Jihadist Violence: the Indian Threat - (Concluding Part): An Examination of A Terrorist Group, A Loosely Organized Indigenous Islamist Militant Network Known as the Indian Mujahideen
By Stephen Tankel
Conclusion: Qualifying the Threat
The Indian jihadist movement constitutes an internal security issue with an external dimension. The two dimensions are historically intertwined and in the last few decades the boundaries between Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 75 them have become increasingly blurred. Pakistan-based groups, most notably LeT, have significantly greater capacity, more robust capabilities, and considerably more resiliency, thanks in no small part to a more hospitable environment. However, they are also easier to detect than their Indian counterparts and typically lack the topographical and cultural knowledge these indigenous operatives enjoy. Ultimately, trying to quantify the threats from each set of actors—internal and external—overlooks the degree to which the two are connected.
Indian jihadists are far more lethal as a result of external support, but no longer entirely depend on it. Even in those instances where a purely indigenous attack occurs, the perpetrators often will have benefited from earlier assistance. Pakistan-based actors may remain able to launch unilateral strikes absent Indian assistance. But they are unlikely to be able to equal the frequency of attacks achieved by the Indian Mujahideen. Moreover, although pure expeditionary terrorism with no indigenous assistance can still occur, a catalogue of attacks—attempted and successful—suggests foreign militants often benefit from some form of Indian assistance such as safe haven or reconnaissance.339 In short, most attacks involve some admixture of foreign and indigenous elements.
Any loss of life is tragic, but as with most terrorist attacks the greater danger lies in the wider responses they can trigger. New Delhi is unlikely to mobilize for war in the event its citizens were responsible for a terrorist spectacular. Given India’s strategic culture of restraint, that likely would remain the case even if it could be proven quickly that Pakistan had provided support or direction. It is even less likely if the culprits cannot be easily identified or traced to Pakistan. However, although an attack by homegrown militants with foreign support is highly unlikely to spark a war, it has become yet another hurdle to overcome as the two countries seek to navigate a peace process. Indeed, the issue of Pakistani support for the IM now merits discussion at some Track 2 events.
The greater threat, and one acknowledged by numerous Indian 76 Stephen Tankel interlocutors, is the prospect that another sustained terrorism campaign or major attack could trigger a spate of communal violence. As one senior Indian security official admitted, “Islamist terrorism is a manageable problem, but we do worry seriously about the backlash effect from the Hindu community.” Such concerns are understandable. Hindu extremists launched several terrorist attacks in recent years—Malegaon, the Samjauta Express, and the Mecca Masjid—in response to Islamist terrorism and what they viewed as the state’s failure to combat it. Notably, they do not appear to have differentiated between attacks by indigenous and Pakistan-based actors, both of which are equally motivated to avenge Hindu violence (as this report illustrates). Indeed, these fed the terrorism cycle, triggering reprisal bombings by the Indian Mujahideen, which was already partly a by-product of past episodes of communal violence.
Relatively speaking, the police response has improved. It is no longer a given that Muslims will be arrested en mass immediately after an attack. But these improvements do not go far enough and some Muslims still see themselves facing a threat from communal (Hindu) organizations and the security forces. This can be exploited to incite Islamist violence. Lashkar-e-Taiba has become a higher priority for the United States since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed six Americans.
Washington has designated the IM a foreign terrorist organization, but it remains a significantly lower priority than other South Asian Islamist militant entities. This is sensible given that it poses less of a threat, the United States has limited resources, and there is only so much Washington can do given the indigenous nature of the problem and limitations of counterterrorism cooperation with India. However, it does not mean that the Indian Mujahideen poses no threats. The network focuses primarily on communal, touristic, economic, and other soft targets, but these have included those at which Westerners are present. If recent reporting about a meeting between IM and al-Qaeda leaders is accurate (and again this should be treated with caution), then it may be that as the Indian Mujahideen evolves it will pursue with greater zeal attacks like the Pune German Bakery bombing that kill foreigners in India. In short, it is far from certain that the IM constitutes a horizon threat for the United States in South Asia, but it is one that should be monitored for signs of an internationalist shift.
Beyond the direct threat, Washington has an interest in reducing Pakistan’s strategic reliance on militant proxies, but doing so entails raising the costs of this policy and reducing its utility. The low-cost and relatively low-risk option of covertly supporting Indian jihadists further reduces the disincentives for the Pakistani ISI of breaking with this practice. Finally, the United States is invested in India’s rise and stability in South Asia. Hence any challenge to either is problematic, but one that must be kept in perspective. Ultimately, the issue of Indian jihadism is not a major threat to regional stability or India’s rise. Rather, it is a symptom of certain factors: a bilateral relationship with Pakistan that remains defined by zero-sum competition, and poor internal governance, political malfeasance, economic inequality, and widespread sense of injustice. As one former official acknowledged, “These problems would still be here even if we had no terrorism.”
Another, a former police officer concurred, adding, “Pakistan may be taking advantage of the situation to radicalize Muslim boys. They may even be controlling the IM. But even if they are then so what? We still must look within as to why Indians are susceptible. And it’s up to us to solve this problem here.”
