
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
17 March 2026
A new crusade: How US-Israeli language justifies war against Iran
Quiet advantage: What Russia and China may gain from US-Iran war
The Gulf expects actions, not words, from Iran
Gulf states building trust through Iran ‘war’ response
The Return of Iraq’s Long War against US Occupation – Analysis
EXPLAINER: What Is Iran’s Kharg Island — and Why Trump Is Targeting It
The Iran War — The Most Obvious Question Liberal Media Refuses to Ask
No time for losers: Why the war meant to save Israel may destroy it
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A new crusade: How US-Israeli language justifies war against Iran
BY MURAT YEŞILTAŞ
MAR 17, 2026
While many experts and commentators focus on the military and political dimensions of the war against Iran, the narrative dimension may prove even more consequential. Wars are not fought only with missiles, intelligence and air power. They are also fought through language, imagery and political framing. The way a war is narrated shapes how it is justified, how it is normalized and, most importantly, how far it is allowed to go.
This is precisely what we are seeing in the U.S.-Israeli framing of the war against Iran.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s remark, “Any time I want it to end, it will end,” together with his demand for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” captures the tone from Washington.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s language does the same from the Israeli side. He has spoken of “two existential threats,” described the conflict as a struggle between “the children of light and the children of darkness,” and cast Israel’s war in the language of civilization versus barbarism.
The White House presented the campaign under the slogan “Peace Through Strength” to “Crush Iranian Regime, End Nuclear Threat.” At the same time, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described Tehran as a “death cult” driven by “prophetic Islamist delusions.”
Taken together, these are not simply emotional wartime remarks. They reflect a broader institutional discourse repeated across the White House, the Pentagon, the Israeli political and diplomatic establishment, and the media in both countries.
That discourse does not present Iran as a strategic rival within a harsh regional power struggle. It presents Iran as something beyond normal politics: a uniquely dangerous, irrational and morally illegitimate actor. Once that framing takes hold, domination begins to sound like order, escalation begins to sound like necessity, and war begins to look like the only reasonable response.
Creating good vs. evil
The first step in this narrative strategy is to remove Iran from the realm of ordinary statecraft. Official U.S. language does not mainly describe Iran as one actor among many in a region already marked by intervention, rivalry and instability. Instead, it portrays Iran as the main source of disorder itself.
White House rhetoric speaks of an “imminent nuclear threat” after “47 years of Iranian aggression.” Israeli official statements similarly describe the moment as the “11th hour” and Iran as an “existential and imminent threat.”
This matters because it changes the terms of debate. Iran is no longer treated as a state that can be deterred, negotiated with or contained. It is treated as an exceptional threat that lies outside the normal rules of politics and therefore justifies exceptional measures. The repetition of this language across policy documents, briefings and speeches gives it power. When the same message is echoed by presidents, ministers, military officials and diplomatic missions, it stops sounding like propaganda and begins to resemble common sense.
A second element of this discourse is more subtle, but equally important. The U.S. and Israeli officials constantly distinguish between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people. On the surface, that sounds humane. The White House says the regime spends its resources on missiles and nuclear programs while “its infrastructure and people struggle” and that it “brutally represses its own people.” Israeli rhetoric follows the same line, insisting that the war is against the regime, not the nation.
But this distinction is not as innocent as it seems. In practice, it serves a political purpose. One Iran is demonized so that war can be justified, the other is humanized so that war can be moralized. The regime is portrayed as fanatical, repressive and irredeemable. The people are portrayed as suffering, passive and waiting for deliverance. The result is not a restoration of Iranian agency, but its management. Iranian society is not treated as a political actor with its own internal dynamics and choices. It is turned into an object of rhetorical rescue.
Religionizing war
This becomes even clearer when the question of regime change enters the discussion. As Netanyahu frames it, Israel is trying to create favorable conditions for the collapse of the Iranian government, even while insisting that any actual overthrow would have to come “from the inside.” That contradiction is telling. Washington and Tel Aviv speak as if Iran’s future belongs to the Iranian people, while simultaneously admitting that military violence is being used to shape the conditions under which that future is supposed to emerge. In other words, they present themselves as supporters of liberation while acting as external engineers of political transformation.
The war is also being framed in a way that gives it a religious and apocalyptic charge. Netanyahu’s language has gone far beyond conventional security rhetoric. His references to light and darkness, good and evil, and civilization against barbarism are not simply colorful political phrases. They elevate the conflict into a larger moral and historical struggle.
Reuters also reported that the operation’s name, “Rising Lion,” was drawn from a biblical verse and reinforced by the note Netanyahu placed at the Western Wall before the strikes. In Netanyahu’s March 12 press conference, which was circulated through his own official messaging ecosystem, he is quoted as saying Israel will “reach the kingdom” and “make it to the Messiah’s return. The broader point is already clear: the war is being narrated in a redemptive and providential register, not just a strategic one.
That matters because sacralized wars are harder to limit. Once a war is framed as part of a civilizational or historical mission, compromise begins to look like weakness and de-escalation begins to look like betrayal. The conflict is no longer simply about interests or security. It becomes a struggle with a moral destiny attached to it.
Depicting Iran as targetable
A third major element of the narrative is spatial. Iran is not only portrayed as evil, but it is also portrayed as a space of concealment, secrecy and buried danger. Official U.S. and Israeli language repeatedly emphasize hidden facilities, underground sites, hardened infrastructure and mountain-protected programs. In this framing, geography itself becomes suspicious. Mountains, tunnels and underground installations are no longer neutral terrain. They are presented as proof of deception. Iran is transformed from a sovereign political space into a subterranean threat-space that must be penetrated, exposed and mastered.
The reverse of this image is domination from above. American military rhetoric repeatedly casts U.S. power as the force that sees, reaches and controls. That vertical imagery is revealing. What is hidden below is framed as deceit, what comes from above is framed as visibility, truth and rightful force. In this way, sovereignty is subtly redefined. Iran is no longer treated as a state with territorial integrity, but as a targetable space whose boundaries can be overridden in the name of security.
