Hariri Needs Protection from Hezbollah, Not Saudi Arabia By Faisal J. Abbas: New Age Islam's Selection, 14 November 2017
New Age Islam Edit Bureau
14 November 2017
• Hariri Needs Protection from Hezbollah, Not Saudi Arabia
By Faisal J. Abbas
• The Trials of Netanyahu and Israel’s Layered Corruption
By Ramzy Baroud
• Will Mohammed Bin Salman Be Arabia's Vladimir Putin?
By Yury Barmin
• Lebanon’s Choice: Havana or Honolulu?
By Dr. Khaled M. Batarfi
• Lebanon in the Eye of the Storm
By Mohammed Al Shaikh
• A New Page in Turkish-Iraqi Relations
By Yasar Yakis
• Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Onus of Preserving Relationship
By Hussein Shobokshi
• Tweets Alone Will Not Work On Iran, US Needs To Take Action
By Dennis Ross
Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau
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Hariri Needs Protection from Hezbollah, Not Saudi Arabia
By Faisal J. Abbas
14 November 2017
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri emerged as an honest, caring and true statesman in his recent television interview, in which he dismissed rumours about his resignation and his stay in Saudi Arabia.
Yes, he did seem concerned and rather alarmed, but this is not because he is worried about himself, but rather about his country; and, as has emerged, he has every right to be.
The interview itself was solid, even though it was broadcast on Hariri’s own channel, Future Television. The interviewer, TV host Paula Yacoubian, did not hold back, and asked every daring question imaginable — including whether Hariri had been forced to resign, and if he was being held in Riyadh against his will.
Now, whether or not Hariri spoke the truth on all counts is a separate issue, and will always be debatable. Of course, while he would certainly not be the first politician to lie in public, one has to take what he said at face value, particularly given that it made a lot of political sense.
The most important takeaway from the interview was that Saudi Arabia is outraged at Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen. As Hariri correctly implied, Riyadh may never have liked this Iranian-backed militia before, but there is a big difference now — which is that “Saudis are dying” as a result of the war in Yemen.
As prime minister of a government that includes Hezbollah, Hariri could be held directly responsible for its hostile actions. And given that Hariri — whose late father, Rafik, was probably assassinated by Hezbollah — neither agrees with attacks on a fellow Arab country and major ally such as Saudi Arabia, nor accepts responsibility for the consequences; then it must be argued that it was Hezbollah, not Riyadh, that forced him to step down.
Here it must be pointed out to the highly imaginative warmongers in our midst that the military option against Lebanon is highly unlikely. Even if we were to entertain this idea for a moment, we should remember that Saudi Arabia does not share a border with Lebanon. This means that any airstrikes to take out Hezbollah targets would require coordination with the Jordanians and the Assad regime, with which Riyadh is at war over the massacre of its own people.
Another fictional scenario is the equally wildly imaginative option of outsourcing the task to Israel, with which Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic ties.
Even if, hypothetically, we believed this to be true, why would Israel bother? As much as Benjamin Netanyahu dislikes the Iranians and their militias, Israel is well protected by its Iron Dome, and its northern borders have been quiet for years now.
Furthermore, airstrikes were tried before, and it is an established fact that they are ineffective against militias who seek protection underground.
It could be argued that perhaps sanctions or a boycott against Lebanon might have been on the table, and that Hariri — knowing only too well how these would hurt Lebanon’s already fragile economy — decided to resign as a way of buying some time to negotiate a way out for his country.
This is going to prove difficult for him. Hezbollah is officially accused of killing his father, and has taken over Beirut by force when challenged in the past.
This is why, rather than speculating and subscribing to the unlikely suggestion that Saudi Arabia is holding Saad Hariri hostage, the international community should be more concerned with guaranteeing his protection when he eventually returns to Lebanon and confronts his government with the incriminating evidence against Hezbollah.
Source: .arabnews.com/node/1193001
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The Trials of Netanyahu and Israel’s Layered Corruption
By Ramzy Baroud
14 November 2017
Whether or not the corruption scandals hounding Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lead to his sacking matters little. Though nearly half of Israelis polled in July — well before the scandals took a much dirtier turn — believe that he is corrupt, a majority said they would still vote for him.