Notes
1 According to many interlocutors, including members of the Indian Muslim community, some politicians depend on Indian Muslims for vote banks, which also leads them to play down the issue.
2 Christine Fair, “Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen: An Assessment,” Asia Policy 9 (January 2010): 102.
3 Scoping discussions for the research contributing to this paper were held in mid-2012 with analysts at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Defense Intelligence Agency, officials at National Defense University with insights into evolving Department of Defense and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) concerns about security in South Asia, and congressional staff members
4 Irfan Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 21.
5 Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, New Delhi, December 1, 2011, http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-indexenglish.htm.
6 Rajindar Sachar, Saiyid Hamid, T. K. Oomen, M. A. Basith, Rakesh Basant, Akhtar Majeed, and Abusaleh Shariff, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India (New Delhi: Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, November 2006).
7 Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy, 234.
8 Nathuram Godse, who assassinated Mohanda Ghandi, was a former RSS member, which led to a temporary ban on the group. When the authorities found no proof that the RSS was involved in the conspiracy, the ban was lifted.
9 Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Politics of Processions and Hindu-Muslim Riots,” in Community Conflicts and the State in India, edited by Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73–75.
10 Jaffrelot, “The Politics of Processions,” 75–76.
11 Ibid., 73–75.
12 For example, Amnesty International reported that police participated in the killing of Muslims during an episode of communal violence in Meerut, a town near Delhi, in 1987 (Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy, 167).
13 Dilip Hiro, Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 179.
14 In 1984, before the Ramjanmabhoomi movement activated, the BJP won two seats in Parliament. In 1989, it won eighty-four.
15 Hiro, Apocalyptic Realm, 180–81; Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy, 167.
16 Sayyed Abdul Bari, Azad Hindustan Mai Muslim Tanzimey (New Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 2001), 291.
17 Fair, “Students Islamic Movement,” 5; Sikand, “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23, no. 2 (2003): 181.
18 SIMI was also at odds with the older, more moderate Students Islamic Organization (SIO), which was attached to the JIH as well.
19 Farhat Aysas, professor at Jamia Millia Islamia, interview by auth r, New Delhi, June 27, 2012.
20 Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy, 23,.
21 Operations Gibraltar entailed infiltrating companies consisting of irregulars, particularly from Pakistan administered Kashmir, into which soldiers from paramilitary units were integrated. Army officers at the major rank commanded units consisting of four to six companies, which infiltrated across the LoC. Approximately thirty thousand men were involved in the invasion, code= named Operation Gibraltar. The plan was predicated on the belief that local forces would rise up and join a rebellion against Indian rule, but little local help was forthcoming. Rather than retreat, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam, which entailed deploying conventional troops. For a detailed account of Pakistan’s covert activities in Indian-administered Kashmir before 1965 and the war, see Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2005 (London: Routledge, 2007), chapters 2–3. See also Gul Hassan Khan, The Memiors of Lt. Gen. Hassan Khan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994).
22 Afghanistan was an ideal place to train militants for this purpose, since it would be easy to hide the purpose of any camps established there and to divert weapons and money to them. A training complex, known as Badr I and Badr II, was constructed in southeast Afghanistan four kilometers from the border with Pakistan. Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2009), 140; Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013), 69–70.
23 HuM was a HuJI splinter. The two briefly reunited to form Harakat-ul-Ansar (HuA), before separating once again.
24 Damning Verdict: Report of the Srikrishna Commission (Mumbai: Sabrang Communications, 1998), http://www.sabrang.com/srikrish/sri%20main.htm.
25 Hasan Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002).
26 S. Hussain Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai: Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2012), 226–27.
27 Praveen Swami, “Harnessing Hate,” Frontline 23, no. 15 (2006),http://www. hindu.com/fline/fl2315/stories/20060811003912800.htm.
28 Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Andhra Pradesh, India: Universities Press, 1992), 33; Thomas Blom Hansen, Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 70.
29 Swami, “Harnessing Hate.”
30 Praveen Swami, “The Well-Tempered Jihad: The Politics and Practice of Post-2002 Islamist Terrorism in India,” Contemporary South Asia 16, no. 3 (September 2008).
31 Swami, “Harnessing Hate”; “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda is a big catch for India,” FirstPost.India, August 19, 2013, http://www.firstpost.com/india/why-let-terrorist-abdul-karim-tunda-is-a-big-catch-for-india-1040373.html.
32 Swami, “Harnessing Hate”; “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda.”
33 Swami, “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda”; Jatin Anand, “Who Is Syed Abdul Karim alias Tunda,” Hindustan Times, August 17, 2013, http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Who-is-Abdul-Karim-Tunda/Article1-1108934.aspx.
34 Praveen Swami, “The ‘Liberation’ of Hyderabad,” Frontline, May 13–26, 2000, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1710/17100390.htm; Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2007), 196.
35 Swami, “Harnessing Hate.”
36 Ansari would allow potassium to burn through the paper ticket. Once complete, it would detonate a small explosive. Rakesh Maria, chief of the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, interview by author, Mumbai,June 11, 2012. See also Shishir Gupta, Indian Mujahideen: The Enemy Within (Guargaon, India: Hachette Book Publishing, 2011), 26.
