‘Red’ Scare in Washington: New Age Islam's Selection, 13 May 2017

New Age Islam Edit Bureau

13 May 2017

•  ‘Red’ Scare in Washington

By M D Nalpat

•  Veiled Identity of British Muslims

By Dr Fawad Kaiser 

•  History’s Lessons

By Irfan Husain

•  Walking the Tightrope on Saudi-Led Alliance, Iran

By Syed Mohammad Ali

•  The Anti-Climax

By Babar Sattar

•  DAWN Leaks Has Lessons for PPP

By Zulfiquar Rao

•  Democracy and Institutions

By Touqir Hussain

•  Balancing Civil-Military Relations

By Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi

•  China’s Cautious Middle East Strategy

By Arhama Siddiqa

Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau

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‘Red’ Scare in Washington

By M D Nalpat

May 13, 2017

IN 1993, US and EU had the opportunity of a century to reset relations with Russia, given that the Soviet Union had collapsed and an individual, Boris Yeltsin, had taken over in Moscow who was amenable to US influence. However, the chance was lost because the newly sworn-in Clinton administration sought to do to Russia what Henry Morgenthau had sought for Germany after 1945, which was to “pastoralize” the country. This involved the destruction of manufacturing industry as well as the hollowing out of advanced technology. Yeltsin bowed and bent, and yet the kicks kept coming, including in the manner in which NATO was expanded to the boundaries of the Russian Federation. Interestingly, although Moscow was ready to join NATO and even the EU, that overture was spurned.

This was for two reasons (a) the entry of Russia into the EU would diminish the importance of France and Germany, which in tandem were then dominant in the group and (b) were NATO to include Russia, that hyper-expensive administrative structure would lose its reason for existence. After all, NATO was set up to challenge Moscow, and even after the USSR’s collapse, that central focus was not altered. Yeltsin’s Russia was humiliated over and over again, including by the way in which ally Serbia was bombed into submission by the US, the UK and other air forces. During the 1939-45 global war, it had been Croatia and Bosnia that had backed the Germans, while Serbia remained anti-Nazi. However, the US and the EU went along with the 1990s German position on the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, which was that Serbia was the enemy while Bosnia and Croatia were to be backed.

It must be said to Berlin’s credit that this is a capital that stands by those who in the past were with them in rather than against them in conflict situations, unlike the US and the UK, which had much shorter memories where friends were concerned. A visitor to Washington would need to be pardoned for believing that there was an ongoing war between the Russian Federation and the US. Newspaper columns and television screens are filled with denunciations of Russia. An example was the May 11 Senate Intelligence Committee Open Hearing, where Senator after Senator ascribed almost all the problems faced by the US to Russia.

Similarly, the US has an ongoing intelligence gathering and covert activity basket of measures in Moscow, which is almost certainly much larger than any of the activities being conducted by what is a much poorer country, Russia. Led by the still-dominant Clinton machine within the Democratic Party but including anti-Trump Atlanticists such as Senator John McCain, politicians have been vociferous ever since the January 20,2017 swearing in of Donald John Trump in characterising Russia as an existential enemy of the US that spends much of its time seeking to destroy the world’s most powerful nation. Given the decades of anti-Soviet propaganda that has filled the public space in the US since the 1950s, it has been a relatively simple matter to convince large numbers of the US people that the biggest threat facing the US is a Russia led by Vladimir Putin. Of course, the real target of these critics is not Putin but Trump. The Clinton machine is on overdrive seeking to ensure that the 45th President of the US faces dismissal through impeachment or is made to resign well before his term ends on January 20,2022. Hillary Clinton had put much more effort into how she would run her administration than in how she would win the election. Unlike in case of President Trump, who is still in the process of identifying individuals to fill the thousands of patron positions in US federal administration, the Clinton campaign had already prepared lists of those President Hillary Clinton would appoint to high positions.

It must be said that several of such picks are of exceptional quality, such as Ambassador Wendy Sherman, who was a potential UN Ambassador or even Secretary of State in a Clinton administration. Hillary Clinton had prepared in detail for the task of running the country, which is why it must have been a shock that the much more skeletal Trump machine bested them in the polls. In the targeting of President Trump, Russia is collateral damage. The reality is that foreign diplomats routinely keep in touch with campaign officials during a Presidential poll. However, thus far the media in the US has been incurious in seeking details about the contacts between the Clinton campaign and foreign diplomats, the focus being solely on meetings between the Trump campaign and Russian officials, meetings that took place in every election cycle. The effort has been to create a toxicity about Russia that makes suspect any contact with that country, and then to insinuate that the Trump campaign connived with Moscow in somehow undermining the interests of the US. That this strategy was being employed was no secret. Indeed, in a televised debate, Hillary Clinton herself called Donald Trump “a puppet” of Vladimir Putin. This was a charge of treason, but it failed to ensure victory for the Democratic Party candidate. However, it must be said to his credit that President Trump has refused to be cowed down by the attacks on him in the matter of Russia. Indeed, he met both the Russian Foreign Minister and the Russian Ambassador to the US in the Oval Office itself, clearly showing that he has nothing to hide.

