Pakistan Press on: US, Legal, IWT, Balochistan, Peace, Zakat: New Age Islam's Selection, 28 April 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
28 April 2025
Why The US Loses More Than It Gains
Can We Register A Business In 18 Minutes?
A Legal Look At IWT
Balochistan As Partner
Paint, Poetry, Peace
On The Brink, Again
Zakat As Non-State Social Welfare
Beneath Dry Rivers
-----
Why The US Loses More Than It Gains
By I Hussain
April 28, 2025
Anyone searching for a coherent rationale behind the Trump administration’s abrupt imposition of steep tariffs in early April – heralded by President Trump as “liberation day” – will be left dazed and confused. The justification for these tariffs has not only been inconsistently articulated but, at times, has appeared outright contradictory.
On the one hand, we are told that the tariffs are designed to revive American manufacturing. On the other, they are characterised as tactical leverage – short-term bargaining chips to compel trading partners to open their markets to American goods. The implication of the latter is especially problematic: if the tariffs are to be lifted upon securing concessions, then US manufacturers are left to wonder what happens next. No rational business would commit to new investments when policy appears this paradoxical.
The early hope that such trade tensions might be swiftly resolved has already begun to fade. Japan – long considered a likely candidate for a quick bilateral agreement with Washington – recently concluded a round of negotiations with no deal in sight. This is particularly telling, given that the US is Japan’s largest export market, accounting for roughly 20 per cent of Japanese exports in 2023, valued at $143 billion. Japan’s chief negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, returned home empty-handed, describing the American posture as “extremely regrettable”.
If securing concessions from Japan proves this difficult, extracting meaningful compromises from Beijing remains exponentially more challenging. The administration has engaged China in what game theorists call a ‘chicken’ scenario – a high-stakes contest of mutual economic brinkmanship. The result: Chinese imports now face a punitive 145 per cent tariff rate in American markets, while American products encounter 125 per cent duties when entering China.
The Trump administration seems to have misunderstood the asymmetry of economic dependency. The US imports a broad swathe of Chinese goods – both consumer and industrial – for which substitutes are either unavailable or prohibitively disruptive to supply chains. China primarily imports agricultural commodities from the US, products more easily substituted through alternative suppliers. Even Boeing aircraft can be replaced with those from Airbus.
While Beijing covets American high-technology exports, particularly semiconductors, these have been systematically restricted by both the previous Trump administration and then by the Biden White House.
Ironically, instead of stunting Chinese innovation, the embargo on sales to China of leading edge semiconductors and lithography equipment may have catalysed it. In recent months, China has made notable strides in strategic sectors, particularly Electric Vehicles (EVs) and Artificial Intelligence. The sudden emergence of the DeepSeek platform on the global AI stage is just one indication that China is not only catching up but it may be starting to lead. This rapid technological advancement underscores an immutable reality: technological diffusion inevitably transcends national boundaries, regardless of attempts to stop it from doing so.
Nowhere is the lack of strategic foresight more evident than in the area of rare earth elements. These 17 chemically similar metals are indispensable in the production of everything from EV motors and jet engines to military-grade weaponry. China holds a near-monopoly on their mining and refining, an environmentally hazardous process involving radioactive byproducts. According to the International Energy Agency, China accounts for approximately 61 per cent of global rare earth production and an astounding 92 per cent of processing.
This dominance poses a serious vulnerability to US industrial and defence sectors. Rare earths are not just an economic asset but a strategic one. Between 2020 and 2023, China supplied 70 per cent of all US rare earth imports. Key American weapons systems depend on them. The Pentagon is acutely aware that without assured access to these materials, the US risks compromising its military footprint across the world.
The significance of these materials was further underscored just a few days back ago when Elon Musk, Tesla’s founder and major shareholder, announced that China’s suspension of rare earth magnet exports has delayed production of the humanoid robots, ‘Optimus’, his company had planned to build.
Ironically, it was Beijing itself that recently showcased its own advances in humanoid robotics – organising a half-marathon in Beijing just a week ago, featuring 21 participating robots. Only six reached the finish line, but even so that is a major breakthrough. As Dr Johnson said about a dog trying to walk on its hind legs, “it is not done well, but you are surprised to find it done at all”.
The event also served as a clear signal to global competitors that Beijing is ready and able to compete on an equal footing in cutting-edge technology.
Greenland, long known to contain rare earth deposits, has thus found itself unexpectedly thrust into US foreign policy discourse. President Trump’s proposal that Greenland should become part of the US has however been met with disdain by the island’s residents as shown by recent voting and opinion polling results.
If history is a guide, protectionism rarely delivers on its promises. Consider the Reagan-era Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) agreement of 1981, under which Japan agreed to limit automobile exports to the US. Far from hobbling Japanese carmakers, the restrictions spurred them to upgrade their product lines, establish manufacturing plants within the US, and enter new markets. By the time the agreement expired in 1994, Japanese automakers had not only survived but thrived – emerging more competitive and more integrated into the global economy.