A recent survey conducted by Israel’s Channel 10 TV concluded that if general elections were held today, Netanyahu would garner 28 percent while his closest contenders, Avi Gabbay of the Zionist Camp and Yair Lapid of Yesh Atid, would each gather 11 percent of the vote.
“The next stage, which is drawing near, is for the citizens of Israel to re-elect a criminal as their leader and entrust their fate to him,” leading Israeli columnist Akiva Eldar wrote in response to Netanyahu’s continued popularity despite accusations of corruption and repeated police investigations. But Eldar should not be surprised. Political corruption, bribery and misuse of public funds have been the norm, not the exception, in Israeli politics.
Alex Roy puts it more succinctly in a recent piece in the Times of Israel: “The fact that (Netanyahu) still has a good chance of being the prime minister after these coming elections says more about how used to corruption we have become than how clean he is.” Roy wrote that his country “has gotten used to political criminals” simply because “each prime minister over the last quarter century has at some point faced criminal charges.”
He is right, but there are two major points that are missing in the discussion that had been, until recently, mostly confined to Israeli media. First, the nature of the suspected misconduct of Netanyahu is different from that of his predecessors. This matters greatly.
Second, Israeli society’s apparent acceptance of corrupt politicians might have less to do with the assumption that they have “gotten used” to the idea, and more with the fact that the culture as a whole has grown corrupt. And there is a reason for it.
Netanyahu’s alleged corruption is rather different from that of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was corrupt in the old-fashioned way. In 2006, Olmert was found guilty of accepting bribes while serving as mayor of Jerusalem. In 2012, he was convicted for breach of trust and bribery, this time as prime minister. In 2015, he was sentenced to six years in prison.
Other top Israeli officials were also indicted, including President Moshe Katsav, who was convicted of rape and obstruction of justice. These charges remained largely confined to a person or two, making the nature of the conspiracy quite limited. Israeli and Western media pundits used such prosecutions to make a point regarding the ‘health’ of Israel’s democracy, especially when compared with its Arab neighbours.
Things are different under Netanyahu. Corruption in Israel is becoming more like mafia operations, roping in elected civil servants, military brass, top lawyers and large conglomerates. The nature of the investigations that are closing in on Netanyahu points to this fact.
He is embroiled in File 1,000, where he and his wife accepted gifts of large financial value from renowned Hollywood producer Arnon Milchan in exchange for favours that, if confirmed, required Netanyahu to use his political influence as prime minister.
File 2,000 is the Yisrael Hayom affair. In this case, Netanyahu reached a secret deal with the publisher of the leading Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, Arnon Mozes. According to the deal, the newspaper agreed to cut down on its criticism of Netanyahu’s policies in exchange for the latter's promise to decrease the sale of rival newspaper Yisrael Hayom.
Yisrael Hayom is owned by pro-Israeli American business tycoon Sheldon Adelson, Netanyahu’s close and powerful ally until news of the Yedioth deal surfaced. Since then, Yisrael Hayom has turned against Netanyahu.
File 3,000 is the German submarines affair. Top national security advisors, all very closely aligned to Netanyahu, were involved in the purchase of German submarines that were deemed unnecessary, yet cost the government billions of dollars. Large sums of this money were syphoned by Netanyahu’s inner circle and transferred to secret, private bank accounts. This case, in particular, is significant regarding widespread corruption in Israel’s uppermost circles.
Central to this investigation are the cousins and two closest confidantes of Netanyahu: His personal lawyer David Shimron, and Israel’s de-facto Foreign Minister Isaac Molcho. The latter has managed to build an impressive but largely hidden network for Netanyahu, where the lines of foreign policy, massive government contracts and personal business dealings are largely blurred.
There is also the Bezeq affair involving Israeli telecommunication giant Bezeq and Netanyahu’s political ally and friend Shlomo Filber. Netanyahu was communication minister until he was ordered by a court to step down in 2016. According to media reports, his handpicked replacement Filber served the role of spy for the telecommunication powerhouse, to ensure critical government decisions were communicated in advance to the company.
Most intriguing about Netanyahu’s corruption is that it is not a reflection of him alone: This is layered corruption, involving a large network of Israel’s upper echelons. There is more to the Israeli public’s willingness to accept corruption than its inability to stop it.
