I believe, is beneficial for all the global economy.”
Saudi Arabia and Russia appeared as though they were enemies separated by miles apart. Several attempts to reproach the two countries failed until facts and realities proved that the two states are not like that at all.
King Salman’s visit to Russia is a historic moment that will drive both countries closer and the relations will enter a new phase of further understanding and deeper cooperation.
Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/10/06/Saudi-Arabia-and-Russia-are-not-foes.html
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Turkey, Iran and Iraq: An Alliance or Just Cooperation?
By Sinem Cengiz
6 October 2017
In 1937, in order to promote regional peace and security, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan signed a non-aggression agreement known as the Saadabad Pact. It lasted only five years, but as Turkey, Iran and Iraq have formed a united front against Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence vote, some have started to refer to a “new Saadabad Pact.”
On Wednesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid an official visit to Tehran, where he was welcomed by his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani with an official ceremony at Saadabad Palace, where the pact was signed.
Erdogan also met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who is more powerful than Rouhani, and has constitutional authority and substantial influence over the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, as well as the military and media. Khamenei is the commander-in-chief of all Iran’s armed forces. His meeting with Erdogan lasted more than an hour.
Turkey’s Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar visited Iran last Sunday to prepare the ground for Erdogan’s visit, and to hold talks with top Iranian officials and commanders on developments in Iraq and Syria.
Akar’s visit was a reciprocation of one by his Iranian counterpart Gen. Mohammad Baqeri. In August, for the first time since Iran’s 1979 revolution, an Iranian army chief visited a NATO member country. Baqeri’s visit was also significant given the state of relations between the two neighbours.
Baqeri said Turkey and Iran will collaborate in matters of military training and border security, and will take part in each other’s war games. Both countries have also deployed additional troops to their border with Iraqi Kurdistan, and have invited Iraqi forces to join in training drills.
This series of visits by military and political leaders indicates a growing impulse to take joint action in some areas of Syria and Iraq. The main driving forces behind these visits are the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan and the “de-escalation zones” to end the conflict in Syria. The atmosphere at the talks was a far cry from Erdogan’s previous meetings with Iranian officials.
At a joint news conference with his Turkish counterpart, Rouhani said any changes to the borders of Iraq and Syria were unacceptable. “Turkey, Iran and Iraq have no choice but to take serious and necessary measures to protect their strategic goals in the region,” said Rouhani. Erdogan warned of further “decisive steps” that Ankara, Tehran and Baghdad might take if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) ignores them.
Despite opposing policies and divergent agendas regarding Syria and other areas in the Middle East, the Kurdish referendum and fears of Iraq fragmenting have united historical rivals Tehran and Ankara.
But there are questions over how long the partnership, which also includes Baghdad, will survive. Given their foreign policy records and stances toward regional crises, it is hard to call the current cooperation an alliance. This cooperation is fuelled by shared concerns against a particular party, so it will not turn into a new Saadabad Pact.
It seems the fate of the oil-rich Iraqi province of Kirkuk will dominate the agenda in the coming days. Both Iran and Turkey had said Kirkuk’s participation in the Kurdish referendum was provocative and unacceptable.
The province has the potential to bring Iran, Iraq and Turkey closer together against the KRG, but it also risks escalating the crisis. The coming days will show how the decisions taken in the recent Turkish-Iranian meetings will be implemented. The durability of the cooperation between Ankara, Tehran and Baghdad depends on how the crisis plays out.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173581
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Kurdish Secession and the Mysteries of Identity
By Amir Taheri
6 October 2017
An old Arab adage asserts that there is always something good in whatever happens. The secession referendum held in the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq is no exception. Yes, it has added to tension in the region, awakened many old demons and diverted attention from more urgent problems, but at the same time it has also provided an opportunity to examine and debate some important issues in a cold and clinical manner, as opposed to the inflammatory style in vogue in our neck of the woods.
One such issue concerns the relationship between ethnicity and nationality.