The lesson is straightforward: unless domestic firms seize protectionist windows as opportunities for reform, foreign competitors will simply adapt, innovate, and return stronger. As a cautionary tale, the subsequent bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors in 2009 – averted only through emergency government loans – should serve as a reminder that artificial trade barriers do not compensate for the lack of strategic acumen.
Today, the Trump administration appears to be repeating the same mistakes, albeit on a larger scale. The ‘ready, fire, aim’ approach to trade policy is beginning to unravel. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is already rowing back on the idea of permanently high tariffs under pressure from sinking stock and bond markets as well as a declining US dollar.
Retail giants such as Walmart and Target have joined the chorus of concern, warning that the ongoing tariff standoff could lead to product shortages and price hikes that would ultimately be borne by American consumers.
Meanwhile, Chinese officials project remarkable equanimity, reportedly denying that any bilateral negotiations are underway. Beijing’s implicit message appears to be that responsibility for de-escalation rests with Washington as the initiator of this conflict. Or, as Napoleon put it: “Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake”.
For countries like Pakistan, these global trade tremors carry indirect but consequential implications. The US remains Pakistan’s largest export destination, accounting for 17 per cent of total exports – or $5.5 billion – against $2.1 billion in imports. This trade surplus of $3.4 billion, the largest Pakistan maintains with any country, offers both opportunity and risk. Future trade negotiations may involve questions of Intellectual Property protection and scrutiny of Islamabad’s economic and strategic ties with Beijing. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities may also draw renewed attention in US policymaking circles.
In sum, tariffs may generate headlines and stir populist sentiment, but they are no substitute for strategic economic policy. Without coherence, consultation or long-term vision, they are more likely to alienate allies, embolden rivals and disrupt domestic industries than to deliver any lasting advantage.
There is still time to shift course. But that would require qualities of humility, strategic thinking, and the ability to learn from the past. Such qualities seem to be in short supply.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1305835-why-the-us-loses-more-than-it-gains
----
Can We Register A Business In 18 Minutes?
By Dr Nasir Iqbal
April 28, 2025
Imagine registering a business in under ten minutes – without visiting multiple government offices, submitting countless forms, or waiting weeks for verification. While this might sound like a distant dream in Pakistan, it is the current reality in countries like Estonia, New Zealand and Singapore. In these economies, streamlined digital business registration has catalysed economic growth, formalisation and innovation.
Pakistan, long mired in bureaucratic red tape and inefficiencies, now stands at the threshold of transformative reform – one that could open the floodgates for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through a fully digital business registration platform.
The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), through its recent Policy Viewpoint, outlines an ambitious but feasible proposal: create a unified, mobile-first, multilingual digital platform to register businesses using only a valid CNIC and a mobile phone. This vision of a paperless, frictionless business registration process aligns with global best practices and has the potential to revolutionize how businesses are created and operate in Pakistan.
Why does this matter? Today, over 90 per cent of Pakistan’s MSMEs remain in the informal economy. This informality restricts access to finance, government support and formal employment opportunities. It also stifles productivity and innovation while eroding the country’s tax base.
According to the World Bank, a key hurdle in formalisation is the complexity and cost of registration. In Pakistan, registering a business can take up to 16.5 days and requires navigating six to eight steps, often including physical visits to multiple government departments. The Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB), with World Bank assistance, has attempted to digitalise the process, but it still requires separate registrations with the SECP and FBR and lacks true one-window integration.
The PIDE-proposed solution addresses these problems head-on. The core of the system is a fully digital, AI-enabled platform where entrepreneurs register using their CNIC, passport, or driver’s license. Upon submission and biometric verification, a unique business number (UBN) is generated, linked directly with the FBR and SECP for tax compliance and regulatory purposes. Bank accounts are integrated at the time of registration, and all documents are stored in a secure digital vault. What would normally take two weeks could now be completed in minutes – even from a remote village.
The benefits of such a system are multifold. First, it dramatically reduces the entry barrier for entrepreneurs, especially women and youth in rural areas who may lack access to legal services or capital. By removing the need for a physical address and enabling biometric verification through mobile phones or nearby point-of-sale (PoS) terminals, the system makes registration universally accessible.
Second, it ensures regulatory compliance and tax inclusion at the point of registration, thereby broadening the tax base without additional enforcement. FBR will automatically link businesses to tax records, reducing evasion and increasing transparency. Third, it provides an opportunity to integrate intellectual property protection. The system allows for simultaneous trademark registration, ensuring that entrepreneurs can protect their brand and identity from day one.
Fourth, from a governance standpoint, the system will enable data-driven policymaking. Aggregated and anonymised data from the registry can provide real-time insights into business activity across regions, helping the government tailor policies and support where needed.