Corruption in Israeli society has become particularly endemic since the occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. The idea that ordinary Israelis can move into a Palestinian house, evict the family and claim the house as their own with the full support of the military, government and courts exemplifies moral corruption to the highest degree.
It was only a matter of time before this massive corruption racket — military occupation, the settlement enterprise and the media whitewashing of Israeli crimes — seeped back into mainstream Israeli society, which has become rotten to the core. While Israelis might have “gotten used” to their own corruption, Palestinians have not, because the price of Israel’s moral corruption is too high for them to bear.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1192931
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Qatif’s Stability Is Not a Gambling Card
By Hassan Al Mustafa
13 November 2017
In the month of August, clashes with armed groups broke out in al-Masura neighbourhood in al-Awamiyah. Some of those on the wanted list were killed while others were detained.
Qatif has been calm since then even though it’s a cautious one. Terrorist operations have gone down and hundreds of families have been allowed to return home. Work to clean Awamiyah neighbourhoods began and governmental services began to gradually return thanks to joint efforts between state institutions and residents.
These efforts have always been ongoing even during confrontations between security forces and terrorists, and it’s all thanks to the areas’ elders, some clerics and brave men who insisted to give their best to confront the ideology of death.
In recent months, patriotic figures in Qatif communicated with authorities in the eastern region and with the security and political command in Riyadh to get the area out of the swirl of violence, which gunmen wanted to maintain. Many figures bravely spoke out against terrorism and condemned regardless of the source and sect.
Their statements were part of a bigger scene as wise and silent efforts alongside security forces’ efforts achieved the clam situation, which the region enjoyed in the past few months.
Probe Underway
Few days ago, on November 6 to be precise, a security officer was killed near the town of al-Bahari in Qatif. Investigation is underway to establish who carried out the attack and what the objective was.
This incident brought to mind similar incidents that happened earlier this year. Many are wondering why this recent attack happened and what its motives are especially that people believe that “terrorism” is a blind weapon that only leads to more bloodshed and chaos.
Stability, rejecting violence and taking part in civil work is the real key to any development. This is what citizens in Qatif believe in. People there were thus surprised by this recent terror attack, which will not find any popular or religious support there.
Like the rest of the Saudis, citizens in Qatif look at the future with great hope. They follow the changes happening in the country and aspire to be part of them.
They want to directly contribute toward achieving Vision 2030, just like their forefathers who contributed to establishing Aramco, giant petrochemical factories in the industrial city of Jubail and other projects in the eastern region and across the country.
The people of Qatif want to build their future. They want to be a model of modernity, awareness and patriotic commitment. They want to stand side-by-side with their partners in the country and to be among top ranks. Violence, which will backfire on those adopting it, will not intimidate them from pursuing this task.
Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/11/13/Qatif-s-stability-is-not-a-gambling-card.html
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Will Mohammed bin Salman be Arabia's Vladimir Putin?
By Yury Barmin
13 November 2017
If the events unfolding in Riyadh are any indication of what Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) will be like as a king, we are in for a bumpy ride for years ahead.
The shake-up of the decades-old Saudi power consensus, as well as the presumably forced resignation of Saad Hariri in Riyadh, all mean that MBS seeks recognition of his authority both domestically and internationally.
Some commentators have dubbed him "the Vladimir Putin of the Middle East" referring to his bold moves in changing the power equilibrium in the Kingdom and bringing down Saudi "oligarchs".
The Russia-Saudi rapprochement of recent months arguably became possible precisely because Russian President Vladimir Putin and MBS speak the same language. Both prefer to use hard power to resolve issues domestically and internationally and both see the world in black and white.
Since MBS was empowered by his father, King Salman, in early 2015, Saudi foreign policy has been undergoing a Russia-style transformation embracing a full-on offensive character. The Yemen war, the Qatar blockade and, finally, Saudi Arabia's alleged role in recent Lebanese developments all seem to have been borrowed out of Putin's playbook.
The Russian president is arguably the politician who brought realpolitik back into fashion, with his military campaign in Syria and a series of hybrid involvements in former Soviet republics. In the region where the power balance is increasingly changing, Saudi Arabia sees the need to stay alert and pro-active, which is why Putin's revisionist policies strongly resonate with the leadership in Riyadh.
