Jihadist Violence: the Indian Threat - 6: An Examination of A Terrorist Group, A Loosely Organized Indigenous Islamist Militant Network Known As The Indian Mujahideen
By Stephen Tankel
Dynamics of Indian Jihadism
Comprehending the dynamics of the Indian Mujahideen network and the wider Indian jihadist movement may help inform assessments about potential future trajectories. The following briefly explores the organization of the Indian jihadist movement, its ideology, drivers and recruitment, and external support.
Scale and Composition
The Indian Mujahideen is part of a larger universe of jihadist entities operating in India. Many are connected to one another and to external jihadist entities like LeT or HuJI-B, each of which recruits and runs its own Indian operatives in addition to supporting independent networks. The IB estimates the entire number of people who are part of the IM network—including foot soldiers within modules, but excluding individual cells tangentially connected to it—to be in the hundreds. Outside Kashmir, Indian militants independent of the IM and connected to LeT, HuJI-B, or other foreign militant organizations are believed to number no more than ten to twenty at most, allowing for the possibility of unknown individuals.
Security officials estimate approximately 150 full-time militants maximum, mostly from LeT and Hizb ul Mujahideen, in Indian-administered Kashmir. The overwhelming majority of them are not connected to the IM network, which has never operated in Kashmir. The Indian Mujahideen is not a hierarchical organization. Rather, it is best understood as a label for a network of modules that connect to, and sometimes support or absorb, smaller cells and self-organizing “bunches of guys,” to borrow a phrase from terrorism expert Marc Sageman. It is also a label that may sometimes be used to describe entities that have only tangential connection to the actual network. The IM reached peak cohesion in 2008 when some modules became more organized. Its attacks were also the most lethal and indigenous that year. This sometimes gave the impression of greater overall organization. In reality, even when it was most cohesive, all the entities acting under the Indian Mujahideen label were not aware of the network’s breadth or even its leaders’ existence. At a briefing provided by the Intelligence Bureau, one analyst explained that some of the men arrested in September 2008 had not even known they were part of the IM until public announcements claiming credit for attacks they had executed began appearing. Another recalled, “these boys [from the Azamgarh module] had joined Atif Ameen to do jihad and that’s all they knew.”
According to Intelligence Bureau analysts who track the IM network, the situation on the ground is fluid and leaders within the wider Indian jihadist movement are best thought of as focal points for action and resources: It’s not like Paki Pakistan where you have JeM turf and LeT turf, JeM leaders and LeT leaders. Here it’s about focal points. If you have one or two people connect with the Bhatkals or LeT in a certain area here in India then they become a focal point and can recruit others mainly from that area. So people join Person X who might go to someone like Riyaz Bhatkal for help and if he’s successful than he will get more support and recruit more people. Riyaz is still a big focal point, even if he’s not in India. But Person X is a focal point too.
Familial ties play an important role in connecting people to existing individual focal points and enabling new players to emerge. They reinforce and are reinforced by geographic collocation. Although it is incorrect to speak of IM turf, the network is concentrated in and recruits from certain states (and specific cities in those states), especially Bihar (Darbhanga), Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh (Azamgarh) in the north, and Karnataka (Bhatkal and Bangalore), Kerala, and Maharashtra (Mumbai and Pune) in the south. Similar, LeT is stronger in some areas than others, including Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in the north, and Hyderabad, Kerala, and Maharashtra (Mumbai and Beed) in the south. If reports regarding Ahmed Siddi Bapa’s statements to investigators are to be believed, then Kolkatamay play an increasingly important role as a base for IM activity.
Its geographic proximity to Bangladesh also raises questions about whether that country will experience resurgence as a base for anti- Indian militancy. Finally, being located in or recruited from one area does not imply being active there. Militants from different areas come together in myriad locations to launch attacks. The Shahbandri brothers exercise a loose leadership over the IM network from abroad. Initially, they were “extremely mobile,” shuttling from Pakistan to the UAE, where they “freely frequent[ed] locations such as Dubai and Shargah.” However, Siddi Bapa allegedly told investigators that the two moved out of the UAE at some point during 2012 in favour of spending the majority of their time in Pakistan, where they sought to remain, perhaps to avoid arrest and deportation. Amir Raza Khan, currently based in Pakistan, also allegedly visits IM safe houses in the Gulf on occasion, though his precise role at this stage is unclear.