37 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad”; “A Road to Perdition: India and Its Invisible Jihad,” unpublished manuscript, April 2008; see also “The Spreading Tentacles of Terror,” The Hindu, August 31, 2003.
38 Praveen Swami, journalist with The Hindu, interview with the author, January 8, 2009; Rahul Bedi, journalist with Jane’s Intelligence Review, interview with the author, January 7, 2009.
39 “Abdul Karim Tunda holds grudges against Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, says he was sidelined,” Economic Times, August 25, 2013,
8, 2009; Rahul Bedi, journalist with Jane’s Intelligence Review, interview with the author, January 7, 2009.
41 “LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda arrested, sent to 3-day police custody,” FirstPost.India, August 17, 2013
42 “Life Sentences for 15 for 1993 Serial Train Blasts,” Rediff News, February 28, 2004; Swami, India, Pakistan, 196; Swami, “Pakistan and the Lashkar’s Jihad.”
43 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad”; “Road to Perdition.”
44 Indian Security Services, “Interrrogation Report of Abdul Razzak Masood”; “Lashkar Using Gulf NRIs in Network,” Times of India, November 29, 2002; Swami, “Behind Bangalore: The Origins of the Long Jihad,” The Hindu, January 9, 2006
45 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad”; “Road to Perdition.” Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2011), 90. On more recent accusations of Tunda’s involvement in smuggling counterfeit currency see Adita Phadnis, “Bankrolling LeT: Indians claim Tunda’s network leads to LeT,” The Express Tribune, August 25, 2013
46 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 90.
47 “LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda arrested.”
48 International Crisis Group, “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh,” Asia Report no. 187, March 1, 2010.
49 For more on militant groups in Bangladesh, see The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh: 2009–2010 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 2011).
50 Swami, “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda.”
51 Swami, “Spreading Tentacles of Terror”; Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion (London: Penguin, 1999), 176–77.
52 Swami, “Harnessing Hate.”
53 Swami, “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda.”
54 “All you need to know about Lashkar-e-Taiba operative Syed Abdul Karim alias Tunda,” FirstPost.India, August 17, 2013
55 “LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda arrested”; Anand, “Who Is Syed Abdul Karim.”
56 “LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda arrested.”
57 Swami, “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda.”
58 “LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda arrested.”
59 Swami, “Harnessing Hate”
60 Praveen Swami, “Road to Unimaginable Horror,” The Hindu, July 13, 2006.
61 K. S. Reddy, bureau chief for The Hindu in Hyderabad, interview with the author, Hyderabad, June 15, 2012; Anjani Kumar, inspector general of police, Hyderabad, interview by author, Hyderabad, June 19, 2012.
62 Reddy, interview, 2012; Swami, “Road to Unimaginable Horror”; Swami, “Harnessing Hate.”
63 Swami, “Road to Unimaginable Horror”; Swami, “Harnessing Hate.”
64 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 128–29.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 130.
67 Ibid.; Devesh K. Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion,” The Hindu, August 24, 2005 ; Swami, “The Indian M Mujahidin and Lashkar-i- Tayyiba’s Transnational Networks,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 6 (2009): 9; Swami, “Riyaz Bhatkal and the Origins of the Indian Mujahideen,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 5
(2010): 3.
68 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 130–31.
69 Swami, “Indian Mujahideen terror linked to organised crime,” Delhi Compass, September 21, 2008
The Arrest of Aftab Ansari,” Frontline, 19, no. 4 (20 70 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 130–31.
71 Ibid., 4, 34. 02)
72 Yoginder Sikand, “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India: The Students Islamic Movement of India” (Electronic: Islam Interfaith, 2005).
73 Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy, 175–79; Sikand, “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India,” 180–92.
74 Rajeev Sharma, Global Jihad (New Delhi, India: Kaveri Books, 2006), 15.
75 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad,” 319.
76 According to the former head of the Intelligence Bureau, Ajit Doval, SIMI was responsible for recruiting cadre, who were then vetted by LeT-linked mosques and then sent to Pakistan for training. Ajit Doval, former head of the Intelligence Bureau, interview by author, May 31, 2012.
77 Ibid.
78 Former superintendent of police in Bhatkal, interview with author, India, June 2012, name and location withheld on request.
79 Swami, “Riyaz Bhatkal.”
80 Final Report Form Under Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, February 27, 2009 [Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009]. See also Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 68–69.
81 Final Form Report Under Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi Police Special Cell, November 2010. See also Swami, “The hunt for the Indian Mujahideen’s ‘al- Arbi’,” Rediff.com, September 15, 2008
82 Swami, “Riyaz Bhatkal.”
83 Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009.
84 Swami, “Riyaz Bhatkal.”
85 Dwaipayan Ghosh, “Abdul Karim Tunda splurged but money proved to be his undoing,” Times of India, August 21, 2013
86 Abdul Razzak Masood, an alleged LeT operative arrested, told police he worked under Karim’s direct command; “Interrrogation Report of Abdul Razzak Masood,” undated,. manuscript in possession of author. See also Swami, “Why LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda.”
