Online Islamist Radicalism and the Threat of Lone Wolves
By
Grace Mubashir, New Age Islam
9 January
2024
The Emergence Of ISIS And The Manipulation Of
Online Tools To Spread The Terrorist Ideology Brought To The Fore The Danger Of
Lone Wolfism. This Article Studies The Pattern And The Strategies Of Lone
Wolfism.
-----
Main
Points:
1. The recent
surge in lone wolf attacks, particularly those inspired by IS, has underscored
the increasing danger posed by individuals who adopt radical ideologies and
engage in violent actions without detection or intervention.
2. The complexity
and diversity among lone wolf terrorists make it difficult to create a singular
framework or profile that can be applied universally.
3. The planning
conducted by lone wolf terrorists often remains unnoticed until it's too late.
4. Factors such as
exposure to extremist materials, influence from spiritual leaders, feelings of
alienation, marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, perceptions
of Western government misconduct, and the desire to take action all contribute
significantly to the radicalization of individuals.
-----
Lone wolf
terrorism has emerged as a significant trend in modern terrorism, presenting an
undetectable and unpredictable threat to Western societies. The appeal and
influence of this approach gained traction notably in September 2014 when Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani, the official spokesperson for the Islamic State (IS),
called upon sympathizers and Muslims in Western nations to commit acts of
violence against non-believers, particularly Americans, Europeans, Australians,
and Canadians.
This tactic
isn't entirely new. However, the recent surge in lone wolf attacks,
particularly those inspired by IS, has underscored the increasing danger posed
by individuals who adopt radical ideologies and engage in violent actions
without detection or intervention. Notable incidents involving individuals like
Man Haron Monis in Australia, Zale Thompson in the U.S., Martin Zehaf-Bibeau
and Martin Couture-Rouleau in Canada, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein in Denmark,
and Mehdi Nemmouche in Belgium have emphasized this growing threat.
Consequently,
there has been a rise in research focusing on lone wolf terrorism. While there
has been an increase in studies shedding light on the ideologies, motivations,
behaviours, and pathways leading individuals to embrace lone wolf tactics,
there are still significant gaps in our understanding of this phenomenon.
Despite efforts, establishing a definitive and typical profile of a lone wolf
remains challenging due to the highly individualized nature of each case. The
complexity and diversity among lone wolf terrorists make it difficult to create
a singular framework or profile that can be applied universally.
Who is a
Lone Wolf
Distinguishing
lone wolf terrorists from other terrorist categories like group-based
terrorists, home-grown extremists, or Pantucci’s (2011) four types of lone
wolves is crucial for pinpointing intelligence and policing gaps that allow
these individuals to evade detection. Definitional challenges in accurately
discerning differences among terrorist types pose a hurdle in identifying lone
wolf terrorism as a distinct phenomenon and understanding the timing and nature
of lone wolf attacks.
Pantucci’s
categorization defines lone wolf terrorism as “individuals pursuing Islamist
terrorist goals alone, motivated either by personal reasons or their belief in
being part of an ideological group.” This definition shares similarities with
others but lacks precision regarding membership or association with terrorist
groups. It presumes that the lone wolf is Islamic and suggests the potential for
psychological issues driving their belief in belonging to a terrorist
organization. For a definition to be effective, it should be precise, without
imposing unnecessary limitations or assumptions.
Spaaij
(2010) offers a more refined definition aimed at isolating lone wolf terrorism.
According to Spaaij, a lone wolf terrorist may hold identification or sympathy
toward extremist movements or terrorist organizations but ceases to be
classified as a lone wolf upon joining an established organization. Spaaij, known
for conducting one of the most comprehensive studies on lone wolf terrorism in
2012, provides a practical definition that sets this form of terrorism apart
from others.
In his
definition, lone wolf terrorists are individuals who:
(a) operate alone,
(b) lack affiliation with an organized
terrorist group or network, and
(c) conceive and direct their modus operandi
independently, without direct external command or hierarchy.
This
distinction, alongside the broader terrorism definition, clarifies the disparities
between group-based terrorists and outlines the actions that qualify as
terrorism, specifically identifying when an act is considered lone wolf
terrorism.