IB analysts speculated in 2012 about tension between Khan and Riyaz after the latter’s arrival in Pakistan, suggesting the former may have been displaced. The secondary literature and recent media reporting supports this contention, but it is difficult to know whether this amounts to a dual confirmation or circular reporting. The same media report also alluded to additional factionalism within Pakistan-based IM commanders and included the assessment that one faction had approached al-Qaeda. Until his arrest in Saudi Arabia in May 2011, Zabiuddin Ansari, the Indian militant involved in the Aurangabad arms haul who was in the control room for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, was acting as an interface between LeT and the Indian Mujahideen. Fayyiz Kagzi, another Aurangabad conspirator also wanted for his role in the 2006 Ahmedabad railway bombing, is alleged to have replaced Ansari. However, he is believed to have fled to Pakistan after Saudi authorities deported Ansari and another Indian militant (Fasih Mahmood).
In addition to liaising with Indian Mujahideen militants, Ansari had travelled to Saudi Arabia to launch a recruitment campaign for future attacks against India.
Ideology
As noted, the IM is part of a larger jihadist project, which also includes operatives from various foreign militant groups. LeT is the most notable of these and has been the primary training provider for the majority of Indian Islamist militants who sought training outside India. These men would have gone through LeT’s Daura-e- Suffa and Daura-e-Amma, both of which focus primarily on religious indoctrination and are generally considered necessary prerequisites for military training. However, it is unclear to what degree these Indian trainees absorbed LeT’s ideology or whether the group invested much energy in their doing so. Several scholars have written extensively about LeT’s ideology. Thus, the focus here is primarily on the Indian Mujahideen’s ideology, to the degree one exists. However, it is useful to first describe briefly the broad contours of LeT’s as it relates to operations in India.
Jihadism is a neologism that has gained currency since 9/11 to connote a movement whose members regard jihad primarily as waging war—as opposed to spiritual striving—and see doing so as the only road to self-fulfillment. For these actors, waging jihad is obligatory and second only to professing the oneness of God.
This differentiates jihadists from the majority of Muslims, who typically do not view waging war as an individual obligation. Most jihadists also aver participation in politics, believing that democracy is Haram (forbidden). Generally speaking, their long-term goals are so utopian and vague as to make them of limited analytical utility. Thus it is more useful to focus on an actor’s rationale for activism, especially as it relates to defining and prioritizing enemies to be fought. In this regard, ideology establishes targets that are off-limits, those deserving of attack, and offers a paradigm for prioritizing the latter.
Strategic calculation also factors. Any terrorist entity will, or should, assess costs and benefits before launching an attack. Meanwhile, capabilities determine whether the actor is actually able to strike a target. Ideologically, LeT is, on the one hand, a missionary organization committed to promoting its interpre Islam and reformism in Pakistan, and, on the other, a pan-Islamist militant group dedicated to waging jihad against all enemies of Islam.
It is also a proxy deployed by the Pakistan army and ISI to further national interests, primarily against India. LeT is considered one of the more theologically doctrinaire jihadist groups and has developed a relatively sophisticated ideology over its almost thirty-year history. The group outlines eight reasons for waging violent jihad, some more utopian than others, and asserts that all Muslims are required to wage or support jihad until these objectives are met: achieving the dominance of Islam as a way of life throughout the entire world; forcing disbelievers to pay Jizya [tax on non-Muslims]; fighting those who oppress the weak and feeble; eliminating Muslim persecution; exacting revenge for the killing of any Muslim; punishing enemies for violating their oaths or treaties; defending Muslim states anywhere in the world; and recapturing occupied Muslim territory, which LeT considers to be any state that ever experienced Muslim rule of Ahl-e-Hadith (Salafi)Any one of these is reason enough, from LeT’s perspective, to wage and support jihad against India. Several are particularly notable.
Eliminating Muslim persecution and exacting revenge for the killing of any Muslim both have informed direct attacks in India-- the Akshardham Temple attack in 2002, for example. They also provide an ideological rationale for supporting the Indian Mujahideen and other indigenous jihadists seeking to avenge Muslim victims of communal violence. Because LeT considers much of India to be Muslim land, and views Indian- administered Kashmir as part of Pakistan, its ant- India activities are also heavily motivated by the desire to recapture “occupied” Muslim territory.
In addition to these specific rationales (and the benefits of ongoing state support), LeT’s pan-Islamism is blended with a vicious ant- Hinduism. The group believes a Hindu-Muslim struggle has existed ever since the time of the Prophet Muhammad and will continue until Muslim rule is restored to the Indian subcontinent.265 Thus, India has been its primary enemy since the early 1990s and remains so today. Yet it is also worth noting that the United States is clearly on LeT’s enemies list, and since 9/11 the group’s anti-American rhetoric has turned into action. LeT has been actively attacking U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan since 2004–2005, deployed a small number of fighters to Iraq, has killed Americans and other Westerners in terrorist attacks in India, and has contributed to other plots targeting them as well.