87 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 132.
88 Swami, “Harnessing Hate.
89 Fidayee can mean both “one who sacrifices himself” and “one who risks his life voluntarily or recklessly.” As a military term of art it is also used to denote a commando. In this case, these were active-shooter assaults (often with the use of hand grenades) in which the chances of death were high, but if the fidayee died it is because he fought to the death rather than dying by his own hand.
90 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 58.
91 Unlike LeT, JeM was not ideologically opposed to suicide attacks and its militants wore suicide vests.
92 Two LeT fidayeen stormed the Akshardham temple in Gandhinagar, the Gujarat state capital. Approximately six hundred worshippers and tourists were inside at the time, more than thirty of whom were killed in the attack. The head of Lashkar’s Indian operations planned the attack and one of the fidayeen killed was the nephew of the group’s finance chief Haji Ashraf. “Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian National Investigative Agency,” June 3-9- 2010.
Author in possession of hard copy.
93 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 140
94 Vicky Nanjappa, “Karachi project: Yasin tells all,” Journalism for Vertebrates, September 3, 2013, 95 “Testimony of David Coleman Headley,” 2010. See also Nanjappa, “Karachi project: Yasin tells all,” Animesh Roul, “After Pune, Details Emerge on the Karachi Project and its Threat to India,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 4 (2010).
96 Bangladesh National Security Intelligence officer, interview by author, Dhaka, June 22, 2012; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 10.
97 Former high-ranking Indian intelligence official, interview by author, Bangalore, June 14, 2012.
98 Fair, “Students Islamic Movement,” 114.
99 Human Rights Watch, “We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat,” vol. 14, no. 3C, April 2002.
100 “Gujarat Riot Death Toll Revealed,” BBC, May 11, 2005
101 Human Rights Watch, “We Have No Orders to Save You.”
102 Gardiner Harris and Hari Kumar, “32 people convicted for roles in Gujarat riots,” New York Times, August 29, 2012.Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 85
103 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 4.
104 Rahul Bedi, “Bombay bombings fuel tension,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor September 12, 2003; Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad”; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 4.
105 Indian Mujahideed, “Rise of Jihad, Revenge of Gujarat,” sent in advance of the Ahmedabad and failed Surat bombings on July 26, 2008,
106 Haidar Naqvi, “Police turned deaf ear to Salar inputs,” Hindustan Times, March 9, 2006
107 Sabauddin Ahmed is presently in judicial custody for leading a fidayeen attack against the Central Reserve Police Force [CRPF] camp in Rampur on December 31, 2007 and January 1, 2008. Atiq Khan, “Acquitted Indians to face trial in Rampur CRPF terror attack case,” The Hindu, May 3, 2010.
108 Salim Salar, the LeT operative, was killed in a police encounter in 2006. “Lakhvi also behind Mumbai train blasts,” Hindustan Times, January 4, 2009.
109 Ibid. See also T. A. Johnson, “Muzammil, Lakhvi: Same Names, ISI Links in IISc Attack Probe,” The Indian Express, December 8, 2008; Robert Worth and Hari Kumar, “Police Foiled Earlier Plot Against Mumbai,” New York Times, December 6, 2008; “IISc attack: Terror suspect confesses,” Press Trust of India, April 5, 2008
110 On December 31, 2007, Sabauddin Ahmed commanded Pakistani fighters during a LeT fidayeen attack against a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in Rampur, Uttar Pradesh. “IISc attack,” Press Trust of India; Khan, “Acquitted Indians”; Presley Thomas, “Lashkar’s ‘only Indian Commander’,” Hindustan Times, May 4, 2010.
111 One of the bombers was killed in a police encounter. The other two, a husband and wife, were convicted and sentenced to death.
112 Samarth Moray, “HC upholds death penalty for 2003 blasts convicts,” Midday, February 11, 2012
113 Worth and Kumar, “Police Foiled”; “IISc attack,” Press Trust of India.
114 “IISc attack,” Press Trust of India
115 See also Khan, “Acquitted Indians”; Thomas, “Lashkar’s ‘only Indian Commander’.”
116 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.”
117 Chandan Haygunde and Sagnik Chowdhury, “Ansari, before he became Abu Jundal,” Indian Express, June 27, 2012,
118 Stavan Desai, Anuradha Nagaraj and Sagnik Chowdhury, “Cops follow Aurangabad arms trail,” Indian Express (New Delhi), July 16, 2006.
119 On the flow of explosives into Gujarat, see Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.” On the Ahmedabad blasts, see “Many injured in blast at Ahmedabad railway station,” Tefiff India Abroad, February 19, 2006, Rajeev Khanna, “Blast hits Gujarat train station,” BBC News, February 19, 2006
120 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.”
121 Ibid.
122 Interrogation report, Javed Hamidullah Siddiqui, Gujarat Police Headquarters, Ahmedabad, 2004.
123 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.”
124 Andhra Pradesh was split in 2013 into two states—Telangana and Seemandhra—and Hyderabad was designated as the joint capital for the next ten years.