The effort of the Clinton machine is to get a Special Investigator appointed, so that the next few years will see the news cycle dominated by negative reports on Trump and his staff spread by a Special Investigator whose future would be bright indeed were he to manage to secure the resignation or dismissal through impeachment of a sitting US President. Aware of such a conspiracy, the Republican Party is for the moment holding firm. However, the Clintons are nothing if not persistent, and their effort to punish Donald Trump for defeating Hillary Clinton at the hustings can be expected to continue. The spirit of Joseph McCarthy, who destroyed many careers by making false accusations of sympathy for the Communist Party, is once again stalking to corridors of power in Washington.

Source: pakobserver.net/red-scare-washington/

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Veiled Identity of British Muslims

By Dr Fawad Kaiser 

13-May-17

Though things have improved vastly in the last few years with integration and community cohesion, the shift of Islam0phobic rhetoric into the mainstream has perturbed Muslims living in the UK. Moreover, the rhetoric in media is even unsettling.

Muslims in the UK have been surrounded by discussions focussing on terrorism, radicalisation, incompatibility and conflict. During this debate, the opinions and views of Muslims have not always been sought on their own terms and have perhaps been overshadowed by misconceptions, which some argue is because of the need to create a front page story. False conclusions about the hostility of British Muslims to mainstream society, their insularity and conservatism, have seized the headlines, amplifying Islamophobia and mistrust.

Muslims are the largest religious minority in the United Kingdom. The majority of today’s Muslim families arrived as migrants in the 1950s and1960s from the former British colonies in India, including Pakistan and Bangladesh. Migration inevitably takes the time to adjust to, as successive generations lay roots and find ways of applying and integrating their cultural and religious beliefs in their new context. Communities, families and individuals can come under considerable strain and pressure as they make these adjustments.

The question is to what extent do British Muslims carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political and social implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter-generational basis.

In contrast, the theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country. Yet, alternative theories of multiculturalism suggest that Muslim migrants, who have acquired deep-rooted and enduring social norms through processes of childhood socialisation within the family, local community, and country, will carry their culture with them when they travel.

Almost every political conversation about British Muslims touches on integration. Politicians complain that instead of integrating with wider society, many British Muslim communities have integrated on a wider scale with their own Muslim communities. They do this based on ethnic background, culture, common language, and country of origin. They follow television channels and news from within their own communities while spending less effort interacting with the wider culture, social affairs, life skills, and appreciating the laws of their own countries.

It is mainly the young British Muslims who are the nexus of what are being portrayed as antithetical systems — between their homes and communities and wider British society; with ‘competing’ values, expectations and social mores. Firstly, it is important to conceptualise these young Muslims, the offspring of immigrant or first generation Muslims, in a comprehensive manner. This group contains a large spectrum of individuals from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds and with different nuances in their religious practices. Whereas a previous generation had pursued ideals of integration, these young UK Muslims want to assert their distinctive character by identifying with the global Ummah of Islam.

Secondly, it matters to argue that for years, Islamists and other extremists have taken advantage of grievances of British Muslims, and have successfully identified ways to integrate them under one “Islamic” banner. The way to tackle Islamophobia is also to tackle prejudice within Muslims as well. What it is not, is to pretend that Islamist extremism does not exist. Prejudices can evaporate in contact with other people and with the understanding on both sides that integration is a two-way process.

Historically, the self-identity of Britain itself has shifted dramatically since its inception, but group identity of young British Muslims has mistakenly appeared as a community that insists on projecting itself as a superior identity to any on offer in Britain. This has created social distancing which has been exacerbated by economic deprivation and compounded by the rise in prejudice and Islamophobia, which is both feared and experienced by Muslims, socially and institutionally. For most young people, the process of negotiating their place in the world, and forming their identity is difficult. Furthermore, occupying a politically, socially and economically marginalised front line position has added further pressure on young British Muslims and made this process more troublesome and difficult to navigate.

The disintegration of the society creates a breeding ground for the preaching of religious hatred and fosters a range of religious and political grievances. Broader social concerns within Muslim communities, such as discrimination, integration or socio-economic disadvantages, should be treated with a dialogue and not as part of extreme religious agenda, which has been counter-productive. We cannot risk further isolating marginalised British Muslim communities.

Source: dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/13-May-17/veiled-identity-of-british-muslims

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History’s Lessons

By Irfan Husain

May 13th, 2017

AS we exchange verbal and artillery salvos with Afghanistan across the border, Iran threatens to send troops into our territory to take out the terrorists who have been killing its border guards.

Clearly not the best way to make friends in our neighbourhood. As it is, our forces are eyeball-to-eyeball with Indian soldiers on the Line of Control in Kashmir, and China has often privately complained about the activities of our Tableeghis in and around Xinjiang. Chinese citizens too have been killed by our Jihadis while working on engineering projects.

