Middle East Press On: Turkish, America's Strategic Trap in Strait of Hormuz, Oman's Middle Path, Israel, Zionist, Netanyahu, America's War, New Age Islam's Selection, 20 March 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
20 March 2026
Turkish model of deterrence: Power, diplomacy and security
Power without exit – America’s strategic trap in the Strait of Hormuz
How can we understand Oman’s middle path toward Iran?
Rethink on Freebie Trips to Apartheid Israel by SA Journalists Sponsored by Zionist Lobbyists
Not Just Netanyahu’s War: The Arab Factor They Don’t Want You to Know
‘Grave Miscalculation’ — Oman Points to the Hidden Driver of America’s War on Iran
FACT CHECK: Inside Trump’s Contradictory Narrative on the Iran War
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Turkish model of deterrence: Power, diplomacy and security
By Merve Suna Özel Özcan
Mar 19, 2026
In recent years, the global system has entered a critical phase characterized by a discernible tendency for conflicts to broaden. When we examine Türkiye's immediate surroundings, regional geopolitics increasingly reveal themselves as a convergence zone for multiple, simultaneous crises. These crises are significant dynamics that directly affect Türkiye's security environment. For this reason, the geopolitical environment surrounding Türkiye exerts intense security pressure, often described as a "belt of fire." At the same time, the limited number of actors capable of reducing tensions and balancing conflict dynamics further increases the risk of regional instability. This situation requires a reconsideration of the concept of deterrence.
Deterrence is often defined primarily in terms of military capacity and displays of power. However, the current international context shows that such an approach is insufficient. In recent years, Türkiye has introduced a different dimension to deterrence by framing it not only through military instruments but also through diplomatic capacity and crisis management mechanisms.
In this regard, proactive mediation has become an important component of Türkiye's deterrence strategy. Türkiye's mediation initiatives should therefore be interpreted not merely as goodwill-driven diplomatic efforts but also as a strategic instrument that prevents escalation and makes actors' cost-risk calculations more visible. Türkiye's deterrence strategy is not shaped solely by military power, but also by diplomatic mediation, crisis management and the production of regional stability.
In recent years, Türkiye's defense industry has made remarkable strides, establishing the country as a key player in deterrence. This growing capability has not only enhanced Türkiye's credibility but also fostered confidence in both allies and adversaries, significantly contributing to the nation's security framework. However, in the context of deterrence debates today, it is necessary to focus on another dimension as well: mediation. Türkiye's approach, developed through its mediation mechanisms, presents a noteworthy model. The concept of proactive mediation particularly shapes this model.
Deterrence, peace diplomacy
Since 2019, and particularly following the COVID-19 period, Turkish foreign policy has experienced an intense phase of geopolitical activity and strategic engagement. Between 2019 and 2025, Türkiye’s immediate geopolitical environment has been surrounded by multiple simultaneous crises, including the Russia-Ukraine war, protracted conflict and normalization attempts in Syria, the fragile political equilibrium in Libya, the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process in the South Caucasus, tensions in the Horn of Africa between Somalia and Ethiopia alongside the Sudanese civil war, and competition over maritime jurisdiction and energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This complex environment has necessitated that Türkiye implement its foreign policy not only through traditional diplomatic tools but also through a broader strategic framework that incorporates security, diplomacy and strategic communication.
In this context, deterrence theory should not be interpreted merely as a military capability of threat or retaliation. Rather, deterrence functions as a strategic framework that operates through communication, credibility, institutional mechanisms and diplomacy. Therefore, deterrence can also be considered an instrument of stability production, influencing how actors calculate risks, costs and escalation dynamics in crisis environments.
Since 2020, Türkiye has integrated a new dimension into its understanding of deterrence. Ankara is now incorporating mediation and stability diplomacy as a layer of deterrence focused on preventing escalation. In this regard, proactive mediation has emerged as one of the most visible instruments in Turkish foreign policy practice. Acting with an awareness of the historical and political codes of its surrounding geopolitics, Türkiye has sought to highlight potential risks and costs to actors involved in conflict environments.