While Putin and MBS have a similar approach to foreign policy, they have different starting points. With his leadership facing no serious challengers at home, Putin can afford a long-term strategy of carrot and stick. For Mohammed bin Salman, foreign policy is, to a large extent, dictated by the need to cement his power domestically as soon as possible.
Russian and Saudi politics are similar in that leadership cults play an enormous role in nation building. Power projection domestically and globally is a factor that determines the acceptance and legitimacy of the leader. Putin spent years carefully building his public image (to the point where his approval rating has been above 80 percent for years now), while his assertive foreign policy, whether one likes it or not, made Russia a country whose opinion cannot be dismissed. It increasingly looks that MBS is set to establish a similar footing for his rule which will likely last for decades.
There is no doubt that both Putin and MBS are products of the very power system that they have tried to rein in. Putin rose from Russia's unruly power vertical of the 1990s; he sought to take control of it throughout the 2000s, battling the unruly business oligarchy, and succeeded. Likewise, MBS has been a beneficiary of the royal consensus system of rule; his father, King Salman, took to the Saudi throne, patiently waiting for his turn.
The process of taking over a huge family-based apparatus (incidentally, Russia's oligarchic system was, at some point, also called "the family") has only just started for the Saudi crown prince, but we can already see what it has led to in Russia, years after that fight was fought. Oligarchs were either co-opted into the political system or exiled, while corruption permeated all spheres of life even deeper.
However, if MBS is using Putin's strategy as a guidebook, he is doing it all wrong. By forcibly eliminating influential family members from the power equation, the young prince is dismantling the system of consensus rule, something that has allowed Saudi Arabia to maintain a careful balance and keep the Kingdom together for decades. What MBS is, in fact, looking to do is to install a governing system based on his uncontested power, which is a page out of Putin's playbook, but, unlike the Russian president, the Saudi crown prince is ruining an equilibrium that helped the Kingdom maintain stability.
Instead of creating a class of royal elites unconditionally loyal to the monarch, MBS risks alienating those who see themselves as having the legitimate right to a chunk of the power pie in the Kingdom. The crown prince, an aspiring patriarch of sorts who no longer views other descendants of Ibn Saud as equals, is creating an enormous class of royalty that will feel disadvantaged and thus united in their rejection of the new status quo.
This rejection, however, is brewing deep inside the elites and won't show until it transforms into dissent. This explains why the MBS-led shake-up in Riyadh was indiscriminate in who it was targeting, disproportionate to the stated goals, and was probably aimed at preventing dissent from appearing rather than targeting any dissident specifically.
This marks the key difference between MBS and Putin. The Russian president has a good sense of underlying domestic power dynamics and easily reigns over them. He created a political system in which branches of "the family" are pitted against each other and he acts as a referee between them.
In this power structure, individual political clans all seek proximity to the leader and compete for Putin's attention and favour. Thus, the power players remain focused on their squabbles and would not challenge the top because once this power pyramid crumbles, it will bring down everyone, including the dissenters.
MBS is looking to establish a very different system, by essentially equally weakening all other branches of the House of Saud to maintain his power over them. This set-up, however, does not guarantee the same level of stability and perhaps will not be able to maintain the same longevity of the regime.
Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-arabia-vladimir-putin-171113072010861.html
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Lebanon’s Choice: Havana or Honolulu?
By Dr. Khaled M. Batarfi
IN international relations, at some point, some conjunction, a nation must choose which way to go. There is a limit to how much you could play others for time, hoping that you may, somehow, win them all.
Neutrality is a solution when you can’t decide. And Lebanon chose that option, but unfortunately couldn’t stick to it. A government influenced by one party which is totally owned by a foreign power, couldn’t be neutral.
On the other hand, there is also a limit to how far other nations can understand and appreciate, wait and tolerate such submission to an enemy state. Instead of getting better, it gets worse. Lebanon is being used as a base for terrorist activities and aggression against other states. Under the legal cover of a normal, democratic, functioning government, decisions are taken, deals are made and wars are launched by a Lebanese political party that is a dominant part of the legitimate government.
Still, others are required to regard such a party as both an integral component of the Lebanese government, and an independent authority conducting its own foreign policies and business, and getting away with murder.
