Culture Wars: We Have Yet To Define What Pakistani Culture Constitutes: New Age Islam’s Selection, 18 January 2016
New Age Islam Edit Bureau
18 January 2016
• Culture Wars: We Have Yet To Define What Pakistani Culture Constitutes
By Hajrah Mumtaz
• Foregoing Preconditions At The Negotiating Table
By Tahir Khan
• Two Steps Back
By Kamal Siddiqi
• Beyond Afghanistan
Muhammad Amir Rana
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Culture Wars: We Have Yet To Define What Pakistani Culture Constitutes
By Hajrah Mumtaz
18 January 2016
THERE’S no dearth in the country of voices lamenting the overtaking of ‘Pakistani culture’ by foreign influences. From as august a platform as the National Assembly, people have at various times called for the state to institute interventions and put in place cultural protectionism mechanisms which could, they argue, ‘save our children from losing touch with their roots’.
This is hardly a concern unique to Pakistan, and many countries have dealt with it in out-of-the-box ways. Consider, for example, the challenges posed by the American cultural industry behemoth to its middling counterpart in Canada, not very differently placed as Pakistan vis-à-vis India. In Pakistan, the result of these concerns have been, at different times and for varying periods, moves such as disallowing Indian films from being screened at local cinemas.
There is, of course, the issue of what exactly ‘Pakistani culture’ constitutes. It is very far from a unitary entity. Further, it is comprised of a whole that amounts to being greater than the sum of its parts. Most problematically for those searching for unique characteristics, it is in many ways analogous to — even indistinguishable from — the cultures on the ‘wrong’ side of international borders.
We have yet to define what Pakistani culture constitutes.
The debate can, however, be framed in broader strokes. Certainly there is an identifiable Pakistani culture, varied and colourful. And certainly, it could do with further promotion. The issue can be seen in terms of not what pressures other, larger cultural industries are subjecting Pakistani culture to, but what this country is doing to promote its own brand.
The primary platforms for the celebration of culture are film, theatre, music and television, in large part. Of these in Pakistan, the last is the largest industry in terms of the volume of money flowing through its veins, the number of people it directly or indirectly employs, and the size of the audiences it reaches. It is, therefore, a significant reflector of the culture we wish to promote and project.
Forget, for the moment, the fact that what plays out on our television screens in entertainment programming for adults is, barring a few exceptions, in the main regressive, patriarchal and parochial. If being in touch with the local culture starts at a young age, what is domestic television programming offering those millions that constitute what leaders and policy planners love referring to as ‘the future of the country’? Sadly enough, not much. Not even as much as was the case in years past.
Of the 100-plus channels that most households in Pakistan’s urban areas have access to, there are a few exclusively for kids. But there is no domestically produced content to speak of for either children or young adults. India, by contrast and perhaps unsurprisingly, has a massive footprint. Cartoons franchises from different parts of the world (such as Dora in the US, the Japan-produced Doremon and countless others) have been dubbed into Hindi and that constitutes a large part of what Pakistani children watch; there are art shows and magic shows; there are also a good number of drama series for older children and young adults, with child actors and especially commissioned scripts.
The quality of these shows is debatable. But the fact remains that in terms of the sheer volume, the air waves here for children are dominated by Indian content and culture. Thus, as was pointed out in a seminar on the subject organised last November by a private school and university network, Pakistan’s children are absorbing words and phrases that are at odds with Urdu and any of the other local languages — ‘sunder’ instead of ‘Khoobsurat’, for example, or ‘Shakti’ instead of ‘Taquat’; the mythology they are watching does not refer to what dominates here, and so on.
In itself, this is not a problem. I would never argue that exposure to other cultures, religions and practices is in any way problematic. But the issue is, what are the so-called custodians of Pakistan culture (the television networks, the directors, producers, scriptwriters etc) and its promotors (eg those who decry the overtaking of ‘our’ culture by foreign interventions) doing to entertain, inform and educate future generations about the fabric that is Pakistan?