In this sense, diplomacy serves not only as a conflict-resolution mechanism but also as a strategic deterrence layer that prevents escalation. This approach has operated through several key mechanisms: Bringing actors to the same negotiation table and making cost-risk calculations visible (e.g., the Istanbul negotiations and diplomatic initiatives related to Somaliland); establishing concrete and verifiable mechanisms (such as the Black Sea Grain Corridor initiative); using legal and regime-based leverage to limit the scope of conflict (for example, the implementation of the Montreux Convention); breaking crisis-escalation spirals through confidence-building and technical security mechanisms (such as the NATO deconfliction mechanism in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea mine countermeasures cooperation) and by maintaining the diplomatic table despite provocations.
This reflects Türkiye’s strategic approach of maintaining diplomatic channels even amid heightened tension. Türkiye’s proactive mediation and stability diplomacy can be interpreted as an expanded application of classical deterrence theory that incorporates diplomacy, communication, and institutional engagement. In this framework, deterrence becomes not only a function of military power but also a multi-layered strategic instrument produced through diplomatic capacity, institutional mechanisms, and crisis-management tools.
Defense Industry, diplomacy
Today, the country's most notable approach, despite being surrounded by intense conflict and war, is its effort to preserve peace and maintain stability. Even in a geopolitical context where military tensions are rising, Türkiye prioritizes maintaining diplomatic channels and preventing the escalation of crises. In this sense, Ankara's approach reflects not only a strategy of security production but also a form of peace diplomacy aimed at maintaining regional stability. For this reason, the Turkish experience can be described as a “human-centred model of deterrence.”
Türkiye's growing capacity and influence in the defense industry have become increasingly significant within the global system. Advances in defense technologies, unmanned systems and domestic production capabilities have given Türkiye a new strategic dimension in deterrence. This development has strengthened not only Türkiye's military capabilities but also its position as a reliable security partner in international relations.
According to the 2026 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Türkiye ranked 11th among the world's largest arms exporters during the 2021-2025 period. However, this development should not be interpreted merely as an increase in military power. Türkiye evaluates its defense industry capacity within a broader strategic framework that integrates peace and stability production.
In this respect, the defense industry becomes not only a tool of power but also an instrument of diplomacy and security cooperation. Particularly in the Afro-Eurasian region, defense industry partnerships have strengthened Türkiye's image as both a security partner and a stabilizing actor. Ongoing crises such as the tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States clearly demonstrate the depth of fractures within the global system. In such an environment, deterrence gains meaning only when combined with diplomatic mechanisms that support peace and stability. Otherwise, in a world where crises are increasingly widespread, deterrence that is not aligned with peace and stability ultimately results in a loss not only for states but for humanity as a whole.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkish-model-of-deterrence-power-diplomacy-and-security
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Power without exit – America’s strategic trap in the Strait of Hormuz
By Ranjan Solomon
March 19, 2026
The United States today finds itself ensnared in a war it cannot win, yet cannot leave. What appears, at first glance, as a familiar display of military dominance in West Asia is, in fact, a deeper crisis of strategy, legitimacy, and control. The conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has exposed a paradox at the heart of American power: the more force it projects, the fewer viable options it retains. Nowhere is this contradiction more sharply visible than in the battle over the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage that has become the fulcrum of a widening geopolitical confrontation.
At the core of this crisis lies a strategic bind. The United States cannot credibly exit the conflict without first securing what it can claim as a “victory.” Yet, in this theatre, victory is narrowly defined: ensuring unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz. That objective, however, is precisely what Iran is positioned to deny. Geography, in this case, has become a weapon. Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily; it merely needs to retain the capacity to disrupt, threaten, or selectively control access to the Strait. In doing so, it transforms a superpower’s overwhelming military advantage into a liability.