Well, it doesn’t work that way! Are they either Lebanese or Iranian, represent their country or a foreign one, answerable to Lebanese or Iranian leadership? They cannot be Arab and Persian, government and militia, legitimate and rogue, responsible and irresponsible at the same time. This is a dilemma only Lebanese can solve. And those are choices only the government and Hezbollah can make.
As for the rest of us, we cannot afford the luxury of patience and understanding, or to “wait and see.” Since the Al-Khobar bombing in 1996 of American compounds by Hezbollah, we have had it with Iran’s promises of “no more” and “this would be the last time.” Reformists presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami managed to keep us waiting, hoping and betting on so-called “moderate” movement and leaders.
Then, came a more transparent leadership, who speaks its mind. Since President Ahmadinejad, Iran became bolder and clearer in its expansion designs and aggressive foreign policies. Maybe because the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, thought he was winning. Iran controlled Iraq, thanks to to the United States, and Syria, thanks to Russia, then Yemen, thanks to both superpowers. Lebanon was under Iranian virtual occupation and Hezbollah was running the show.
Even in African Arab nations, Iran has a say. The aging Ayatollah might have thought he could execute the Commandment of his predecessor, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It calls for controlling the Muslim world and establishing an Islamic Caliphate, including Makkah and Madinah. He probably felt that this can be done during the remaining years of his life. All or some of the above may explain all the rush, recklessness and boldness Iran exhibited in recent years.
The moment of truth has arrived for Lebanon to decide which way to go. Does it want to be a Havana or a Honolulu? as Lebanese leader, Jumblatt, once put it. Does Lebanese government wish to be the Switzerland of the Orient (like it once was), or the Qom of the Mediterranean? A respected member of the Arab family or a second-class citizen in the Persian Empire?
We would do all we could if Lebanon asks for our assistance to break away from the Iranian jail. The first call for help came from Prime Minister Saad Hariri in his resignation statement. He clearly pointed to Iran intervention in Lebanese affairs and its agent, Hezbollah’s, enforcement of Tehran's agenda with its military might. More calls for help came from Lebanese Christian statesmen, such as former President, Michael Suleiman, and party leader Samir Jaja, as well as countless Sunni and other leaders. More would come as politicians become less afraid of bogeyman, Hassan Nasrallah, and more worried about their country’s security, identity and future.
After crossing the last redline with its firing of Iranian Scud missile toward Saudi capital, Riyadh, the Arab Alliance should now present Hezbollah with an ultimatum. Either they give up their arsenal of missiles and heavy weapons, disband their private army, and becomes a normal political party, like all others did in accordance to Taif Agreement of 1989, that ended the Civil War, or else. We will no longer tolerate an internationally designated terrorist militia governing an Arab country and spreading war, conflicts and drugs in our nations. They declared war on us and they should receive one. Other Lebanese parties and leaders should pick sides now. Better choose right or take the bite! Life can’t just go on! There is a new world, new order, now, where criminals are punished, crimes are revenged, and innocents are protected. Hear that Iran and company! If not, soon you feel it, too!
Source: saudigazette.com.sa/article/521740/Opinion/OP-ED/Lebanons-choice-Havana-or-Honolulu?
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Lebanon in the Eye of the Storm
By Mohammed Al Shaikh
13 November 2017
Dealing with the snake’s head, which is the source of the poison, is better than preoccupying yourself and wasting your time trying to tackle its tail.
This is the formula which Saudi Arabia, and its American ally, seems to have decided to work upon in terms of the crisis with the Iranians in general and their coup in Yemen in particular.
It seems the ballistic missile which the Iranians ordered the Houthis to fire toward Riyadh will be the straw that breaks the Iranian camel’s back as well the back of its destructive wings, primarily Hezbollah militias, in the region. Lebanon’s official government includes members of this terrorist group. The Lebanese official decisions are controlled, directed and governed by this militia.
Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who resigned recently, tried to get parties allied with this militia to side with Lebanon’s internal and regional interests instead of serving Hezbollah that’s an agent to a foreign party. He has done that during his entire term as prime minister but his attempts just failed and he ended up resigning.
Hariri’s resignation stirred political turmoil in Lebanon and made the Lebanese people see the magnitude of the trouble which Hezbollah has put them in, especially that the repercussions began to appear after Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries and Western countries prevented their citizens from travelling to Lebanon.