Frustratingly, not too long ago, productions for children and young adults were being created. Till as late as the early ’90s, locally produced drama and music shows — as well as some offerings from other cultures — for the younger age bracket were broadcast. They seem to all have disappeared, victim perhaps to the superficial thinking that children’s programming is not lucrative. Where private television networks are patently not interested in this area of operations, neither does the state-run PTV appear so inclined in terms of entertainment (a few education-oriented productions are available).
How many ways are there to fail not just future generations but the future itself? In Pakistan, one can just carry on counting.
Hajrah Mumtaz is a member of staff.
Source: dawn.com/news/1233633/culture-wars
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Foregoing Preconditions At The Negotiating Table
By Tahir Khan
January 17, 2016
The writer is a reporter at The Express Tribune
The much-publicised four-nation meeting in Islamabad last week “emphasised the immediate need for direct talks between representatives of the government of Afghanistan and representatives from Taliban groups in a peace process”. An important aspect of the recently-launched quadrilateral mechanism was the joining of the US, marking a shift in focus from its long-standing quest to go for a military option in resolving the Afghan quagmire towards a political solution. The Taliban have not as yet formally reacted to the Afghanistan-Pakistan-China-US talks, but its leadership, in a series of discussions, appears to have ruled out the possibility of talks with the Afghan government, insisting that they want to talk to the US first as they believe the superpower is the real party to the conflict. Taliban leaders have defended this stance by arguing that it was American military action that dislodged their government in late 2001.
The Taliban took to their online media to share their thoughts about the January 11 talks, stating that “meetings had also been held in the past. Kabul’s puppet officials could hold more meetings on the orders of the Americans, but such meetings have neither found any way in the past nor will Afghans accept their unreasonable recommendations”. The Pashto-language commentary on Alemra1.org has also condemned what it termed were threats by an Afghan official who said the “Taliban will either have to come to the negotiation table or they will be crushed”. The Taliban also referred to a recent statement by President Ashraf Ghani, in which he had attached conditions to the talks. “Such kind of remarks and threats to the Taliban would be seen as a stupid and childish step that will never be considered logical,” stated the commentary.
This approach by the Taliban highlights the trickiness of the situation. Unnecessary statements and conditions would not be helpful at this stage. Pakistan’s adviser on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, had rightly pointed out in his speech at the Islamabad meeting that pre-conditions should not be attached to the negotiation process. Instead, there is a need for confidence-building measures (CBM) by both the US and Afghan governments that can play a key role in encouraging Taliban groups to join the negotiation process. A major CBM could be the recognition of the Taliban office in Qatar that has been authorised in the past by the group’s leadership to carry forward the political process. Taliban negotiators are still based in the oil-rich Gulf state, but they have boycotted negotiations ever since former president Hamid Karzai raised objections over the raising of the Taliban flag and the use of the insignia of the “Islamic Emirate” at the Qatar office. It had been Kabul’s demand that the Taliban should have a proper address. They have such an address in Qatar and the office’s reopening should be facilitated. Approaching the Taliban through any other source could create misunderstandings. The Afghan government should ignore minor issues like the use of the Taliban flag at the Qatar office. At the same time, the Taliban should also give up their stubborn behaviour if they are interested in facilitating the political option.
Removal of Taliban leaders’ names from the UN sanctions list could be another CBM that can convince the group’s leadership to opt for political negotiations. As the US and China are active members of the Afghan peace process, they could help in easing the travel curbs on Taliban leaders. Russia has reportedly increased contacts with the Taliban in view of the emerging threats from the Islamic State, so in all probability, it will not block any move to lift these sanctions. China’s active role in the quadrilateral process can prove to be more effective than any other country’s because of its impartial stance on Afghanistan. The Taliban have officially confirmed their contacts with China as part of their interaction with other countries. One of the group’s leaders has even said that a meeting between the Chinese and the Taliban is expected shortly. With the next round of the quadrilateral meeting set to begin today, all participants of the process need to keep paramount the need for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Only then will this process have any chance of success.
Source: tribune.com.pk/story/1029299/foregoing-preconditions-at-the-negotiating-table/
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Two Steps Back
By Kamal Siddiqi
18 January 2016
A bill to prohibit underage marriages was withdrawn earlier this week after the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) declared it un-Islamic. Marvi Memon, the PML-N parliamentarian who moved the bill, withdrew her proposal following staunch resistance from the council, which advises the legislature whether or not a certain law is Sharia-compliant.