This is the cruel logic of asymmetry. For Washington to guarantee maritime security in the Strait, it would have to escalate—potentially by occupying strategic islands at its mouth, intensifying naval deployments, or even targeting Iranian coastal infrastructure. Such moves would not only expand the war but also risk drawing the United States into a deeper and more protracted conflict. Exit, paradoxically, demands escalation. And escalation offers no guarantee of resolution.
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be overstated. A significant portion of the world’s oil supply passes through this narrow corridor. Control over it is not simply about trade; it is about leverage over the global economy. Iran’s proximity to the Strait gives it a natural advantage—one that no amount of distant military power can easily neutralize. Even limited disruption can trigger global economic tremors, placing pressure not only on the United States but on its allies and adversaries alike.
Compounding this dilemma is the collapse of allied consensus. Unlike previous conflicts where the United States rallied a coalition under the banner of collective security or shared values, this war appears strikingly unilateral. Key allies have refrained from offering meaningful support. The reasons are not difficult to discern. This was a war initiated without broad consultation, lacking a clear legal or moral mandate, and unfolding against the backdrop of widespread global disillusionment with Western interventions.
The absence of allies is not merely a logistical setback; it is a profound indicator of declining legitimacy. Military power, in the modern world, is sustained as much by perception as by capability. Without diplomatic backing, even the most formidable force appears isolated. The United States, once the architect of multilateral action, now finds itself acting alone, its calls for support met with hesitation or silence.
This isolation intersects with another structural reality: the conflict is not binary. As James M. Dorsey astutely observes, “it takes three to tango.” The United States is not the sole protagonist. Israel and Iran are independent actors with their own strategic imperatives, neither of which aligns neatly with American objectives.
Israel, in particular, has undergone a significant shift in doctrine. Since the events of 2023, its strategy appears to have moved beyond deterrence toward the systematic weakening—if not outright incapacitation—of its regional adversaries. This includes not only Iran but also actors in Lebanon and Syria. The goal is no longer stability through balance, but dominance through disruption. Such a strategy inherently resists de-escalation. For Israel, a prolonged conflict may serve broader regional ambitions.
Iran, for its part, views the confrontation through the lens of survival and resistance. Despite suffering significant losses, it has demonstrated resilience and internal cohesion. Its strategy does not depend on outright victory but on endurance. By sustaining pressure—whether through control of the Strait, targeted strikes, or regional proxies—it ensures that the conflict remains costly and unresolved.
Caught between these two actors, the United States finds itself in a reactive posture. Even a partial withdrawal would not guarantee disengagement. Continued hostilities between Israel and Iran could easily draw Washington back into the conflict, whether through strategic commitments, regional security concerns, or the imperative to maintain credibility.
Adding another layer of complexity is the parallel war being waged in the realm of information. Modern conflicts are no longer confined to battlefields; they unfold equally in the domain of perception. Narratives, legitimacy, and global opinion play decisive roles. In this arena, the United States and Israel face an increasingly uphill battle.
The conduct of the war in Gaza has already inflicted significant damage on Israel’s global standing. Images of devastation, civilian casualties, and humanitarian crises have circulated widely, shaping international opinion in ways that military victories cannot easily counterbalance. In this context, Iran’s information strategy need not be sophisticated; it merely needs to amplify existing doubts and criticisms.
This erosion of narrative control has tangible consequences. It weakens diplomatic support, fuels domestic dissent, and complicates efforts to justify continued engagement. War, in the twenty-first century, is as much about legitimacy as it is about firepower. And legitimacy, once lost, is difficult to reclaim.
The notion that the conflict can be resolved through decisive military action is, therefore, increasingly untenable. Even the targeted elimination of senior Iranian officials or the degradation of military infrastructure does not fundamentally alter the dynamics at play. This is not a war that can be won through attrition alone. It is, as Dorsey suggests, a contest of endurance—a test of which side can “hold its breath” the longest.