125 Praveen Swami, “Roads to Perdition: The Politics and Practice of Islamist Terrorism in India,” in Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, edited by K. Warikoo (London: Routledge, 2011), 56.
126 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.”
127 Interrogation report, Shaikh Abdul Khaja.
128 Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.”
129 For example, Sheikh Abdul Khaja linked up with him in Saudi Arabia in 2005. He contacted Abdul Sahed in Karachi who, working with Rasool Party, arranged travel to Pakistan for training in a LeT camp. Interrogation report, Shaikh Abdul Khaja.
130 Ibid.; Reddy, interview with the author; Swami, “Well-Tempered Jihad.”
131 Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009; see also Gupta, Indian Mujahideen,.
132 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 71–72.
133 Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009; see also Gupta, Indian Mujahideen,.
134 Swami, “The Arrest of Aftab Ansari”; Pandey, “ Bangladesh Blasts”; “American Center Attack: SC Stays Death Sentence of Aftab Ansari,” Times of India, May 25, 2010,
135 Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009.
136 Indian Intelligence Bureau analysts responsible for IM portfolio, briefing for author, New Delhi, June 7, 2012 [Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012]. See also Gupta, Indian Mujahideen.
137 Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009.
138 Final Form Report Under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi Police Special Cell, November 2010 [Final Report New Delhi Special Cell, 2010].
139 Ibid.
140 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 127–28.
141 Swami, “Riyaz Bhatkal”; Final Report New Delhi Special Cell, 2010.
142 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 135.
143 Swami, “The Indian Mujahidin,” 9;“Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” Organization for Counter Terrorists Operations (OCTOPUS), Government of Andhra Pradesh.
144 U.S. Department of State, “South and Central Asia Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, April 30, 2008.
145 See, for example, Bhupendra Pandey, “IM men carried out blasts, not HuJI,” The Indian Express, October 5, 2013,
146 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 161–62.
147 Ibid., 70, 161–62.
148 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; Indian National Investigative Agency analyst, interview with author, New Delhi, June 5, 2012. Former Indian intelligence official, interview with author, Bangalore, India, June 14, 2012.
149 Haygunde and Chowdhury, “Ansari, before he became.”
150 The 2006 Mumbai and 2008 Bangalore blasts are both discussed in greater detail in the dynamics section.
151 The Azamgarh module attempted to bomb an Uttar Pradesh Roadways bus travelling from Varanasi to Allahabad in early 2005. The IED never exploded. Had the attack succeeded, this would have been its first attack. Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 160–61.
152 LeT was blamed for this attack, and it is possible that one or several of its 88 Stephen Tankel operatives was involved. However, Indian Mujahideen co-founder Mohammed Sadique Israr Sheikh told interrogators the Azamgarh module was responsible for the 2005 Delhi Blasts. Babu Bhai also confessed to delivering RDX to Atif Ameen ten days before the attack. “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen,.
153 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS; Mohammad Mansoor Ashgar Peerbhoy, Mubin Kadar Shaikh, and Asif Bashiruddin Shaikh, Final Report Baweja Court, September 13, 2008; see also Chaitraly Deshmukh and Prasannakumar Keskar, “Bhatkal Brothers Spent 8 Years to Set Up IM Base,” DNA India, October 12, 2012.
154 Shishir Gupta, journalist with The Hindustan Times, interview with author, New Delhi, June 1, 2012.
155 “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS; Vicky Nanjappa, “Yasin Bhatkal: The Real Story,” Journalism for Vertebrates, August 30, 2013,Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 192–94; interrogation report, Thadlantede Naseer (Kannur District, Kerala), Interrogation Centre, Bangalore, January 7, 2010; interrogation report, Sarfaraz Nawaz (Ernakulam District, Kerala State), Bangalore City Police, PIN 683565.
156 Mohammed Shakeel et al., Final Report Baweja Court, December 18, 2008; Peerbhoy, Shaikh, and Shaik, Final Report Baweja Court, September 2008.
157 Indian Mujahideen, “Declaration of Open War Against India,” sent after Jaipur bombings on May 13, 2008.
158 Shakeel et al., Final Report Baweja Court, December 2008; Peerbhoy, Shaikh, and Shaik, Final Report Baweja Court, September 2008.
159 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS, undated, author in possession of hard copy; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 135, 165.
160 Nanjappa, “Yasin Bhatkal”; “Yasin’s Interrogation so far,” August 30, 2013,
161 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 178, 181, 189–191, 203–205; Praveen Swami, “Who is arrested Indian Mujahideen founder Yasin Bhatkal?” FirstPost.India, August 29, 2013, Nanjappa, “Yasin’s Interrogation so far.”