In brief, we have managed to antagonise all four of our neighbours. Luckily, Chinese self-interest has prevented our major benefactor from taking these pinpricks too seriously.

We have managed to antagonise all our neighbours.

But this does not alter the fact that, in a difficult region, our diplomacy has been singularly crass.

But before readers jump up and accuse our Foreign Office, let me point out that our relations with all four of our neighbours are conducted largely by the security establishment.

Over the years, the latter has usurped many of the Foreign Office’s functions but, in particular, it controls our relationship with our immediate neighbours, as well as the United States.

Relations with the latter have been rocky ever since sanctions were imposed over our bouts of martial law, as well as our nuclear programme. If you talk to our generals, you will get a litany of complaints against our principal supplier of weapons, beginning with the cut-off of arms during the 1965 war with India.

What is forgotten is that the formal pacts we entered into with the US entitled us to receive arms specifically to combat communist aggression. These modern weapons were not supposed to be used in other conflicts, especially not one of our own choosing, as the 1965 war was.

Since then, the US has used its military aid as a tool to wield influence in Islamabad. That it failed to rein in our support for the Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups speaks volumes for the power of the military in formulating defence policy.

And it is only a short step from defence planning to shaping a foreign policy to sustain it. But to achieve all this, a high degree of public support is needed to shut out interference from elected civilian leaders. This requires a degree of control over the media, as well as a message that discredits the political leadership. Here it is often pointed out that the public has been largely brainwashed by what is seen as propaganda produced by the security establishment.

But while we docilely accept actions that isolate us regionally and globally, others do not. For years, we have been accused of using the rugged geographic nature of our borders as an excuse for cross-border militancy. Each time there is a bloody incident involving attacks on neighbouring targets from our soil, the mantra from our Foreign Office is that our borders are too porous for us to control.

However, why should surrounding countries put up with this? While Afghanistan may be too militarily weak to block incursions, should we be surprised if this vulnerability pushes it into the Indian orbit?

And as Americans suffer casualties from militant groups that have operated from Pakistani soil for years, should we be bewildered by the hostility coming our way from Washington? Had we followed a more astute long-range policy, we could have made much more of initial American dependence on Pakistan for its campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11 than we did.

Tensions with Iran are another result of confusion and lack of clarity of our long-term strategic goals. The reality is that we share a long border with our western neighbour, apart from ties rooted in history and culture. By casting our lot with Saudi Arabia, a distant and socially backward country, we risk alienating a friend of long standing.

Our relations with India are not going to improve any time soon, given the baggage both sides carry, but surely an effort to defuse the ongoing tensions would be worth the effort. And here, I must say, Nawaz Sharif has tried his best but has been thwarted at every turn.

One of the first things military history teaches us is that fighting on two fronts is suicide. And here we are, doing our best to open three fronts simultaneously. Another thing grand strategy teaches us is that defence is closely related to the economy: if we are unable to raise the necessary finances, we cannot maintain a credible military machine.

Sadly, these basic lessons seem to have escaped our security establishment. If they are going to run our foreign policy, some reading of Bismarck and Metternich is surely necessary.

Source: dawn.com/news/1332724/historys-lessons

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Walking The Tightrope On Saudi-Led Alliance, Iran

By Syed Mohammad Ali

May 13, 2017

A recent statement by Iran’s military chief, threatening to conduct cross-border raids against Jaish-e-Adl militants who carry out cross-border attacks, has led to a flurry of diplomatic activity during this current week. Pakistan recorded a formal protest with the Iranian ambassador in Islamabad over the statement, which in turn led a high-level Iranian delegation to visit Pakistan for meetings with our military and political leadership.

Both Pakistan and Iran have reiterated their desire to do more to secure the frontier, curb smuggling and human trafficking, and crack down on dissidents operating on either side of our shared border. Yet, while the above episode seems to have been addressed in a constructive manner, there are larger developments at work which will continue to complicate Pakistan’s relationship with Iran.

General Raheel Sharif’s decision to head the Saudi Arabia-led Islamic Military Alliance (IMA) earlier this March is not something that has gone unnoticed in Iran. Ever since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when ties between Riyadh and Tehran began to sour, Pakistan has had an increasingly difficult time maintaining ties with Tehran, especially due to Islamabad’s closeness with Riyadh. The proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iran’s relationship with India, and its divergent interests in Afghanistan have further complicated this relationship.

Prior to taking up the command of the 39-nation military alliance of Muslim states, General Raheel called for inclusion of Iran in the alliance, required being granted decision making autonomy, and the ability to act as an arbitrator to promote greater harmony across the Muslim world. While these reported preconditions were meant to act as counters to the apprehensions that many observers have expressed regarding this appointment, the fact remains that the military grouping is still an overtly one sect alliance.