It is important because the Middle East — which is, and has always been, a mosaic of ethnicities — has arrived at the point of nation-statehood, a la Europe, through a historic shortcut that bypasses the ethnic conundrum.
In Europe, the birthplace of the modern nation-state, the concept of citizenship provided a synthesis between ethnicity and nationality. All European states are multiethnic entities, yet few of them experience ethnic tension the way it affects the emerging nation-states of our region.
The assumption on the part of Iraq’s Kurdish secessionists is that statehood should coincide with ethnicity. However, if that were the case almost all Middle Eastern states would have to be divided and subdivided, by one account, to create at least 18 more states. Kurdish secessionists dismiss that account with the argument that most ethnic groups in the region are too small to merit statehood. In other words, size becomes a justification for secession.
They also claim that Kurds represent the largest ethnic group without its own state. That, of course, is not true: In the Indian subcontinent, the Dravidians, numbering over 300 million, do not have a state of their own. The same is true of the Punjabis, some 100 million of them, who are divided between India and Pakistan with reference to religious differences into Muslim, Hindu and Sikh sub-groups.
In Africa, the Haussa and the Ibo — who number 40 and 35 million respectively — do not have a state of their own. In China, the Uighurs (22 million) and the Manchus (12 million), as well as 4 million Tibetans, of course, have had their states wiped out by the Han majority.
There are more Pathans in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, more Irish in the UK than the Republic of Ireland, and more Hungarians outside Hungary than inside it.
The second argument is that since Iraq is an “artificial country” created by Sykes-Picot, there is no reason why anyone should not walk out of it. To start with, despite fashionable buzz, the so-called Sykes-Picot “plot” has nothing to do with the current shape of the Middle East.
Sykes-Picot was a draft treaty by Britain, France, Russia and Italy to carve out the Middle Eastern possessions of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. However, the draft never received final ratification by the four countries involved.
Before the war ended the Tsarist Empire collapsed and the new Bolshevik regime published the text of the draft as part of its propaganda against “Imperialist powers.”
The draft envisaged giving large chunks of Anatolia to Russia, an ally of Britain, France and Italy. But when the Bolsheviks seized power Russia became an enemy; there was no reason to give it anything.
As for Italy, it had performed so miserably in the war that Britain and France decided it merited nothing but crumbs of the cake, in the shape of a presence in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. With Sykes-Picot rendered inoperable, Britain and France made new deals later reflected in several treaties notably of Lausanne and Montreux.
In any case, to say Iraq is “artificial” is meaningless. All states are artificial. None has fallen from the heavens fully shaped. It took the US almost 200 years to assume its present shape, by admitting Hawaii, annexed in 1898, as its 50th state in 1959.
A century ago there were 32 nation-states in the world; today there are 198, the majority of which are newer, and more “artificial,” than Iraq.
In some cases, ethic identities are either fabricated or exaggerated in pursuit of political power. For example, the Castilians and the Catalans share the same Christian faith, speak variations of the same Latinesque language, and are hardly distinguishable from one another by outsiders. Yet, we have a Catalan secessionist movement in Spain. The reason is that Catalonia has always been a support base for leftist movements in the Iberian Peninsula while the rest of Spain, especially Castile and Galicia, has been conservative.
Ironically, the more multi-ethnic a state, the more successful it has proved in history. The Sumerian state was “pure” in ethnic terms but vanished without trace. The Roman Empire, open to all ethnicities up to the position of the emperor, lasted over 1,000 years, and perished when it tried to impose uniformity through its new official religion: Christianity.
Countries where citizenship is not based on ethnicity or religion offer inhabitants freedoms unavailable elsewhere. In a small street in Paris, Rue des Petites Ecurries, shops and cafes belonging to all sorts of Islamic sects, Jews and Christians exist side by side without anyone cutting anyone’s throat — at least not yet; something unthinkable in “pure” places such as a Daesh or Taliban “emirate.”