As if on cue, the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony rejected the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Bill 2014 after the CII dubbed it ‘anti-Islamic’ and ‘blasphemous’.
The committee meeting, which was presided over by its Chairman Hafiz Abdul Karim, unanimously rejected the bill on ‘purely religious grounds’.
Not one to take a stand, Marvi Memon then withdrew her proposal. The proposed legislation had recommended harsher punishments for those entering conjugal contracts with minors. What a shame that this piece of legislation could not pass through our parliament. The members of our ruling party remained silent.
It may be recalled that lawmakers in the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly had also blocked a bill seeking ban on child marriages over similar concerns. The fear of a religious backlash forces parliamentarians to think twice.
The background to this setback is that the CII has already ruled the minimum age stipulated for marriage in the Child Marriage Restriction Act of 1929 does not comply with Islamic laws.
It may also be recalled that in May 2014, amid severe criticism from various quarters, the council had endorsed its earlier ruling that girls as young as nine years old were eligible to be married “if the signs of puberty are visible”.
About two years ago, CII Chairman Mohammad Khan Sheerani told the National Assembly that the council had given its recommendations over the suggested law and this should “not have been discussed anymore.” Is this at all part of its ambit?
One needs to put things in perspective. The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) is a constitutional body that advises the legislature on whether or not a certain law is repugnant to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. It is strictly an advisory body and is not empowered to act like a supra-parliament.
But according to the CII’s 2008 special report, 90 per cent of the country’s laws are not in conflict with Islam and only 10 per cent may be reviewed by parliament. By implication, examining those laws is now the domain of parliament and not of the council.
In an editorial written in this paper, it was observed how over the years, the CII has acquired an extra-constitutional influence and it has become almost impossible to reverse the process. This is more so because, instead of constitutional and legal experts, the CII’s membership is dominated by religio-political parties, which wield an unhealthy street power and threaten violent public protest at the slightest self-perceived provocation.
But if we look at the CII’s performance, it is only logical not to rule out the possibility of a creeping backlash against its exaggerated self-image. The CII’s pronouncements started receiving royal treatment ever since the advent of General Zia.
Let us recall the pronouncements made by the council over the years. Regarding punishing the misuse of blasphemy laws, the CII has said that there are laws in the Pakistan Penal Code, which deal with registration of false cases and false statements, and these can be applied to blasphemy cases as well.
When using DNA test reports as proof to verify rape, it has insisted adherence to the current law that requires four mature individuals to testify the occurrence of this crime, while DNA reports can only be used as supplementary proof.
On the existing law that requires a “written approval” from the first wife if a man wants to marry a second time, the council is of the view that this law is against Islamic principles and therefore should be abolished. It also ruled that a woman older than 40 can serve as a judge, provided she is properly veiled. Only last week there was a debate in the Senate in which lawmakers suggested that the body should be abolished since it completed its constitutional task back in 1996. Going by the mood of the nation, this is not going to happen any time soon. We continue to be held hostage.
Source: tribune.com.pk/story/1029288/two-steps-back/
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Beyond Afghanistan
Muhammad Amir Rana
18 January 2016
THE last few weeks have been crucial for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Apparently, the civilian and military leaderships dealt successfully with the challenges thrown up by developments in the region and the Middle East. However, the question remains: is Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation heading towards a major shift, or merely undergoing some adjustments?
Let us have a look at some major highlights of the past few weeks. First, the Saudi foreign and defence ministers’ visits to Islamabad mounted considerable pressure on Pakistan to become a ‘visible’ partner in the Saudi-led 34-state anti-terror military coalition. While Pakistan reassured the kingdom of its resolve to defend the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, it remained cautious in committing to a clear engagement in the alliance. That was in line with its previous stance in the aftermath of the Yemeni crisis.
Secondly, the first round of the quadrilateral steering committee meeting on reconciliation in Afghanistan concluded on an optimistic note in Islamabad. Representatives of the four nations comprising the committee — Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US — agreed to continue efforts for exploring the prospects of reconciliation between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul.
It seems Pakistani foreign policy has been stuck in Afghanistan.
Thirdly, though the talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan have been delayed for a while after the Pathankot incident, the overall optimism remained intact. In a departure from the past, it seems that, at least for the moment, the militants have failed to disrupt bilateral engagement between the two countries.
Fourthly, there was an important development in Quetta; the Balochistan chief minister and the governor of the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan agreed to lay a railway track to connect Gwadar with the Iranian port of Chabahar. This may prove a balancing act in the context of developments in the Middle East. Also, from the geo-economic perspective, it could be a major development as Pakistan has remained concerned about Indian engagement in the Chabahar port project.
However, the sizzling debate on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the country, which forced the Chinese embassy in Islamabad to issue a press note appealing to the government to remove political discord, should also not be overlooked.
Credit goes to Pakistan’s leaders for managing all these diplomatic challenges. However, Pakistan’s responses were largely of a defensive nature. It was quite evident that Islamabad was trying to ease pressure coming from different sides. Would it be depicted as a weakness of Islamabad’s foreign policy, which is seen by many as stagnant in nature and made active only by external factors?
This is happening at a time when Pakistan’s neighbours are pursuing organic and proactive foreign policies while maintaining a fine balance between their geo-economic and strategic interests. For instance, China has adjusted its foreign policy objectives according to its ‘one road, one belt’ dream and is redefining its relations with its neighbours.
India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy is yielding results. Iran is successfully pursuing its foreign policy principle of multilateralism both on the regional and international levels.
In Pakistan’s foreign policy, which was based on the core principle of Kashmir, Afghanistan has gradually taken centre stage. It seems our foreign policy has been stuck in Afghanistan. This factor has further transformed the drivers of diplomatic engagement. The international community, including Arab friends, evaluate Pakistan from the perspective of one driver — security.
Pakistan’s strengths are broad in scope and not necessarily confined to security capabilities. The country has huge economic potential, which has not been exploited because of internal and external constraints. Despite structural issues, Pakistan still has the option to realign its diplomatic engagements as opportunities are available to evolve a balance between its economic and strategic priorities.
CPEC is an important avenue, which can help Pakistan transform its economy and dynamics of regional engagement, as well as enhance its international image. But CPEC is facing multiple challenges. However, the prime minister has formed a committee to look into domestic grievances regarding the project.
It is imperative Pakistan work for regional peace that is important for the completion and functioning of CPEC. It is easy to see that internal and regional conflicts and crises invite international attention and interventions, which first hit the economy of the country and region.
The Chinese see in CPEC much potential for regional connectivity, trade and economy. Experts also see Iran as a potential partner in the CPEC initiative and an active contributor in energy, infrastructure, and maritime links. Many believe that Sino-Iran relations will thrive. A few media reports indicate that China has already promised $52 billion in investment to Iran.
Yet these developments should not happen at the cost of Pakistan’s relations with the Arab countries, not only for reasons of faith, but also from the geo-economic and strategic perspectives. Pakistan needs to review its Middle East policy to exploit full potential of economic ties with it. This is also important in the context that, rightly or wrongly, Pakistan is considered part of an extended Middle East.
As far as regional strategic issues are concerned, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provides an opportunity to Pakistan to safeguard its core strategic and economic interests as well as to readjust its diplomatic priorities. There is a need for a discourse on how Pakistan can optimise its relations with Central Asia. Can Pakistan make it a top diplomatic priority to connect with Central Asia?
No one can ignore South Asia, and Pakistan is after all part of the region. But Pakistan first needs to deal with its Afghanistan approach. An unstable Afghanistan will not benefit the region, including Pakistan. The world sees Pakistan in Afghanistan’s context, and Pakistan has to break this stereotype through fast-tracking the reconciliation process.
Afghanistan has multiple factors of instability, but what hinders Pakistan the most is the perception of its influence on the Taliban. Once Pakistan is able to detach itself from this perception, it can rationalise its regional view and start exploring the world beyond Afghanistan.
Muhammad Amir Rana is a security analyst.
Source: dawn.com/news/1233470/beyond-afghanistan
URL: https://newageislam.com/pakistan-press/culture-wars-yet-define-pakistani/d/106025