General Raheel’s leadership of the military alliance will yield potential benefits, such as enabling Pakistani military diplomacy to rebuild and bolster ties with Arab Gulf states, and it may even help slow the pace of deepening strategic ties between India and Gulf countries like the UAE. Yet, whether Pakistan’s former army chief’s appointment as the alliance head will imply a shift in our principled stance of neutrality in the Yemen crisis is yet to be seen. Pakistan’s close involvement with the military alliance does bring with it the threat of exacerbating proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran on Pakistani soil.

However, proponents of Pakistan’s decision to allow General Raheel to head the military alliance argue that Iran should have little reason to protest if Islamabad adopts a policy of dual engagement with Riyadh and Tehran. They argue that China and India have good relations with Iran and the Arab states, so Pakistan should be able to do the same.

There is now growing convergence in how Pakistan and Iran view the prospects of bringing stability to Afghanistan, working alongside other regional powers such as Russia and China. It is also encouraging to see Iran and Pakistan and their respective emerging ports of Chabahar and Gwadar as ‘sister’ entities instead of rival ports. However, there are several impediments that both these countries need to address which do not complicate Iran’s relationship with countries like India or China. Alleged Iranian support for Pakistani militants, for example, continues to provide fuel for the Pakistani Taliban aspirations of targeting the country’s Shia population, and incursions by Jaish militants into Iranian territory are also becoming a major source of irritation. There are also allegations of Iran also helping stoke restiveness in Sistan-Baluchestan, and Iranians too have had their concerns vis-à-vis Pakistani patronage of militant groups such as Jundullah.

Optimists point to the possibility of developing a grand alliance with Iran, as well as Turkey, anchored by China and Russia, to bring stability and economic development to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Conversely, the above challenges may exacerbate tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, worsen the existing sectarian rift in Pakistan, and aggravate past cleavages between Iranian and Pakistani approaches to addressing the problems of Afghanistan.

How General Raheel’s appointment at the helm of the alliance will impact Pakistan’s ambitions of balancing dual engagement with the Arab Gulf states, especially with Saudi Arabia, and Iran, remains an important question with varied implications.

Source: tribune.com.pk/story/1408375/walking-tightrope-saudi-led-alliance-iran/

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The Anti-Climax

By Babar Sattar

May 13, 2017

The state of shock and mourning of those earlier vying for a dogfight between an elected government and the military and now inciting hatred against the khaki high command for declaring the Dawn Leaks issue settled would be hilarious if it were not such a serious issue.

Imagine the state of mind of those (the term ‘hawaldar media’ is pejorative and undesirable, for a hawaldar is an honourable soldier employed in state’s service) linking the poised climb down of the military over an inappropriate tweet to Pakistan’s surrender in 1971.

Do we need enemies when we have mastered the art of concocting false narratives and indulging in masochism? 1971 didn’t happen because we had an army unwilling to fight. It happened because our state policies post-independence confirmed to the Bengalis that they were the ‘other’ and lesser than us, which led them to conclude that it was in their best interest to create their own country. It was conceit, prejudice and lack of introspection that created Bangladesh, and not timid soldiers.

The 1971 analogy is apt, though: nothing other than conceit and a blinkered approach to constitutionalism and civil-military relations can nurture the desire to see an elected government and the military entangled. The belief that because khakis wield a stick, their professionalism and credibility don’t get tarnished when they intervene to produce partisan consequences is false. Institutions such as the military or the judiciary are non-partisan by design and their venturing beyond their legitimate domain to produce political consequences is baleful.

Which professional soldier (ingrained with a sense of discipline, hierarchy and command) can justify a statement by a Maj Gen or even the army chief publicly rejecting an order issued by the country’s chief executive? Disagreeing with an order and denouncing it publicly are two different things. Can a GOC reject an order issued by the GHQ? Even while reasonable minds can disagree over whether Dawn Leaks was a national security issue or not, there was little disagreement that the DG ISPR’s offending tweet was plain wrong.

Article 243 of the constitution unambiguously states that, “the Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces”. Article 244 requires soldiers to make oath set out in the 3rd Schedule. Each soldier thus swears that, “I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and to uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan…as required by and under the law.”

There is always some gap between the law and its implementation. In Pakistan that chasm is huge. The Pakistan Army is as disciplined as a military can be. There has never been a successful coup by junior officers against the military high command. Is there any doubt that if an officer ‘rejected’ orders of a superior and made a public demonstration of such insubordination, the consequences that would flow would be swift and severe? In evolved democracies, that principle applies equally in case of insubordination to a superior who is a civilian.

Pakistan is at a lesser stage of evolution. The idea of civilian control of the military is anathema to many who imagine the army as a supra-constitutional body meant to keep constitutional institutions in check. Notwithstanding that the constitution is the source of all authority and the only authority a state institution can claim to wield is that vested in it by law, some still view the army’s ability (and willingness) to use brute force within the country as a self-legitimising reality. Why does no one appeal to the air or naval chiefs to save the country?

The executive, judiciary and the legislature are the three pillars of state. The military is a subset of the executive. But the distance in our constitutional journey that remains to be covered can be gauged from the fact that we view the civilian government as the executive and the army as an independent countervailing institution. To bridge the gap and antagonism between the civilian and military arms of the government, we must address the process of identity formation in which the civilian is stigmatised as the ‘other’.