This implies that serious measures will be taken by major countries, primarily by the US, toward Hezbollah, which is one of Iran’s destructive wings in the region.
The question which many Lebanese people are asking is how will this confrontation shape up? Will it be a military confrontation or a confrontation via economic sanctions? It seems the military option is unlikely for now considering the consequences it will have on the region’s security and stability and on Lebanon in particular.
Economic Sanctions
Tough economic sanctions are the possible option as they can restrain Lebanese banks, especially transactions made by Lebanese expatriates, as they are important source of funding economic activities inside the country. When these banks are restrained and prevented from dealing with Hezbollah or with those allied to it, the Lebanese state will be gravely harmed.
It seems Hariri expected these threats which Lebanon cannot afford to bear. He thus decided to resign and left those allied with Hezbollah and Iran to face the next storm alone. Lebanese President Michel Aoun who is allied with the militia is the one who will confront this storm and he will have to deal with this crisis.
There are only two options here: Either Hezbollah stays and remains protected by the Lebanese state, while Lebanon loses its stability, or they get rid of Hezbollah, and hence get rid of Iranian influence so that Lebanon maintains its stability.
Saudi Arabia’s first enemy in the region is Iran. Saudi Arabia knows that the Houthis who staged a coup against the legitimate authority in Yemen are mere primitive fighters as the real threat comes from those standing behind them, i.e. Iran and its main wing Hezbollah.
Clipping Hezbollah’s wings in Lebanon thus means clipping the mullahs’ wings in Iran. I have no doubt that the Iranians, and these militias’ leaders, along with Lebanese President Michel Aoun, are well-aware of this.
How will they act? Will they be able to face this hurricane? This is what the next few months will reveal.
Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/11/13/Lebanon-in-the-eye-of-the-storm.html
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A New Page In Turkish-Iraqi Relations
By Yasar Yakis
14 November 2017
Because of the fluidity of developments in the Middle East, almost every actor in regional crises may have opposed another actor at one stage, while having cooperated with them at another stage. This is true of Turkey and Iraq in recent years.
Ankara turned a deaf ear when Baghdad expressed reservations about oil exports by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). But the KRG’s independence referendum prepared the ground for Turkey and Iraq to turn a new page; they are now genuinely cooperating.
Turkish-Iraqi ties were heavily affected by Ankara’s relations with the KRG. Baghdad did not oppose these relations, but brought to Turkey’s attention that according to Iraqi laws, oil produced in the country is the property of the Iraqi nation, and one segment of its population (the Kurds) is not entitled to appropriate oil revenue.
Details of deals made by the KRG with several countries have been reported by the media for several years. Reuters has been publishing articles on this subject since 2014. According to these articles, oil produced in Iraqi Kurdistan is exported via a pipeline that runs from Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean harbor of Iskenderun.
The US imported its first crude oil cargo from the region in May 2014; Israel has done so since the start of that year. Baghdad threatened to sue any company involved in this trade. Israel’s Energy Ministry declined to comment.
Turkish company Powertrans is the broker for the KRG and selling oil via tenders to traders. The deal involved many international commodity traders, including Trafigura, one of the world’s leading independent commodity trading and logistics houses. A spokesman for Trafigura also declined to comment.
An oil tanker, Marinoula, unloaded 265,000 barrels Iraqi oil in Houston in May 2014. The identity of the buyer was unclear. The oil was loaded by the trading company Petraco in Dortyol, Turkey. The company declined to comment. These refusals to comment are more telling than a detailed account of what is going on.
For the time being, Turkey and Iraq are genuinely cooperating because they have converging interests. But an issue that casts a shadow on bilateral relations is a Turkish battalion of around 600 soldiers stationed in Bashiqa, northern Iraq. It is more of a symbolic presence, but since Baghdad is uneasy about it, the issue is likely to be on the agenda sooner or later.
When Iraq demanded that Turkey withdraw these soldiers, the latter said they were stationed according to an agreement with the KRG. In the present circumstances, Ankara can hardly justify it on those grounds.
Another critical issue, which is on the backburner for now, is water. The water of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers is a source of longstanding conflict between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The Euphrates part of the issue is more controversial with Syria. The Tigris part is mainly an issue with Iraq because the river does not cross Syrian territory.