Such wars tend to favour those with less to lose and more to prove. For Iran, survival itself constitutes victory. For the United States, anything short of clear dominance risks being perceived as defeat. This asymmetry in expectations further entrenches the strategic bind.
Meanwhile, domestic politics within the United States are beginning to reflect the strain. Segments of the political spectrum that once supported assertive foreign policy are now expressing dissent. Voices such as Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens have questioned the rationale for continued involvement, highlighting fractures within the broader support base. Public opinion, too, appears increasingly wary of another prolonged and costly conflict.
These internal divisions are not incidental; they are symptomatic of a deeper fatigue. After decades of military engagements in the Middle East, the American public is less inclined to accept the human and economic costs of war, particularly when the objectives remain obscure or shifting. In a midterm election context, such sentiments carry significant political weight, further constraining the administration’s options.
What emerges, then, is a picture of a superpower caught in a narrowing corridor. To escalate is to risk deeper entanglement and unforeseen consequences. To withdraw is to concede strategic ground and undermine credibility. Neither path offers a clear or satisfactory resolution.
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is thus emblematic of a broader transformation in global power dynamics. It underscores the limits of unilateral action in an increasingly multipolar world, where regional actors possess both the will and the means to resist external dominance. It reveals the fragility of alliances built on expediency rather than shared purpose. And it highlights the enduring importance of legitimacy as a foundation of effective power.
For the United States, this moment demands a reckoning. The instruments of power—military, economic, and diplomatic—remain formidable. But their efficacy is contingent upon context, perception, and restraint. In the absence of these, power becomes self-defeating, generating the very constraints it seeks to overcome.
The Strait of Hormuz, narrow and contested, has become more than a strategic chokepoint. It is a mirror reflecting the contradictions of contemporary geopolitics. It shows an empire struggling to reconcile its ambitions with its limitations, its capabilities with its credibility.
In the end, the question is not whether the United States can control the Strait, but whether it can redefine what control means in a world where dominance no longer guarantees compliance. Until that question is answered, the path forward will remain fraught—an uneasy passage through turbulent waters, with no clear exit in sight.Top of FormBottom of Form
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260319-power-without-exit-americas-strategic-trap-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/
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How can we understand Oman’s middle path toward Iran?
March 19, 2026
By Karam Nama
Several years ago, I asked a senior Omani scholar a question that has puzzled many in the Arab world: why does Muscat maintain such deep mutual trust with Tehran, despite decades of Iranian behavior that convinced most Arab states that Iran is not a reliable partner? He answered with quiet confidence: “Because we fought them throughout history. We understood them, and they understood us.”
It was not a nostalgic reference to old battles, but a concise summary of a long political memory. Oman is the only Gulf state that has confronted Persia directly, defeated it at times, and negotiated with it at others. This history includes a fact often ignored in regional narratives: in 1775, it was the Omani fleet that broke the Persian siege of Basra after Arab tribes appealed to Imam Ahmad bin Said. Such episodes are not invoked for pride, but to explain a relationship that cannot be understood through the lens of recent decades alone.
Yet the question returns today in a more bewildering form. How is it that Iranian missiles have struck Omani ports and facilities—despite Oman being the country that worked hardest, and most discreetly, to prevent a war on Iran? How can a state absorb such blows and still refuse to abandon its middle path?
This is not a mystery to those who know Muscat’s political doctrine. Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr al-Busaidi, told me years ago during a discussion at Cambridge University that Omani moderation is not a tactic, nor a gesture toward Iran alone. It is a governing philosophy—part of how the state defines itself, not a position shaped by the crisis of the moment.
That philosophy was on full display recently when al-Busaidi published one of the most striking articles of this war in The Economist. Writing as missiles fell on his country, he urged America’s allies to help Washington exit what he called an “illegal war.” He described Iran’s retaliatory strikes on what Tehran claimed were American targets in neighboring states as “inevitable, though deeply regrettable and entirely unacceptable.” Faced with a conflict that Israel and the United States say aims to eliminate the Islamic Republic, he argued that Iran may have seen no other rational option.