It is not hard to appreciate that monarchial regimes in the Middle East don’t seem very sustainable in the long run. We also know that the primary and immediate target of faith-inspired terror groups like Isis is not the West but Muslim states with weak institutions and an appetite for radicalism. We know that poverty, illiteracy, abuse of religion and disempowerment within a bulging population makes a toxic mix. We thus need a strong military given our hostile geography and the very real threat we face from religious extremism.

But we don’t need a military that sees itself as an arbiter of political fortunes: one that becomes a tool in the hand of the government to suppress its opponents or one that acts as an agent of the opposition to dismember or weaken an elected government. Much is wrong with our non-performing governance system, the authoritarian ethic within political parties and overall lack of accountability in the political realm. Likewise, insular notions of national interest and patriotism and short-sighted national security policies need to be critically scrutinised.

Our civil-military imbalance (or overreach by any institution for that matter) creates false binaries. You may loathe the idea of an elected government attempting to shape public opinion to win a behind-the-curtain policy debate between the civilian and military arms of the executive. But when the military oversteps its constitutional limit to discipline an elected government there emerges a dilemma: do you defend a constitutional principle or do you justify the threat of use of brute force?

Your gut sense tells you that the PM isn’t speaking the truth about his family assets. Do you wish the Supreme Court to throw him out on the basis of hunches, and in the process evolve jurisprudence that would give an unelected institution uncontrolled power to determine who heads the executive? Or do you wish for due process to be upheld, benefit of doubt to be given to the accused and decisions to be taken in accordance with settled principles of law even if that means producing no immediate consequences for such a PM?

There are no quick fixes for the problems and challenges we face. The character of our governance system will not be transformed overnight because the military inflicts fatal wounds on Nawaz Sharif that weaken him to a point where the opposition can devour him in 2018. Accountability will not take root in Pakistan because in one exceptional case the judiciary comes up with a creative interpretation of the constitution to hold that a PM seemingly unwilling to tell the court the truth (or the whole truth) can be booted out without a trial.

Exceptional interventions can retard the journey of institutional evolution instead of facilitating it. Let Nawaz be convicted on the basis of tangible evidence in a trial that is seen to be fair by all. And if that doesn’t happen before the next election, let people judge him on the basis of their own sense of whether or not he is honest and whether or not perception of honesty is the determining factor in whom they wish to elect as PM. If our polity is to evolve, the fight for political legitimacy must take place in the political arena and not in the courts or in the GHQ’s shadow.

In view of our sorry history of holding the constitution “in abeyance”, a day when a release states that, “[the] Pakistan army reiterates its firm commitment and continued resolve to uphold the Constitution…and support the democratic process” is a proud day for Pakistan. Being swept up by tides of populism is neither brave nor virtuous. The bigger man stands on the side of principle even when it is unpopular. Leaders with the ability to see where we went wrong and take corrective action instead of mimicking the past are the real agents of change.

Source: thenews.com.pk/print/204138-The-anti-climax

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DAWN Leaks Has Lessons for PPP

By Zulfiquar Rao

13-May-17

It’s heartening that the DAWN Leaks stalemate — obviously blown out of proportion from the day one — is now settled. However, the entire episode offers several lessons for political parties and their leadership — particularly for the Pakistan People’s Party that so proudly lays claim to its democratic credentials. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) had exercised its rightful powers when it issued a notification approving inquiry committee’s recommendations. If anything was missing in the notification, the relevant quarters should have communicated concerns privately, rather than through the social media.

The crisis was further fanned by opposition political parties and sections of the media who had held grudge against the government. Much to the surprise of those who admire the PPP’s struggle and commitment for democracy, its parliamentary leader, Syed Khursheed Shah, who’s also the Opposition Leader of the House, openly supported the ISPR’s restive reaction on social media. It was a jaw dropping scene when the Opposition Leader from a party that democratically governed Pakistan four times with an utmost yen for civilian supremacy conveniently ignored the act of outright insubordination to an elected PM just for political expedience.

As sanity prevailed and the government and military leadership agreed to bury the hatchet over the DAWN Leaks report without any further bickering, it’s the PPP and its leadership which stood at a loss. Had the PPP adopted a principled stance and condemned the ISPR’s insubordination in public, it would certainly have gained respect. But that would have required it to rise above petty politicking and to suppress the urge to side with the establishment. In the end it lost on both fronts.

As this latest episode has literally reminded us of the suicidal politics of 1990s, it’s important to recall and learn from just one event from that period. On the chilly morning of January 8, 1993, the media had flashed the news of sudden death of General Asif Nawaz Janjua, the then Chief of Army Staff. His death had not preceded any personal ailment, so it was a shocking development. President Ishaq Khan — with exceptional powers under eighth amendment of the Constitution — instantly appointed General Abdul Waheed Kakar as the new COAS. Much to the personal chagrin of the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif — the President appointed the new COAS even without a slight consultation with him. During all this, Asif Janjua’s bereaved family raised suspicions over the circumstances surrounding his sudden death; his wife even claimed he was poisoned. Rumour mongering and conspiracy theories led to a point where Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was openly accused of involvement in Janjua’s demise.