The Indian Mujahideen is more of a terrorist network than a jihadist organization. Its division of responsibilities is almost entirely operational, save for a Media Group, and the network has never boasted a religious committee of any sort. Nor does the Indian Mujahideen have any clerics among its ranks. At its essence, the IM’s ideology boils down to exacting revenge for communal injustices. Riyaz Shahbandri asserts in the first IM manifesto explaining the “causes behind jihad (holy war) in India”:
When our Muslim brothers were fleeing from India to Pakistan at the time of partition, Abdul Kalam Azad asked them not to go & promised them on behalf of congress party (Gandhi, Nehru and Patel) that all of you can stay here and they (Gandhi, Nehru and Patel) had promised to give us full rights and amenities for rehabilitation. Everybody knows what had happened to that promise and how our brothers and children were brutally killed and our sisters were raped. I am not going to take you too back; I would like to take your attention towards 1992 massacre, the year when I realized the fact regarding their promises. the wounds given by the idol worshipers to the Indian Muslims; They demolished our Babri Masjid and killed our brothers, children and raped our sisters, especially in Maharashtra this all happened with the support of congress party which was ruling at that time both in Centre and in Maharashtra. Indian police which always play key role in such massacre has provided arms and full protection to the son of bitches like Shiv Sena, RSS, and VHP etc men. This injustice does not stop here; the police officers who were pointed out by the Shri Krishna Commission for their negative role in 1992 massacre were given promotions and felicitated by the Indian government for their graveyard sin. [sic passim]
Before exploring the desire for revenge in depth, it is helpful to highlight infrequent attempts at locating this rationale in a broader ideological paradigm. In keeping with the utopian goals most jihadist entities pursue, and the belief that jihad is the only path to achieving them, the network’s introductory manifesto asserts This is not the war between two communities [Hindu and Muslim], but this is war for civilization. We want to empower the society from injustice, corruption etc. which is prevailing in the society now a days. Only Islam has the power to establish a civilized society and this could be only possible in Islamic rule, which could be achieved by only one path Jihad-Fee-Sabilillah.
However, whereas most jihadist entities eschew democracy for religious reasons, the IM’s antipathy toward it appears reactive and informed by communal sentiment. For example, in “The Rise of Jihad: Revenge of Gujarat,” the Shahbandri brothers assert that “democracy, secularism, equality, integrity, peace, freedom, voting, elections are yet another fraud” used by the Hindu majority to oppress the Muslim minority.268 IM statements also make only infrequent attempts at calling non-Muslims to Islam and this is done in the guise of referencing the historical Muslim subjugation of the Hindu majority (presumably during the Mughal Empire) and threatening its repetition.269 Finally, IM leaders attempt to situate their domestic struggle in the context of a wider pan-Islamist jihad, for example, by referring to India’s capital not only as the “most strategic Hindutva hub,” but also the country’s “green zone,” a likely reference to the protected U.S. enclave in Iraq.
Yet while the Indian Mujahideen leadership clearly seeks to locate itself within the global jihadist movement, its pretence of a grander ideological paradigm masks what still remains an overwhelmingly locally focused terrorist campaign fuelled by communal grievance and bent on revenge. The Shahbandri brothers repeatedly proclaim their bombing campaign as Muslims’ Quisas, or revenge. In the “Declaration of Open War Against India,” sent after the May 2008 Jaipur bombings, IM leader Riyaz Shahbandri warns the “Kuffar-e- hind [unbelievers of India]” that, “if Islam and Muslim in this country are not safe then the light of your safety will also go off very soon.
Continuing in this vein, the Shahbandri brothers declared in “The Rise of Jihad: Revenge of Gujarat” that Here we begin the answer to your tyranny and oppression, raising the illustrious banner of Jihad against the Hindus and all those who fight and resist us, and here we begin our revenge with the Help and Permission of Allah, - A terrifying revenge of our blood, our lives, and our honor that will Insha-Allah terminate your survival on this land.
Although IM leaders repeatedly single out Hindu nationalist organizations, the police, and various politicians and state institutions as the culpable parties, they do not ideologically circumscribe their violence accordingly:
Let us make it clear to all the enemies of Muslims, especially the Hindus of India, that the BJP backed RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, and the entire Sangh Parivar would be the only responsible factors for whatever horrifying tragedies you are to face in the nearest future. The cause will be these wicked bastards and the effect will be on the entire nation [emphasis added].