Globally, the impact of digital registration has been profound. In Serbia, for example, the average time to register a business dropped from 51 days in 2003 to just 2–3 days by 2005, with a 95 per cent increase in taxpayer registration among entrepreneurs. Estonia reduced company registration time to 18 minutes and saw a 46 per cent increase in registrations after simplifying the process. Under Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, business registrations surged by 78 per cent between 2014 and 2023 following digital reforms.
Pakistan must now replicate and contextualise this success. The roadmap for implementation is clear and credible. The National Information Technology Board (NITB) will lead development, integrating systems with NADRA, FBR, SECP, banks, and trademark authorities. The Ministry of IT and Telecom will spearhead policy reforms and a whole-of-government approach. A phased rollout will begin with major cities, followed by rural expansion through telecom partnerships and mobile PoS. Stakeholder coordination, strong encryption for data security, and digital literacy programmes will ensure inclusion and trust.
Of course, challenges exist – digital literacy, limited infrastructure, resistance to formalisation – but the policy outlines practical solutions. Community help desks, training programs, and awareness campaigns will guide users. Incentives such as tax breaks and reduced registration fees for early adopters will accelerate uptake. Integration with the Pakistan Single Window (PSW), which has already digitised import/export processes by eliminating 155 paper-based documents, creates a seamless domestic and international trade ecosystem.
This proposal does more than simplify a process; it reimagines the relationship between the state and the entrepreneur. It replaces suspicion with support, paperwork with trust, and friction with efficiency. It empowers the youth, especially in underserved regions, to start businesses and participate in the formal economy. It aligns with Pakistan’s digital transformation goals and provides a rare opportunity to leapfrog into a new era of business facilitation.
The economic impact could be enormous. A 25–30 per cent increase in formal registrations would bring thousands of businesses into the tax net, boost financial inclusion, and generate employment. It would improve Pakistan’s rankings in global indices such as the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and make the country more attractive to domestic and foreign investors.
But perhaps the most important impact is philosophical. By simplifying registration, Pakistan would signal that it values and trusts its entrepreneurs – not just the big industrialists but the street vendors, artisans, freelancers and small shopkeepers who form the backbone of its economy.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1305836-can-we-register-a-business-in-18-minutes
------
A Legal Look At IWT
By Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar
April 28, 2025
In light of India’s continued hostility towards Pakistan, marked by repeated violations of bilateral and international obligations, it is imperative to examine recent developments concerning the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and the strategic suspension of the Simla Agreement. Both instruments are foundational to the legal and geopolitical relationship between the two countries. Under international law, Pakistan’s position remains principled, well-founded and defensible.
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 by India and Pakistan with the World Bank as a guarantor, is a binding international agreement. The treaty allocates control of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and grants Pakistan rights over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), subject to certain limitations. Importantly, Article XII of the treaty explicitly provides that it “shall not be terminated except by agreement of both the governments”, rendering any attempt at unilateral withdrawal legally void and internationally untenable.
The treaty includes no provision that allows unilateral withdrawal by either party. The only legally permissible options are its continuation, or its amendment or termination through mutual consent. This shows a critical legal reality: while the treaty allows for negotiated reform, it unequivocally prohibits unilateralism. Any Indian assertion or action suggesting a unilateral exit from the treaty stands in direct violation of its express terms and the principles of international law.
This is not the first time India has threatened to disrupt or unilaterally abandon the Indus Waters Treaty. On several occasions, Indian officials have made provocative declarations regarding the diversion of water flows legally allocated to Pakistan, acts that Pakistan has rightfully regarded as hostile and tantamount to a declaration of war. In response, Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) has consistently issued strong, evidence-based rebuttals, characterizing such moves as grave violations of international law and serious threats to regional peace and stability. The NSC has reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to responding through legal, diplomatic, and strategic channels in a manner consistent with both constitutional and international norms.
India’s ongoing attempts to bypass or undermine the treaty’s framework clearly violate international legal obligations. Given the World Bank’s role as a third-party guarantor, Pakistan has multiple avenues available under international law to challenge India’s conduct, including the treaty’s built-in dispute resolution mechanisms, recourse to the International Court of Justice, and other international arbitration forums.
Pakistan must adopt a proactive legal strategy to defend its water rights. This includes invoking the dispute resolution provisions in Annexures F and G of the treaty, whether by appointing a neutral expert or initiating proceedings before a Court of Arbitration. In view of India’s repeated infractions, Pakistan is also justified in engaging the UN and calling upon the World Bank to ensure adherence to the treaty’s stipulations.
Turning to the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan’s recent suspension of the agreement is both legally justified and diplomatically strategic. For decades, India has misused the agreement to block international attention to the Kashmir issue, insisting on exclusive bilateralism. However, India’s unilateral revocation of Article 370 of its constitution, its demographic engineering in Indian-Occupied Jammu & Kashmir, and its continuing human rights violations has rendered the bilateral mechanism defunct.