As the prime minister was already in a tight spot as since he had not been consulted on appointment of new COAS, these allegations would have added to his troubles. He responded by promptly formulating an inquiry commission to probe the cause of general’s death. Before the commission could come up with its findings, the then Opposition Leader, Benazir Bhutto, also joined that the conspiracy bandwagon and asked the president to dismiss the government using the very same powers that she had previously criticised. Ms. Bhutto held that the mystery of general’s death could not be resolved while Mr Sharif was at the helm. Although it later turned out that the general had died of heart attack, the political hullabaloo surrounding his death was successful in driving a wedge between President Ishaq and the prime minister, leading to the dismissal of the latter’s government in April 1993 — within three months of general’s death. Eventually, however, both Mr Sharif and President Ishaq Khan were made to resign following the former’s lawsuit against the latter in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Though Ms. Bhutto succeeded in coming back to power through 1993 elections, she could hardly get any strength out of that successful agitation which was so devoid of any democratic principle. We then saw the second term of Ms Bhutto being cut short by a president from her own party. The most immediate cause of her government’s dismissal was the killing of her brother, Murtaza Bhutto, in an encounter with the police which, her opponents accused, was done at the behest of her husband, Asif Ali Zardari. Benazir’s government was dissolved within one-and-a-half month of Murtaza’s death — though years later the court acquitted Mr Zardari from the charge.

Like the asinine opportunism of 1990s didn’t serve any good — the same attitude won’t serve the PPP and the political dispensation as a whole now. In future, before devising any stance on critical issues such as the principle of civilian supremacy, the PPP needs to attentively listen more often than not to the likes of Farhatullah Babar and Raza Rabbani.

Source: dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/13-May-17/dawn-leaks-has-lessons-for-ppp

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Democracy and Institutions

By Touqir Hussain

 13-May-17

Democracy and institutions have a complex relationship that is generally not well understood. The common perception is that democracy’s weakness or strength owes itself to the weakness or strength of institutions. The way to strengthen democracy is thus to strengthen the institutions. As if institutions were the sum total of democracy had an existence independent of the society, and could be strengthened without reference to it. Equally simplistic are the perceptions about the relationship between democracy and how societies change.

The reality is, societies change not because they have become democratic; they become democratic because they have changed. Of course, once democracy takes roots it provides a strong foundation for a sustained change and progress. But if societies try to become democratic without having changed, not only democratisation but also the change becomes difficult or remains perfunctory at best. The illusion of democracy thus ends up masking many of the societal flaws and power imbalances opening us up to an uncertain future.

The role of institutions is critical to the success of the long and painstaking struggle by societies to change and democratise. And they have to be strong to serve both these ends. But how do you strengthen the institutions as they are not really extraneous to society? They are a product of the society, the way it is organised, how it addresses the challenges of state and nation building, and above all, where the political power resides and to whose benefit? The institutions thus have an organic linkage with the society reflecting as well as affecting its power structure, values, intellectual capital, and the organising idea. They do not stand alone which you can fix and thus fix the society.

The view — if democracy is not performing, it is due to the weakness of the institutions — is indeed the way the thinking in the West goes. It makes sense in advanced democracies where institutions and democracy have become one integrated whole. But for us to deduce from the Western experience that all that is required to strengthen democracy is to strengthen the institutions is faulty logic. Western aid agencies and NGOs who also have bought into this view for their own reasons go a step forward. Their favourite hobby horse as a solution is capacity building.

Institutions in Pakistan are reasonably strong. The issue here is not of the capacity building; it is their moral strength we should be concerned about. And if they lack moral purpose and substance, it is not because of lack of able people, or poor understanding of their vital role in good governance, or participatory democracy. It is their orientation and performance we should be worried about.

The problem with Pakistan’s institutions is not weakness but their trivialisation and abuse, by subservience to centres of power, organised and dominant social groups at the top, and by their subversion at the hand of uncontrolled layers of militant religious, sectarian and ethnic outfits at the bottom.

The institutions lack autonomy and integrity. They are strong enough to perform well on their own and behalf of the centres of power but lack moral strength to perform on behalf of the people. That is where they need to be strengthened, not in their capacity which they have.

But you cannot strengthen Pakistan’s institutions without addressing the substance of its society, and without taking into account its many fault lines, competing visions of national identity, religion and culture, the state of education, and influence of extremism that have all compromised the institutions by putting conflicting demands on them. The institutions are being pulled in opposite directions between status quo and change, personalised rule and democracy, and between extremism and moderation, and exclusivity and inclusivity.

The biggest threat we face as a country is the creeping extremism, in thought, action and belief, and our escape to the world of illusions and emotions. We believe that democracy will defeat extremism but do not realise that democracy itself risks being defeated by extremism.