There is nothing easier to invent than “traditions” upon which to construct ethnic identities. To fabricate a new identity, Ataturk adopted the Latin script, purged the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian vocabulary, and used French words instead. Now, however, we see the old Ottoman ghost coming back to reassert itself.
Some Kurds tried a similar scheme by including the vowels in Arabic script and, imitating Ataturk, purging many Arabic and Persian words. The result is that their new-speak appears more Kurdish but is harder to understand, especially when it comes to classical texts of their literature.
There is much talk of identity these days. But human identity is protean, subject to the tangential twists and turns of individual and collective life.
For example, Masoud Barzani’s identity is not exactly the same as the Peshmerga who drives his bullet-proof Mercedes. Barzani was born in Mahabad, Iran, as an Iranian subject, but he spent the first 12 years of his life in the Soviet Union. He then spent a decade in Iraq before being forced out by the Baathist terror machine, finding refuge first in Iran and then in the US. None of this makes him any less Iraqi or any less Kurdish — if only because the two are not incompatible but complimentary in his case.
An Iraqi citizen is easy to define and recognize because citizenship is a politico-judicial status that can be tested and ascertained. When it comes to ethnic and/or religious identities, however, we are often in terra incognita.
Two things are certain about any one of us: Our humanity and our citizenship. Everything else is subject to speculation and convoluted definitions.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173576
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Threats To Kurds Made Independence Referendum Inevitable
By Huda al-Husseini
6 October 2017
An American official asked President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani why they held the referendum now and why they rejected all demands to postpone it.
Barzani told his American guest that Baghdad’s government began to receive heavy and advanced weapons from the US, including military jets, which means that in few years, the balance will be in favor of the Iraqi army. Barzani also told the American official what worries him and said he expects “the Shiites, supported by Iran, to win and the Shiites to be defeated.”
He said: “The (Sunnis’) cities like Anbar and Mosul are all destroyed, ISIS was defeated and the Shiite ‘Popular Mobilization’ has emerged. By doing a small calculation, we can see that no one will stay in the face of the Iraqi government and (the Popular Mobilization). With an armed army, the spikes will be directed against us to eliminate us. This is why we should be ahead of time and call for an independence referendum.”
This American official told me that Barzani refused Iraqi commitments and promises as he does not trust Baghdad.
American guarantees came a night before the referendum as they asked the Kurds and the Iraqis to sit for unconditional negotiations to address the matters which concern them both, including the independence. The Americans proposed to sign a pledge to commit to this proposal and to the negotiations’ results.
Meanwhile, Iraq Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi said he will respect the Kurds’ desire.
When Barzani heard about the proposal, he said it came in late, especially that it included postponing the referendum.
Barzani told his guest: “I mobilized the entire Kurdish street. They look forward to this referendum and view it as their life and future. I cannot tell them it’s postponed and if I do, I have to find an island to resort to because I will lose my people’s trust.”
Following all the efforts he made, Barzani was not willing to lose what he achieved. He governed for a long time and other parties began to escalate, oppose and defect. He wanted to play a historical role as a bigger leader so he called for an independence referendum. All parties, including the opposing ones, met the call and Barzani restored his leading role.
Kurds have heard nothing but threats from neighbouring countries ever since the referendum was held. All these threats aim to please Baghdad’s government but who can punish an entire region with 5 million people?
Role of Saudi Arabia
This is where the role of Saudi Arabia which has good ties with Baghdad, Abadi and the Kurdistan region comes. Saudi Arabia is the only country capable of inviting both Abadi and Barzani to negotiate under its supervision.
It’s said that Abadi has become accepting of the idea of a confederal Iraq. This must be encouraged because this system grants Arab Sunnis land, rights and existence in the Arabic Iraq and it decreases Iranian influence.
In a confederal Iraq, Kurds’ lands will neighbour Sunnis’ lands and they will form a linked entity that’s parallel to Shiite lands. This extended land can pave way to distribute oil from North Iraq through Sunni lands and to Jordan and it can split the Iranian “extension” from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon through Hezbollah.