The suspension of the Simla Agreement reactivates the jurisdiction and relevance of the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. These resolutions explicitly call for a plebiscite to allow the Kashmiri people to determine their political future. By suspending the agreement, Pakistan is no longer legally restricted to bilateral avenues and can reinternationalise the Kashmir dispute, placing it firmly back on the global diplomatic and legal agenda.
The core reason for the deterioration in Indo-Pak relations lies in India’s aggressive and destabilising behaviour, including orchestrated false flag operations, disinformation campaigns, and state-sponsored terrorism targeting Pakistan. Incidents like the Pulwama attack and the Balakot airstrikes, widely viewed as politically motivated provocations, exemplify India’s belligerent approach to regional security.
Pakistan’s legal position on both the Indus Waters Treaty and the Kashmir issue is firmly rooted in international law. The international community – particularly the World Bank and the UN – must play a more active role in holding India accountable. Meanwhile, Pakistan must continue its legal advocacy, strategic diplomacy and principled resistance to safeguard its sovereignty and ensure regional peace.
Pakistan is on strong legal footing with respect to the Indus Waters Treaty. The suspension of the Simla Agreement represents not only a lawful response but also a necessary strategic shift. These steps demonstrate Pakistan’s firm resolve to confront India’s escalating hostilities with constitutional clarity, legal integrity, and international legitimacy.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1305837-a-legal-look-at-iwt
-------
Balochistan As Partner
By Aisha Saeed
April 28, 2025
Balochistan’s isolation is not only geographic or developmental but rooted in questions of power and sovereignty. The province faces an armed separatist movement that seeks not reform, but secession, and has increasingly resorted to violence to pursue that goal.
While often framed as a domestic political crisis, there is a growing understanding that elements of this separatism are externally influenced and, in some cases, sustained by foreign interests. This dimension adds complexity to an already sensitive situation.
At the heart of the current policy approach is a development-security framework. On the one hand, Balochistan has been the focus of renewed investment and infrastructure-building, particularly through CPEC and regional connectivity projects. On the other, ensuring the safety of workers, assets and local communities has necessitated an expanded security presence. These twin pillars – economic development and security stabilization – are now at the centre of the state’s engagement in the province.
This shift is significant. Just recently, new initiatives have been launched in Gwadar under the government’s integrated development strategy, including a desalination plant to address local water scarcity, expanded vocational training centres and housing schemes tied to employment generation. These are early steps, but they suggest an intent to translate national-level projects into community-level benefits.
It signals that Balochistan is no longer viewed solely through a security lens, but increasingly as a region integral to Pakistan’s future economic landscape. However, if these initiatives are to succeed, they must move beyond physical infrastructure and address the deeper question of political legitimacy and inclusion.
As emphasised in international frameworks on the security-development nexus, sustainable peace requires more than parallel progress in security and economic growth; it requires that the two actively reinforce one another. Where security enables development, development must, in turn, reduce the drivers of conflict – particularly exclusion, inequality and lack of trust in public institutions. Without this mutual reinforcement, both objectives risk falling short. Development divorced from participation and local ownership risks undermining itself.
For decades, Balochistan has seen decisions made about it, not with it. Security imperatives have often dictated the tone and direction of federal engagement, while provincial institutions remained weak and local voices struggled to shape the agenda. Even today, national conversations about Balochistan tend to orbit two fixed points: insurgency and investment. One casts the province as a threat to national cohesion; the other, as a resource-rich frontier. In both cases, the people of Balochistan are rarely presented as political actors in their own right.
What’s missing is a national approach that sees Balochistan not as a zone of intervention, but as a constituency with agency and aspirations.
While Balochistan has formal representation in federal structures, including the Senate and National Assembly, its perspectives are often filtered through the prism of national priorities. There is limited space in mainstream policymaking and media for Baloch positions that diverge from centre-structured narratives. As a result, even genuine concerns are sometimes viewed with suspicion or dismissed as peripheral.
This marginalisation has real consequences. When communities feel that their political voice holds little weight in shaping their future, trust erodes. When politics becomes extractive rather than participatory, development loses its legitimacy, even when intentions are sincere. The result is a recurring pattern: investment plans launched with optimism, only to be met with scepticism or resistance on the ground.
That is not to deny that progress has been made. Recent initiatives indicate an emerging awareness that Balochistan’s challenges cannot be resolved through force or funding alone. Dialogue with estranged Baloch groups has been attempted. Local development efforts have increased. Programmes in education, health and digital access reflect a growing focus on human development. These efforts deserve recognition, but they must be embedded in a deeper political strategy.
Strengthening provincial institutions is essential – through transparent elections, empowered assemblies and genuine local participation in key decisions, especially on natural resources and development planning.