Strategies
The
strategies employed in lone wolf attacks and those orchestrated by organized
extremist groups often share similarities yet yield distinct outcomes. While it
proves more challenging for extremist groups to execute successful attacks in
Western territories compared to lone wolf terrorists, these groups tend to be
more effective in advancing their agenda through terrorist strategies. Kydd and
Walter, in their essay "Strategies of Terrorism," assert that
"terrorists must delegitimize the regime and impose costs on occupying
forces," aligning with the goals pursued by both lone terrorists and
extremist groups.
Terrorists
typically utilize five primary strategies to delegitimize the state or
propagate their message. Of these, two are particularly prominent in Western
attacks:
Attrition
And Provocation
In an
attrition strategy, terrorists aim to convince their adversary that they
possess sufficient strength to impose substantial costs if the enemy continues
a specific policy. For Islamist extremist terrorism, this might involve
targeting 'unbelievers' and 'apostates' in the West, pressuring the government
to withdraw from Middle Eastern operations, or imposing penalties on voters,
thereby escalating costs for the government and its populace.
On the
other hand, provocation involves instigating the enemy to respond to terrorism
with indiscriminate violence, which, in turn, radicalizes the population and
garners support for the terrorists. The underlying theory is that government
crackdowns on perceived dangerous or similar populations to the terrorist
attacker could lead to radicalization within the target population, thereby
increasing support or sympathy for the extremist cause.
Radicalization
Suicide bombing
Community manipulation
ISIS, al
Qaeda, and Global Threat of Lone Wolves
Terrorist
organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda have evolved their tactics to include
inspiring lone attacks. They've shifted away from centralized approaches due to
struggles for power. Daniel Byman pointed out that when these groups are weak,
they tend to encourage lone wolf actions. For instance, in a 2010 issue of Inspire
magazine, al Qaeda focused on disseminating 'do-it-yourself' terrorism methods,
providing basic instructions on target selection and attack methods. This
approach emphasizes the strength of lone wolf attacks compared to the
cumbersome, bureaucratic processes of organized extremist groups. Techniques
like vehicle ramming require minimal planning and few weapons, making them
accessible to individuals without extensive guidance.
These types
of attacks demand less organization, planning, and funding compared to larger
extremist operations, making them easier to carry out and potentially more
efficient in causing violence. Propaganda magazines such as Inspire for al
Qaeda and Dabiq and Rumiyah for ISIS target potential lone terrorists. These
individuals are often vulnerable to the messaging of these groups, especially
when focusing on narratives like belonging. While mainstream audiences may
witness gruesome videos of brutal acts by these organizations, they also craft
narratives portraying a supposed community, fostering a sense of belonging.
Easterly
and Geltzer suggest that belonging is a powerful draw for recruits,
particularly those from Western states. This aspect of ISIS's propaganda tends
to resonate with individuals who feel disconnected or alienated from their own
communities. The appeal lies in becoming part of something larger than
themselves by taking up arms or carrying out violent acts, offering a sense of
purpose and community, contrary to feeling alone or isolated.
Induction
Of Lone Wolves Through Online Tools
The present
surge in the influence of IS (Islamic State) has raised apprehensions regarding
the future generation of terrorists, necessitating further research into all
facets of lone wolf terrorism. Lone wolves, as previously defined, operate
independently, detached from organized terrorist networks, and are propelled
toward violence without external assistance. Spaaij's study in 2012 examined 88
lone terrorists responsible for 198 attacks, delving into five prominent cases.
This research provides crucial insights into the ideologies, motivations, and
radicalization processes of these individuals. Despite the absence of a
universally agreed-upon profile for lone wolf terrorists due to their
individuality and rarity, researchers have identified some common
characteristics. These include a higher likelihood of facing mental and social
challenges, a history of criminal behaviour, a tendency to blend personal
frustrations with extremist ideologies and externalize blame onto others,
experiences of depression, grievances, personal crises (e.g., job loss,
financial issues, stress), familiarity with weapons, and a tendency not to act
impulsively.