He warned that the consequences of this escalation are felt most sharply on the southern shores of the Gulf, where Arab states that placed their security in American hands now see that partnership as a vulnerability.
He expressed hope that talk of regime change in Iran is mere rhetoric, noting that Israel openly seeks the collapse of the Islamic Republic without much concern for what might follow.
Here lies the paradox few dare to articulate: a state under fire chooses to speak the language of mediation, not victimhood. This is not naïveté. It is the logic of a small state that understands the cost of anger, and the price of being dragged into a conflict it cannot control.
Critics often dismiss Omani moderation as weakness or appeasement, as if foreign policy were measured only by the volume of one’s outrage. But this view ignores a simple truth: states that shout do not necessarily shape events, while states that calm the waters sometimes do.
Nor is Omani neutrality a moral equivalence between aggressor and victim. It is a cold reading of regional realities. Muscat knows that forcibly toppling the Iranian regime would not produce a safer Middle East. It could instead unleash a wave of instability stretching from the Gulf to Iraq and Afghanistan. Oman’s message is implicit but clear: the question is not whether one likes or dislikes Tehran, but whether one has calculated the cost of its collapse. In this sense, Omani moderation becomes a form of “compulsory rationality” imposed by geography before conscience.
That geography matters. Oman sits at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage through which nearly a third of the world’s traded oil flows. Any escalation in this corridor reverberates instantly through global markets. A state that guards such a chokepoint cannot afford impulsive politics. The strait does not need another actor adding fuel to the fire; it needs a state capable of lowering the temperature. Every ship passing through Hormuz is a reminder that the world depends on a calm Oman, not a confrontational one.
This is why Muscat sees itself not merely as a Gulf state, but as a custodian of global energy stability.
Omani moderation is therefore not a tactic but a worldview shaped by centuries of political experience. It rejects polarization, resists dependency on any single power, and understands that survival in a turbulent region requires a cool head, not a loud voice. Its understanding of Iran is not rooted in fear or admiration, but in familiarity—an intimate knowledge of a neighbor whose behavior cannot be managed through threats alone.
In the end, Oman bets on time. Wars end, regimes change, alliances shift—but the reputation of a state endures. Muscat has built its reputation on being the actor that does not betray, does not auction its positions, and does not abandon its role as mediator even when it becomes a target.
Missiles may fall on Omani ports, but what does not fall is Muscat’s belief that the world is not governed by anger, but by balance. The moderation some mock is, in truth, the last remaining form of sanity in a region that too often feeds on illusions.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260319-how-can-we-understand-omans-middle-path-toward-iran/
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Rethink on Freebie Trips to Apartheid Israel by SA Journalists Sponsored by Zionist Lobbyists
March 20, 2026
By Iqbal Jassat
The controversy surrounding non-disclosures by South African journalists who participated in a freebie junket to the apartheid regime of Israel sponsored by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) has not died.
It is very much alive and for good reason, having placed the spotlight on why and how pro-Israeli lobby groups operate in advancing the Zionist regime’s agenda.
A crucial element that gave rise to the public debate on the ethics of journalism, particularly as it relates to the coverage of Palestine, resulted from the probe by well-known unionist and media activist Hassen Lorgat.
His determination to uncover the source of sponsorship for journalists from the Sunday Times, Citizen, and Biznews was initially met by stubborn obduracy.
Persistent prodding by Lorgat finally yielded results that not only scored a huge victory for overcoming obduracy, but also led to a humiliating acknowledgement by the editors of the three titles.
The ensuing debate has correctly centered on media ethics and the integrity of news coverage.
What SAJBD had hoped to score ended in embarrassment. The exercise undertaken by the journalists revived memories of apartheid-era scandals.
Media scandals during that notorious era were defined by state censorship, intense propaganda, and clandestine operations to influence global opinion.
The most significant was the 1978/79 Muldergate Scandal, which exposed secret government projects using public funds for propaganda and bribery.
