Tunisia’s Nonviolent Salafists Can Mitigate the Threat of Salafist Jihadists
By Sherelle Jacobs
July 08, 2013
The Salafist jihadist threat in Tunisia is taking on a new dimension, pitting the moderate Islamist government against Salafists of all stripes – groups long suspected of posing a serious threat to the country’s security. But in the problem may lie part of the solution. Non-jihadist Salafists, particularly those who have a real inclination toward moderation, can play a key role in minimizing the jihadist threat and in addressing the future of Salafism in Tunisian politics.
Over the past year, Salafist jihadist-related violence has been on the rise. Last month, the Tunisian security forces clashed with Tunisia’s largest Salafist organization, Ansar al-Shariah, when the group tried to hold an annual conference without having gained official permission for this. The fallout was serious: Over 200 Salafists were detained. The cases of Salafist jihadists who were suspected of or implicated in violent acts are moving swiftly through the courts. In June alone, six Salafists were sentenced to terms of five years in prison for setting fire to a Sufi shrine in October of last year. Twenty others were given suspended jail sentences for attacking the U.S. Embassy in Tunis last September. Ansar al-Shariah is also suspected – according to the Tunisian interior minister – of involvement in terrorism activities at the Algerian border, which has been part of a crisis that Tunisian security forces have been battling since last December.
For many Tunisians, the trials are a welcome development, as Salafists are suspected of committing numerous violent acts – including the assassination of the secular opposition leader Chokri Belaid, which rocked Tunisia and ushered in widespread disdain and fear of Salafists. However, these developments have invigorated interest in the complex mosaic of Salafist groups now vying for a voice in the new Tunisia. In particular, the less-combative members of the Salafist movement deserve closer attention. How they conduct themselves in the coming months will partly decide the reach of Tunisia’s jihadists in society.
Apart from Salafist jihadists, two other major currents of Salafism exist in Tunisia: “Salafiyya Ilmiyya,” which is often translated as “scientific Salafism,” as well as political Salafism. Members of the Salafiyya Ilmiyya current are apolitical and prefer to immerse themselves in religious devotion. Their movement dates back to the eighth century.
Until the last century, Salafiyya Ilmiyya remained an elitist, almost forgotten, sect. Although their profile has risen since the revolution in 2011, scientific Salafism’s imprint on religious life remains limited – only around 24 of Tunisia’s mosques are under their control. Nonetheless, some scientific Salafist sheikhs, such as Bashir bin Hasan, are well-known religious figures, who have impressive followings and media platforms.
By contrast, political Salafists aspire to use political avenues to influence Tunisian society. Some have formed parties such as Jabhat al-Islah and Hizb al-Tahrir. Although they were unsuccessful, Jabhat al-Islah members contested six seats in the Constituent Assembly as independents (the party did not receive an official license until March 2012) in the October 2011 elections. Enacting Shariah law is their foremost policy priority, and they have also called for cutting ties with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and for Tunisia to stop repaying foreign debts. Hizb al-Tahrir also advocates an agro-industrial economy that is less reliant on tourism.
Some of these groups have less alarming policy aims, including establishing a waqf (or Islamic charity) system, invigorating Tunisia’s tech industries, and boosting the use of the Arabic language in schools. Other Salafist groups, despite their political ambitions, shun mainstream politics. For example, Ansar al-Shariah lambasts democracy because it requires man-made laws, which they consider a symptom of a polytheistic state. Instead, the group favors what it refers to as street politics, which includes organizing demonstrations and boosting its political engagement through charity projects in poor areas.
However unpalatable their ideas and political ambitions, both scientific and political Salafists could play a role in mitigating the double threat that Salafist jihadists pose to Tunisia – imposition of Shariah by force and violence against those who challenge them. Working with Ennahda, they could boost the credibility of moderate Islamism. Although Salafism might seem extreme by definition, the term is still helpfully vague. Some high-profile Islamists have shown a capacity to use the term’s ambiguity to their advantage. For example, last year Ennahda’s co-founder, Rached Ghannouchi, claimed – in an attempt to pacify and woo young Salafists – that he himself was a Salafist in the sense that Salafism means a “return to the noble values of Islam founded on the Quran and the Sunna.”