The same logic is extended to the region. Iran is depicted as the center of instability radiating disorder across allies, sea lanes and the broader Middle East. The U.S. and Israel, by contrast, present themselves as managers of a threatened security architecture. Once that map is accepted, the intervention no longer appears as an intervention, but it appears as an administration.
Gamification of war
Even the visual language of the war follows this pattern. The official White House social media videos mixed real Iran-war footage with video game imagery, action heroes, sports clips and slogans such as “JUSTICE THE AMERICAN WAY,” while officials said they would continue showing Iranian missiles and facilities being destroyed “in real time.”
This is not a trivial detail. It shows how war is not only narrated but also aestheticized. In speeches, the regime is demonized and the people are paternalized. In images, both disappear into a flat world of explosions, impacts and visual spectacle. Iran is reduced from a complex society into a target environment.
In the end, the deeper issue is not one Trump quote or one biblical phrase from Netanyahu. It is the convergence of institutions around the same narrative structure.
Iran is framed as exceptional evil. The regime is separated from the people only to make the latter available for rhetorical rescue. War is lifted into a civilizational and partially sacralized register. Iranian territory is turned into legitimate target space.
What emerges is not simply propaganda in the narrow sense. It is a full political framing strategy that decides in advance whose violence will be understood as order and whose very existence will be understood as a threat.
For that reason, the narrative dimension of this war may prove more dangerous than its military dimension alone. Military campaigns end. Narratives, once normalized, can endure much longer. And when they do, they make the next war easier to justify.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/a-new-crusade-how-us-israeli-language-justifies-war-against-iran
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Quiet advantage: What Russia and China may gain from US-Iran war
BY BASEL HAJ JASEM
MAR 16, 2026
At first glance, a military confrontation involving the U.S., Israel and Iran appears to be a conflict largely confined to the Middle East. Indeed, the immediate consequences would likely be felt most intensely across the region through security instability, economic disruption and shifting alliances. Yet wars of this scale rarely remain regional in their strategic impact. Beyond the visible front lines, the geopolitical ripple effects would reach far into the global balance of power, particularly affecting how Russia and China position themselves in the evolving international order.
In the early stages of such a conflict, it might seem that both Moscow and Beijing stand to lose. Iran has become an important partner for each in different ways. For China, Iran represents a significant source of energy supply and an important node in the broader infrastructure and connectivity networks that Beijing has promoted across Eurasia. For Russia, cooperation with Iran has deepened in recent years, particularly in the context of Moscow’s war in Ukraine, where Iranian-made drones have reportedly played a role in Russian military operations. From this perspective, any serious weakening of Iran or instability that undermines its state structure could deprive both powers of a useful strategic partner.
However, geopolitical outcomes are rarely so straightforward. If the conflict were to expand or drag on for an extended period, the broader strategic picture could look very different. A prolonged confrontation in the Middle East would inevitably demand substantial American military, financial and diplomatic resources. The U.S. would likely need to reinforce regional deployments, strengthen air and missile defenses, protect shipping lanes, and maintain a sustained operational presence across several theatres.
Modern warfare is extraordinarily resource-intensive. Precision-guided munitions, air defense interceptors, surveillance platforms and logistical infrastructure are consumed at a pace that few peacetime planners anticipate. Recent conflicts have demonstrated how quickly even large stockpiles can be depleted once large-scale military operations begin. If Washington were drawn deeply into another extended military commitment in the Middle East, the strain on its military inventory and operational planning could become significant.
Losers and winners of the war
For Russia, such a shift could bring indirect advantages. Western support for Ukraine has relied heavily on American military assistance, particularly in the supply of ammunition, air defense systems and other advanced capabilities. If the U.S. found itself diverting a meaningful share of these resources to another theatre, the scale or speed of aid to Kyiv could face new constraints. Even a modest slowdown in Western military support might provide Moscow with strategic breathing space on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.
China, meanwhile, would likely view such a scenario through a different but equally strategic lens. Beijing has long been attentive to how the U.S. manages complex military operations and balances commitments across multiple regions. Any large-scale conflict involving American forces provides a rare opportunity for careful observation. Military planners in Beijing would study operational patterns, logistical vulnerabilities and the performance of advanced weapon systems under real combat conditions.
Beyond the purely military dimension, there is also a broader strategic calculation. For several years, Washington’s strategic focus has increasingly shifted toward the Indo-Pacific, where competition with China is widely seen as the defining geopolitical contest of the coming decades. The U.S. has strengthened alliances, expanded regional military cooperation and invested diplomatic energy in counterbalancing China’s growing influence.
If Washington were forced to devote greater attention and resources to a major conflict in the Middle East, that shift could slow or complicate its strategic reorientation toward Asia. Even without a dramatic policy change, the practical demands of managing a new war could dilute the intensity of American engagement in the Indo-Pacific. For Beijing, any reduction in pressure along its immediate strategic periphery from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea would be carefully noted.
Necessarily cautious
At the same time, both Russia and China would likely proceed with caution. Neither power has an interest in becoming directly entangled in a military confrontation with the U.S. over Iran. China in particular remains deeply integrated into the global economy, with extensive trade and financial ties to Western markets. An overt military alignment with Tehran against Washington and its allies could carry significant economic risks for Beijing, potentially jeopardizing the stability that underpins China’s continued growth.
Moreover, despite its expanding global influence, China still maintains only a limited military presence in the Middle East. While Beijing has developed economic partnerships and infrastructure projects throughout the region, it has not built the kind of security architecture that would allow it to play a decisive military role in a regional war. As a result, China’s most likely approach would be one of cautious observation, protecting its economic interests, advocating diplomatic solutions, and avoiding direct involvement in hostilities.
Russia faces a more complex calculation. Its political and military cooperation with Iran has deepened in recent years, yet Moscow is also aware that its strategic priorities remain concentrated in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin would need to balance its interest in maintaining partnerships in the Middle East with the potential benefits that might arise from a shift in American attention elsewhere.