Echoing al-Qaeda’s assertion that all Americans are fair targets for terrorist violence because they voted in elections for and paid taxes to the U.S. government, the Indian Mujahideen makes the theologically unsophisticated, but strategically important, claim that There is no difference in the Shari’ah between a soldier and civilian. Rather, the Shari’ah divides people into combatant and non-combatant. And combatant is anyone who helps in the fight with his body, wealth or opinion. According to this criterion, the people of this country are combatant because they have willingly elected their leaders and representatives in the parliaments who draw up the policies which murder our children, Dishonours our women, occupy our houses and plunder our wealth. And they are the one who fund the terrorist organizations like R.S.S, V.H.P and Shiv Sena, which provide armed men to attack our women and children [sic passim].
Unlike LeT, which officially abjures attacks against fellow Muslims, the Indian Mujahideen urges it: Come, O Muslim Youth! Make your preparations with whatever you have. Join our ranks and help us—the ranks of Indian Mujahideen to strengthen the Jihad against the Hindus. Get ready with all the weapons you have. Plan and organize your moves. Select your targets. Target these evil politicians and leaders of BJP, RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal, who provoke the masses against you. Target and kill the wicked police force who were watching the “fun” of your bloodshed and who handed you to the rioting sinful culprits. Target their hired informers and spies even if they are the disloyal and betraying Munafiqeen [hypocrites] of our Ummah (emphasis added].
The concept of anti-Munafiqeen violence is associated with Deobandi jihadist groups in Pakistan, which use the claim of hypocrisy to target Barelvis, Sufis, and Shiites in the country. LeT argues that they are not Munafiqeen and that focusing on them as targets distracts from waging jihad against non-Muslims outside Pakistan who are at war with Muslims and should be attacked. In reality, LeT has not shied away from killing Muslims outside Pakistan in terrorist attacks or from eliminating spies and informers at home. Nevertheless, the IM’s public encouragement of such activity stands in contrast to LeT’s avowed ideology.
Although the Indian Mujahideen leaders establish broad parameters for acceptable targets, they do delineate priorities and exhibit a degree of discretion in terms of where to focus violence. First, they assert that all state governments “must know that the trouble faced by us will be definitely repaid and if the Muslims are terrorized, the Hindus can never breathe in peace. However, IM leaders single out states where communalism and alleged police abuses are the highest:
We hereby declare an ultimatum to all the state governments of India, especially to those of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra to stop harassing the Muslims and keep a check on their killing, expulsion, and encounters.
To reinforce this point, in their next missive they assert that it is not at all difficult for us to attack you in states like Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Kerala etc. And by The Grace of Allah there is no shortage of explosives or lack of manpower and we are extremely capable to shed your blood anywhere anytime. The only reason here is that your wrongs against us in other states have crossed the limits of cruelty.
A review of IM attack locations reveals that the network’s rhetoric matched its operational planning. In addition to focusing its violence geographically, the Indian Mujahideen also discriminated in terms of specific targets. Its pronouncements make numerous references to communal organizations and its operations include multiple attacks against specifically Hindu targets. The leadership also singles out the police and judicial system for arresting and prosecuting Muslims not involved in IM terrorism as well as for targeting SIMI members. In its first communiqué, which preceded an attack against three courts in Uttar Pradesh, the network stated, Now the Islamic raids which is going to take place against lawyer within few minutes Insha-Allah is because police nabbed two innocent groups and frame them in fake [terrorism] charges.
It warned the next target would be the Indian police. Perhaps because this proved too difficult to execute, the IM instead bombed markets in Jaipur. The missive sent after that attack again threatened retribution against the police for arresting innocent Muslims, but justified bombing markets in Jaipur as a way of imposing economic costs. In the missive sent before the September 2008 Delhi blasts, the Shahbandri brothers again threatened the Indian police force and especially the Anti-Terrorism Service in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. Once again, it struck soft targets, a practice that continued once the Indian Mujahideen regenerated after the Batla House encounter.
When explaining the Jaipur attack, Riyaz Shahbandri also asserted that it was intended to kill tourists in order to “warn the entire crusaders of the world, U.S. and Britain in particular, we Muslims are one across the globe and you won’t find it easy in India as well [sic].” Punishing the Indian state, as described, was more likely the primary motivation. Indeed, after going on to warn India to stop supporting the United States in the international arena, the communiqué quickly pivots back to a revenge-oriented rationale, “You people have tortured us for the past 60 years, now its our turn to feel the heat and we promise you that we will get back to you very soon.”