There must also be an unambiguous commitment to constitutional protections and rule of law. Allegations of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and legal impunity must be addressed through proper judicial mechanisms. Justice, even when politically inconvenient, builds far more legitimacy than silence or denial.
Equally important is the decentralisation of narrative ownership. Balochistan has for too long been viewed through external frameworks – whether shaped by national security concerns, centralised economic planning or distant media narratives. National media, academia and policy institutions must create room for Baloch perspectives, especially those that challenge the dominant discourse or question the centre’s assumptions.
The presence of separatist violence complicates the picture. Attacks on security personnel, civilians, infrastructure, and economic projects have all contributed to instability and fear. This violence, while often framed as resistance, has in reality narrowed the space for dialogue and democratic engagement. It has placed ordinary citizens – especially those working on or benefitting from state-led initiatives – in the crossfire.
Yet militancy thrives in political vacuums. The task ahead is not only to contain violence but to outcompete it, by offering a credible political alternative grounded in rights, representation, and respect. Security operations may be necessary, but they cannot substitute for long-term political inclusion.
The federal government must move beyond seeing Balochistan as a project site or a security risk. It must treat it as a partner. That requires patience, humility and a willingness to address uncomfortable truths. It also demands a broader national conversation in which Balochistan is not just present, but central.
If progress is the goal, politics can no longer be an afterthought. It must be the foundation.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1305838-balochistan-as-partner
--------
Paint, Poetry, Peace
By Rutaba Syed
April 28, 2025
Mental health in Pakistan is facing a growing crisis. As someone who has spent the past five years working at the intersection of creativity, healing, and community engagement, I witness this reality unfold daily – not just in the statistics, but in the human stories behind them.
One in four people in Pakistan will experience a mental health challenge in their lifetime, and yet fewer than 900 psychiatrists serve a population of over 240 million. These figures alone highlight a systemic shortfall in mental health care. But beyond the shortage of clinical resources, there is something equally pressing: the urgent need for approaches that are culturally rooted, accessible and emotionally resonant for the people they aim to serve.
While mental health has gained more visibility in public discourse and national policies in recent years, the dominant model of care still leans heavily on clinical interventions – psychotherapy, psychiatry and pharmacological treatments. These services, although critical, are not enough. They are often inaccessible to the majority of Pakistanis due to cost, geography and cultural hesitation. In this context, we must look beyond traditional models and explore how culturally rooted, contextually relevant approaches – especially arts-based and community-led interventions – can bridge the gap and make mental well-being a reality for more people.
Arts-based methodologies are emerging globally as powerful complements to mental healthcare. These approaches do not seek to replace clinical treatment; rather, they offer additional pathways for individuals and communities to process emotion, develop resilience, and access support in ways that feel safe, familiar, and empowering. Creative practices – such as storytelling, visual arts, movement, music and theatre – can provide non-verbal avenues to express complex emotions, particularly in cultures where discussing mental health openly is still a taboo.
I have lived through different formats of loss and mental health challenges and explored how the arts can help understand emotion within community settings. Over time, the impact and importance of creative practices for healing and wellness have become more evidence-driven, when applied in a community setting.
What makes these interventions effective isn’t just the art but their deep connection to the local context. Rather than importing Western therapeutic models and retrofitting them to rural Pakistan, the approach centres on listening, adapting and co-creating with communities. It draws on Pakistan’s rich traditions of oral storytelling, devotional poetry like that of Bhit Shah and Rumi, indigenous crafts, and communal gatherings. These cultural expressions serve as psychosocial tools, offering familiar and safe ways for people to make meaning, reduce stigma and access support.
Arts-based practices do not require diagnostic labels, high literacy, or clinical spaces. They can be implemented in classrooms, camps, or under a tree in a village square. They invite everyone in–regardless of age, gender, or background. They are also scalable, cost-effective, and adaptable across humanitarian, educational, and health sectors. In a country where formal mental health infrastructure remains concentrated in urban centers, this matters immensely.
Pakistan’s evolving mental health frameworks have begun to acknowledge the importance of community care, prevention, and well-being. This is encouraging. But policy alone is not enough. We need investment in capacity building, training facilitators in trauma-informed creative practices. We need local research that documents and validates the impact of these practices. And we need partnerships across sectors – education, healthcare, humanitarian aid – to embed these methodologies where they are most needed. I’ve seen how creative practice can open doors that therapy alone cannot. I’ve watched a teenage boy in Lyari paint his unspoken rage into something beautiful. I’ve listened to a grandmother in Gilgit sing lullabies that carried generations of loss and strength. I’ve sat with communities as they transformed pain into poetry, displacement into tapestry, and silence into collective songs. This teaches us how art can create safe spaces to celebrate beauty – even if beauty isn’t beautiful.
