Pakistan: Musharraf's exit, opportunity for a new policy for FATA

Monday, August 18, 2008

Rustam Shah Mohmand

With the exit from the scene of Gen (retd) Musharraf looking imminent, there is a unique opportunity for the country to embark upon its own agenda for peace in FATA. From whichever angle one looks at the mess in the tribal areas, one is led to the inescapable conclusion that General Musharraf had become a symbol of intense hatred among the population in generally and among the tribespeople in particular. His removal will offer an opportunity for fresh initiatives without the baggage associated with him.

There is no doubt that Gen Musharraf aligned himself unconditionally with the US-led war on terror in order to gain legitimacy and prolong his rule. And in doing so, he put the peace and stability of the country at stake – and, as time showed, especially of FATA.

The rise of insurgency in the region is directly attributable to his unbridled and no-holds barred support for a war that Pakistan should not have been fighting.

The fundamental root cause of the insurgency is the great disconnect between the aspirations of the tribespeople and the government’s policy to bear any cost, any humiliation, any loss of sovereignty – in other words, any abdication of authority as long as the interests of the west are served.

True, one has to be mindful of the international obligations that Pakistan is required to fulfil in handling the situation. The Security Council resolution mandates that all steps that are necessary to deny sanctuary to militants and prevent infiltration into the border with Afghanistan should be taken. The current government minus General Musharraf will have to design a policy that seeks to achieve a harmonious balance between our obligations in the pursuit of the Security Council resolution and our national security imperatives, along with the objective of achieving a lasting peace in the tribal areas.

The pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ and to ‘rein in’ the militants on its soil who are allegedly causing trouble across in Afghanistan is relentless. The situation, therefore, calls for astute and adroit handling of the situation and skillful crafting of a policy that steers the country out of its current troubles. Any unilateral change in policy will certainly invite the disapproval of Washington, especially since it has become used to Islamabad’s policy of complete and total submission. The rationale of the new policy therefore would have to be explained in great detail to the both the Bush administration as well as the one that will be in place after the November elections this year.

A key ingredient of the new policy will have to be transparency. Pakistan will have to engage the US authorities in a candid and frank discussion of the objectives and goals as well as the strategy of its new approach to the problem of handling the insurgency and impress upon the interlocutors that the objectives may not necessarily coincide in some cases. Furthermore, the pragmatic and honourable course to follow would be to seek parliamentary endorsement of this new policy.

The following could be the main elements of the new approach that parliament will be asked to debate and give a verdict on:

1. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any training of militants, nor allow any hideouts where militants collect, plot, rearm and then launch attacks on either government positions or carry out acts of terrorism across the border in Afghanistan.

2. It will mobilise its resources to ensure, as far as possible, that there is no infiltration of militants into Afghanistan.

3. At the same time Pakistan will expect that Afghanistan to put its house in order, deal with the insurgency effectively according to its own national policy and not resort to blaming Pakistan for what is essentially an indigenous uprising. With this policy in place the government should proceed to engage the militant groups, along with the concerned tribes, in meaningful negotiations, which would include the following new framework:

• The military will be withdrawn from the tribal areas in phases and responsibility for security will be handed over to the political agent who, as usual, will be assisted by the Frontier Corps and Khasadars.

• The role and image of maliks will be restored.

• The political agent’s office will be strengthened. He will, as before, assume responsibility as the overall coordinator of law and order, security and development projects in the area under his administrative control.

• Foreign militants will be asked to leave unless they can give sureties, to the satisfaction of the political agent, for their good behaviour, as laid down under the local ‘riwaj’ (customs and traditions). The tribes will move against anyone who violates this code and also against those who provide shelter to foreigners who do not give such guarantees.

• As soon as a conducive environment is created, the government in collaboration with international community will launch a large-scale infrastructure development programme for FATA. This will encompass all sectors of nation-building such as communication, power, quality education, improved healthcare delivery systems, provision of clean drinking water, sanitation, development of appropriate mineral-based industries with guaranteed market access and so on.

A somewhat similar approach will need to be adopted in case of dealing with rising militancy in Swat and Hangu. In these districts, the old system of deputy commissioner exercising powers as district magistrates and district collector will have to be restored to bring the law and order situation under control and help ensure that the police operate under a magisterial watchdog. Those who object to the restoration of the old system of district commissioner should understand that at least for these areas, it used to work well and law and order was never a problem.

The issues in the tribal areas are not beyond resolution. There is no need to endlessly debate whether a policy of appeasement or aggression would be more suitable in handling the situation. There is no need to unnecessarily create confusion in the minds of the people with regard to the objectives and goals of the militants. While there may be entrenched militants espousing radical ideas and concepts, one must remember that the rank and file of the tribespeople, who are not militant by any stretch of the imagination, are also not supporters of what the government is doing. Hence, the need arises to formulate and implement a policy that is not only independent but also realistic and for that it should be consistent with aspirations of a broad majority of the tribespeople. This is crucial because if government is able to win the tribes over to its side, the extremists will automatically be isolated and thereafter it would be relatively easy dealing with groups with a militant agenda.

Of course, the whole process towards lasting peace is long, arduous and painful. The foundation of this process will have to be a long-lasting engagement with the tribes. The hallmark of this will be removing the trust deficit that currently exists on both sides, formulating a policy for the reason in accordance with the local ‘riwaj’ (customs and tradition) and then selling it to the people of Pakistan as being in their and the nation’s interest. Again, the sceptics of such an approach would do well to remember that when ‘jihad’ was being waged in Afghanistan and the Tribal Areas were the main conduit for supply of weapons to the mujahideen, the region remained peaceful and there was no violence. There is no reason why robust institutions, with roots in the local ‘riwaj’, and a sound policy cannot deliver now.

The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and also served as Pakistan’s ambassador to Kabul. Email: rustammohmand@hotmail.com

Source: The News, Pakistan

URL: https://newageislam.com/war-terror/pakistan-musharraf-exit,-opportunity-new/d/586