The inclusion of a warning to the United States and United Kingdom suggests a secondary motivation or, at least, the desire to position the Indian Mujahideen as more than merely a local, communal phenomenon. This is notable in light of the Pune German Bakery attack, recent reports that some IM leaders were interested in aligning with al-Qaeda. According to one of those accounts, some IM leaders were interested in adopting a more pan-Islamic agenda, but feared the impact on recruitment. IM violence is likely to continue to prioritize communal targets, but indications of an ambition to expand should not be ignored.
Drivers and Recruitment Indians who associate with LeT, the IM, or other indigenous outfits have made antisocial decisions that can force them to live life on the run, and that cast suspicion and often shame on the families they leave behind. Such a description could apply to those who have joined many other antiestablishment terrorist organizations around the world and throughout history. However, it notably contrasts with the experiences of many Pakistani recruits to LeT, who live in the open, enjoy a level of societal acceptance, and sometimes even receive permission from their families to wage jihad. So why do Indian men become involved in jihadist violence? Anecdotal evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of them are motivated primarily by a sense of grievance and a desire to seek revenge, a rationale that again echoes the experiences of aggrieved young men who have joined other terrorist groups around the world and throughout history.
Individual Indian recruits may believe that violent jihad is obligatory, but collectively, the ambition to impose Sharia or otherwise Islamize society is secondary, if it exists at all, to the desire for revenge against real and perceived injustices. As noted, the IM rhetorically embraced a pan-Islamist agenda, though not in place of a locally focused one. According to one report, IM leaders backed off of expanding the aperture too much after finding this alienated potential recruits motivated mainly by communal grievances, especially related to the Gujarat riots and Babri Masjid demolition, and a desire for retribution.
According to police and intelligence officials, almost every arrested militant they interrogated mentioned the Babri mosque’s demolition, the Gujarat riots, or both as a major motivator. Frequently, they explained how established militants exploited these incidents to radicalize and recruit them. Indian experts such as Praveen Swami and Shishir Gupta have written about the role that economic hardships, especially frustration and a sense of institutionalized discrimination among educated Muslims who believe employment opportunities are closed off to them, are believed to play in terms of contributing to a sense of injustice. According to security officials and Muslim community leaders, an over-response by the security forces to Islamist terrorism reinforces the narrative of a communal Hindu war against Indian Muslims.
As one Muslim leader complained, The police are communal. Whenever a blast takes place the police arrest Muslims whether or not they were involved. Hundreds have been arrested and acquitted, but even though they’re released these peoples’ careers are ruined.Official statistics are unavailable, but Muslims are believed to be very poorly represented in state police forces across the country, and especially in the Indian Police Service (IPS). The Times of India filed a right to information request seeking hard numbers from each state police service about the communal breakdown among their forces. Eleven states and one union territory never responded, despite some of them having Muslim populations of more than 10 percent.
Using the responses it received and extrapolating using data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), the Times of India estimated Muslim representation in the Indian police force hovers around 6 percent, whereas Muslims make up roughly 14 percent of the population. Coupled with poor investigative techniques and a generally lax attitude, this demographic imbalance often leads the police to respond to any attack simply by “rounding up a bunch of Muslim boys.”
The local level policing challenges have national repercussions. High-ranking security officials in New Delhi are aware of the problem. When asked what the state could do better in terms of counterterrorism, one senior official zeroed in on policing and said, “We need to be careful and aware of the prejudices in our own security forces.” This underrepresentation and sense of systematic scapegoating fosters a sense of group victimization among Muslim communities. As a result, lamented the head of Jamiat Ulema e-Hind, Indian Muslims often see themselves facing an external threat from communal (Hindu) organizations and the security forces, while internally a small segment of clerics and militants exploit the situation to incite violence.
As in other countries where Muslims are a minority and a small segment of their community has been susceptible to radicalization, recruiters and jihadist ideologues frame political, economic, and social exploitation as evidence of a war against Islam. All Muslims everywhere are depicted as the victims of oppression, and violence is presented as the only alternative to “the system” and a necessary means of defending the faith. The heightened international profile of the faith as a result of the U.S.-led war against al-Qaeda and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce this perception. Moreover, although many Indian militants belonged to SIMI or other Islamic organizations, a significant number of them have relatively limited knowledge of their faith. Even some of the more educated militants are susceptible. For example, Mansoor Peerbhoy became interested in Islam later in life and began associating with the Quran Foundation in 2004.
A colleague visited him at the Jama Masjid in Pune during the holy Muslim holiday of Ramadan in 2006 and explained that, “the meaning of Jihad is to fight in the cause of Allah.” Immediately, Peerbhoy told investigators, “When viewed through the Jihad angle, I was aware of the immediate threat posed to the very existence and honour of Indian Muslims, which exist under the banners of BJP, RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena, and others.”