Healing, after all, is not just about diagnosis and treatment; it’s about recognition, relationship and meaning-making. We began – long ago – with clay, with song, with shared stories. In reclaiming these creative roots, we reclaim a more holistic path to healing.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1305839-paint-poetry-peace
----
On The Brink, Again
Maleeha Lodhi
April 28, 2025
INDIA and Pakistan are back on the brink of a dangerous confrontation. Escalating tensions have pushed the subcontinent into uncharted territory heightening the risk of a full-blown crisis as bilateral mechanisms are cast aside and diplomatic relations further downgraded.
Following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in occupied Kashmir, which claimed the lives of 26 civilians, India announced a raft of punitive measures against Pakistan. They included suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which governs the sharing and management of trans-border rivers between the two neighbours. Other steps involved closing the Attari border crossing, cancelling visas and shrinking the size of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi.
These so-called retaliatory steps were taken without any investigation into the terrorist incident and absent any evidence of Pakistan’s involvement. The Indian foreign secretary’s announcement only mentioned “cross-border linkages of the terrorist attack”. But an orchestrated campaign in the Indian media pointed the accusing finger at Pakistan.
More significantly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi warned of “unimaginable punishment” for the attackers and their backers. This intensified speculation in India that his government was planning some kind of kinetic action to avenge the killings. It recalled memories of the 2019 Balakot crisis when Indian planes crossed the border to launch strikes inside Pakistani territory ostensibly against militant hideouts. Pakistan retaliated by air strikes in Jammu. The crisis was defused with the help of friendly countries after Pakistan repatriated an Indian pilot captured when his plane was shot down by Pakistan.
Islamabad’s response to India’s April 23 announcement was carefully calibrated to match Indian moves. A statement issued after a meeting of the National Security Committee announced a slew of retaliatory actions. It described Indian measures as “unilateral, unjust and irresponsible”. It rejected the Indian decision to suspend the IWT and warned any attempt “to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan” will be “considered an act of war and responded with full force”. Pakistan, it said, reserved the right to hold “all bilateral agreements with India”, including the Simla Agreement, “in abeyance” but stopped short of suspending any. Pakistan also shut down the Wagah border crossing and its airspace to Indian overflights as well as halted all trade. These steps mostly mirrored Indian actions.
India’s announcement about putting the IWT “in abeyance” was not made in a vacuum. For the past several years New Delhi has been raising doubts about the fate of the 1960 treaty, that has for over six decades survived wars, confrontations and tensions to provide a framework for water-sharing.
The two countries disagreed in recent years over the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism. India, for example, boycotted a court of arbitration hearing in January 2023 at The Hague on Indian hydroelectric projects on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers disputed by water-stressed Pakistan. It wanted a neutral expert instead. In January 2023, India notified Pakistan of its intention to amend the treaty’s dispute settlement provisions. Islamabad responded at the time by expressing willingness to discuss any concerns in the relevant body, the joint Indus Waters Commission, while calling on India to comply with the treaty.
In August 2024, New Delhi formally asked Islamabad for a review and renegotiation of the IWT. In its communication to Pakistan, India called for modifying it on grounds of what it called “fundamental and unforeseen change” in circumstances as well as security concerns. It mentioned concerns over issues including “demographic changes, environmental challenges, and the need to accelerate clean energy development”. India’s letter of April 24 to Pakistan echoed the same points but significantly added “sustained cross-border terrorism by Pakistan” as justification for putting the treaty in abeyance.
India’s decision to suspend the treaty is neither consistent with treaty provisions nor international law. The treaty does not allow either party to unilaterally put it in abeyance or abrogate it. Both parties have to consent to any treaty modification or its termination according to its provisions. India’s announcement says the IWT “will be held in abeyance with immediate effect until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism”.
For now, abeyance means India will cease sharing water flow data and exchanging information about project designs. But it already stopped doing that years ago. It can take other steps to mount pressure. But India cannot immediately halt the flow of water or significantly divert it as it lacks the infrastructure at present to do so. So, the near-term impact of this action will be limited. Of course, in the longer term it has serious implications.
The imminent danger is from any military action New Delhi is tempted to take, encouraged by what its officials see as ‘effective’ Indian coercive diplomacy in play, which needs reinforcement. Modi’s speech in Bihar on April 24 in which he said terrorists and their backers will be pursued to the “ends of the earth” is being widely construed as strong indication of that possibility. Speculation is running rife that conventional kinetic strikes may be combined with cyberattacks and asymmetrical actions by India.
Already deployment of heavy weaponry is reported close to the Line of Control and international border. Prime Minister Modi may think he can borrow from the Israeli playbook to ‘punish’ Pakistan but any Indian kinetic action will be met by a strong military response from Pakistan, with uncertain and unpredictable consequences for New Delhi. This will likely set off an escalatory cycle and trigger an all-out crisis, which could be on a larger scale than what happened in 2019.