Another factor that deserves attention lies in the technological and industrial foundations of modern warfare. Contemporary conflicts depend heavily on global supply chains that include semiconductors, advanced manufacturing components, rare earth minerals and sophisticated electronic systems. Many of these supply chains remain deeply interconnected with China’s industrial capacity.
In the event of a prolonged conflict involving Western militaries, the strain on these supply networks could become more visible. Increased demand for high-tech components and strategic materials might expose vulnerabilities within the global defense industrial ecosystem. In such circumstances, China’s central role in global manufacturing, especially in areas indirectly connected to defense production, could become a source of strategic leverage.
This does not mean that Beijing would seek confrontation. On the contrary, Chinese policymakers have consistently emphasized stability as a prerequisite for economic development. Yet structural advantages within global supply chains may quietly shape the balance of power over time, particularly during periods of prolonged geopolitical tension.
What will pragmatism bring?
It is also worth remembering that both Russia and China tend to approach international politics with a pragmatic outlook. If internal political changes were to occur in Iran as a result of conflict or instability, neither Moscow nor Beijing would necessarily remain tied to a specific political leadership in Tehran. Historically, both powers have shown a willingness to adapt quickly to new political realities, prioritizing the preservation of strategic and economic interests over ideological alignment.
In this sense, the broader geopolitical consequences of a war involving Iran could prove far more complex than initial impressions suggest. While Tehran might bear the immediate costs of military confrontation, the indirect effects could reshape the strategic environment in ways that extend well beyond the Middle East.
The paradox is striking. A conflict that appears at first to weaken a network of states loosely aligned against Western influence could, under certain conditions, produce dynamics that ultimately benefit those same powers. If a prolonged war were to absorb American attention, stretch military resources, and complicate Washington’s global priorities, the strategic landscape could gradually shift in ways that favor competitors operating outside the immediate battlefield.
History has repeatedly shown that the outcomes of wars are not determined solely by victories or losses on the front lines. Often, the most significant geopolitical consequences unfold in the quieter arenas of resource allocation, strategic focus and long-term power competition. In such a scenario, the most consequential winners may not be the countries directly involved in the fighting, but those observing carefully from a distance, waiting for the balance of global attention to tilt in their favor.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/quiet-advantage-what-russia-and-china-may-gain-from-us-iran-war
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The Gulf expects actions, not words, from Iran
FAISAL J. ABBAS
March 16, 2026
On Saturday, March 7, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian made headlines when he gave a statement that was wholeheartedly welcomed across the Gulf. “I personally apologize to the neighbouring countries that were affected by Iran’s actions,” the president said in a televised address. “What happened was that our commanders and our leader lost their lives following barbaric aggression, and our armed forces ... fired at will because their commanders were absent and did whatever they deemed necessary.”
This came shortly after a wide-ranging interview that Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, gave to AFP. In it, he thanked Saudi Arabia for not allowing its airspace to be used in attacks on Iran and denied that Tehran had targeted the US Embassy in Riyadh or the Shaybah oil field.
Many observers, yours truly included, breathed a sigh of relief. The indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians in Gulf countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia (which had signed a nonaggression treaty with Tehran in Beijing in 2023), were assumed to have been a result of strategic miscalculation and were given the benefit of the doubt. This is despite the repeated pattern, and the clear indication that Tehran sought to target oil facilities to make the war as expensive as possible for America and the world at large.
Still, some speculated that these attacks resulted from confusion or a command vacuum following the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Others suggested that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may have used the moment to remind the “civilian” side of the Iranian government (such as the president, the foreign minister, the deputy foreign minister and the ambassador) who really holds power.
That interpretation, however, ignored the view long held by many Iran experts that the Revolutionary Guards have always been the real power center in Iran and that the regime’s good-cop, bad-cop dynamic has long been a deliberate tactic.
It did not take long for the Revolutionary Guards to shatter any lingering doubts. The IRGC quickly doubled down on the attacks, even belittling and criticizing their own president. Indeed, the attacks on civilian targets in the Gulf, and Saudi oil facilities, increased instead of being halted.
Despite this, goodwill on the Saudi and Gulf side continued. The hope was that once a new supreme leader was chosen, Iran would regain a clear and consistent direction. When Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the slain supreme leader, was selected, there was cautious optimism, particularly when he said: “Iran is fully prepared for unity and to establish mutually beneficial, warm and sincere relations with all its neighbors.
We have 15 neighboring countries by land and sea, and we have always desired, and continue to desire, friendly and constructive relations with all of them.”
At that point, there seemed to be no excuse for ambiguity. The supreme leader, by definition, reigns supreme. He holds religious, political and military authority. Moreover, few could be expected to demonstrate greater loyalty to the system than a son avenging the deaths of his father and family members in American and Israeli strikes.
Yet the new ayatollah has not appeared publicly. Iranian officials have confirmed that he was injured in the Feb. 28 strike that killed his father, raising questions about whether he is fully in charge. So far, it does not appear that the Revolutionary Guards have obeyed his orders.
It is worth noting that Mojtaba Khamenei is not only the supreme leader, but he also served for decades as his father’s chief of staff. He would have been present when his father received the handwritten message from King Salman that was delivered last year by Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman. Mojtaba was also likely in the room when the elder Khamenei, not speaking for the cameras, nor acting as a diplomat paid to offer pleasantries, told Prince Khalid that Iran wholeheartedly wished to see Saudi Arabia “rich, strong and stable.” That sentiment reinforced the spirit of the 2023 Beijing Agreement, which would not have been possible without the former supreme leader’s blessing.
Today, while Saudi Arabia, like other GCC countries, has made clear that the right to respond to aggression remains on the table, the prevailing hope is that the new supreme leader will continue along the path his father appeared to embrace when he endorsed the Beijing Agreement. Putting differences aside would benefit not only bilateral ties but the entire region.