162 Shakeel et al., Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009; Nanjappa, “Karachi project: Yasin tells all”; Praveen Swami, journalist with The Hindu, interview with author, New Delhi, June 5, 2012; “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS; Chaitraly Deshmukh and Prasannakumar Keskar, “Bhatkal Brothers Spent 8 Years to Set Up IM Base,” DNA India, October 12, 2012,
163 Nanjappa, “Karachi project: Yasin tells all.”
164 Indian Mujahideen, introductory manifesto, sent prior to the Uttar Pradesh court bombings on November 23, 2007.
165 Swami Aseemanand, an alleged figure in the Hindutva terror network believed to be responsible for these attacks, confessed to attacks against the Mecca Masjid, Malegaon, and the Samjhauta Express in January 2011. He retracted that confession in March, claiming coercion. The same week, the government transferred all Hindutva terrorism cases to the National Investigative Agency, which continued to investigate them at the time of writing. On Swami’s confession, see Vinay Kumar, “Swami Aseemanand’s confession reveals Hindutva terror activities,” The Hindu, January 31, 2011, On Swami’s retraction, see “Swami Aseemanand takes back confession, says he was ‘coerced’,” MSN News, March 31, 2011, On the transfer to the NIA, see “Govt transfers all Hindu terror cases to NIA,” IBN Live, March 21, 2011
166 Indian Mujahideen manifesto, 2007.
167 Iqbal signed the email for the 2008 serial Delhi blasts as “Al-Arabi” and Riyaz signed as “Guru-Alhindi.”
168 Peerbhoy, Shaikh, and Shaikh, Final Report Baweja Court, September 2008; Shakeel et al., Final Report Baweja Court, February 2009; Indian Mujahideen, “Eye for an Eye: The Dust Will Never Settle Down,” sent prior to the Delhi bombings on September 13, 2008“Rise of Jihad.”
169 The men would drive around, identify an area where they could pick up free Wi-Fi and return to send emails to coincide with attacks. Peerbhoy, Shaikh, and Shaikh, Final Report Baweja Court, September 2008.
170 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012.
171 Interrogation report, Shahzad Ahmed.
172 Praveen Swami, “Behind the Batla House Shootout,” The Hindu, October 10, 2008
173 Interrogation report and charge sheet, Mohammad Mansoor Ashgar Peerbhoy.
174 According to Institute for Conflict Management data, a total of 132 IM/SIMI cadres have been arrested in fifty-nine incidents across the country since the Batla House encounter of September 19, 2008. Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Indian Mujahideen: Mutating Threat,” Eurasia Review, May 14, 2012
175 At the time of writing, twenty-three people had been charged and thirteen were in custody.
176 Interrogation report and charge sheet, Sadique Sheikh.
177 Interrogation report, Shahzad Ahmed.
178 “Study Material on Indian Mujahideen,” OCTOPUS.
179 “Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian National Investigative Agency,” June 3–9, 2010, author in possession of hard copy; interrogation report: statement of Sabahuddin Ahmad, Anti-Terrorist Cell, Bangalore City Police, Office Gandhwar, Police Station Sakri, District Madhubani, Bihar, undated, author in possession of hard copy.
180 Interrogation report, Sarfaraz Nawaz; Swami, “The Indian Mujahidin.”
181 Naseer claims it was Sarfarz Nawaz who first initiated the idea of planting bombs in Bangalore and offered to fund the operation. Nawaz contradicts this claim. IB analysts and the secondary literature support his contention that Naseer germinated the plot. Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; Swami, “The Indian Mujahidin”; interrogation report,Sarfaraz Nawaz; interrogation report, Thadlantede Naseer.
182 He provided between $4,000 and $5,000 for the operation.
183 Interrogation report, Sarfaraz Nawaz.
184 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 192–94.
185 Interrogation report, Thadlantede Naseer.
186 The IM intended to use the rest for a bombing in Surat the same month.
187 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 192–94.
188 Interrogation report, Thadlantede Naseer.
189 According to India’s Institute for Conflict Management, more than 130 men allegedly belonging to or associated with the Indian Mujahideen were arrested following the Batla House encounter. Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Indian Mujahideen: Mutating Threat,” Eurasia Review, May 14, 2012,
190 Interrogation report: statement of Salman (aka Chotu, aka Aquib), Intelligence Bureau; Shishir Gupta, “Varanasi Blast: Dr Shahnawaz, Bhatkal Brothers Emerge as Main Suspects After Mail Traced to Vashi,” The Indian Express, December 8, 2010
191 Nanjappa, “Karachi project- Yasin tells all.”
192 Various figures have been reported for the death toll. This figure is from the final report submitted by the chief investigating officer to the court in Mumbai. See Mumbai Terror Attack, Final Form Report Under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, February 25, 2009.
193 Member of JuD senior leadership, interview by author, Pakistan, May 2009. Plea agreement in United States of America vs. David Coleman Headley [aka Daood Gilani].
194 “Testimony of David Coleman Headley,” 2010.
195 ISI officers stationed in Bangladesh were known to provide passports and money to militants operating there as well as to intervene with local authorities when necessary. Bangladesh National Security Intelligence officer, interview by author, Dhaka, June 22, 2012; Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 10.
196 Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh: 2010-2011” (Dhaka: BEI, September 2011).
197 Pushpita Das, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, interview by author, New Delhi, June 5, 2012.
198 Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 92–95; Swami, “The Indian Mujahidin,” 7.
199 Interrogation report, Sabahuddin Ahmad; interrogation report, Salman; Vicky Nanjappa, “Yasin speaks of Riyaz and Iqbal,” August 29, 2013,see also Stephen Tankel, “The Mumbai Blame Game,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2012, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/09/the_blame_game.