There is evidence that some Tunisian Salafists are becoming increasingly pragmatic. For example, members of the Salafiyya Ilmiyya current have vetoed violence when Tunisians have clashed over religious issues – from the airing of the allegedly blasphemous film “Persepolis” to a niqab ban on university campuses. Some actors within Salafist political parties have slowly shed their jihadist convictions over the years. For example, Mohammad Khoja, who leads Jabhat al-Islah, was a founder of the Tunisian Islamic Front, which had suspected ties to terrorism. Now he rejects violence and insists that, if elected, party members would not outlaw alcohol or ban bikinis.
Even Ansar al-Shariah members, many of whom have waged jihad abroad, have shown a capacity to move away from extremism – at least publicly. Although the Tunisian authorities believe that some members still have links to terrorism, Ansar al-Shariah has tried to outwardly distance itself from violence. In February, Abu Ayad, the head of Ansar al-Shariah, expressed his wish that young Tunisians refrain from traveling to Syria to engage in jihad there, and to focus on engaging in peaceful action at home.
In a BBC interview in June, the head of the Ansar al-Shariah’s youth wing stressed that his was a peaceful group focused on preaching and charity activities. Ansar al-Shariah is eager to cultivate a peaceful image not just because it fears government reprisals, but also in order to avoid alienating those of its members who are against violence in Tunisia. It is, after all, a disconnected movement that relies on dozens of charismatic leaders to exploit everyday discontent at the grassroots level of Tunisian society.
If nonjihadist Salafists support peaceful action for the long haul, they can in turn reach out to Tunisians who are vulnerable to the seduction of Salafist jihadism. But their powers of dissuasion will depend on their ability to prove that their brand of Salafism is superior.
Politically inclined Salafists must show that they can be more effective actors than Salafist jihadists can. In this regard, Salafist political parties have a much harder task than groups such as Ansar al-Shariah. These parties must prove their ability to shape political decisions, rather than simply blasting more energy into street politics.
Currently, Ansar al-Shariah has proven more successful in appealing to disenfranchised Tunisians. A large portion of its members are young and it has a robust and well-organized youth wing. Crucially, its emphasis on grassroots action provides unemployed youth with the opportunity to feel empowered. By contrast, the youth activities of political parties are much less visible. Jabhat al-Islah’s Facebook page, for instance, is dominated by pictures of middle-aged men. Similarly, older “wise men” provide the face of scientific Salafism. As a result, these movements hold only limited appeal for Tunisian youths.
To a secular Tunisian or Western observer, the prospect of Salafist politicization is a catch-22 situation. While the increased civic clout of Salafists is undesirable, their political marginalization strengthens the hand of terrorists who attest that the only way to make an impact is through the use of force. This predicament could be resolved by two potential scenarios. The first is the gradual moderation of Salafist ideology as Salafist groups gain political experience. The second is a shift in focus away from controversial religious questions toward solving pressing economic issues within an Islamic framework – from the development of Islamic banking to the creation of a welfare state inspired by Islam’s egalitarian principles, for example.
Such outcomes may not even be probable, let alone guaranteed. But, as Ennahda’s journey demonstrates, this kind of political evolution is not without precedent in Tunisia. After all, the party has gone from once calling for the implementation of Shariah to leaving it out of the constitution completely. And, in the words of Rached Ghannouchi, “astonishing is the capacity of [Tunisia] to tame the most stubborn of plants.”
Sherelle Jacobs is a Tunisia-based freelance journalist. This commentary first appeared at Sada, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Source: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2013/Jul-08/222867-tunisias-nonviolent-salafists-can-mitigate-the-threat-of-salafist-jihadists.ashx#ixzz2YTgWBAxv
URL: https://newageislam.com/the-war-within-islam/tunisia’s-nonviolent-salafists-mitigate-threat/d/12515