It must also be noted that since the war between US-Israel and Iran began, it is Iran that has violated the declaration, not Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has refrained — so far — from firing a single bullet back at Tehran in response, even though it possesses the capability to inflict serious damage. That statement stands even without invoking the US security partnership or the defense ties with Pakistan, both of which have signaled readiness to protect their ally (in Washington’s case, we are a major non-NATO ally, and in Islamabad’s case, the land of the Two Holy Mosques that it shares a security pact with).
The new supreme leader should not allow those who wish to tear up the Beijing Agreement to succeed. According to Iran’s own ambassador, Saudi Arabia has not allowed its airspace or territory to be used against Iran. Tehran would do well not to rely on unsubstantiated, anonymous claims appearing in certain Western media outlets, written by reporters with agendas that seek to sow discord between Tehran and Riyadh.
The credibility of those claims deserves to be “shot down” just as much as the missiles aimed at Riyadh or its oil facilities.
Saudi Arabia did everything possible to avert this war and diplomatic channels remain open, up until now. So did the Omanis by the way, but there is little anyone could have done 18 days ago if Iranian negotiators insisted on the right to enrich uranium during negotiations. If Iran’s nuclear program is purely peaceful, why insist on enrichment at this moment? Was that insistence worth the consequences? Playing ball with US President Donald Trump might have spared Iran immense suffering and preserved its relations with its neighbors. Alas, it is too late now to cry over spilt milk.
We are neighbours who share history, faith and geography. It is painful for us to see Iranian civilians suffering, 150 schoolgirls reportedly killed and heritage sites destroyed. Yet sympathy becomes difficult when Tehran fires missiles even toward its closest partners, including Oman, which as noted above was negotiating on Iran’s behalf until the very last moment and whose sultan was among the first to congratulate the new ayatollah.
Finally, Tehran’s claim that attacks on Gulf countries were carried out by enemy drones disguised as Iranian ones creates a troubling dilemma. If the claim is true, why the delay in raising it? And how does Tehran reconcile that narrative with earlier statements by figures such as Ali Larijani and other hard-liners who openly justified the attacks? Such a scenario would also suggest that the regime and its militias are either dysfunctional and operating in silos or have been infiltrated to an alarming degree.
If the claim is false, it only further erodes what little credibility remains.
Either way, the attacks on neighboring countries must stop. The Gulf expects actions, not words, before it is too late.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636594
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Gulf states building trust through Iran ‘war’ response
DR. DANIA KOLEILAT KHATIB
March 16, 2026
Many articles and social media posts have been published in the last two weeks covering how Arab Gulf states are handling the war — or, more specifically, the unjustified Iranian strikes on their territory. To start with, this is not a war between Iran and the Gulf. This is Iran unjustifiably striking its neighbours. The coverage varies from influencers relaxing on golden beaches to people fleeing the so-called war in panic. However, despite the hardships, the conflict represents an important test — a test in crisis management that the Gulf states have so far aced.
Some who were either uncomfortable with or jealous of the Arab Gulf’s success are now saying that Gulf prosperity was built on security and stability. In their perspective, this pillar no longer exists. However, this logic is twisted. To start with, no country — no matter how developed — is immune from war. Everyone thought that Europe was done with wars. Well, it is currently experiencing a war that has been going on for more than four years. The key is how states handle it.
The Gulf states have demonstrated exceptional defense capabilities, with a very high interception rate. Gulf countries have used advanced US-made systems, specifically Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot, to block attacks on their territory. In addition to the high interception rate, Gulf countries have a good early warning system. There has also been good compliance with safety measures by institutions and the public.
If we think about it logically, no matter where you are, you can never guarantee that a neighbouring state will not carry out an aggressive act. However, you want to be in a place where you know for sure that the state has the capabilities to ensure your safety.
Even though everyone is tense, everything remains functional. Again, many people who are either pessimistic or jealous started speculating about how everyone living in the Gulf would suffer if the Strait of Hormuz was closed. This turned out to be a huge exaggeration. People living in the Gulf cannot notice any difference when they do their grocery shopping. The aisles are well stocked with a variety of perishables. This is because the Gulf had a good contingency plan. Once the strait was closed, all trade was redirected to the ports on the Red Sea. Therefore, as an individual, a business or an investor, you can rest assured that Gulf states know what they are doing. They plan for contingencies.
Of course, business has gone down. To start with, people are not in the mood for spending or investing due to the uncertainty that comes with war. Also, there are fewer tourists and several events have been canceled. We should remember that a similar dip occurred due to COVID-19. After the pandemic, the Gulf bounced back. At that time, the region smartly applied economic boosters to make sure small businesses did not shut down and regular employees did not lose their jobs. They can do the same again if required. The Gulf states are well endowed with sovereign wealth funds. These were created to be useful on rainy days like the ones we are currently witnessing. The Gulf countries will mitigate the effects of this conflict in the same way they jumpstarted their economies after COVID-19.
There is another factor that is very important for anyone looking to the Gulf to settle or invest: these states are led by rational people, not people driven by their hubris. This is why, despite the various Iranian provocations, the leaders of the different states analyzed the costs and benefits of going to war. They know that they are better off staying out of it and focusing on defense. They made a rational decision.
Again, for those who are pessimistic or jealous and who use dramatic headlines like, “Can the Gulf still act as an airline hub for the world?” I respond that it is likely to emerge stronger. Yes, stronger. Whether you live in the Gulf with your family, are employed in the Gulf, own a business in the Gulf or just have investments in the Gulf, when you see the effectiveness of the crisis management these states have demonstrated, you cannot help but increase your trust in them. Hardships are a test of resilience, strength and decision-making. The Arab Gulf states have proved they can be trusted.
For investors, professionals and even blue-collar workers, for citizens as well as expatriates, what they seek is a system that protects them and allows them to thrive. The Gulf states have provided this ecosystem. Despite the dip these states might be experiencing currently, they have earned trust and this will give them a big boost in the long run.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636598
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The Return of Iraq’s Long War against US Occupation – Analysis
March 17, 2026
By Robert Inlakesh
Imperial Foundations of Iraq’s Long War
After more than two decades and a million dead later, armed resistance groups in Iraq are shaping up to be one of the defining features of today’s regional war. Although greatly overlooked in the Western media, it is a historic instance of blowback, coming back to bite Washington.