The challenge, therefore, is about changing the purpose and integrity of democratic institutions, and not about strengthening or reforming them. It is about reforming the society and the system which makes it easy to empower only the empowered who hijack the institutions and go on to strengthen their class and institutional interests. In essence, the institutions need to be democratised so that they start serving the purpose of democracy. And that will not happen in isolation. Change has to begin elsewhere.

Yes, Pakistan is witnessing a visible economic turnaround, but for a long term stability and progress of the country, you need to address the multiple other issues as well to improve human security, justice and fairness in the society. And above to make democracy work. Otherwise, Pakistan will remain in a precarious situation — progressing and regressing the same time.

Source: dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/13-May-17/democracy-and-institutions

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Balancing Civil-Military Relations

By Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi

May 13, 2017

The settlement of the news leak issue between the civilian federal government and the army top command has removed the latest irritant in civil-military relations, thereby lowering tensions in the political system, at least for the time being. This has been possible because the army top command decided to step back from its strong reservations on the news leak and the federal government’s efforts to resolve this issue.

This has eased political pressure on the Nawaz Sharif government and gives it the much-needed confidence to cope with other pressures caused by the Panama Leaks case and the opposition’s efforts to launch a nationwide protest against the government. When the controversial news item against the military was published in an English-language newspaper on October 6, 2016, the army top command was the first to declare it a national security breach.

At least two meetings of the corps commanders discussed the issue and expressed their concern. The retired military officers appearing in TV talk shows made no secret of their contempt for the news item and maintained that the army people were extremely unhappy about it. The army pressure led Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to appoint an inquiry commission whose report was said to be the basis of the current action by the federal government against three of its top political and bureaucratic officials.

The federal government’s punitive action against three persons was an attempt to pacify the army top command while controlling the damage to the PML-N government’s credibility. The ISPR tweet on April 29 rejected this action, forcing the government to review the matter in order to ward off the army pressure.

The ruling PMLN’s in-house deliberation during April 30-May 9 led them to conclude that the army top command did not have much options available to them to force the federal government to change its decision. It, therefore, decided to stick to its earlier decision of punitive action against three officials. However, in order to create a space for the army top command to review its disposition, the federal government decided to reissue the notification by making it more comprehensive. For all practical purposes, the new notification did not make any change in the earlier decision.

The decision of the federal government left the army top command high and dry. The army high command could persist in its opposition but that would have created more uncertainty in the political system at a time when Pakistan was faced with a difficult internal security situation and a troubled relationship with three neighbouring countries. Such a confrontation could create a situation where present civilian leadership and the army top command would have found it difficult to co-exist. The military could not dislodge the government in the name of “breach of national security” because the domestic and global environment was not favourable to such an action. Long before the news item controversy began, the military top command was more or less settled on the issue that the direct assumption of power was not a viable option. The army top command decided to defuse the situation by accepting the “re-issued” federal government’s notification.

The army’s retreat is expected to be unpopular among the officers. It is, therefore, important for the civilian government and the army top command to explain this decision. Further, the PML-N activists should not engage in persistent propaganda against the army senior command. This can add new tensions to civil-military relations. The assertion of civilian primacy is not a one-shot affair. It is a continuous process that requires a tactful handling because the balance can shift in one direction or another, from time to time.

The experience of Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil and other countries that experienced the expansion of the role of the military suggests that the classical notion of civilian supremacy is not fully returned. However, if the military command and the political leadership undertake some actions, a new relationship of mutual respect, restraint and constitutionalism emerges.

The following issues need attention for promoting a responsible civil-military relationship within a democratic constitutional framework: (1) A decision on the part of the top brass of the military to restrain their political ambition and stay within their professional domain. The civilian leaders must also respect internal service autonomy of the military. (2) The civilian political leaders, especially those in power, must create a credible civilian alternative to military rule by ensuring good governance and a judicious political management. (3) Strengthen the civilian institution and processes in a genuinely democratic framework rather than pursuing personalised and patrimonial governance. The democratic institutions must ensure conflict management and these should become the pivot of power and authority. (4) The democratic institutions and processes must ensure delivery of basic services and facilities to its citizens. (5) Only the policies based on genuine political participation and socio-economic justice promote strong attachment among the people for the political system which strengthens the role of civilian institutions and processes. (6) A consensus among the key political players not to cultivate the military for pursuing their individual political agenda. (7) A minimum reliance on the military for undertaking purely civilian tasks. The calls to the military “in aid of civil” should be as minimum as possible. (8) The military’s political clout will increase in the countries that face acute external military threats and internal security issues, including terrorism. (9) Appointment of highly professional political leaders to foreign policy, defence and internal security portfolios.

The PML-N government should take the current political space available to it due to the military’s retreat on one issue as an opportunity to create a credible civilian alternative by ensuring effective, nonpartisan and corruption-free governance. Pakistan is facing numerous internal and external challenges that require greater cooperative interaction between the civil and the military. Pakistan’s stability is linked with reliable civil-military relations. This calls for a sense of responsibility and restraint from both sides.

