Asian Age
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed might have attained notoriety in India for being the chief of the terrorist organisation called Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, but in his home country, Pakistan, Saeed purports to be a professor and the head of a peaceful, proselytising organisation called the Jamaat ud Dawa. In recent times, Saeed has emerged as something of a spokesperson for the pro-establishment jihadis in Pakistan. He holds forth on diverse issues such as Kashmir, domestic politics, foreign policy, the evil that is India and how he and his countrymen will stand shoulder to shoulder against any US aggression in Pakistan. His latest claim is that India will be sending troops to Afghanistan as part of the Indo-US nuclear deal. This move, according to him, is part of a wider conspiracy launched by India, Israel and the US "to destroy Pakistan’s defence".
Odd thing is that for once the bad professor is half right. India does appear to be set to increase its presence in Afghanistan. And this is certainly what Washington wants. Whether or not there is a larger conspiracy depends on one’s point of view, but the aim certainly is not to crush or destroy Pakistan. The objective is to stabilise Afghanistan and presumably to free Nato troops from guard and training duties. In the coming weeks and months, New Delhi will be increasingly pressured by Washington to provide military trainers, more para-military troops and support staff in Afghanistan.
Saeed is voicing the concern of a section of the Islamist establishment in Pakistan, which views any attempts by India to regain a foothold in Afghanistan as completely unacceptable. This is because Afghanistan has traditionally been hostile to Pakistan. It was only in the Taliban period that Islamabad was comfortable with Kabul. Otherwise, relations have usually been strained for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the historical dispute over the Durand Line. Islamabad has often wanted to establish a "friendly" regime in Kabul to keep out India and thereby bury the Durand Line issue.
There are several problems with this line of thinking. It is absurd to assume that Kabul is obsessed with the Durand Line because of New Delhi. Truth is, India has nothing to do with that dispute and much less with its persistence.
Secondly, a Pakistan-friendly regime has invariably meant a rabid Islamist outfit, from the time of the late dictator, General Zia ul Haq, who promoted fanatics such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Taliban were no better or worse than the earlier lot, but certainly more motivated and willing to fight alongside Pakistani professionals. The late Gen. Zia and his Islamist successors promoted Afghan Islamists rather than nationalists because they felt that the latter could not be trusted and would sooner or later rake up the Durand Line issue.
This policy in practice was disastrous and led to a global upsurge in terrorist violence. For India, the Taliban victory resulted in a precipitous and ignominious flight from Kabul. In 1996, Indian diplomats packed their bags hastily and departed abandoning a once proud embassy. For many years, Indian foreign policymakers impotently wrung their hands in South Block while the Taliban and their Pakistani masters freely roamed the deserts and mountains of Afghanistan, putting to sword anyone who had the potential to disagree with them. India’s helplessness was further highlighted in 1999 when a hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft was taken to Kandahar and released only after New Delhi agreed to free three top Islamist terrorists.
The Indians could return only after the US military had chased the Taliban and the Pakistani Army out of Afghanistan. Once the embassy in Kabul was re-opened, the Indians gradually operationalised its consulates in the cities of Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazaar-e-Sharif. The Indian government also pledged to help in the Afghan reconstruction and has, till date, allocated a whopping $ 750 million for various projects — roads, mobile communication networks, electricity transmission lines etc. India, like most other countries, hoped that economic reconstruction, the beginnings of democracy and continued pressure on the Taliban would bring Afghanistan back from the brink.
Sadly, many feel this has not quite happened and that Afghanistan is once again poised to hurtle headlong into the precipice of civil war and violence. Curiously, this time it is the British who are leading the cynics. The latest bombshell was set off by Britain’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, who is supposed to have told a French diplomat that the Nato campaign against the Taliban was doomed to fail and that the best solution was installing an "acceptable dictator" in Kabul. This statement axed many a thesis and much hope about the country moving towards stability.
According to Canard, the French weekly which published this report, Sir Sherard believed that "the current situation is bad; the security situation is getting worse, so is corruption; the government has lost all trust".
While the British government claimed that Sir Sherard had been horribly misquoted, it could do little to counter this week’s remark by one of its top military commanders in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, who bluntly and publicly declared: "We’re not going to win this war." He felt that negotiations with the opposing Taliban were the only way out and that the world should not expect a decisive victory in Afghanistan.
Thereafter, matters have been further muddied by reports of the Afghan government holding secret parleys with the Taliban under the auspices of the Saudis. In some Western capitals, there is serious talk of troop withdrawals. Yet another set of countries are complaining about Nato not doing enough to increase troops in Afghanistan. If any country remains resolute in its Afghan mission, it is the United States, which has succeeded in keeping terrorism away from its borders by taking the fight to the enemy heartland.
The big question that would now have to be debated in India is whether we are prepared to increase our involvement in Afghanistan. One opinion in New Delhi favours a low profile and feels that development assistance is about the maximum that Kabul and Washington should expect from us. The problem is that this might not be enough. A US military defeat in Afghanistan is likely to lead to yet another Indian flight from Kabul. Besides, despite a "low profile", Indians continue to be targets of the Taliban and several workers have lost their lives in terrorist attacks. At the same time, any increase in India’s role in Afghanistan is certain to be met with violent opposition from a powerful section of the establishment in Pakistan, which is determined to counter Indian presence in that country even if it means sanctioning acts such as the bombing of the Indian embassy in July this year. Clearly, New Delhi is confronted by a tough choice. But one way or another, a decision will have to be taken sooner than later.
Indranil Banerjie is a defence and security analyst based in New Delhi
Courtesy: Asian Age
URL: https://newageislam.com/war-terror/is-time-india-join-war/d/876