Regional central governments have rejected the Kurdistan referendum but Kurds in the region see it as the first sign of the domino effects on Kurdish separatist movements in the four countries where there are Kurdish presence.
The Kurds in Iraq voted for a free Kurdistan. Kurds in Syria are implementing a plan to establish a Kurdish parliamentarian regime in Syria, and they’re doing so with America’s support. Turkey views these Kurds as terrorists. The concerned governments think the matter of deciding the Kurds’ fate and independence is not just about unity of land but it also paves way to more wars in the region where civil, ethnic and sectarian battles have been raging for years.
Criticism Of The Timing
The US and Europe did not criticize the referendum itself but they criticized its timing. Meanwhile, Israel supported it and some interpreted this as a sign of a “hidden American agenda” that aims to sow more divisions and weaken any opposition to American interests.
Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was disgruntled the most regarding this as he believes that everything outside the context of his opinions falls within the context of American, Saudi and Israeli directions against Iran. Last Saturday, he warned of an ‘Israeli-Palestinian peace’ that’s being looked into and warned the Palestinians agianst accepting it because any Palestinian reconciliation and any peace with Israel aims to target Iran and the axis of the Resistance.
Turkey, Iran and Iraq threatened to take military action against the Kurdish Region. Rapprochement among the three countries is shallow and any possible individual or collective military act can lead to serious consequences. The biggest threat is that any military action by these countries will force the Peshmerga forces to shift their attention from fighting ISIS to fighting the new aggressor. This will give ISIS fighters a chance to gather again and neither the US nor Russia want this to happen.
Weak Government in Baghdad
Despite its strict rhetoric, Baghdad’s government is weak and its record in terms of operations against ISIS is weak. The same applies to how it resolved ethnic divisions inside Iraq. Without foreign (Iranian) support, Baghdad’s government will not be able to stand in the Peshmerga’s face.
Meanwhile, the Russians have mutual interests with the Kurds in Iraq as the Kirkuk oil fields are under their control. In this case, it is probable that Damascus will keep the Kurds happy in Syria. Let’s keep in mind that last year Russia invested more than $4 billion in the energy sector in Iraq’s Kurdistan, thus surpassing the US as the biggest investor.
As for Turkey, it has been allied with Barzani for a long time now. Barzani opposes the Kurdistan Workers’ Party while Turkey is the biggest economic supporter of Kurdistan. There are 1,730 Turkish companies in there. A Turkish company built the Erbil airport – which until the recent crisis, no plane landed in without a permission from Baghdad. If we review Erdogan’s moves since the crisis erupted, we can see that they did not reflect his fiery statements. His statements were full of rage but his actions have been calculated.
Meanwhile, Iran closed its airspace and advised Baghdad to deploy Iraqi troops on the borders between it and Kurdistan.
Erdogan may increase tariffs on Kurds to transfer their oil via Turkish territories and he may threaten to pay the oil revenues to Baghdad’s government. He will not execute any military operation in order not to jeopardize Russia’s and Turkish businessmen’s interests.
A Turkish source said Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed with Erdogan the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. The Russian Rosneft company wants to keep the pipeline open.
Meanwhile, Moscow thinks the revenues of the Kurdistan region’s government are a return on its investments and without the pipeline and open borders or payments from Baghdad to Erbil, the Kurdistan government will collapse thus seriously jeopardizing the Russian project.
Iran’s Backyard
Iran may act against Barzani through Baghdad and the Shiite militias it controls. However, in this particular case, support will come from America and Israel, a point which Hassan Nasrallah addressed. Other countries will not hesitate to provide support and play in Iran’s backyard.
Kurdistan’s problem which Barzani led up to put the four countries in a very difficult corner. If they act against the Kurds, they’d be risking a huge war that goes beyond proxy wars, and if they do not do anything, they’d be giving the Kurds in Iraq a chance to declare their freedom and their brothers in Turkey, Iran and Syria will follow suit. The end result of this path will be very bloody.
