Saudi Arabia Is Hardly Ripe For Revolution: But Why?
By Nawaf Obaid
March 10, 2011
The past few months
have seen unprecedented turbulence in the Middle East. Leaders in Tunisia and
Egypt have been forced from power by popular uprisings, Libya is careening
toward civil war, and widespread unrest has rattled Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, Iran
-- and to a lesser extent, Jordan, Algeria, Oman, and other countries in the
region. Yet at the geographic center of all this chaos is Saudi Arabia, a
country untouched by turmoil. This fact has led some pundits to the conclusion
that the kingdom has only temporarily muffled the latent discontent of its
people and that ultimately the domino of dissatisfaction and regime change will
fall in Riyadh. These analysts, however, are highly likely to be proved wrong,
as they fundamentally misunderstand the unique strengths of the Saudi monarchy
and the current system of governance.
What their assessments
fail to take into account is that though the kingdom shares several
characteristics with the Middle Eastern countries listed above, it has a number
of features that render it exceptional. Saudi Arabia is not ripe for
revolution. Not even close.
Unlike many of the
regional governments currently facing unrest, the kingdom has a strong record
of fiscal responsibility. Revenues from energy exports and the more than $500
billion in foreign reserves (the third-largest in the world) amassed during
King Abdullah's rule have been tapped to fund development projects that benefit
the kingdom's surging population. In fact, the Saudi government has spent tens
of billions in the last several years alone to build universities, schools,
hospitals, rail links, and housing developments. King Abdullah recently
announced a financial amelioration package, which had been in development since
December 2010, to coincide with his return from abroad. These include $29.5
billion in extra expenditures that will benefit the poor, aid the unemployed,
provide housing assistance, and support a real estate fund and bank of credit.
Another program will raise the salaries of public employees and military personnel
and give part-time public-sector employees full employment and benefits.
Another aims to help those impacted by inflation. All these programs will be
augmented by a further series of initiatives that will be announced later this
year and included in the 2012 budget, with a focus on social security,
unemployment, and housing. It is precisely these types of programs that were
lacking in those countries that have witnessed revolution or are now facing
unrest.
In addition to its
social spending, the kingdom has invested extensively to shore up the defenses
of its energy infrastructure, including several billion dollars for its
35,000-strong Facilities Security Force, and has spent a similar amount on its
various armed services to protect its borders. Finally, the Saudi government
has made considerable investments in internal security to root out al Qaeda
from the kingdom; domestic safety and stability have been a key pillar of
support from the general population.
Of course, the kingdom
is not immune to economic problems. Greater efforts at fighting poverty and
youth unemployment, as well as investing in infrastructure and public services,
are still drastically needed. All Saudis receive housing assistance and free
health care and education; the kingdom has a GDP per capita of about $18,500;
and relatively few live in extreme poverty. Nonetheless, there is a widespread
acknowledgement that the standard of living is not commensurate with a country
as resource rich as Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the leadership has
undertaken various economic reforms. A plan is in development to raise the
minimum salary for civil servants to about $1,500 per month. The bureaucracy is
being streamlined to improve the delivery of health care and other services.
And several years ago, the government launched an office with the mandate of
reducing the number who lives under the poverty level ($1,015 per month) from
13.3 percent in 2010 to 2.2 percent in 2020. Another initiative will
successfully reduce to zero the 1.63 percent of Saudis living in "extreme
poverty" (less than $450 per month) by the end of this year. Compared with
the world poverty line of $1.25 per day, the kingdom is doing very well. But
because Saudi Arabia is no ordinary country, such numbers are an embarrassment
and have been met with large-scale government action.
Although there are
some cultural similarities between Saudi Arabia and some of the states that are
currently experiencing unrest, the dissimilarities are more important. First,
no Arab country possesses a culture so rooted in change-resistant conservatism,
which is in many ways derived from the kingdom's unique role in Islam and the
Arab world. Not only is it the birthplace of the Prophet Mohammed and the home
of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, but it is also the largest provider of
Muslim charitable contributions worldwide. And the fact that the Saudi monarchy
has acted as a responsible custodian of the two holy sites gives it enormous
legitimacy, both at home and abroad.