When the United States and Israel chose to attack Iran on February 28, their decision truly did ignite an “epic fury” across West Asia, but not in their favor. Iraq in particular is shaping up to be one of the most difficult fronts to face, and therefore it is important that the story – which the corporate media dares not tell – be explained.
Baghdad, the city where Iraqi resistance factions are now targeting US bases, its embassy, personnel, and facilities day in and day out, was the first city ever subjected to a sustained aerial bombing campaign.
In the 1920s, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) became the first to adopt the strategy of committing aerial bombardments in order to reduce the quantity of ground forces needed to subdue a city’s population. The British would later pass the torch on to the United States when it came to their project of imperial domination, in the land once called the cradle of civilization.
The Iraqi population has for decades survived the terrorism of the United States, whether that be Washington’s use of Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, to the First Gulf War, the sanctions that killed hundreds of thousands of children, or the invasion of 2003. While covering all of this nation’s history would be too tall a task for this article, it suffices to say that the Yankee boot has ceased to lift from the Iraqi throat.
Over a million people were said to have perished as a result of the US regime change operation against Iraq, with many millions more scattered to all corners of the globe. Yet, the failed nation-building exercise, Israeli-style occupation camps, and dismantlement of a nation slowly faded from the headlines, especially with the eventual withdrawal of the majority of foreign soldiers from its territory.
While the cameras turned away, the US embedded itself in Iraq, using its economic and soft power control to dictate outcomes inside the country, never truly permitting total independence and refusing to withdraw its soldiers and contractors from the country. A large part of the reason why was because of their need to ensure they were able to set up their next regime change operations, the most important to them being the toppling of the government in Tehran.
Blow Back over Two Decades Later
The rise of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS), known in the region as Daesh, provided the United States with the perfect excuse to enter the Iraqi arena once again in 2014. However, contrary to the narrative popularized in the West, the United States’s role in fighting Daesh was rather limited and mainly conducted through air campaigns – evidently with exceptions.
So, where the United States saw the opportunity for further involvement in West Asia, in particular the way that Daesh aided in their covert operation to topple the Syrian government, so too did their arch nemesis Iran seize the opportunity.
The fight to defeat the Takfiri death cult was in need of a ground force, which is where the Iraqis themselves took up the fight. With the help of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Hashd al-Shaabi, or Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), were formed. The PMU, alongside the Iraqi national armed forces, would then wage on-the-ground battles against Daesh in order to put down their ever-expanding extremist State project.
It was a bloody fight, not one that anyone should have any illusions about, but in the end, the PMU were the military units that turned the tide and crushed Daesh. The man who was chiefly responsible for aiding the rise of these groups was the IRGC’s Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. In other words, the man that US President Donald Trump assassinated in 2020 was the man who is widely credited with playing a decisive role in defeating Daesh.
An important point to note is that the majority of Iraq’s population is Shia Muslims, which equalled a natural affinity between many Iraqis and Iran’s religious leadership, in particular Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. Therefore, when the United States and Israel decided to murder Khamenei, they immediately triggered a reaction from Iraq.
But the struggle goes deeper than this. The Iraqis have been under the boot of the US for decades now, having lost the nation they once knew, with everyone collectively understanding who stole it from them, whether they love or loathe Iran. If you listen to the rhetoric coming from the Iraqi factions today, you hear this rage that has been brewing over what has been done to them, along with evident Shia religious themes and anti-imperialist slogans.
Iraq’s Return to the Regional War
Groups like Saraya Awliya Ad-Dam (The Guardians of the Blood Brigades) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have emerged as important players in the recent widespread operations across the country and against Israel.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq was the group that offered a support front to the Palestinian resistance during the Gaza genocide, while Awliya Ad-Dam appears to have been founded back in 2020 and only recently began advertising itself.
Both these groups possess drones and missiles of varying types, evidently armed by Iran. But then you have the full power of Hashd al-Shaabi itself, which, when fully mobilized, has a force of around 250,000 fighters at its disposal. Within the Hashd, there are various groups, one of the most well-known being Kataeb Hezbollah, many of whom have more advanced weapons. The PMU is not “Iranian proxies”, but instead constitutes a crucial part of Iraq’s security apparatus.
Recently, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed to have shot down the US’s KC-135 refuelling aircraft, killing 6 American servicemembers, while other groups have been hammering US military installations. US Central Command (CENTCOM)’s narrative about how the aircraft was downed appeared nonsensical, but they denied it was shot down by enemy fire. The importance of this is that the announcement in itself demonstrates just how far the Iraqi groups are willing to go.
What we are currently witnessing is an Iraq that has returned to the way of resistance against US imperialist domination. Similar to how Hezbollah had waited for 15 months for the correct set of circumstances to fight for the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation, the Iraqis had also long held their fire.
For those who have long followed developments across the region, it was obvious that the firepower and battle experience acquired by the Iraqi groups were being held in reserve for the day that it would eventually have to be used. The time has now come. Tehran also knew that supporting the rise of such groups inside Iraq would work as a pillar of their defense against any US-Israeli aggression.
It appears as if the US and Israelis have been taken aback by just how aggressive the Iraqi factions have been in their fight against them. Similarly, the Israeli Hebrew media have been expressing their shock at the intensity of Hezbollah’s fire during the war. All of which goes to show that Tel Aviv and Washington appear to have forgotten the history of what they put the region through.
The US-Israeli coalition has killed millions across West Asia, destroyed Iraq and Syria in order to place them under their control, fostered inorganic sectarianism, with the help of their allies in the Arab World, all while causing a mass exodus. Everyone they are now fighting is a product of their own endless aggression, their arrogance, and their refusal to allow the region’s people to simply live.