Those who think the US is losing its influence in the region are wrong. Proxy wars via militias and that have prolonged for the purpose of dominating the Middle East will finally return “home” to Iran and Turkey.
Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/10/06/Threats-to-Kurds-made-independence-referendum-inevitable.html
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Las Vegas Massacre Reveals A Troublesome, Global Truth
By Iain Overton
6 October 2017
Within the deluge of news in the wake of the Las Vegas shooting, one fact seems to have been lost: that America's bloodiest gun massacre in modern history - with at least 59 killed and over 500 injured - happened in the same city as the world's largest gun trade exhibition - the SHOT show.
Of course, some would say this is just a coincidence.
But then you find out the organisers of that trade fair are the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF). And the NSSF's headquarters are in Newtown - the place where, in 2012, Adam Lanza murdered 28 people, including 20 children between six and seven years old at Sandy Hook's Elementary School.
And some say this is just a coincidence.
Then you read that the world's most armed nation - the US, with about 300 million guns in the hands of private citizens - has, of all developed countries, the most gun homicides per capita. According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in fact, over one and half million Americans were killed or injured by guns between 2001 and 2015.
That's seen as coincidental, too. People deny the correlation: that more guns don't equate to more gun deaths. But, as these facts reveal themselves, you begin to wonder if there is something approaching cause and effect at play.
Let's take the Vegas "coincidence", for example.
The SHOT show is a celebration of both the firearm and of capitalism. With about 65,000 attendees and 630,000 square feet of exhibition space, the visitor is confronted with row upon row of carbines and silencers, semi-automatics and revolvers. The mountain of guns for sale at the SHOT show reflects a country where there are few, if any, regulations governing the ownership of guns, and where guns are noted for their ubiquity.
If, for instance, China, Germany, and India were taken out of the equation, America would have more privately owned firearms than the rest of the world put together. A reality brought home with the knowledge that Stephen Paddock- the Vegas murderer - had at least 42 guns in his possession.
Of course, this does not prove cause and effect. There have been massacres all over America, and Paddock did not choose to murder people in Vegas because the SHOT show was there. But the profits made from that trade show, and the gun industry in general, enabled Paddock to carry out his murderous crimes.
Between 2004 and 2014, the domestic US production of guns increased by 192 percent (from 3,099,025 to 9,050,626), while the import volume of foreign guns rose by 90 percent (1,910,859 to 3,625,268). According to research from IBISWorld, American gun stores saw $8.6bn in revenue in 2016. And such sales have led to substantial profits.
These profits have been ploughed back into lobbyists and marketeers, selling the lie that more guns make people safer. The National Rifle Association, for instance, poured $36.3m into the 2016 US election campaign, breaking its own record of $31.7m from just two years before (according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics).
Such money talks. It leads to US Senators voting not to close loopholes that allow people to buy firearms without a background check from gun shows or online. All but three of the 45 senators who torpedoed gun control measures in Congress in 2013 had accepted donations from gun lobbyists.
So, for people to say that there is no connection, whatsoever, between a highly profitable gun show and a highly murderous gun shooting is simplistic. It fails to acknowledge that the legal conditions that let a "demented" man like Paddock (to use President Trump's description) to stockpile so many guns, were ones created by political lobbying and funding. America is the only place in the world where, following a gun massacre, they have loosened, not tightened their gun laws.
The American response to this observation - coming as it is from a Brit - is often: well, it's our country, if you don't like it, get lost. But the US love affair with the Second Amendment right to bear arms is not just an American issue: it affects the whole world.
The ease with which guns can be purchased in the US, for instance, has deep consequences. It is estimated over 250,000 guns are smuggled into Mexico and Central America every year. To the north, Canada estimates that 50 percent of the guns used in crime in Ottawa were smuggled across the border. These illicit guns have consequences. In 2015, El Salvador had over 6,650 murders, a rate of about 104 homicides per 100,000. Most were committed with guns - and about 49 percent of the firearms traced in El Salvador that year came from the US. So, yes, America's guns kill more than just Americans.