While the
ideologies of terrorists and lone wolf terrorists may align, the pathways to
radicalization often differ. Typical terrorists commonly undergo radicalization
by travelling abroad for training, associating with known terrorist or
extremist groups, and procuring weapons or creating explosives before an
attack, actions that usually draw attention from law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. In contrast, the planning conducted by lone wolf
terrorists often remains unnoticed until it's too late. Presently, lone wolves
primarily seek training online, researching methods to cause harm in the name
of their ideology and connecting with like-minded radicals to develop their
beliefs and motivations without direct physical contact.
The process
of lone wolf radicalization is complex and lacks a single defining factor.
Typically, it begins when individuals experience frustration with their lives,
societal structures, or both foreign and domestic government policies. Precht
outlines a common radicalization trajectory where individuals connect with
like-minded people and collectively undergo a series of events and phases,
potentially culminating in terrorism. Various factors contribute to this
process, including social and religious identification, interactions and
integration within social circles, experiences in prison, influences from
family and friends, socioeconomic status, government policies, personal
experiences, criminal backgrounds, globalization, racism, psychological
well-being, the internet, and broader global political, cultural, and economic
developments. To gain a comprehensive understanding of radicalization, it's
crucial to examine each factor and behaviour individually, discerning their
roles in the radicalization process
Presently,
the Internet is considered a significant factor in the radicalization of lone
wolves, although opinions on its level of influence vary among researchers.
This perception often hinges on specific case studies. Online platforms allow
potential lone wolves to connect with like-minded individuals, shaping their
beliefs, expressing grievances, and fostering a sense of belonging to a cause.
Anders Behring Breivik, for instance, revealed his use of the Internet to
gather tactical knowledge from Al-Qaeda and participate in extremist forums,
aiding his solo terrorist attack in Oslo. The Internet offers access to endless
extremist propaganda and violent ideologies, often evading detection.
Factors
such as exposure to extremist materials, influence from spiritual leaders,
feelings of alienation, marginalization, political oppression, discrimination,
perceptions of Western government misconduct, and the desire to take action all
contribute significantly to the radicalization of individuals. However, despite
extensive research on terrorist radicalization and home-grown terrorism, a
comprehensive understanding of lone wolf radicalization remains limited. Prior
studies have struggled to differentiate between true lone wolves and individual
terrorists with ties to terrorist organizations or networks. While a
single-case study may not yield broadly applicable conclusions, it aims to
offer valuable insights into the radicalization process of a lone wolf.
Conclusion
Omar Mateen
orchestrated the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil post-9/11 precisely
because he acted alone. He operated without connections to suspicious groups
that would trigger counterterrorism surveillance, radicalizing in isolation
through online exposure. Purchasing weapons legally, he evaded suspicion. His
attack drew inspiration but lacked direction from Islamist extremist groups.
Its impact, however, didn't resonate on a governmental scale, failing to
instigate change or impose significant costs on the state.
Lone wolf
actors necessitate fewer resources and less organization compared to structured
extremist groups, rendering their identification and apprehension more
challenging. Their elusive nature makes attacks in high-security Western
countries more probable. Radicalization via online propaganda and conspiracy
theories, originating from extremist groups, blurs the line for law enforcement
between curious bystanders and those actively planning violence.
While lone
wolf attacks often result in higher casualties, they lack the capacity
demonstrated by organized extremist groups, such as the impactful 9/11 attack
by al Qaeda, which coerced governments to yield to terrorist demands. Numerous
lone wolf incidents in the West have failed to prompt significant shifts in
state or international policies, hence posing a less substantial threat to
state survival.
References
Burke,
Jason. “The Myth of the ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist.” The Guardian, 30 March 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist
Pantucci,
R. (2011). A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist
Terrorists. Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, 1-39.
Precht,
T. (2007). Homegrown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe.
Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice.
Spaaij,
R. (2012). Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and
Prevention. London/New York: Springer.
Spaaij,
R. (2010). The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 854—870.
Veilleux-Lepage,
Yannick. “How and Why Vehicle Ramming Became the Attack of Choice for
Terrorists.” The Conversation, 29 March 2017.
https://theconversation.com/how-andwhy-vehicle-ramming-became-the-attack-of-choice-for-terrorists-75236
-----
A regular columnist for NewAgeIslam.com, Mubashir
V.P is a PhD scholar in Islamic Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia and freelance
journalist.
URL: https://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-jihad/online-radicalism-threat-lone-wolves/d/131479