The same behaviour has been demonstrated with the Palestinians, born of racist and orientalist beliefs, that if you just oppress them enough, they won’t be capable of fighting you, or will give up. Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and Gaza form what is known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’, who are fighting with a vengeance. In the case of Iraq, it took over 22 years for there to be a force capable of sufficiently fighting back. On February 28, the US and Israel gave them the perfect circumstances under which to do so.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-return-of-iraqs-long-war-against-us-occupation-analysis/
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EXPLAINER: What Is Iran’s Kharg Island — and Why Trump Is Targeting It
March 16, 2026
What Is Kharg Island?
Kharg Island is a small coral island located roughly 33 kilometres off Iran’s southern coast in the northern Persian Gulf, but its strategic importance far outweighs its modest size.
Nearly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports pass through Kharg, making it the country’s primary crude oil export terminal.
Massive storage tanks, loading facilities, and tanker berths dominate the island’s infrastructure, turning it into one of the most strategically significant energy sites in the Middle East.
For decades, Kharg has functioned as the gateway between Iran’s oil fields and the global market. Tankers dock there daily, loading crude destined primarily for Asian markets.
In geopolitical terms, Kharg is not merely an island — it is the beating heart of Iran’s oil economy.
Why Is the US Targeting It?
In recent days, the United States has begun striking targets on Kharg Island during its military campaign against Iran.
US President Donald Trump described Kharg as Iran’s “crown jewel,” according to NDTV, framing the attacks as part of a strategy to pressure Tehran to end restrictions affecting the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.
According to reports, multiple US strikes hit targets on the island, though major energy infrastructure has so far avoided catastrophic damage.
Trump has also threatened further attacks, saying the US might strike Kharg Island again “just for fun,” according to reports citing remarks he made to NBC News.
The remarks have raised alarm among energy analysts and regional observers, who see Kharg not merely as a military target but as a critical economic lifeline for Iran and a sensitive trigger for global oil markets.
Why Does Kharg Matter to the Global Oil Market?
Kharg’s importance lies in its overwhelming role in Iran’s oil exports.
Satellite data and maritime intelligence show that tens of millions of barrels of oil have continued to move through Kharg even during the war.
AP reported that Iran exported about 13.7 million barrels of crude oil after the war began, with many tankers loading directly from Kharg’s terminals.
If the island’s export facilities were severely damaged, the consequences would not be limited to Iran.
Energy analysts warn that disrupting Kharg could immediately tighten global supply, sending oil prices higher and increasing volatility across international markets.
This is particularly dangerous during a war that is already threatening shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf.
Why Does Kharg Matter to China?
The geopolitical stakes become even clearer when examining China’s role in Iran’s oil trade.
Because of US sanctions, Iran has relatively few buyers for its crude oil. China has emerged as by far the largest purchaser of Iranian oil.
According to energy analytics firm Kpler, China purchases more than 80 percent of Iran’s exported crude oil.
Reuters also reported that China bought about 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian oil in 2025.
Much of that oil passes through Kharg Island.
For China — the world’s largest crude importer — any disruption at Kharg could ripple quickly through its energy system.
The consequences are already being felt. NDTV reported long lines at gas stations in parts of China as fuel prices surged following disruptions linked to the Iran war.
In this sense, Kharg is not only an Iranian asset — it is a strategic pressure point in the global energy system, particularly for Asia.
Does Iran Have Alternatives?
Iran does have an alternative export route.
In 2021, Tehran opened the Jask oil terminal, located on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz. The terminal was designed partly as a strategic hedge against exactly the kind of disruption now unfolding.
However, Jask has a major limitation. Its loading capacity is roughly one million barrels per day, about half the capacity of the Kharg terminal.
While shipments from Jask have increased since the war began, it cannot fully replace Kharg’s role in Iran’s energy infrastructure.
For that reason, Kharg remains the single most important export hub for Iranian oil.
Why Is Trump Now Focused on Kharg?
The shift toward targeting Kharg Island also reflects a broader dynamic in the war itself.
Washington initially framed the campaign against Iran as part of a strategy to secure the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes.
But the strategy has encountered serious obstacles.
Regional states and global powers have been reluctant to join a US-led coalition to reopen the strait militarily, and the conflict has already triggered wider instability across the Gulf.
Against this backdrop, the focus on Kharg increasingly appears to be an attempt to create leverage — or claim a symbolic victory — in a war that has proven far more complicated than Washington anticipated.
Whether targeting Iran’s most critical oil export hub can achieve that goal remains uncertain, if at all likely.
What is clear, however, is that Kharg Island has become one of the most dangerous flashpoints in a war already reshaping the global energy landscape.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/explainer-what-is-irans-kharg-island-and-why-trump-is-targeting-it/
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The Iran War — The Most Obvious Question Liberal Media Refuses to Ask
March 16, 2026
By Ramzy Baroud
Doubtless, the war launched by US President Donald Trump is not popular among ordinary Americans.
According to the latest public opinion poll, only a minority of Americans—part of the dwindling core of Trump’s supporters—believe that the US-Israeli aggression against Iran has merit.
According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted in early March 2026, only 27 percent of Americans approve of the US-Israeli strikes on Iran—while 43 percent disapprove and 29 percent are unsure.
This pro-war constituency is likely to remain supportive of Trump until the end of his term in office, and long after.
However, the war on Iran is not popular, and it is unlikely to become popular, especially as the Trump administration is reportedly fragmented between those who want to stay the course and those desperate for an exit strategy. Such a strategy would allow their president to save face before the midterm elections in November.
Mainstream media—aside, of course, from the pro-war chorus in right-wing news organizations, podcasters, and think tanks—also recognize that their country has entered a quagmire.
If it continues unchecked, it will likely prove worse than the war in Iraq in 2003 or the long war in Afghanistan, which lasted 20 years and ended with a decisive American defeat in August 2021 following the withdrawal of US forces and the collapse of the Afghan government.
Both wars have cost US taxpayers an estimated $8 trillion, including long-term veteran care and interest on borrowing, according to the Brown University Costs of War Project.
Iran is already promising to be even more costly if the insanity of the war—instigated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war-crazed government—does not end very quickly.