America's love affair with the gun also translates into foreign policy. So in love, indeed, that the US government believes they can export democracy down the barrel of a gun. Over 1.45 million guns were given by the US government to armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2015, of which 285,981 were AK-47s. The Pentagon acknowledges it has lost track of many of them. At least 190,000 rifles and pistols given to Iraqi security forces have gone missing, and 43 percent of the 747,000 weapons sent to the Afghan National Army cannot be accounted for.
Without question, some of these US government-funded arms have ended up in the hands of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) militants. And ammunition magazines identical to those given to Afghan government forces by the US military have been found on dead Taliban fighters.
This is not all. The Second Amendment, and the funded lobby that supports it, has also inhibited effective global gun control treaties. The multilateral Arms Trade Treaty, for example, would have prohibited the US from transferring arms to states that might use them in genocide or crimes against humanity. But Congress refused to ratify the United Nations treaty, in large part because the National Rifle Association claimed it would curtail American citizens' right to bear arms - something Amnesty International insisted wasn't true. The world's biggest arms trade treaty has, then, not been ratified by the world's biggest firearm producer - a troublesome truth.
The US also stands accused of watering down other UN treaties. Then-Ambassador to the UN John Bolton ensured the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons made no mention of the civilian possession of arms nor the need for laws to control them in the final document. Bolton now chairs the National Rifle Association's International Affairs Subcommittee.
All of this is why we should see significance in the fact both the world's largest gun show and America's worst gun massacre happen in Las Vegas. The profits from one bleed into the political environment that makes the second more likely. And it is not just a massacre in Vegas. It is a femicide in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. A gangland killing in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. A gun battle in Raqqa, Syria.
Ultimately, this is what we must learn from Las Vegas: that the American right to bear arms can affect us all. That's not a coincidence - that's a fact.
Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/las-vegas-massacre-reveals-troublesome-global-truth-171006054512920.html
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Why Has Qatar Chosen The Option Of Defiance?
By Abdulrahman al-Rashed
6 October 2017
Qatar has adopted one concept for its approach while responding to the four Arab countries that have decided to boycott it: do whatever it can to fail their plan and force them to reconcile with it.
It redirected itself towards Iran and restored relations with Hezbollah. It’s funding Houthi militias in Yemen and hostile Islamic extremist groups that oppose the boycotting countries. It also supports the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) and wants to criminalize Saudi Arabia by accusing it of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
It is pushing international organizations to hold Saudi Arabia accountable at the UN Security Council and the American Congress for its military activity in Yemen – keep in mind that Qatar itself was part of the coalition in Yemen. Doha is also paying huge amounts of money to anyone who speaks out against the anti-terror quartet.
Some may ask: Why do we denounce Qatar for doing so when it is defending itself and when the quartet actually started the crisis by boycotting it? It is true that we denounce what Doha is doing but we are not at all surprised as this is how it secretly operated earlier. Doha, however, is now openly targeting these countries, and it has also escalated their activity against them.
Hostility and confrontation which Doha has opted for is not the only option as there was also the option to accept reality and co-exist with it. Qatar and the anti-terror quartet – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates – had three options to choose from since the crisis erupted between them.
The Three Options
The first option is to accept conditions and rearrange relations based on guaranteed interests. The problem will thus end and we would all live through a stable phase based on mutual respect and not interfering in each other’s affairs. The second option, which Qatar could have chosen, was to boycott others, like the anti-terror quartet did, and just manage its affairs without them.
The third and most difficult option, and which Qatar has chosen, is to declare enmity and launch a war by confronting the four countries via international organizations and governments, building alliances, sealing military deals, funding the four countries’ rivals and inciting against them through every available platform.