The conservatism of
the Saudi population also explains the lack of any true "liberal"
movement in the kingdom, with just a few groups that attract little support
among the general populace. In addition, Salafism, the conservative strain of
Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, forbids opposition to earthly rulers, which is
why Islamist reform movements led by radical clerics are also small and
fragmented. Five recent petitions by such groups, which organizers hoped would
attract millions of signatories, have come nowhere close: only a few thousand
have signed. And so far protests organized on Facebook and other websites have
yielded only a handful of individuals: Last Friday, March 4, a group called the
"March 4th Youth Revolutionary Movement" brought out 12 demonstrators
to a Riyadh mosque, despite inflammatory media coverage in the West of Saudi
protest pages on various social networks. Shiites in Qatif and Hasa staged
three protests together and brought out about 500 protesters combined.
As for the most
serious threat to the leadership in the past decade -- al Qaeda -- it has lost
whatever public support it may have had after a series of horrific bombings in
the kingdom in 2003. Indeed, after a coordinated counterterrorism campaign,
fully supported by the population, the al Qaeda network in Saudi Arabia has
been decimated.
Most of these factors
that make Saudi Arabia unique in the Arab world are relatively well known. But
an equally important element is less often discussed, especially in the West:
the prevalence of a robust nationalism that has been nurtured by and is firmly
linked to the monarchy. Over the past decades, Saudis' allegiance to region and
tribe has been largely superseded by a commitment and attachment to an emerging
nation-state, thus greatly reducing the possibility of revolt.
The two main drivers
of this rising nationalist sentiment have been external threats (most
importantly Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) and internal crises (especially the
fallout from the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the 2003 al Qaeda bombings in
Saudi Arabia). Another important factor is the rise of Iran and its anti-Arab
policies, to which Saudis have responded with growing national solidarity. The
leadership has also been aggressively pursuing domestic policies to unify the
population (including the 1.5 million Shiites in the kingdom, who have
long-held legitimate grievances over discrimination and lack of opportunity).
For instance, the Saudi school system increasingly encourages students from the
outlying tribal areas to attend urban schools, thereby shifting their
allegiance from the local to the national level. Saudi Arabia also runs the
world's largest foreign scholarship program, which provides full college
tuition to over 110,000 students from all classes and regions to study abroad,
and these foreign-trained students overwhelmingly return to the kingdom with
feelings of dedication to the emerging nation-state, as evidenced by the fact
that the majority of the first batch of returning students sought work in the
public sector.
Restrictions against
freedom of expression have been loosened, and vibrant debates and government
criticism are now common in the local press (as was seen in the recent coverage
of the disastrous Jeddah floods and the government's initial inept response).
Further, the military has drastically expanded its recruitment scope to include
eligible young men and women from across all regions for the armed forces,
security services, and National Guard. As a result of these opening and
unifying factors, there has been an increase in public expressions of
supratribal Saudi nationalism among the people, something unseen in the country
until recently. For instance, during the last Saudi National Day on Sept. 23,
huge celebrations erupted across the country, whereas in the past, conservative
religious authorities had opposed any expressions of fidelity to the state and
regional and tribal allegiances trumped national fervor.
Just as important,
however, is the widespread view that King Abdullah is a deeply popular leader
at the head of a monarchy seen as legitimate by the vast majority of Saudi
citizens. For example, a visiting Shiite delegation from Qatif headed by a
highly esteemed Shiite cleric and judge came to pay their respects to the king
this week and used this occasion to reaffirm their loyalty to the kingdom by
thanking God for the king's safe return. "You have been in the hearts of
your people since you left," they said, "and we do not want anything
other than your presence, which protects the kingdom's security and safety."
Many analysts worry,
however, about what will happen to Saudi Arabia in the event that the king
passes away. They shouldn't. The kingdom recently set up a group called the
Allegiance Commission to deal with all succession issues. It is composed of the
living sons and one grandson of every dead son of King Abdul-Aziz, the founder
of modern Saudi Arabia, and its mandate is to choose a ruler (from among his
sons and grandsons) who has the best qualities to lead. The process is designed
to ensure that any upcoming transition of power will be smooth and result in
another leader who garners widespread legitimacy and respect. So, while other
governments in the area reap the bitter harvest of irresponsible fiscal
policies, social disharmony, and unpopular leadership, the Saudi monarchy is
very likely to continue for many more decades in its role as the bulwark of
regional stability and security -- as well as a responsible steward of the
largest oil reserves in the world.
Nawaf Obaid is a senior fellow at the King Faisal
Center for Research and Islamic Studies and is pursuing a doctorate on the rise
of Saudi nationalism at the department of war studies at King's College London.
Source: foreignpolicy.com
URL: https://newageislam.com/the-war-within-islam/saudi-arabia-hardly-ripe-revolution/d/6750