Turkey should be able to solve this problem with Iraq, since it cannot use much of the Tigris water for irrigation because the terrain is not suitable for this purpose. Dams that Turkey is building on the Tigris are mainly for power generation, meaning that water has to be released downstream in order to generate power.
Despite this, Iraq opposed construction of the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris, and persuaded Austrian banks to block the credits that Ankara was going to receive from them. Turkey is now constructing the dam with its own funds, though it is impeded from time to time by harassment by the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi’s visit to Turkey after the Kurdish referendum augured well because he focused on positive aspects of future cooperation without raising thorny issues. Post-crisis periods usually open up new opportunities for cooperation. Hopes are high that Turkey and Iraq will be able to capitalize on them.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1192936
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Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Onus of Preserving Relationship
By Hussein Shobokshi
13 November 2017
To put things in perspective for terrorist Hassan Nasrallah, who appeared “confused” and “worried” about Saad al-Hariri, he is the same person Saad Hariri accused of killing his father Rafik al-Hariri. This rather amusing development is useful in describing the real Saudi position on Lebanon.
The new young Saudi leadership has no special relationship with Lebanon. There is no nostalgia of the past that affects its perspective of Lebanon or old friendships. The Saudi people as a whole have changed their relationship with Lebanon.
They neither travel to spend their vacations in Lebanon, especially as there are other alternatives and more secure and respectable destinations like Dubai, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey Europe, Asia and the US.
They also do not go to Lebanon for education as they can travel to the whole world instead. They also no longer await a Lebanese mediator to complete their work, because Saudi people have become fluent in all languages. They can connect directly to the decision-making capitals around the world.
The Lebanese people are no longer the most experienced, knowledgeable or sought-after in the labour market. There are more accountable alternatives, from Jordan to India and countries around the world.
The Lebanese media is no longer the source of real news and Saudi competencies have become noticeably qualified and many of the traditional attractions of Lebanon in Saudi Arabia have ended.
National Security
On the contrary, there is a prevailing view among the Saudis that Lebanon is dangerous for Saudi national security. Lebanon has become a platform for television channels attacking Saudi Arabia, military training station for terrorists and funding source for operations against Saudi Arabia.
Lebanon used to play a similar role during the 1970s, when it hosted Saudi nationals whom it called political opponents (and hosted political opponents from other countries, which resulted in a civil war that lasted more than two decades).
Today, Lebanon is in a real crisis and has to confront itself. When it symbolized civil, scientific, economic, technical and educational culture, Lebanon was a truly exceptional country. It “exported” experts to the world in these areas.
Lebanon, a country, which was once known for Kahlil Gibran, is today represented by terrorist Hassan Nasrallah, and gives him the space to participate in political decision-making, even exports terrorism to the region in Kuwait, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria. Yet the strange proposition from the President and the media continues that Hassan Nasrallah is an opponent.
Lebanon has chosen this path. It chose to “participate” in terrorism to build its future. It chose to be an evil platform against countries of the region. It chose to “ignore” the prevailing terrorism emanating from it. These were the choices Lebanon made. But when the consequences of these decisions caused death and destruction in Saudi Arabia and its allies; then Saudi Arabia has the right to defend itself.
Lebanon will not find lot of supporters in Saudi Arabia calling for special connections with it. Lebanon is the one that started taking positions against Saudi Arabia.
Historically, Saudi Arabia has been consistent in its position on Lebanon and has only tried to safeguard it. Taif Agreement could be described as the most famous example of this approach. Yet, the level of insults hurled against Saudi Arabia that have been allowed in Lebanon confirms that the country is not keen to preserve this relationship. May be this is better for both parties.
Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/11/13/Saudi-Arabia-Lebanon-and-the-onus-of-preserving-relationship-.html
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Tweets Alone Will Not Work On Iran, US Needs To Take Action
By Dennis Ross
November 13, 2017
In Yemen, the Houthis are firing rockets at Saudi cities, including Riyadh, with increasing frequency.
United States President Donald Trump pulled no punches about Iran when he outlined the pillars that would guide his administration's policy toward the country. He recounted Iran's aggressive, threatening behaviour over time and declared that the United States would counter Iran's de-stabilising activities in the region. Left unsaid was how his administration would do so.