A pattern is clear of Indian militants moving back and forth between jihadism and for-profit crime, and some officials claim that financial motivation now plays a larger role in recruiting noncriminal elements as well. According to one Indian police officer, “So many boys we arrest mention the money factor in term of their recruitment process.” In some instances, recruiters may spot men—potentially disaffected and definitely in need of money—and use the provision of financial support to begin building rapport. However, if recent reports regarding Siddi Bapa’s interrogation are to be believed, compensation for newer recruits is paltry. One report cites Intelligence Bureau officials who assert that he was using illegal immigrants as foot soldiers and paying them only Rs1000 (approximately US$15) per operation. Finally, as with many militant movements, the IM also attracted its share of attention seekers. One member reportedly told an interrogator he simply wanted to see his face on India’s Most Wanted.
How are those l looking to engage in violence or at least open to it recruited into the jihadist movement? Most interlocutors agree that Indians, not outsiders, have been doing the recruiting for some time. In some instances, a person is exposed to the proper “mood music,” decides he wants to do jihad and looks for assistance where he can find it. Recently, in addition to the use of Jihadi chat rooms, recruitment has been taking place via Facebook and Twitter. In other cases, talent-spotters work top-down, but even in this instance the connections are often organic. For example, Atif Ameen enrolled in Jamia Millia Islamia University in Delhi using fake graduation documents to cultivate new recruits.
In a pattern that would be familiar to those who study terrorist recruitment, especially in no conflict zones, LeT and IM operatives, including the Shahbandri brothers, typically exercised a patient approach, grooming potential recruits over a period of weeks or months. As Peerbhoy explained to investigators,[Initially,] Iqbal never discussed practical ways of Jihad with us. He only used to talk about theoretical Jihad, and used to motivate us with talks about struggle. He never spoke of any Jihad that he might or might not have done, and he certainly never discussed any of his plans or his whereabouts or his contacts with us. He was very secretive, and urged us also to be so. He only gave us as much information as we were required to know, and urged us not to ask too many questions, or to expect too many answers. He never told us his real name or his origin (we found those out later in Police Custody).
As in other countries, the grooming process includes jihadist propaganda, such as videos of militants training, the Gujarat riots, World Trade Centre attacks, and other events related to jihad. SIMI may no longer be the feeder it was in the past when a core mass in the hundreds radicalized and motivated to fight against Hindu domination moved along a conveyer belt into jihad. But SIMI connections still matter, as do familial and friendship ties. After its ban by India, SIMI split into two groups, one that eschewed militancy and another, led by Safdar Nagori that was prepared to use violence. After Nagori’s arrest, Abdul Subhan Qureshi (aka Tauqir) took command of this second faction. He linked up with Riyaz Shahbandri and through him Atif Ameen, thereafter travelling throughout India and using his SIMI connections to recruit foot soldiers for the IM.
Some of those who did not engage in militancy, contributed to the cause by providing safe haven for IM, LeT, or HuJI-B operatives. Recruitment also takes place in the Gulf where many Indian Muslims have sought employment opportunities. The Gulf employment boom for Indian Muslims led it to become a place for recruiting and indoctrinating them first by LeT and now by the IM. Connections to the Gulf are historically stronger for Muslims in southern Indian states who, with the exception of those in Andhra Pradesh, experienced significantly less trauma in terms of communal violence.
As a result, their exposure to Salafism and its import into India may be a more important factor in terms of recruitment. In short, Muslims in north versus south India have had distinct experiences. Ascertaining a causal connection between these experiences and recruitment is difficult. It would require significantly focused research and access to a sizeable sample of confirmed militants from north and south India. In addition to recruitment in the Gulf, some Indians recruited or groomed at home are directed to travel there for indoctrination and instruction.313 Whether or not this is more common than actual recruitment in the Gulf is difficult to ascertain based on the open source. Fayyiz Kagzai, Fasih Mahmood, and Syed Zabiuddin Ansari (aka Abu Jundal) were the three most well-known Indian recruiters based in Saudi Arabia. As noted earlier, Mahmood and Ansari have since been deported to India. Moreover, all three are considered LeT members who recruit for and interface with the Indian Mujahideen, suggesting considerable overlap between the two.