In 2019, a third party helped to defuse the crisis. Will this happen again? If no such help is forthcoming in a timely way it would make the situation between two nuclear neighbours more dangerous than in the past.
The notion of limited war waged under the nuclear threshold is fraught with untold risks. Such a scenario should be avoided at all costs. Even though there is little appetite for this by the Indian side, a backchannel must be re-established without delay to avoid any miscalculation, manage the crisis and prevent it from spinning out of control. The alternative is too terrifying to contemplate.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1907055/on-the-brink-again
----
Zakat As Non-State Social Welfare
Umair Javed | Max Gallien | Vanessa Van Den Boogard
April 28, 2025
THE last few years have proven to be immensely difficult for low-income households in Pakistan. High rates of inflation and low economic growth have exacerbated poverty and heightened the importance of redistributive welfare mechanisms.
One such mechanism practised widely across Pakistan, and the Muslim world in general, is zakat. Zakat constitutes an annual payment amounting to approximately 2.5 per cent of wealth held by an individual and represents one of the five pillars of Islam. Most Muslims fulfil this obligation during the holy month of Ramazan. Despite its importance as a mechanism for redistribution, research on actual zakat payments and their effects remains limited. Since 2021, the authors of this piece, based at the International Centre of Tax and Development and the Lahore University of Management Sciences, have partnered to examine how zakat functions in practice and its effects on social equity and state-society relations.
As part of our research, we were able to carry out a new nationwide survey of 7,500 Pakistanis in 2024. The results from this exercise uncover significant findings about zakat, and demonstrate its substantial economic and social impact in Pakistan.
Before moving on, it is important to clarify some aspects about the survey itself. While no estimate can be perfect, our figures currently represent the most accurate assessment of zakat payments in Pakistan, given the absence of comparable studies. We have implemented two specific methodological improvements to enhance accuracy.
First, we acknowledge that data on religious and charitable giving may be influenced by social desirability bias. Respondents might claim to pay zakat even when they don’t, potentially fearing judgement from interviewers. To address this, we incorporated a list experiment in our survey design.
This methodological approach allowed us to quantify the extent of misreporting. According to direct responses, 52pc of men and 45pc of women reported paying zakat. However, after applying corrections based on the list experiment results, our final calculations assume actual payment rates of 43pc for men and 39pc for women.
These adjustments produce more conservative and realistic estimates than would be obtained through conventional survey methods alone, increasing the reliability of our findings despite the inherent challenges in measuring religious giving practices.
According to the data we collected, Pakistanis contribute more than Rs619 billion in zakat each year. In 2024, the average contributor gave approximately Rs15,000, with over 50 million Pakistanis participating.
This annual zakat distribution exceeds the budget of the Benazir Income Support Programme, Pakistan’s largest state-led cash transfer initiative, which was allocated Rs598.71bn for 2024-2025. The zakat total also surpasses revenue from federal excise duty (Rs576bn in 2023-2024) and the amount Pakistan received in official development aid in 2022, despite being among South Asia’s major aid recipients. It is important to note that the estimates likely understate the actual amount suggesting that the true figure may be higher.
We were also able to document how the actual practice of zakat in the country varies significantly from the state’s policymaking and administration around the issue. Since the 1980s, Pakistan has maintained a system for compulsory zakat collection through a state-administered fund with councils at the federal, provincial and district levels. However, the survey reveals that most Pakistanis prefer to bypass this system, with less than 2pc of contributors utilising the state fund.
This avoidance reflects a broader pattern of low trust in government institutions. The national state fund collects merely one-fiftieth of the estimated annual zakat contributions, as respondents overwhelmingly indicated a preference for managing their own giving.
The majority of zakat is thus distributed directly to individuals. Some contributors opt for intermediaries while still avoiding the state, choosing to give through mosques, schools, and to a lesser extent, non-governmental organisations.
Another main finding from our work is that gender significantly influences zakat distribution patterns. Through analysis of reported giving behaviours and a conjoint survey experiment, we consistently find that people prefer giving zakat to women, regardless of the contributor’s gender. This gender preference is not prescribed in religious texts. While the Quran identifies eligible categories for zakat — including the poor, the needy, administrators of zakat, recent converts, those in bondage or debt, those serving God’s cause, and travellers in need — it does not specify gender preferences for recipients.
Nevertheless, our survey finds that more than half of respondents who gave zakat to individuals reported giving zakat exclusively to female recipients. This pattern suggests that zakat contributors recognise the economic challenges and barriers to state social protection that women in Pakistan face. In fact, the profile most likely to receive zakat according to the conjoint experiment embedded in the survey was widowed women, indicating that contributors consider both gender and economic vulnerability when determining recipients.
These findings highlight the importance of studying non-state social protection and redistribution mechanisms in Muslim countries, particularly given the scale of zakat compared to other social protection channels.