200 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; interrogation report, Salman; interrogation report, Shaikh Abdul Khaja; Najappa, “Yasin speaks of Riyaz and Iqbal”; see also Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 148.
201 Gupta, interview, 2012; interrogation report, Salman; Bhattacharya, “Indian Mujahideen: Mutating Threat”; Vicky Najappa, “Darbanga- Yasin’s baby,” Journalism for Vertebrates, August 29, 2013, http. Neeraj Chauhan, “Investigators suspect role of first IM module,” Times of India, August 6, 2012.
202 Interrogation report, Salman.
203 Gupta, interview, 2012; Neeraj Chauhan, “Investigators suspect role of first IM module,” Times of India, August 6, 2012.
204 “Pune blast: 2 detained, usage of RDX confirmed,” Indian Express, February 16, 2010 RDX usage confirmed in Pune blast,” DNA India, February 16, 2010“Terror strike in Pune, 9 dead in bakery blast,” IBN Live, February 14, 2010,Assem Shaikh, Swati Shinde, and Mihir Tanksale, “Blast rips Pune’s German Bakery; 9 dead, 45 wounded,” Times of India, February 14, 2010
205 Swami, “Who is arrested Indian Mujahideen founder.”
206 Rahul Tripathi and Muzamil Jaleel, “Himayat Baig writes to HC: Let there be fresh probe, this time by NIA,” Indian Express, September 11, 2013
207 Ibid.; “Bhatkal’s confession raises question on Baig’s conviction in German bakery case,” IBN Live, September 8, 2013,Shishir Gupta, Wrong man nailed in Pune bakery blast: Bhatkal,” Hindustan Times, September 4, 2013
208 Gupta, “Wrong man nailed”; Krishna Kumar, Pune Bakery blast main accused Himayat Baig is innocent, says Bhatkal,” IndiaToday.in, September 5, 2013,
209 U.S. intelligence analysts, briefing for author, Washington, DC, September 5, 2012; Santosh Sonawane, “Bilal Trained in Pak to Make Explosives: Cop,” Times of India, October 18, 2012,
210 The improvised explosive device used for the Pune bombings contained ammonium nitrate as the core charge and RDX as the booster charge. Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 261; Praveen Swami, “Lashkar-linked charity raises terror fears,” The Hindu, September 2, 2011
211 LeT leaders, like many in Pakistan, believe India is fueling the insurgency there Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 93 and this operation was intended to avenge an attack on the Karachi police academy. “Jundal states the obvious, says LeT takes ISI’s orders,” Rediff News, August 8, 2012
212 “Testimony of David Coleman Headley,” 2010.
213 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda chief delivers a warning,” AsiaTimes Online, February 13, 2010, h
214 Praveen Swami, “Indian Mujahideen doesn’t end with Yasin Bhatkal’s arrest,” FirstPost.India, August 30, 2013,
215 T. A. Johnson, “2006 meeting with Ilyas Kashmiri sent Yasin down jihad path: Investigators,” Indian Express, September 8, 2013
216 Shishir Gupta and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “Alert: Indian Mujahideen plans to kidnap Jews,” Hindustan Times, September 23, 2013
217 “Testimony of David Coleman Headley,” 2010.
218 “CCB files charge sheet in stadium blasts case,” DNA India, July 25, 2010, Nairita, “Bangalore stadium blast accused strangled to death in jail,” OneIndia News, June 8, 2012 Santosh Singh, “Amid NCTC debate, Bihar in dark over arrest for Bangalore blast,” Indian Express, May 8, 2012,“Police Files Chargesheet Against Suspected Indian Mujahideen Member Fasih Mahmood,” Press Trust of India, February 16, 2013,
220 “Read Delhi Police on arrests of alleged terrorists,” NDTB India, November 30, 2011,“6 arrested for Pune blast, Jama Masjid attack,” IBN Live, November 30, 2011
221 Rashmi Rajput and Prachi Wagh, “Varanasi bomb blast: Indian Mujahideen email,” NDTV India, December 8, 2010,Anubhuti Vishnoi, “IM sends email, ‘biased’ Babri verdict its theme,” Indian Express, December 8, 2010,
222 Rajesh Ahuja and Aloke Tikku, “IM claims blast, says it’s retaliation for Babri verdict,” Hindustan Times, December 7, 2010
223 Rajput and Wagh, “Varanasi bomb blast”
224 Sushant Sareen, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, interview by author, New Delhi, May 28, 2012; B [Bahukutumbi] Raman, director of the Institute for Topical Studies, interview by author, Chennai, June 18, 2012; Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012.