It is to the question of external support that we now turn. External Support and Influence The Indian jihadist movement received significant support from abroad; most notably from Pakistan, but its members also operated in Bangladesh, Nepal, and several Persian Gulf countries. Over time, Pakistan and Pakistan-based groups transitioned from needing locals to help execute attacks to supporting them as a way to increase plausible deniability. Recall that the Pakistani ISI allegedly launched an enterprise dubbed the Karachi Project to help sustain the home-grown jihadist network in India without the same negative international repercussions that came from attacks by Pakistani actors. Although the ISI is alleged to have initiated this effort in roughly 2003, would-be Indian militants (outside of those from Kashmir) began training in Pakistan in the early to mid-1990s. LeT emerged as, and has remained, the primary, though not the only, group responsible for instructing Indian recruits. It’s questionable whether as many of those recruited -- either in the Gulf or locally – go to Pakistan for training as in the past. Over time, Indians learned how to build explosives using locally sourced materials. Once a well-Numerous Indian security officials point to interrogations and intercepts corroborating that Pakistan continues to provide safe haven for wanted Indian militants including Amir Raza Khan and the Shahbandri brothers. For example, the Indian operative Salman (aka Chhotu) who traveled on a Nepali passport to Dubai and then to Pakistan was arrested in 2010 after returning to India. In his confession to the Indian authorities, he allegedly described having seen Riyaz Shahbandri and Amir Raza Khan living in Karachi.
Sheikh Abdul Khwaja (aka Amjad) told a similar tale, alleging that he met Amir Raza Khan, the Shahbandri brothers, and Ahmed Siddi Bapa in Karachi in late 2009. He also claims to have connected with LeT Indian operatives Syed Zabiuddin Ansari and Fayyaz Kagzi in Pakistan. After his deportation from Saudi Arabia, where he had travelled on a recruiting mission, in summer 2012, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari reportedly told Indian authorities that the Shahbandri brothers were in Pakistan and met semi-regularly with LeT. As this report went to press, Indian authorities had recently arrested Abdul Karim, LeT’s first Indian field commander, who had been living in Pakistan since roughly 2000. He was nabbed in Nepal.
Until recently, Bangladesh was a major staging and transit point for Indian and Pakistani militants, with Bangladesh-based HuJI-B and LeT operatives often facilitating travel, providing safe haven, and smuggling money and material as well. Their ability to do so stemmed primarily from the lack of effort made by a succession of governments in Dhaka to crack down on these and ot activities. However, the ISI is alleged to have provided passports and money to many of these operatives and, in some cases, to intervene with local Bangladeshi authorities when necessary. Such activity has reduced significantly since the current administration in Dhaka came into office. Nepal remains an area of concern, but as already discussed little evidence in the open source suggests that its role as a transit point or logistical base has grown considerably in recent years. Moreover, the serious lack of governance in Nepal raises questions about whether the ISI needs to play a role in facilitating jihadist activities there. Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, remain more important transit points and logistical bases.
Salman, the operative who told Indian authorities he saw Riyaz and Amir Raza Khan in Karachi, also claims to have met them previously, along with Iqbal Shahbandri, in the UAE. Indian militants who transit through or base themselves out of the UAE and Saudi Arabia are known to travel on Pakistani passports. At least until recently, if arrested in either country carrying a Pakistani passport, militants would be sent back to Pakistan.In addition to indirect assistance in the form of training, safe haven, and logistical support, foreign actors, most notably LeT and HuJI-B, also have provided money, weapons, and explosive material. Recent historical examples of LeT funding its own Indian operatives are her militant numerous. For example, Abdul Khwaja told investigators that LeT commander Muzammil Butt paid him a salary for recruiting and motivating Indian youth, and Rashid Abdullah provided money for the 2008 Bangalore serial blasts via a conduit (Sarfraz Nawaz) in Oman.
Another Oman-based operative, Ali Abdul Aziz al-Hooti, who allegedly trained twice with LeT, became one of its top organizers in the Gulf responsible for transiting money and weapons into India. LeT funding its operatives is hardly surprising and easier to validate than ongoing financing of the Indian Mujahideen. Its reasonably clear that foreign funding helped the network during its earlier years. For example, in addition to smuggling RDX, Jalalludin Mullah, better known as Babu Bhai, helped transit real and counterfeit currency to IM leaders from Bangladesh. It is an article of faith among the Indian authorities that LeT continues to finance the IM through Hawala networks and cash couriers (some of who transport counterfeit currency). Both are notoriously challenging to trace.
Thus, although investigators allege that Abdul Karim confessed to playing a significant role in circulating counterfeit currency, it is unclear where this money was flowing. In short, though the evidence strongly supports the contention that IM leaders and operatives receive safe haven from Pakistan, it is difficult to assert with the same degree of confidence that money still flows to the Indian Mujahideen. This is especially true in terms of money used for recruitment or travel, which can be more difficult to trace than financial infusions for specific attacks.