The apartheid regime funded projects such as the “Club of Ten,” a front that took out advertisements in international newspapers to argue for the benefits of apartheid. They also bribed foreign journalists and politicians to promote a positive image of South Africa.
State broadcaster SABC systematically distorted news, while “Black Wednesday” (1977) marked the banning of newspapers and detention of journalists.
Thanks to Lorgat’s assiduous efforts, a can of worms has opened up.
Redi Tlhabi has publicly shared her personal experiences with pro-Israel lobbying efforts directed at journalists, particularly in the South African context.
This came up recently in a thread on X (around March 15–16, 2026), sparked by Chris Vick’s criticism of undisclosed sponsored trips in media coverage.
In response to discussions about journalists accepting or being offered sponsored trips to Israel by SAJBD or SA Zionist Federation (SAZF) — often framed as familiarisation or study tours — Tlhabi described her own encounters: She stated that such “trips to Israel” have been aggressively offered to journalists for years.
Invitations began gently when she was at the SABC (starting around 2002), using flattery such as being told how “amazing” she is and that she’d “enjoy visiting Israel”.
One person reportedly followed her to book launches with persistent, ego-stroking approaches.
The tone shifted to aggression after she criticized the treatment of Judge Richard Goldstone following his 2009 UN report on Gaza, which accused Israel of possible war crimes; he faced intense backlash from pro-Israel groups in SA.
Tlhabi has consistently declined these invitations, emphasizing they are designed to promote a one-sided pro-Israel perspective and often patronize critics as “ignorant” or “ill-informed.”
She stressed the need for editorial protocols requiring disclosure of sponsorships when relevant, calling non-disclosure “outrageous” and a simple fix for transparency.
This aligns with her broader public stance on the Israel-Palestine issue: She has hosted/interviewed critics of Israeli policies on Al Jazeera’s UpFront, including discussions on Gaza, ICJ cases, and lobbying influence.
In older writings, she described being “lobbied and blackmailed” to view the conflict solely from one side, receiving floods of pro-Israel materials, books, documentaries, and coffee invitations after critical comments.
She rejects conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism and highlights solidarity with Jewish voices opposing occupation or war.
These sponsored trips are a long-standing point of debate in journalism ethics globally and in SA, amid ICJ genocide proceedings and Gaza coverage.
Whether lessons have been learned may not be evident as yet. But the debate is wide open and ongoing, providing hope that South African journalists will avoid being lobbied to whitewash Israel’s horrendous policies of racism, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and unjust wars.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/rethink-on-freebie-trips-to-apartheid-israel-by-sa-journalists-sponsored-by-zionist-lobbyists/
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Not Just Netanyahu’s War: The Arab Factor They Don’t Want You to Know
March 20, 2026
Are the Arabs innocent?
The question is uncomfortable, but it cannot be avoided.
At one level, everything unfolding in the region appears internally logical—not in a moral or legal sense, but in terms of how these states have historically behaved and positioned themselves.
It is logical, for example, for Israel and the US to seek to expand the war with Iran by drawing in Arab states and other regional actors. Their long-standing preference for managed instability—what has often been described in policy circles as “constructive chaos”—fits this trajectory.
It is equally logical for Iran to respond by targeting US military and strategic interests across the region, in addition to retaliating directly against Israel. Tehran has stated this position consistently for years: that any confrontation will not remain geographically contained. Its current actions, whether one agrees with them or not, follow a declared doctrine.
And it is also “logical,” in that same narrow, descriptive sense, for Arab Gulf governments to express shock when the consequences of these alignments reach their own territories—even if that shock is politically convenient rather than analytically sound.
This is where the logic begins to fracture.
Because a pattern that is predictable based on past behavior does not make it politically coherent, legally sound, or morally defensible.
Official statements and dominant narratives in much of Arab media suggest genuine surprise, even moral outrage, at Iran’s response. Iran is framed as reckless, irrational, even unlawful. But this framing strips away context. It ignores the structural reality that many of these same states have, directly or indirectly, facilitated the very escalation they now condemn.