The next steps in our study of zakat will focus on a series of additional questions, especially those related to individual giving and its distributional impact: What factors determine who gives zakat? Why do people avoid the state fund? Are there biases in giving patterns based on proximity, language, or ethnic background? Do zakat practices vary by region, religiosity, or jurisprudential approach? How does widespread zakat payment affect attitudes toward state-led redistribution efforts like wealth taxes?
The answers to these questions will provide further insight into the complex relationship between religious giving, social welfare, and governance in Pakistan and potentially other Muslim-majority countries.
Max Gallien and Vanessa van den Boogard are researchers at the International Centre for Tax and Development. Umair Javed teaches at Lums.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1907056/zakat-as-non-state-social-welfare
-----
Beneath Dry Rivers
Moazzam Husain
April 28, 2025
WHAT if we could see beneath the earth’s surface, like a doctor reading an MRI? We’d see vast aquifers — entire underground reservoirs. Just beneath Rawalpindi and Islamabad, one expert estimates, there’s more water than in Mangla or Tarbela dams. Yet, we only see the shallow surface lakes: Rawal, Simli, and Khanpur.
Below the dry beds of the Sutlej and Ravi lie vast underground water reserves stretching hundreds of kilometres. These are not assumptions — they are a geological phenomenon. Water experts Hassan Abbas and Asghar Hussain have estimated that Pakistan’s riverine aquifers hold more than 400 million acre-feet of fresh water, equal to three years’ flow of the Indus river. Although the Ravi and Sutlej have lost much of their surface flow after the Indus Waters Treaty, the underground reserves beneath their beds are filled with fresh water which gets replenished by floods and rainfall.
What is needed now is a detailed scientific study to confirm the size of these reserves and how much water can be sustainably drawn. Just last month, the World Bank approved new funding to support Pakistan’s climate resilience. Part of this funding should be directed towards these studies. The results must feed directly into policymaking and help attract private investment.
If confirmed, these hidden reserves could open up real opportunities for private-sector-led development. Water extraction contracts can be designed based on the study’s results, legally allowing companies to build and operate modern water-harvesting systems such as horizontal collector wells and solar-powered tube wells. Because this set-up is decentralised, pipelines — not canals — will be used to move the water.
These contracts must be bankable to help private investors raise funds. They will be governed by strict rules for licensing, environmental protection, and sustainable extraction. And all of this can be included in the scope of the study.
In our context, you need to first solve the water, then solve the land. In choosing Cholistan, we were putting the cart before the horse. Now that a wise political decision has been taken to rethink that project perhaps it is best to drop that idea, and instead, develop arid land in districts skirting the dry riverbeds — Bahawalnagar, Pakpattan, Okara, Kasur, Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib, and Faisalabad. Here the land development concession should include one-time cost of installing drip and sprinkler systems which are linked via pipeline to water harvesting infrastructure. Water extraction, irrigation and corporate farming can be unbundled and offered to multiple enterprises through a public-private partnership framework.
This is how FDI is mobilised — not through vague incentives, but through clear, interlinked frameworks where water, land, irrigation and agri-supply chains operate in synergy. If we want meaningful investment, this is the path. Fragmented efforts rarely deliver results.
This model is next generation from the one across our border, where the ambitious Indira Gandhi Canal project in India’s Thar desert presents a cautionary tale. While it has undeniably brought irrigation to some arid zones in the upper reaches, it has also caused soil salinity. And as it cuts into the desert a good amount of water is lost through seepage and evaporation. Our focus on subterranean harvesting with drip and solar power offers an opportunity to evolve a more sustainable and localised model, learning directly from the successes and shortcomings of our neighbour’s endeavour.
A decade ago, this was unthinkable. High pumping costs made groundwater extraction uneconomical. Now, cheap solar energy and efficient irrigation — delivering water directly to root zones via soil moisture sensors — have changed everything. Canal water, with its silt, can’t run through these systems. This shift must replace outdated flood irrigation and canal reliance.
As India and Pakistan continue to confront the realities of a warming subcontinent, both will need to transition towards decentralised, sustainable water solutions. The Indus Basin is a shared resource. Instead of contesting control, both nations should shift focus to nurturing their shared rivers, especially by ensuring adequate flows into the Indus Delta to preserve the integrity of the basin. For Pakistan the riverine reserves beneath the Sutlej and Ravi represent an asset critical to food security and climate resilience. Their sustainable use demands a new water economy that is built on science, structured private investment, renewable energy, and modern irrigation practices.
The roadmap exists. The resource exists. The technology exists. It is now up to the state to act with resolve, with clarity, and with urgency.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1907054/beneath-dry-rivers
-----
URL: https://www.newageislam.com/pakistan-press/us-legal-iwt-balochistan-peace-zakat/d/135334
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism