Pakistan Press on: Delta, Pact, Autonomy, Newspapers: New Age Islam's Selection, 18 April 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
18 April 2025
Water Wounds In The Federation
A Nearly Dead Delta
The Forgotten Pact
Housing For People
Mining Bill & Autonomy
Family Law Confusion
Dying Newspapers
Gender Sensitisation
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Water Wounds In The Federation
By Barrister Zamir Ghumro
April 18, 2025
Water scarcity and environmental degradation are existential concerns for the people of Sindh. Until 1960, the Indus consistently claimed land from the sea as the outflow was an average of 94 million acres per feet annually. Now the sea claims millions of acres of fertile land periodically in Badin, Sujawal, Thatta districts and even jeopardises Karachi.
Sindh has been destroyed due to the lack of annual water flows, and sea erosion has claimed more than three million acres of fertile land since Mangla and Tarbela Dams were built. At present, the out flow is often less than the absolute minimum of 7.3 maf. Sadly, the once mighty Indus often runs dry even before it meets the sea.
For millennia, the Indus River wholly and exclusively provided for Sindh, and Sindh alone. In 1945, a fallacious concept was devised: The Indus River ‘System’. It was floated by the British in cahoots with the Unionist Government of Punjab. Earlier and in preparation for the subjugation of Sindh, a brave and independent chief minister, Allah Bux Soomro, had also been removed in 1942.
Hidayatullah’s party had only three seats in a house of 60 members of the Sindh Assembly. He signed the infamous Sindh Punjab Water Agreement of 1945, which was then used to provide a framework for the Indus River ‘System’ which now was deemed to comprise Indus as well as its five tributary rivers: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas.
Earlier, the undivided province of Punjab took water from the five rivers, excluding the Indus. Hydrologically and geographically, the Sindhu (Indus) is a separate and independent river. Up until 1945, Sindh had exclusive rights to the waters of the “mighty” Indus.
Amalgamating the Indus with other rivers and then sharing the pooled waters paved the way for disputes and grave inter-provincial discord. Nature on its own had achieved a fair distribution under which Sindh historically took waters of he tIndus exclusively and Punjab, from the other five rivers, with the proviso that Punjab would not interfere with water flows into the Indus at Panjnad.
This arrangement had ensured separate water regimes for both Sindh and Punjab. However, the British had their own colonialist goals to pursue. Therefore, Punjab and Sindh, under the 1945 Agreement, were each granted 48 per cent of the waters of the Indus. From the Punjab’s share, 5-6 per cent would go to NWFP (KP) and the remaining 4.0 per cent to Balochistan. Under the 1945 Agreement, a dispute resolution mechanism was arranged between Sindh and Punjab and decisions were made by consensus (each having equal voting right). The role of referee fell to the federal government.
In 1960, at the behest of the World Bank, General Ayub Khan, agreed to the Indus Basin Water Treaty with India. For a paltry sum of $200 million, General Ayub Khan did the unthinkable and sold the waters of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej in perpetuity to India. In exchange, Pakistan received the grandiose Mangla and later Tarbela Dams designed, built (and even operated initially) by the most expensive consultants, contractors, engineers and suppliers in the world, with borrowed money from the World Bank.
Most dictators want mammoth infrastructure projects constructed during their rule. Ayub was no different. He particularly wanted to garner support and admiration in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. The Mangla and Tarbela dams were constructed on River Jhelum and River Indus, respectively. It must be remembered that until then, western Punjab was fed by Jhelum and Chenab as three rivers were given away to India. So Punjab was compensated from the Indus via new diversionary off-takes such as Jinnah and Chashma Barrage, and the Thal Canal, thereby drastically affecting water flows to Sindh.
As if this arrangement was not lethal enough, in 1990, the establishment installed another government of its choice in Islamabad as well as in Sindh to bulldoze another new Water Accord of 1991, enacting the IRSA Act of 1992 (by replacing the Sindh–Punjab Water Agreement of 1945).
The PPP opposed this revisionist policy and voted against it. It had fathomed that this would create bad blood between the provinces in future. Water disputes erupted and have only exacerbated since 1992. Both the Water Accord 1991 and the IRSA Act 1992 were imposed during highly unrepresentative setups installed by a powerful military-civil-bureaucracy-feudal (Punjab) cartel.
Surreptitiously, Punjab had managed to retain the lion’s share that it enjoyed in the 1945 Sindh-Punjab agreement, when east and west Punjab were one territory: Punjab’s share remained at 48 per cent. Sindh’s share, which should have stood at 66 per cent (in the absence of Indian Punjab) was reduced to 42 per cent whilst the shares of KP and Balochistan were retained at 5.8 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively.
Once again, the water dispute resolution under the IRSA Act was most unfair to Sindh. Prior to 1991, Sindh had 48 per cent share of Indus waters but was allowed equal power in decision-making with Punjab, whereas the other two provinces and Islamabad had no vote each. Under the 1945 Sindh Punjab Waters Agreement, Sindh was at least an equal stakeholder with Punjab, whilst the British government played the role of referee.
Post 1991, a federal government that had no previous entitlement to a share of Indus waters suddenly became party to water issues, accentuating water disputes even further. After much struggle by the PPP, other parties and the civil society, the federal government finally yielded in the year 2000 and conceded that the federal member of IRSA shall be appointed from Sindh, being the lowest riparian.
The notification issued in 2000 is protected under Article 270AA of the constitution. The 17th Amendment paused the contentious Water Accord and Sindh got some relief, as it now had two members out of five.
However, this practice was inexplicably discontinued in 2014. The decision was challenged in the Sindh High Court in 2014. The SHC declared in 2017 that the constitution protected Sindh and the federal member of IRSA shall be appointed from Sindh. Interestingly, the federal government filed an appeal in the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in 2021.
To date, the federal government has failed to appoint a member to IRSA from Sindh. Without IRSA having two mandatory members from Sindh (as determined by the constitution), a ‘Water Availability Certificate’ was issued by IRSA for the construction of the Cholistan and Thal Canal(2) project, on January 24, 2024 during the caretaker setup.
The government of Sindh immediately opposed this move and ECNEC has yet to approve the project. The government of Sindh’s appeal is pending in the Council of Common Interests and can be challenged under Article 155 by an aggrieved government in a joint session of parliament. Until this legal process is completed, no scheme can be initiated or started on the ground.
The government of Punjab allegedly commenced digging on the site. This is unconstitutional and illegal. It has led to fears in Sindh that constitutional forums are being bypassed, and construction is being carried out. No lawful construction can be carried out in the absence of decisions by ECNEC, CCI or the joint session of parliament under Section 8 of the IRSA Act, 1992 and Article 155 of the constitution.
PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has warned the PML-N government in the centre that the federal and Punjab governments cannot construct canals or sow seeds of hatred among provinces by bypassing provinces. Bilawal Bhutto has also said that the Cholistan and Thal Canal (phase II) are highly divisive issues and the federal government must cancel this ‘on the demand of the people’. President Asif Ali Zardari had also spoken similarly whilst addressing a joint session of parliament on March 10, 2025.
The people of Sindh are rightly enraged and furious as a carefully constructed yet fragile federal mechanism of water sharing is being violated yet again. If continued, it will have a very negative effect on the environment, the fertility of the delta and water availability in Sindh’s capital city, other cities, towns, villages and hamlets of Sindh.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1302437-water-wounds-in-the-federation
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A Nearly Dead Delta
By Masood Lohar
April 18, 2025
Pakistan's vital Indus River Delta, a historically fertile and ecologically rich region, is disappearing at an alarming rate, facing a catastrophic crisis driven by drastically reduced river flows, land erosion, and relentless sea intrusion, exacerbated by climate change. Environmental data reveals a stark reality: the delta has shrunk by a staggering 92 per cent since 1883.
Once a sprawling lifeblood covering approximately 12,900 square kilometres, the delta’s active area had dwindled to nearly 1,000 square kilometres by 2018. This dramatic decline signals a profound environmental catastrophe unfolding along Pakistan's coast, with consequences reaching far beyond the immediate delta region.
The dramatic reduction in freshwater and sediment reaching the delta from the Indus River, primarily due to interventions upstream, is essentially the basic issue at hand. One of the predominant sources of this degradation is the severely curtailed water discharge downstream of the Kotri Barrage.
Historically, before major dam and barrage construction began in earnest around 1930, the annual flow reaching the delta (downstream Kotri) was estimated at a massive 150 million acre feet (maf). This flow carried over 400 million tons of vital silt annually, the building blocks of the delta itself.
However, the construction of extensive upstream dams, barrages and large-scale irrigation networks, while serving agricultural and power needs elsewhere, choked the river's final reach. By the 1950s, downstream flow had plummeted to around 80 maf. The situation worsened dramatically over subsequent decades, reaching a record low of just 1.5 maf in the drought years of 2001-2002.
While a consensus now suggests a minimum environmental flow of 10 maf is needed downstream of Kotri to sustain the delta's basic functions, officials concede this target is often not met. This chronic, century-long reduction in flow has slashed the crucial sediment supply to a mere 26-30 million tons per year.
The result is a delta effectively starved of the materials needed to maintain itself against the sea. The once-extensive mudflats are decaying, and the vast silt-deposit deficit accumulated over nearly a century is considered almost irreparable. The fundamental ecology of the delta has been irrevocably altered.
The consequences of this diminished freshwater outflow are starkly visible along the Sindh coast. Without the river's pushback and sediment replenishment, the powerful Arabian Sea advances relentlessly inland – a phenomenon known as sea intrusion. Since 1956, an estimated 3.5 million acres of land, much of it previously fertile agricultural area, have been swallowed by the sea.
This humanmade crisis is being amplified by global climate change. The Himalayan glaciers, the source feeding the Indus River, are melting at unprecedented rates – average retreats approach 15 meters per year in some areas. While initially increasing meltwater, the long-term depletion of these ‘water towers’ poses a grave risk to the river system's stability.
Simultaneously, global sea levels are rising, with the South Asian region experiencing an average increase of 3.7 millimetres per year – a rate reportedly doubling over the last two decades. Projections suggest a potential rise of up to one meter by 2100 under high-emissions scenarios. This rise directly exacerbates coastal erosion and sea intrusion, pushing saltwater further into the weakened delta.
The loss of the Indus Delta is a tragedy extending far beyond the landmass. River deltas are ecological and economic powerhouses. They offer exceptionally fertile land, support vast fisheries through their nurseries in wetlands and mangroves, act as natural buffers against storm surges, and host unique biodiversity.
The Indus Delta, characterised by its mix of riverine and tidal influences (though increasingly dominated by the latter due to low river flows), boasts one of the world's largest arid mangrove ecosystems (a Ramsar Site). This habitat is critical for countless species. Its degradation means losing these invaluable services, impacting food security, coastal safety, and natural heritage.
The catastrophic shrinkage of the Indus Delta is an environmental emergency demanding immediate, strategic action. However, addressing the core issue – ensuring adequate freshwater and sediment flow downstream Kotri – is entangled in complex water rights disputes.
Experts warn that without tackling this fundamental water management issue head-on, proposed solutions like coastal defences or mangrove replanting, while potentially helpful, may only be cosmetic.
A comprehensive, politically challenging, but strategically vital approach is needed to address water distribution, invest in coastal resilience, mitigate climate change impacts, and support the vulnerable communities clinging to these vanishing shores before it's too late.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1302438-a-nearly-dead-delta
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The Forgotten Pact
By Dr Ramesh Kumar Vankwani
April 18, 2025
Just after three years of Partition, a terrible series of riots on religious grounds broke out in both parts of Bengal. At that time, extremists in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) and West Bengal of India started brutally targeting religious minorities. Minority women from both sides were abducted while attacks on each other's holy religious places of worship were on rise. Reportedly, one million people were forced to leave their homes to seek refuge across the border.
In such critical moments, Pakistan's first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan reached Delhi on April 2, 1950, to initiate dialogue with his Indian counterpart Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The prime ministers of both countries signed a historic treaty on April 8, 1950, which was called the Liaquat-Nehru Pact in diplomatic circles and commonly known as the Delhi Pact.
On the occasion, both prime ministers showed firm determination to protect the dignity, property and lives of their respective minority populations. It was agreed that abducted women from the minority community would be returned to their families and forced conversion would not be accepted.
Even at that time, both governments were facing a serious challenge in the form of fake news and rumours. This is why the agreement also included a clause for strict monitoring and prompt action to prevent the dissemination of disinformation and mischievous opinion calculated to rouse communal passion.
Unfortunately, this relief for the minorities proved to be temporary and just a year after the Delhi Pact, Liaquat Ali Khan was martyred during a public jalsa in Rawalpindi. The agreement faced severe criticism from extremist elements in India from day one. Pandit Nehru's close political ally Syama Prasad Mukherjee resigned from Nehru's cabinet to record his protest against the said treaty with Pakistan. He formed his own political party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party, the predecessor to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
I had a very cordial relationship with Rana Bhagwandas, the most honest chief justice of Pakistan, until his last breath. He considered the Liaquat-Nehru Accord to be a guarantee of permanent peace between the two countries as well as stability in the region. Many times during our conversation, it was discussed that since the signing of the Delhi Pact, the head of the Waqf institution to look after the properties of Muslim minorities in India has always been a Muslim, but unfortunately this is not happening in Pakistan.
I have raised my voice several times that the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB) should be headed by a patriotic Pakistani Hindu. I also proposed the name of former CJ Rana Bhagwandas in this regard, but no progress has been made so far.
Unfortunately, today the situation has become so critical that if on the one hand, centuries-old holy sites of non-Muslims are in a state of disrepair in Pakistan, then across the border, the political party founded by Pandit Nehru's disgruntled colleague Syama Prasad Mukherjee is in power.
The Modi government, in a latest move, has amended the Waqf laws to control the Waqf properties of Indian Muslims. Due to this, not only is the historical religious heritage of the Muslims of the Subcontinent now in danger, but for the first time after Partition, a legal justification has also been provided for appointing a non-Muslim as the head of a Waqf institution in India.
On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Liaquat-Nehru Pact, it seems that both countries have completely forgotten the historic pact to protect minorities. I therefore would like to appeal to the top leadership of both countries to ensure that minority representatives from both countries should be in the driving seat of the Waqf institutions established on each side. Religious minorities living in their respective countries must also be included in the national mainstream to address their sense of insecurity, as promised under the Delhi Pact.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1302440-the-forgotten-pact
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Housing For People
By Syeda Tehseen Abidi
April 18, 2025
In August 2022, when Pakistan faced one of the most devastating climate disasters in its history, with one-third of the country submerged under water, the tragedy left millions of citizens displaced, homeless and vulnerable.
The floods brought untold destruction, but they also offered a moment to rethink disaster recovery, to envision a future where rebuilding goes beyond the physical structures, to one where justice, dignity and empowerment are central to the restoration process. Under the leadership of PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the Sindh government undertook an unprecedented initiative to rebuild the lives of those affected.
The Sindh People’s Housing for Flood Affectees (SPHF) programme stands as the largest provincial post-disaster housing project in Pakistan’s history, encompassing an ambitious target of over 2.1 million homes to be rebuilt across the flood-affected areas. This initiative is not merely a reconstruction project but an embodiment of a progressive vision that goes beyond the restoration of physical homes to include a deep commitment to social justice, gender equity, and sustainability.
The SPHF programme, which spans a number of districts, is significant not only for its scale but for its unwavering focus on ownership equity, women’s empowerment and inclusive development. At the centre of this is a historic policy that for the first time in Pakistan’s history, women are being granted legal ownership rights to homes built through the program. More than 800,000 women, many of whom have never been able to inherit or own property, are now recognised as owners. This single decision has redefined the socio-economic landscape of Sindh, granting women more than just homes; it is granting them control over their economic future and independence.
In Sindh, where cultural norms and property laws have long denied women the right to own land or property, this initiative is revolutionary. The Sindh government’s decision to prioritise women as homeowners represents a monumental step forward in empowering women within both the public and private spheres. It ensures that their voices are heard and their rights are respected. It marks a profound shift from a history of marginalization, where women were often seen as secondary actors in property ownership and inheritance, to a future where women are central to the reconstruction and recovery of their communities.
Alongside this empowerment of women, the SPHF programme also prioritises the most vulnerable groups – including persons with disabilities, landless peasants, marginalized indigenous communities and informal settlers. Over 111,000 individuals with disabilities have been identified as beneficiaries of the program, ensuring that they too are not left behind in the recovery process. This inclusive approach reflects the vision of the PPP, which has consistently championed the rights of the marginalised, making it one of the most progressive political forces in the country.
The geographical scope of the programme spans every district affected by the 2022 floods. From the coastal areas of Thatta and Sujawal to the interior regions of Dadu, Kashmore and Larkana, every affected district is receiving attention and resources to rebuild. The impact of this effort is not just felt in urban centres but throughout the rural heartlands of Sindh, where access to government support is often limited.
For example, in Sukkur, over 83,000 homes are under construction, while Kashmore has already received 4,200 homes, with 10,000 more currently under construction. In districts like Jacobabad, Ghotki and Hyderabad, thousands of families have already been relocated into new, disaster-resilient homes, while others wait for their homes to be completed. This far-reaching initiative has transformed the recovery narrative from one of dependency and survival to one of restoration and empowerment.
One of the standout features of the programme is the technological integration that has ensured transparency, efficiency and accountability. The Sindh government, in collaboration with experts and international partners, is using cutting-edge technologies such as drone-assisted land mapping, real-time monitoring and geospatial data to track the progress of construction and ensure that homes are built in a timely and sustainable manner.
The solar energy solutions incorporated into the housing designs further reflect the government’s commitment to sustainable development. Over 200,000 homes are being powered with solar energy, reducing reliance on the national grid and contributing to Pakistan’s broader environmental goals.
The financial backing for the SPHF programme has been robust and multi-faceted. The World Bank has committed $500 million to support this initiative, recognising the scale and importance of this programme in Pakistan’s disaster recovery landscape. This global recognition has positioned Sindh as a leader in climate justice – a beacon of hope for other regions that may face similar climate-induced challenges. The Sindh government has also matched this commitment with $227 million from its own resources, proving its dedication to not just recovery, but a new way forward. These contributions have been instrumental in ensuring the smooth and swift execution of the programme.
Despite these achievements, the programme has faced its share of challenges. The federal government’s unfulfilled commitment of Rs50 billion in promised funds has created delays and put additional pressure on provincial resources. However, despite these setbacks, Sindh’s resilience has shone through. The government has continued to push forward, driven by a sense of urgency and an unyielding commitment to the people of Sindh. The lessons learned from these challenges have reinforced the need for greater provincial autonomy and decentralised governance, especially when responding to crises.
The Sindh People’s Housing for Flood Affectees (SPHF) is a commitment to social justice, economic empowerment and gender equality. Through programmes like the SPHF, Sindh has shown that true resilience is not about returning to the status quo but about building a better, more just future.
The floodwaters have receded, but the work is far from done.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1302439-housing-for-people
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Mining Bill & Autonomy
Rafiullah Kakar
April 18, 2025
THE recently concluded Mineral Summit was proclaimed a success by federal officials. Yet beneath the celebratory tone lies a contentious debate — particularly in KP and Balochistan — over a draft mining legislation reportedly prepared under the supervision of the SIFC. The Balochistan government has already enacted a version of this bill, while KP continues to deliberate.
The timing of this legislation, and the opaque process that birthed it, have raised legitimate concerns about its constitutional validity, centralising tendencies, and potential sociopolitical fallout. Constitutionally, provinces in Pakistan have long held exclusive jurisdiction over minerals — excluding nuclear-related resources — even prior to the 18th Amendment. In this context, fears of federal encroachment are not without basis.
The KP bill, while imperfect, retains essential elements of provincial control. Its references to the federal mineral wing are advisory and non-binding. Still, their very inclusion invites future overreach. In contrast, the Balochistan Act goes a step further. It not only permits the federal mineral wing to make recommendations on mineral development, licensing, leasing, and financial aspects including royalties, but appears to surrender the province’s right to initiate proposals on these matters, reducing its role to one of passive review. Though technically non-binding, the legal role of the federal government can potentially lead to serious encroachment.
Both the KP and Balochistan frameworks allow temporary permits to be granted for projects deemed of “national interest” — a vague designation that includes licences to federally owned public enterprises. Such provisions undermine provincial autonomy.
To their credit, the laws decentralise some authority to newly established provincial mineral authorities and district committees, replacing the erstwhile discretion of secretaries, directors general, and deputy commissioners. However, the inclusion of two federal representatives with voting rights in provincial authority might be problematic. These members should serve as observers, not decision-making members.
One of the most glaring omissions in both laws is the absence of meaningful representation for local communities, mining associations, and independent experts in the governance structures. In a sector as complex and high-stakes as mining, leaving governance solely to bureaucrats and politicians is a recipe for failure. Equally problematic are vague, largely non-enforceable clauses on community benefits and employment preferences. What is needed are legally binding frameworks for community participation, benefit-sharing, and local ownership. In short, while the KP bill requires minor amendments, the Balochistan Act needs to be repealed, as it contains clauses that effectively hand over certain powers to federal authorities.
Just as troubling is the process through which the legislation has been drafted and enacted. The SIFC — an extra-constitutional body — has driven the process with apparently little transparency. In a context where political legitimacy of both federal and provincial governments remains contested, this top-down approach is counterproductive. It risks deepening community mistrust and fuelling provincial grievances, even if the resulting agreements are legally sound.
Mining is a long-horizon sector. It demands political stability, policy continuity, and social licence to operate. But Pakistan’s political elite functions on extremely short time horizons, motivated more by immediate gains and rent-seeking than long-term planning. Past episodes — Reko Diq, IPPs — are cautionary tales of rushed, opaque deals that ended in litigation or disrepute. On a technical level, the country lacks the institutional depth and financial capacity to negotiate mining contracts that balance investor interest with public good. In the current climate, any foreign-backed agreements are more likely to serve short-term gains than long-term development.
Similarly, our history of community benefit-sharing in mining is dismal. Corporate social responsibility remains tokenistic at best, with few tangible gains for affected populations. The new legislations do little to reverse this trend. What is needed is a complete rethink of the model — one that places local communities at the heart of decision-making and revenue-sharing. To ensure community ownership and provincial autonomy, the following steps are essential:
Peace and consensus first: No foreign investor can operate sustainably without peace, political stability and provincial buy-in. The experience of CPEC in Balochistan offers a stark warning.
Eliminate federal overreach: All references to the federal mineral wing should be removed. An ‘Inter-Provincial Mineral Coordination Council’ may be established, instead, to harmonise policy among provinces while respecting their autonomy.
Mandatory community consent: The free, prior and informed consent of local communities must be a legal prerequisite for all large-scale mining projects.
Revenue sharing with community: At least five per cent of royaltiesmust go directly to resource-producing districts, over and above provincial royalty.
Employment guarantees: Mining legislation should mandate 100pc local employment in unskilled jobs and a minimum of 50pc in skilled roles, with a plan to raise the latter to 90pc over 10 years.
Establish a provincial mineral wealth and development fund: This should include: a provincial wealth fund, where 25-40pc of royalties are saved for future generations under strict fiduciary rules and independent oversight; a community development fund to pool 5pc district royalties, 3-5pc company profits and other funds for investment in infrastructure and services of local community.
Transparency as policy: All mining licences and contracts, including those for Reko Diq and Saindak, must be fully disclosed; companies linked to politically exposed persons should be flagged; and detailed, disaggregated data on royalties, production, taxes, and social expenditures must be published regularly.
Pakistan stands at a crossroads. It can either repeat the mistakes of opaque, centralised, and authoritarian resource governance—or it can reimagine mining as a platform for inclusive, democratic, and community-led development. If reforms are not grounded in transparency, accountability, and respect for provincial and community rights, then no summit, however well-marketed, will bring lasting prosperity.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1904967/mining-bill-autonomy
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Family Law Confusion
Sara Malkani
April 18, 2025
LAST year, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed that a woman is entitled to dissolve her marriage on the grounds that her husband, without her permission, married another woman. Recently, the Council of Islamic Ideology released a statement rejecting this decision, asserting that it is against Islamic law to permit a woman to dissolve her marriage because she did not consent to her husband’s marriage to another woman. The CII is an advisory body and cannot overrule the Supreme Court, but is deemed to be an authority on the requirements of Islamic law.
The fact that in 2024, the Supreme Court had to author a detailed judgement to clarify very straightforward statutory provisions in the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO), 1961, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 — which was then repudiated by the CII — is an indication of the manufactured confusion around family laws in Pakistan.
Why does this confusion persist? Muslim personal law covers matters related to marriage, divorce and inheritance for the majority of Pakistan’s population. Personal law is partially codified in the form of statutes derived from religious jurisprudence. Courts and religious bodies often misinterpret the plain meaning of statutes to conform to their own views of Islamic jurisprudence. For example, courts have repeatedly misread the 1961 ordinance’s provisions on talaq, often refusing to enforce the notice and registration requirements in the law. They also tend to fill in the gaps in codified laws with conservative interpretations of Islamic law.
The origins of Muslim personal law lie in the British colonial era. As the colonial government began to introduce legislation regulating political and economic spheres, it carved out exceptions for matters related to marriage, divorce and inheritance, declaring that these would be dealt with in accordance with the custom and religious laws of each community.
Muslim political groups were keen to secure the primacy of the Sharia over custom in matters of family law and inheritance. In 1937, Muslims secured legislation that declared that personal law derived from the Sharia alone rather than custom would govern family matters and inheritance for Muslims.
Prior to independence, Muslims secured another codified law — the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act passed in 1939. While this law established the right of Muslim women to dissolve their marriage in certain circumstances, the motivation behind the law was not the promotion of women’s rights. In fact, it was passed to prevent Muslim women from renouncing their faith and marrying non-Muslims. Prior to this law, Muslim women seeking to end a marriage could only do so after they converted to another religion, which would lead to the automatic termination of their marriage to a Muslim man. This would also enable Muslim women to marry outside their faith after their marriage to the Muslim man stood terminated.
Muslims in the subcontinent, like other religious communities, were extremely concerned about losing their members, especially women, to marriage outside their communities. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, specifically stated that renunciation of their faith by a married Muslim or her conversion to another faith shall not by itself dissolve her marriage.
After independence, Muslim personal law continued to govern family matters for Muslims in Pakistan. When, in 1955, Prime Minister Bogra entered into a second marriage, protests by prominent women led to the formation of the Rashid Commission, whose objective was to recommend reforms to Muslim personal law and “give women their proper place in society according to fundamentals of Islam”. The commission’s recommendations included limitations on polygamy and compulsory registration of the nikahnama. Its cautious recommendations were opposed by conservative forces and it was not until 1961 that Field Marshal Ayub Khan promulgated the MFLO, which incorporated some of the commission’s recommendations.
The MFLO fell short of demands of women’s rights activists as it permitted polygamy as well as unilateral divorce, while introducing some safeguards for women. Even these limited protections were subsequently watered down through judicial interpretations. The Zina Ordinance, imposed by Gen Ziaul Haq, introduced strict penalties of adultery and fornication, making enforcement of MFLO even more complicated. Divorce or talaq that did not meet the MFLO’s requirements was validated by the courts to protect women who remarried after they thought they had been divorced by their husbands.
The gap between codified law and court interpretations, contradictory decisions by courts, and pronouncements by religious authorities continue to create uncertainty around family laws. Women and children suffer the most due to this confusion.
How do we move beyond this confusion? In place of fragmented and incoherent family laws, we should adopt codified laws related to marriage, divorce and inheritance that take precedence over non-codified interpretations of religious jurisprudence. A central objective behind framing these civil laws should be consistency with fundamental rights in the Constitution, including the right to equal protection under the law and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Supreme Court should provide clear directions to the judiciary on application of family laws and specify that courts are bound to enforce statutes, judicial precedent and the Constitution. Courts cannot selectively impose their interpretations of religious jurisprudence.
Efforts to improve family laws so far prove that reforms relying on progressive interpretations of Islamic law tend to fall short. They are further weakened by conservative enforcement. Recognising this hurdle, women’s rights activists, in particular the Women’s Action Forum, have recommended a more enlightened approach towards all matters related to marriage and inheritance. It is high time our lawmakers accepted their recommendations.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1904968/family-law-confusion
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Dying Newspapers
Mohammad Ali Babakhel
April 18, 2025
AS a student and later a lecturer of journalism, the future of newspapers and the challenges faced by print media were part of the academic discourse. But three decades ago, no one imagined that newspapers — the foundation of journalism — would one day struggle for survival.
Last year, two leading Urdu newspapers in Peshawar halved their number of pages and editorial content. The editorial page is considered the soul of a newspaper and reflects its policy. Its reduction suggests that newspapers have sacrificed their souls. Historically, newspapers functioned as nurseries of journalism, producing towering figures like Faiz Ahmad Faiz and prominent TV personalities.
According to the PBS, there were 749 newspapers and periodicals in 2011; by 2019, the number had dropped to 707. In Punjab, dailies declined from 102 in 2011 to just 42 in 2019. In Sindh, the number fell from 44 to five. In contrast, KP and Balochistan saw a rise: from 90 to 214 and from 155 to 178 respectively.
The PBS also noted that the average combined daily circulation of newspapers fell from 9.9 million in 2007 to 6.1m in 2008 — including 4.6m for Urdu, 670,743 for English, and 640,897 for Sindhi newspapers and periodicals.
The decline can be attributed to technological, economic, social and political factors. Rising inflation and falling revenue have made printing and distributing papers commercially unviable. The increasing cost of newsprint and fuel has further dented circulation. More critically, advertising revenue — long the lifeblood of newspapers — has shifted to digital platforms. This digital competition, combined with falling readership, has made the survival of local newspapers extremely difficult. In rural areas, where purchasing a newspaper is often considered a luxury, readership remains limited mostly to students or government offices. Historically, print outlets have also had to endure the effects of censorship — including self-censorship — which undermines credibility.
Globally, the closure of newspapers is now a common trend, driven by economic pressures, shifting consumer habits and digital disruption. Many papers have transitioned to digital editions, relying on online subscriptions and advertising. This shift has especially hurt smaller regional papers, shrinking the space for local news coverage and forcing communities to rely on less reliable digital sources.
In India, digital media is fast replacing print as the primary source of news. Print readership is falling, making it harder for newspapers to sustain themselves. As in other developing countries, local papers are shutting down while larger outlets pivot to digital-first strategies. Nonetheless, some newspapers are adapting by focusing on quality journalism and launching digital-only subscription models. But the digital shift has led to declining circulation, job losses and newsroom downsizing.
Forward-looking newspapers recognised these challenges early and adopted digital-first models, introduced online editions, and began updating news to stay afloat, with readers now preferring real-time updates. The shift of advertisers to digital platforms has resulted in significant revenue losses and job cuts. The increasing use of smartphones has driven consumers to digital news platforms.
Since 2017, the Indian print media has been faced with declining circulation and revenue, resulting in reduced staff. Many newspapers have opted for a digital-first approach, and these circumstances have led to corporate consolidation, reducing the scope for local journalism.
Despite these challenges, some newspapers are finding ways to adapt, such as by focusing on quality journalism, offering digital-only subscriptions, and experimenting with new formats.
Guidance is another purpose of newspapers. Urdu newspapers primarily cover statement-based journalism, crime, and other aspects of hard news, thus failing to perform the guidance function. Investigative reporting may help, but that involves high costs and risks. The local Urdu press of KP primarily does most of the above, but fails to cover soft avenues. However, by publishing obituaries, the local press performs its social function.
The circulation of Pakistani newspapers has never been proportionate to the population. Due to a poor literacy rate, the circulation of English newspapers remained low, compared to Urdu newspapers. Though web journalism is more interactive, Urdu dailies have failed to understand its importance, as it is a totally different medium.
Newspapers are the first draft of history; thus they shall survive in either printed or digital form. Print media has acted as an instrument of change, but are newspapers ready to embrace it?
https://www.dawn.com/news/1904966/dying-newspapers
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Gender Sensitisation
Rida Tahir
April 18, 2025
WOMEN make up only two per cent of the police force across Pakistan. Considering they constitute around half of the total population, this stark underrepresentation highlights a significant gender disparity in the country’s law enforcement.
A 2024 report by the Social Development Organisation states that while globally 20pc of women face abuse, a shocking 90pc of Pakistan’s females endure violence. Therefore, it is crucial to adopt survivor-centric models of reporting and access to justice. Meanwhile, most cases of violence against women and their children (VAWC) go unreported. To increase reporting, a safe and supportive environment for individuals must be promoted. An increase in reported cases should not be seen solely as a rise in crime, but also as a sign that more people may be placing their trust in the criminal justice system (CJS).
As reporting to the police increases, it may indicate a stronger belief in the system and the pursuit of justice. Holding perpetrators accountable helps reduce repeat offences over time, which leads to gradual reform in society.
Women, children and trans persons feel more comfortable reporting their grievances, particularly sensitive cases of VAWC, to female police officers. Possessing the same professional skills as their male counterparts, women police officers also demonstrate a heightened sensitivity to gender-related issues. This is why women’s police stations were the initiative of Pakistan’s only female prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who understood the obstacles to reporting gender-based cases to male officers.
Justice Ayesha Malik’s landmark judgements also show how women better understand the experiences of other women; she was the one who declared the two-finger test in rape cases illegal and recognised gender discrimination as workplace harassment.
Sindh has shown resourcefulness in provincial policing by starting women-led initiatives. One of them is the women and children protection centres (WCPC) that have been set up in all districts of the province. These are not police stations but facilitation centres.
At these centres, uniformed women police officers facilitate the complainant in terms of how they can move forward in cases of family disputes, including those pertaining to maintenance and custody, in which the affected parties do not want to involve the courts. The WCPC can be seen as an informal alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Mediation between families often results in a written and signed ‘compromise’ or ‘mafinama’. Other times, a ‘warning’ or ‘caution’ may be given to a perpetrator before the formal CJS process starts with the registration of the FIR.
In domestic disputes, it is crucial that victims/ survivors are empowered to make their own decisions according to the circumstances of their case. These are different from other aggravated gender-based violence (GBV) offences, such as ‘honour’ killings and sexual violence where the state can register an FIR on its own initiative and where there is no room for a ‘compromise’. In such cases, facilitation of the relevant police station for registration of the FIR must be provided.
Different models of access to justice work for different cases of GBV, and should be designed to empower the victim. One model is the one-stop protection centre, which has been set up in Hyderabad. Women and girls in South Asia face mobility challenges. OSPCs eliminate the need for victims/ survivors to travel to multiple locations in a state of vulnerability to access support services. The OSPC operates as a one-location centre, providing immediate support and assistance to victims/ survivors of GBV by placing all sectoral responses (health, psychosocial, counselling, legal services and police) under one roof.
In Pakistan, the CJS is hindered by a serious lack of female representation. Women account for less than 2pc of the superior judiciary and under 15pc of the subordinate judiciary. Likewise, their presence in prosecution services and medico-legal fields is limited. Greater female participation in the CJS must be encouraged through providing equal wages, maternity benefits, and essential facilities such as women’s restrooms and dedicated spaces that prioritise the well-being of female professionals.
Increasing women’s representation in the police force and expanding women-led initiatives like WCPCs and OSPCs is crucial, as police are the first point of contact for victims. However, it’s equally important to ensure women’s presence across the entire CJS including as medico-legal officers, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to ensure survivor-centric, empathetic and effective justice at every stage.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1904965/gender-sensitisation
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/pakistan-press/delta-pact-autonomy-newspapers-/d/135216
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