Doha’s behaviour is not surprising. This is what it has been doing for 20 years and it still is. Qatar thinks it can impose its views on other countries regardless of their orientation and capabilities. Qatar has also paid huge sums of money to see this through. However, isn’t its concern justified? Can Qatar’s command really go to bed every night and rest assured that no one will climb Doha’s walls and take over power?
What Qatar is actually doing is provocation and antagonism. Its hostile activity against these four countries may force them to climb the walls on one dark night or support those with ambitions, and they are many. The other truth is that no one wants to impose change by force, unlike what the Qatar regime is alleging.
This is due to several reasons, as for example changing regimes and arranging coups gains the countries behind them a bad reputation. Besides, if the quartet really wanted to stage a coup or an invasion, it would not have boycotted it and put Qatar security forces on alert 24/7. Those angry at Qatar could have simply not sparked a battle and then simply seized Doha in the dark within two hours.
The royal family, which used to conspire during tea sessions to topple regimes in the region and intimidate governments, including the quartet’s, is terrified, like we’ve never seen it before. This fear of a “justified” revenge pushed it to scream out and appeal for help from every state, especially that now it’s been distanced and belittled. It has been spending hefty amounts of money, like nothing we have ever seen before. The result, however, will be as I have written before; it will submit and sign, maybe behind closed doors.
I think Qatar could have tried to live in isolation without Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain. It could have been best friends with 200 other countries, instead of being reckless and attacking the quartet everywhere. This behaviour will eventually lead to bankruptcy and make others lose respect toward it. It may even provoke its rivals to do far more.
Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/10/06/Why-has-Qatar-chosen-defiance-.html
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Saudi-Russian Arms Agreements Signal A Hedging Of Bets
By Dr. Naser Al-Tamimi
7 October 2017
King Salman’s current visit to Moscow — the first such trip by a sitting Saudi monarch — marks a turning point in relations between the two countries.
The king’s agenda in his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin was full of important issues, ranging from stabilizing international oil markets to a political settlement in Syria. The most significant development was however the signing the arms agreements.
Indeed, after about a decade of negotiation, there is finally a breakthrough in military relations between Moscow and Riyadh.
Russia is the world’s second-largest arms supplier after the US, and is seeking to cement its position in new markets. From 2012 to 2016, Russia was responsible for almost a quarter of global arms exports, second to America’s 33 percent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s vast defence budget in 2016 made it by far the largest military spender in the Middle East and the fourth largest in the world, according to SIPRI.
Until now, the US has been the major supplier of weapons to Saudi Arabia and stands to reap additional deals worth tens of billions of dollars following President Donald Trump’s visit to the Kingdom in May.
Russia and Saudi Arabia signed an “agreement for military and technological cooperation” in 2008, but since then Moscow has been trying to penetrate Saudi Arabia’s arms market without any success.
But Russian defence companies are intensifying their efforts to capture business from the Saudis, while the Kingdom is pushing to diversify its sources of arms suppliers. Indeed, localizing over 50 percent of its defence spending is one of the main objectives of Saudi Vision 2030.
Russia’s entry into the Saudi arms market would be a major diplomatic breakthrough for Moscow. It would also give Russian weapons a huge international publicity boost.
Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding to buy S-400 air defence systems from Russia. The two countries also signed a preliminary agreement to help the Kingdom in its efforts to develop its own military industries, according to a statement from state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI).
SAMI said that the procurement was “based on the assurance of the Russian party to transfer the technology and localize the manufacturing and sustainment of these armament systems in the Kingdom.”
Even if a weapons deal does take place between Moscow and Riyadh, though, Russia is unlikely to replace the US as the Kingdom’s main arms supplier any time soon. America will continue to dominate for the foreseeable future.
Yet Russia — and China — may be able to supply the Kingdom with weapons that the US refuses to sell, such as long-range missiles, unmanned planes, and satellite and nuclear technology.
Indeed, various reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has shown an active interest in the Russian planes used in Syria, including Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters, and Su-34 fighter-bombers.