225 “Minor explosion outside Delhi High Court, no casualties,” NDTV India, May 25, 2011
226 “HuJI email after Delhi HC blast,” Hindustan Times, September 7, 2011
227 Vinjay Kumar, “No definite leads yet, only email from Indian Mujahideen,” The Hindu, September 9, 2011“Now, Indian Mujahideen too claim responsibility for Delhi blast,” FirstPost.India, September 9, 2008
228 Praveen Swami, “Pakistani LeT operative suspect in Delhi court blast,” The Hindu, October 22, 2011,
229 NIA interview; Swami, interview, 2012; wami, “‘Dr. Jihad’ key to Delhi High Court blast,” The Hindu, October 24, 2011,
230 Swami, “Pakistani LeT operative suspect.”
231 “3 bomb blasts in Mumbai; 17 dead, 131 injured,” IBN Live, July 14, 2011“Three bomb blasts shatter Mumbai’s peace,” Rediff News, July 13, 2011, Shailesh Shrivastava, “Serial Blasts in Mumbai, at Least 10 Killed,” International Business Times, July 13, 2011,
232 Ammonium nitrate used to carry out Mumbai blasts,” IBN Live, July 14, 2011,
233 “Mumbai blasts: Death toll rises to 26,” Hindustan Times, July 30, 2011, Mumbai blasts: Death toll rises to 23,” NDTV India, July 23, 2011,
234 Maria, interview, 2012.
235 “MHA not kept in the loop on 13/7 Mumbai blasts arrests by Maharashtra ATS: sources,” IBN Live, January 23, 2012
236 Vicky Nanjappa, “13/7 blasts- Goof ups galore,” Journalism for Vertebrates, September 10, 2013
237 “Another Suspected IM Militant Held in Pune Blasts Case,” Outlook India, October 17, 2012 Mihir Tanksale, “Yasin Bhatkal one of the August 1 Pune bombers?,” Times of India, August 11, 2012,“Pune serial blasts case ‘cracked,’ three held,” The Hindu, October 12, 2012, “Another Suspected IM Militant Held in Pune Blasts Case”; “Pune serial blasts case cracked,” The Hindu, October 12, 2012
238 “Dilsukhnagar bomb blast toll rises to 17,” The Hindu, March 6, 20
239 “Indian Mujahideen suspect had in 2012 confessed doing recce of Dilsukh Nagar in Hyderabad,” IBN Live, February 21, 2013
240 “Indian Mujahideen modules: Darbhanga out, Kolkata in,” Rediff News, September 6, 2013
241 Gupta and Chaudhuri, “Alert: Indian Mujahideen plans to kidnap Jews.”
242 Rajesh Ahuja, “Bhatkal says IM looking for tie-up with al Qaeda,” Hindustan Times, September 9, 2013,see also Rahul Tipathi, “Indian Mujahideen has grown stronger, spread to Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Indian Express, October 17, 2013
243 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; interrogation report, Salman; interrogation report, Shaikh Abdul Khaja
244 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012,
245 Military Intelligence briefing with author, New Delhi, May 23, 2013. Police officials in Srinagar and Sopore, interviews by author, May 18–21, 2013.
246 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; Sareen, interview, 2012; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
247 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012
248 Ibid
249 Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh is less consequential for the IM. It has been active there, but not nearly to the degree as LeT. Kumar, interview, 2012; Reddy, interview, 2012.
250 Geographic distribution based on database of more than five hundred alleged militants sought or captured by the Indian authorities
251 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012
252 Interrogation report, Salman. Other arrested militants made similar statements. interrogation report, Shaikh Abdul Khaja; Najappa, “Yasin speaks of Riyaz and Iqbal.”
253 Najappa, “Yasin speaks of Riyaz and Iqbal.”
254 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012; interrogation report, Salman.Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 97
255 Intelligence Bureau briefing, 2012
256 Gupta, Indian Mujahideen, 148; Tipathi, “Indian Mujahideen has grown stronger”
257 Tipathi, “Indian Mujahideen has grown stronger.”
258 Stephen Tankel, “The Mumbai blame game,” The Afpak ChannelThe India-Saudi link,” The Af-Pak Channel, July 30, 2012, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com
259 For example, three operatives arrested while planning attacks in Bodhgaya and New Delhi, alleged to the police that Kagzai facilitated their meeting with Iqbal Bhatkal in Saudi Arabia after which they were told to coordinate with Yasin Bhatkal in India. Vicky Nanjappa, “IM’s Saudi hub- Fayaz Kagzai is the man we need,” Journalism for Vertebrates, October 5, 2012- 260 Manan Kumar and Nikhil S. Dixit, “Saudis deport IM operative,” Daily News and Analysis, October 23, 2012.
261 Jarrett Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2009), 5.
262 Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries,” 257–60
263 Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 175--78
264 Hafiz Abdul Salam bin Muhammad, Why We Do Jihad? (Muridke: Dawa al-Irshad) May 1999).
265 Tankel, Storming the World Stage
266 Indian Mujahiheen, introductory manifesto, 2007
267 Ibid.
268 Indian Mujahideen, “The Rise of Jihad,” 2008
269 Ibid
270 Indian Mujahideen, “Declaration of Open War,” 2008
271 Ibid.
272 Indian Mujahideen, “Rise of Jihad,” 2008.
273 Indian Mujahideen, “Eye for an Eye,” 2008.
274 Indian Mujahideen, “Declaration of Open War,” 2008.
275 Ibid.
Source: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/jihadist-violence-the-indian-threat
URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-terrorism-jihad/jihadist-violence-indian-threat-(concluding/d/35319