Many Americans may understand the difficult situation in which Trump’s unhinged behavior and his unexplained loyalty to Netanyahu have placed their country. What they rarely confront is the moral dimension of that crisis.
Though they speak of the war’s failure—the lack of strategy, the lack of preparation, the absence of an end goal, and the confusion surrounding its objectives—very few in mainstream media have taken what should have been the obvious moral position: that the war itself is criminal, unjustifiable, and illegal under international law.
That position should have been obvious the moment the first bomb was dropped over Tehran. The aggression—particularly while negotiations between Iran and the United States were underway under Omani mediation—was ethically indefensible.
Any remaining doubt should have disappeared when US-Israeli strikes hit civilian areas, including schools and residential districts in the city of Minab in southern Iran, killing hundreds of civilians, mostly children and women.
This moral silence is not new. In fact, it has often been masked by a familiar rhetorical device: the selective invocation of women’s rights.
In nearly every US war on Arab and Muslim countries, women’s rights have featured heavily in the propaganda used to justify war. The vast majority of mainstream media organizations, think tanks, human rights groups, and activists—even those who rejected military interventionism on principle—agreed at least on that particular premise: the urgency of women’s rights.
They used Malala Yousafzai as a symbol of girls’ education and women’s rights, presenting her as a model of American benevolence. At the same time, they ignored the fact that among the countless innocent Muslims killed across the Middle East and Asia in the last few decades—some counts place them in the millions—children and women represented a large share of the victims.
The same scenario was repeated in Gaza during the ongoing genocide, where UN agencies estimate that women and children make up roughly 70 percent of the more than 72,200 Palestinians killed since October 2023. According to data compiled by ‘UN Women’ and Gaza’s health authorities, the total includes an estimated 33,000 women and girls.
Yet mainstream media continues to center Israeli claims about abuses of women’s rights by Hamas in Gaza, as if the tens of thousands of women killed and maimed by Israeli bombardment were not even worthy of serious consideration.
The same pattern is now repeating itself in Iran. The administration of Donald Trump—a man known for his degrading views and actions toward women—has been allowed, along with war criminal Netanyahu, to frame the war against Iran as a struggle for women’s rights and liberation.
They cultivated a network of supposed women’s rights activists, presenting them as authentic Iranian voices whose mission was to rescue women from massive human rights abuses in their own country. Even on the Left, many fell into that trap—denouncing Trump on the one hand, while still absorbing and reproducing his and Israel’s propaganda.
Now that thousands of women and children have been killed or wounded in the US-Israel unprovoked, unethical, and illegal war on Iran, many of these same voices have fallen silent, quietly placing women’s rights on hold until the outcome of the onslaught becomes clear.
Though much of the media now expresses doubt about Trump’s war, the moral foundation of anti-war opposition has largely disappeared, replaced instead by a narrow strategic debate over costs, risks, and political consequences.
Complaints about rising energy prices, commentary about Trump’s political immaturity, and criticism of his failure to assess the situation properly before ordering bombs to fall have replaced the moral argument altogether.
Equally absent is Netanyahu’s role in the war, as well as the stranglehold Israel exerts over successive US administrations—Republican and Democrat alike—including the supposedly ‘America First’ president.
This logic dominates much of the mainstream strategic debate. Commentators such as Fareed Zakaria, Thomas Friedman, and others have repeatedly argued, in one form or another, that the United States must avoid being consumed by Middle Eastern conflicts and instead concentrate on what they describe as the central geopolitical challenge of our time: the rise of China.
While it is important to highlight the unpopularity of America’s latest military adventure, such opposition must rest on moral and legal grounds.
That said, mainstream liberal media should not be confused with genuine anti-war voices. Their objection to war is rarely principled. They tend to oppose military interventions only when those wars fail to serve US strategic interests, threaten corporate profits, or risk undermining Israel’s long-term security.
This is not opposition to war.
It is the logic of war itself.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-iran-war-the-most-obvious-question-liberal-media-refuses-to-ask/
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No time for losers: Why the war meant to save Israel may destroy it
By Dr Ramzy Baroud
March 16, 2026
When Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu launched their military aggression against Iran on 28th February, they appeared convinced that the war would be swift. Netanyahu reportedly assured Washington that the campaign would deliver a decisive strategic victory—one capable of reordering the Middle East and restoring Israel’s battered deterrence.
Whether Netanyahu himself believed that promise is another matter.
For decades, influential circles within Israel’s strategic establishment have not necessarily sought stability, but rather “creative destruction.” The logic is simple: dismantle hostile regional powers and allow fragmented political landscapes to replace them.
This idea did not emerge overnight. It was articulated most clearly in a 1996 policy paper titled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, prepared for then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by a group of US neoconservative strategists, including Richard Perle.
The document argued that Israel should abandon land-for-peace diplomacy and instead pursue a strategy that would weaken or remove hostile regimes in the region, particularly Iraq and Syria. The goal was not merely military victory but a geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East in Israel’s Favor.
In many ways, the subsequent decades seemed to validate that theory—at least from Tel Aviv’s perspective.
The Middle East Reordered
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was widely considered a catastrophe for Washington. Hundreds of thousands died, trillions of dollars were spent, and the United States became entangled in one of the most destabilising occupations in modern history.
Yet the war removed Saddam Hussein’s government, dismantled the Baath Party, and destroyed what had once been the strongest Arab army in the region.
For Israel, the strategic consequences were significant.
Iraq, historically one of the few Arab states capable of confronting Israel militarily, ceased to exist as a coherent regional power. Years of instability followed, leaving Baghdad with a fragile political system struggling to maintain national cohesion.
Syria, another central concern in Israeli strategic thinking, would later descend into its own devastating war beginning in 2011. Libya collapsed earlier after NATO’s intervention in 2011 as well. Across the region, once-formidable Arab nationalist states fractured into weakened or internally divided systems.
From Israel’s vantage point, the theory of regional fragmentation appeared to be paying dividends.
Without strong Arab states capable of projecting military power, several Gulf governments began reconsidering their long-standing refusal to normalise relations with Israel.