Moreover, reporting suggests that the IM also continues to raise money through criminal activity and, more recently, began soliciting donations from Gulf donors via dummy organizations under the pretence of using it for charity, a tactic LeT and other militants groups have engaged in for many years. Siddi Bapa allegedly coordinated with Gulf-based Indian operatives, including Fasih Mahmood, to “rope in the funds through which the Indian Mujahideen survived” after Batla House. This raises questions about whether the IM successfully built independent financing operations to support recruitment, travel, logistics, and attacks. If so, this could be a sign of strength and ambition or an indication the IM was no longer receiving financial support from external actors.
This report highlights several instances in which LeT provided, or attempted to provide, weapons and explosives to its Indian operatives, including the Aurangabad arms haul and the RDX used for the 2006 Ahmedabad railway bombing. The IM also used RDX provided by HuJI-B for its first several attacks. Babu Bhai smuggled his first shipment of RDX in early 2004. Additional shipments followed, including more RDX and Rs15, 000 in June–July 2004, 20 kilograms of RDX in August-September 2005 and 16 kilograms in January 2006. The semi-regular smuggling schedule indicates a sophisticated support operation rather than an ad hoc provision of explosives. The IM ultimately shifted toward using locally sourced ammonium nitrate, which increased its indigenous capabilities.
However, the February 2010 Pune bombings used ammonium nitrate as the core charge and RDX as the booster charge. Networks associated with LeT commander Rashid Abdullah were suspected of supplying the RDX.332 Seven months later, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari allegedly provided a shooter for the Jamia Masjid attack, which also included a failed attempt to explode an ammonium nitrate bomb. Although the July 2011 serial blasts in Mumbai used ammonium nitrate, subsequent bombs contained PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate) to trigger ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel. This indicates that foreign militants groups, most notably LeT, may step in to provide assistance in those instances when the indigenous Indian Mujahideen struggles, such as after Batla House.
IM attacks have been typically below the threshold of what might trigger an Indian response vis-a-vis Pakistan and ascribing culpability for them has generally proved difficult. Hence the immediate risks for Pakistani intelligence in terms of providing limited safe haven and support are relatively low. Does this support equate to control? A spectrum of possibilities exists with significant control on one end of the continuum and an ISI-LeT–supported “wind-up toy” on the other. Without exculpating Pakistan, it is important to note that safe haven and ad hoc support most likely do not translate into strict command and control over the entire IM network, which is significantly decentralized. Different Indian operatives are alleged to act as an interface with the LeT, the ISI, or both. The ISI and LeT may have influence over individuals and modules within the IM, even to the point of promoting specific attacks, but that is different than command and control over the entire network. As one of India’s most respected analysts, the late B Raman, observed,We don’t know if there is instruction for every attack or if [there is instruction, if] it’s coming from the ISI or just LeT. And [if there is direction from the ISI] a lot of retired officers in Pakistan are running around giving instructions to jihadists too. So it is very difficult toknow what is and is not official. The authorities here presume every attack is directed and [that] any retired officer is acting with sanction, but we don’t actually know that for a fact either.
It may be that the ISI (or LeT) engages IM leaders on ad hoc basis to undertake discrete attacks. To quote another Indian analyst, “You do what I ask you to do, but I don’t tell you to do everything you do.” However, this does not preclude broad guidance about the tempo of attacks. Siddi Bapa allegedly told investigators that “Sometimes the ISI would tell us to immediately plan an operation and on other occasion, it would ask us to lie low.” This reportedly contributed to the supposed decision by some IM leaders to approach al-Qaeda.
As noted, reporting about al-Qaeda should be treated with significant caution, but, if true, would have three significant implications. First, it would be another example of Pakistan-supported militants growing frustrated with ISI constraints and migrating toward al-Qaeda, a path other LeT members—including David Headley—have traveled. A prized ISI and LeT asset, Headley grew frustrated and connected with Ilyas Kashmiri, who by then was working with al-Qaeda.
Second, were an IM leader or leaders based in Pakistan able to forge such an association, it would suggest a distinct lack of situational awareness by the ISI, an inability to dedicate the resources necessary to scupper such a relationship, or the assignment of ISI liaison officers with jihadist sympathies. Third, it would correlate with the increasing Pakistanization of al-Qaeda as Arab members are killed or migrate to Arab countries. It would also signal an attendant elevation of the al-Qaeda threat to India, and specifically to U.S. and Western interests there.
Source: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/jihadist-violence-the-indian-threat
URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-terrorism-jihad/jihadist-violence-indian-threat-6/d/35292