Washington has refused to supply the F-35 — its own fifth-generation aircraft — to any Arab country, in order to maintain Israel’s “qualitative edge.” Saudi Arabia might therefore regard the Russian planes as a bargaining chip in negotiations with America.
Saudi Arabia has previously expressed interest in ballistic missiles from Russia, particularly the Iskander system. But there is also a possibility that Russian companies could help the Kingdom develop its own ballistic missile capability.
Yet Saudi-Russian military relations are still clouded by numerous complexities, and it remains unclear whether the preliminary agreements signed on Thursday will result in concrete deals. What is certain is that these relations are on the verge of positive developments.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173726
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A Reset in Turkey-EU Ties Requires Ankara’s Return to Democratic Reforms
By Serkan Demirtas
October 07 2017
An overall assessment on the current state of Turkish foreign policy would highlight three main challenges facing Turkey’s security, economic and political interests. All three have, at one point, been linked to each other.
Top of the list are obviously security threats posed by both Iraq and Syria, with the risk of disintegration of both neighboring countries. The fact that both Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have never been so close to independent rule is being regarded as a national security matter by Ankara and is pushing the government to take some excessive measures. A tactical alliance with Iran and verbal threats of potential military action into both Iraq and Syria can be seen within this context. In both cases, the support Turkey receives from its traditional Western allies is far from being sufficient. On the contrary, Turkey accuses them of plotting against it by - directly or indirectly - pushing Iraqi and Syrian Kurds to chase after their political objectives.
The second challenge is about the deteriorating relationship between Turkey and the United States. The strategic dimension of the Turkey-U.S. alliance seems to no longer be sufficient to keep a meaningful and healthy dialogue based on mutual interests. On Iraq and Syria, Turkey has chosen to collaborate with Russia and Iran at the expense of abandoning its long-term priority of toppling Bashar al-Assad because of Washington’s insistence on continuing its cooperation with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
The U.S.’s inaction on Turkey’s demand for Fethullah Gülen’s extradition, the arrest of two Halkbank senior officials, and the arrest warrant issued for former Economy Minister Zafer Çaglayan are regarded as almost hostile acts in Ankara. Likewise, the arrest of an American pastor, a human rights activist and - most recently - a Turkish citizen working at the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, are all seen as revanchist moves in Washington. There are no signs this trend will be reversed soon.
The third problem is Turkey’s problematic relationship with the European Union. The hope that both sides would clean the slate after Turkey’s referendum in April and Germany’s election in September have apparently been disappointed, as it has been proven that the problem is much more structural.
On one side of the coin are the growing populism and xenophobic trends across Europe, which often associate with Turkey-skeptic rhetoric at the hands of narrow-minded and irresponsible politicians. Their impact on further worsening ties between Turkey and Europe is indisputable. On the other side of the coin, however, is the fact that Turkey abandoned its reformist identity long ago, at the cost of brewing undemocratic trends and human rights violations.
In a televised interview on Oct. 3, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoglu, upon a question about the tarnished image of Turkey, admitted the criticisms to this end in the world but underlined that “Turkey can reverse it through its reformist identity.” Çavusoglu refers to the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) reforms in its early years in the power that allowed the beginning of accession talks with the EU.
The best answer to populist, far right, outdated European politicians would be Turkey’s resumption of a new reform process to let democracy, human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms prevail in this country. This may not immediately remove already existing Turkey-skepticism and prejudices on Turkey in Europe but would allow strengthening societal unity and decrease political polarization. The lifting of the state of emergency, the release of journalists, academics and politicians would be an influential start to this end.
On all these challenges, it would be both rational and relatively easy to begin by fixing ties with the EU, because the government has all the means to hit the road apart from the willingness. A reset of Turkey-EU ties could be possible if and only if the government displays a genuine willingness to readopt democratic reforms.
Source: .hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/serkan-demirtas/a-reset-in-turkey-eu-ties-requires-ankaras-return-to-democratic-reforms-120488
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/middle-east-press/saudi-arabia-russia-foes-salman/d/112793