The result was the Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020 under the Trump administration, which formalised normalisation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later followed by Morocco and Sudan.
For a moment, it seemed that the geopolitical transformation envisioned decades earlier had been realised.
Gaza changed the equation
But history rarely moves in straight lines.
Israel’s genocide in Gaza did not produce the strategic victory Israeli leaders had anticipated. Instead, the war exposed deep vulnerabilities in Israel’s military and political standing.
More importantly, Palestinian resistance demonstrated that overwhelming military force could not translate into decisive political control.
The consequences reverberated far beyond Gaza.
The war galvanized resistance movements across the region, deepened divisions within Arab and Muslim societies between governments aligned with Washington and those opposed to Israeli policies, and ignited an unprecedented wave of global solidarity with Palestinians.
Israel’s international image suffered dramatically.
For decades, Western political discourse framed Israel as a democratic outpost surrounded by hostile forces. That narrative has steadily eroded. Increasingly, Israel is described—even by major international organizations—as a state engaged in systematic oppression and, in Gaza’s case, genocidal violence.
The strategic cost of that reputational collapse cannot be overstated. Military power relies not only on weapons but also on legitimacy. And legitimacy, once lost, is difficult to recover.
Netanyahu’s final gamble
Against this backdrop, the war on Iran emerged as Netanyahu’s most consequential gamble.
If successful, it could restore Israel’s regional dominance and reassert its deterrence. Defeating Iran—or even severely weakening it—would reshape the balance of power across the Middle East.
But failure carries equally profound consequences.
Netanyahu, now facing an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court in 2024 over war crimes in Gaza, has tied his political survival to the promise of strategic victory.
In multiple interviews over the past year, he has framed the confrontation with Iran in almost biblical terms. In one televised address in 2025, Netanyahu declared that Israel was engaged in a “historic mission” to secure the future of the Jewish state for generations.
Such rhetoric reveals not confidence but desperation.
Israel cannot wage such a war alone. It never could.
Thus, Netanyahu worked tirelessly to draw the United States directly into the conflict—a familiar pattern in modern Middle Eastern wars.
The paradox of Trump’s war
For Americans, the question remains: why did Donald Trump—who repeatedly campaigned against “endless wars”—allow the US to enter yet another Middle Eastern conflict?
During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump famously declared: “We should have never been in Iraq. We have destabilised the Middle East.”
Yet nearly a decade later, his administration has plunged Washington into a confrontation whose potential consequences dwarf those of the earlier wars.
The precise motivations matter less to those living under the bombs.
Across the region, the scenes are painfully familiar: devastated cities, mass graves, grieving families, and societies once again forced to endure the violence of foreign intervention.
But this war is unfolding in a fundamentally different geopolitical environment.
The US no longer commands the unchallenged dominance it once enjoyed.
China has emerged as a major economic and strategic actor. Russia continues to project influence. Regional powers have gained confidence in resisting Washington’s dictates.
The Middle East itself has changed.
A war already going wrong
Early signs suggest that the war is not unfolding according to the expectations of Washington or Tel Aviv.
Reports from US and Israeli media indicate that missile-defense systems in Israel and several Gulf states are facing a serious strain under sustained attacks. Meanwhile, Iran and its regional allies have demonstrated missile capabilities far more extensive than many analysts had anticipated.
What was supposed to be a rapid campaign increasingly resembles a prolonged conflict.
Energy markets provide another indication of shifting dynamics. Rather than securing greater control over global energy flows, the war has disrupted supplies and strengthened Iran’s leverage over key maritime routes.
Strategic assumptions built on decades of uncontested American military power are colliding with a far more complex reality.
Even the political rhetoric emanating from Washington has become noticeably defensive and increasingly angry—often a sign that events are not unfolding as planned.
Within the Trump administration itself, the intellectual poverty of the moment is difficult to miss. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, whose public persona is built on television bravado rather than strategic literacy, has often framed the conflict in language that sounds less like military doctrine and more like locker-room theatrics.
In speeches and interviews, he has repeatedly reduced complex geopolitical realities into crude narratives of strength, masculinity, and domination. Such rhetoric may excite partisan audiences, but it reveals a deeper problem: the people directing the most dangerous war in decades appear to understand very little about the forces they have unleashed.
Hegseth’s style is symptomatic of a broader intellectual collapse within Washington’s war-making circles—where historical knowledge is replaced by slogans, and strategic planning by theatrical displays of toughness. In such an environment, wars are not analyzed; they are performed.
The end of an era?
Netanyahu sought to dominate the Middle East. Washington sought to reaffirm its position as the world’s unrivalled superpower.
Neither objective appears within reach.
Instead, the war may accelerate the very transformations it was meant to prevent: a declining US strategic role, a weakened Israeli deterrent posture, and a Middle East increasingly shaped by regional actors rather than external powers.
Trump, despite the lofty and belligerent language, is in reality a weak president. Rage is rarely the language of strength; it is often the mask of insecurity. His administration has overestimated America’s military omnipotence, undermined allies and antagonized adversaries alike, and entered a war whose historical, political, and strategic dimensions it scarcely understands.
How can a leadership so consumed by narcissism and spectacle fully grasp the magnitude of the catastrophe it has helped unleash?
One would expect wisdom in moments of global crisis. What we have instead is a chorus of slogans, threats, and self-congratulation emanating from Washington—an administration seemingly incapable of distinguishing between what power can achieve and what it cannot.
They do not understand how profoundly the world has changed. They do not understand how the Middle East now perceives American military adventurism. And they certainly do not understand that Israel itself has become, politically and morally, a declining brand.
Of course, Trump and his equally arrogant administration will continue searching for any fragment of ‘victory’ to sell to their constituency as the greatest triumph in history. There will always be zealots ready to believe such myths.
But most Americans—and the overwhelming majority of people around the world—no longer do.
Partly because this war on Iran is immoral.
And partly because history has very little patience for losers.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260316-no-time-for-losers-why-the-war-meant-to-save-israel-may-destroy-it/
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