A quick survey of the region validates the need to counter what Iran is doing in the region. Saad Hariri resigned as Lebanon's prime minister, citing fears of an assassination plot against him. He has accused Iran of sowing "sedition, devastation and destruction in any place it settles in."
In Yemen, the Houthis are firing rockets at Saudi cities, including Riyadh, with increasing frequency-and the rockets are supplied by Iran. Anti-ship rockets are also being provided by Iran to threaten shipping lanes in the Bab el-Mandeb straits.
In Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran's Quds Forces, the action-arm of the Revolutionary Guard, was quick to take advantage of the conflict between the central government and the Kurdish Regional Government, pushing the Popular Mobilization Units, who are materially supported and guided by the Iranians, to force the Peshmerga to retreat from Kirkuk even as they keep the crisis going.
To be sure, the Iranians don't create these conflicts but are quick to exploit them, using militia proxies from as far away as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nowhere is this more true than in Syria. It is not just that the Iranians and their proxies have helped to secure the Assad regime; they are actively now trying to fill the vacuum that is going to be left by the defeat of Daesh. While the US has concentrated on defeating Daesh, Iran is focused on the day after and is actively creating facts on the ground and even working to change the demography by moving Shi'ites into Sunni-majority areas.
Iran's reach, especially with Hezbollah, extends everywhere in Syria. Go to the Golan Heights and one can see, as I just did, the hill-top where the Quds Force and Hezbollah have established forward observation posts peering into Israel. It is only a matter of time before they will turn their attention to the border with Jordan. The Iranians are being quite purposeful in Syria and in time will control Syria's border with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. Will they do so with Syria's Turkish border? If it means cutting a deal with Turkey to prevent an autonomous Kurdish region, one can bet this, too, will happen.
So the Trump administration is right to speak of Iran's "malign activities." The problem at this point is that the policy seems to be tough in tone and rhetoric but largely limited to words. True, there are increasing designations for sanctions of entities tied to the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah. While sanctions are surely one instrument of policy, their application is largely a continuation of the Obama approach. The challenge from Iran is unmistakable. The policy must be to raise the costs to the Iranians. The Obama administration was not wrong that there are splits in the Iranian leadership. Like many, I believe that Obama could have preserved the leverage that brought the Iranians to the negotiating table more effectively during the talks to produce a better outcome. But if the Trump administration wants to deal with some of the flaws of the JCPOA-the end of key limitations on enrichment and reprocessing in 13 years and ongoing ballistic missile testing-it needs to be sure it has international partners. And, the same is true for dealing with Iran's behaviour in the region.
Here again the logic should be to raise the costs to the Iranians while leaving them a way out. That starts with developing an international consensus by putting the spotlight on what Iran is doing everywhere in the region. Iran is not about stability but expansion. And, the US must lead, not with words but with action.
Presently, in the Trump administration, there continues to be a debate about how to counter the Iranians. Some seem prepared to concede Syria to Russia and let them contain the Iranians while the US does more to counter the Iranians in Iraq. There are two problems with this approach: first, the Russians have little incentive to play this role, particularly as long as a low level insurgency continues in Syria and the Shias represent their boots on the ground. And, second, Iran may have more leverage in Iraq than we do.
Either approach requires something from the administration other than words and the threat of sanctions, particularly if the sanctions are going to be largely unilateral and not multilateral. As it is, Trump is unlikely to get the Europeans to join the sanctions unless he addresses their concerns about not renegotiating the JCPOA or makes clear that the price for him not walking away from the JCPOA is European responsiveness on sanctions against Iran's de-stabilising regional actions. Even this may not be sufficient to put the necessary pressure on the Iranians unless the Trump administration is prepared to use tailored air power to raise the costs to the Iranians and the militias in Syria and also engage the Iranians. Is it prepared to do so? If it is not, if President Trump is not prepared to back diplomacy with coercion and contain the Iranians in Syria or Iraq, the gap between his stated policy and reality will only widen. -Asharq Al Awsat
Source: khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/tweets-alone-will-not-work-on-iran-us-needs-to-take-action
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/middle-east-press/hariri-needs-protection-hezbollah-saudi/d/113211