Source: tribune.com.pk/story/1408371/balancing-civil-military-relations/

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China’s Cautious Middle East Strategy

By Arhama Siddiqa

May 13, 2017

IT has been more than a decade that the region of the Middle East and North Africa has been through massive political upheavals. Of late, China has been relying on its traditional non-interference policy based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which were developed during the Mao period. However, more recently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership has progressively adopted a more forward-looking policy toward the Middle East, making its role as a responsible and emerging power. Now Beijing has a broad range of interests in the Middle East.

There are at least four reasons for China to adopt a pro-active policy in the Middle East. There is no doubt that the Middle East region as a whole is significant for China primarily because of its copious energy resources, its position as a geostrategic junction, and its budding role in the westward rebalancing of the Chinese economy within the framework of the One Belt, One Road. Chief among these reasons is having sustained access to the region’s energy capital. Simultaneously, China’s mercantile interests in the region also include developing new investment opportunities and contracts for infrastructure projects for Chinese firms as well as gaining market share for their products. China’s second key interest in the Middle East is developing relationships and building influence with regional powers beyond the comfort of its proximate Asia-Pacific neighbourhood. Here, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt figure illustriously in Beijing’s plans. A third advantage for China is preserving its domestic security by preventing radical ideologies having roots in the Middle East that also affect China. Fourth, it can be said that China has a general interest in the Middle East, as it does in other regions, as a stage for attaining acknowledgment as a genuine great power. There is also a growing equity stake for China since it imports more than half of its oil from the Gulf, as well as a third of its natural gas. Chinese major energy companies have already established supply anchorages in the Middle East including in Iraq, and most recently in Abu Dhabi. The Sino-Arab partnerships encompass petrochemical and natural gas projects in the region as well as refinery projects in China itself.

The Middle East is a growth market for reasonably priced consumer merchandise, and China is now the largest source of the region’s imports. Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia import more from China than from any other country. Chinese firms are winning contracts for engineering, construction, and infrastructure development projects. In recent years, Chinese investment in the region particularly in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia has also increased and China is actively seeking collaboration in new domains including nuclear and renewable energy and aerospace technology.

Moreover, there is a sentiment of heightened susceptibility because until recently, Beijing had not considered conflicts in the region as having a direct impact on its interests. However, China’s heavy reliance on Middle East energy, and on the Gulf in particular, has made it extremely vulnerable to possible supply disruptions and price spikes resulting from unrest and conflict in the region. Chaos in the Middle East has raised Chinese policy-makers’ concerns about the spread of aggressive ideologies, the prospect of Chinese foreign fighters returning to commit acts of terrorism as well as the possible desertion of profitable contracts, damage to or destruction of investment assets, and endangerment of Chinese workers and expatriates. Elevated exposure to these diverse threats has made it imperative for Beijing to develop and dexterously utilise diplomatic and military tools to respond.

China’s deepening involvement in the Middle East and its attendant risks has generated a great deal of conjecture about whether Beijing has a long-term strategy. If indeed such a strategy exists, the Chinese leadership has yet to articulate it openly. Nevertheless, one can garner evidence from Chinese official statements and conduct three interrelated directives that guide its approach to the region: (1) buy what you need and sell what you can; (2) do not interfere either in domestic or inter-state political affairs; and (3) emphasise dialogue and development as opposed to the use of force, as the solution to the Middle East’s problems, and thereby distinguish China from other powers in the region. Beijing’s obedience to non-interference in the Middle East is intended to avoid direct involvement in conflicts or crises, and to avoid clear-cut positions on contentious issues. It’s obvious that China is not keen to play a central role as peace-maker. China’s first “Arab Policy Paper,” issued in January 2016, carefully addressed the Middle East issues. Tentative forays such as Beijing’s Four-Point Plan for Syria gained little traction and was evidence enough for many observers to characterise China’s policy as “cautious, wary, and risk averse.”

Nevertheless, China’s policy in the Middle East has been more pragmatic. As events have been occurring, Beijing has become more active on diplomatic fronts mainly through participation in multilateral institutions such as the Arab League, the China-Gulf Forum, and in the recruitment of nine Middle East and North African countries as members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China has also played a more visible role in the security of the region in recent years, most notably in its deployment of combat troops for peacekeeping in South Sudan, in addition to the construction of its first overseas naval base, in Djibouti. Moreover, authorising more expansive counter-terrorism operations beyond China’s borders, demonstrates that it is willing to secure its interests around the world, and by force if needed.

China’s “new activism” in the Middle East is on the rise and is not just confined to the old wisdom of commercialism as was in the past. Yet China is still not pursuing a dominant policy in the region but carefully responding to crises. Strategic caution remains the hallmark of the Chinese approach to the Middle East and would continue to be a topic of vibrant debate.

Source: pakobserver.net/chinas-cautious-middle-east-strategy/

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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/pakistan-press/red-scare-washington-new-age/d/111127