The contradiction is stark.
Several Gulf states have, over the past decade, deepened normalization with Israel, expanded economic ties, and—crucially—allowed varying degrees of strategic cooperation. This includes airspace coordination, intelligence sharing frameworks, and integration into US-led regional security architectures aimed explicitly at countering Iran.
At the same time, these governments insist on a posture of neutrality.
They want to provide access, logistical support, and financial investment—while claiming no responsibility for the consequences. They want normalization with Israel, participation in US security frameworks, and integration into regional military planning, while simultaneously demanding immunity from retaliation.
This is not neutrality. It is selective engagement without accountability.
Arab media, with notable exceptions, has largely echoed this position. Coverage often lacks historical context and avoids critical examination of Gulf-state policies. Iran is isolated as the sole aggressor, while the broader architecture of escalation—one that includes US military deployments, Israeli strategic doctrine, and Gulf-state alignment—is left unexamined.
But this posture did not emerge overnight.
During the administration of US President Barack Obama, several Gulf leaders expressed deep frustration with what they perceived as American weakness and restraint toward Iran, particularly during the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement itself was widely criticized in Gulf-aligned media as appeasement.
This dissatisfaction became more explicit with the election of Donald Trump in 2016. His administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the subsequent “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran were broadly welcomed by Gulf governments.
Trump said on May 8, 2018, that the JCPOA was “a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made,” a position that aligned closely with Gulf and Israeli lobbying against the agreement.
Additionally, regional media outlets amplified narratives of Iranian internal instability, frequently highlighting protests as signs of an imminent weakening, in fact, a potential collapse of the Iranian state.
In other words, the idea of confronting Iran—politically, economically, and even militarily—was not only tolerated but actively encouraged in certain quarters.
That history now sits uneasily with current expressions of shock.
What has changed is not the underlying policy alignment, but the consequences. Iranian retaliation—particularly when it threatens energy infrastructure, shipping routes, or domestic stability—has exposed the risks inherent in that alignment.
The disruption of energy markets, the vulnerability of strategic installations, and the realization that US military presence may prioritize its own interests, and those of Israel, over Gulf security have all contributed to a sudden recalibration in tone.
Another point demands serious reflection—one that cannot be separated from the genocide in Gaza.
Throughout Israel’s ongoing genocide, Arab governments failed to exert meaningful pressure to halt the devastation. There were no sustained economic measures, no coordinated use of energy leverage, no serious political confrontation with Washington. Instead, in some cases, economic and logistical ties continued, providing indirect lifelines to an Israeli economy under strain.
This absence of action is not incidental—it is central.
Had Arab states adopted a different position—leveraging their financial power, energy dominance, and diplomatic weight—the trajectory of the war might have been significantly altered. The scale and duration of the devastation in Gaza, and the subsequent regional escalation, cannot be separated from this lack of intervention.
Instead, what emerged was a pattern of rhetorical condemnation paired with material continuity.
The current crisis, therefore, is not simply the result of Iranian actions or Israeli strategy. It is also the product of choices made—or not made—by Arab governments.
There remains, however, a narrow window for recalibration.
The evolving balance of power, shaped in part by Iran’s capacity to impose costs and the growing strain on US-Israeli strategic objectives, has created an opening. Whether Arab governments choose to reassess their alignment—gradually or decisively—may determine not only their own security, but the broader trajectory of the region.
One thing is now certain: the logic has reached its limits, and the choice is clear—stay tethered to the US and Israel, or break free for the sake of regional stability and good neighborly relations.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/not-just-netanyahus-war-the-arab-factor-they-dont-want-you-to-know/
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‘Grave Miscalculation’ — Oman Points to the Hidden Driver of America’s War on Iran
March 19, 2026
A Mediator’s Warning
In a rare and unusually direct intervention, Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, has publicly challenged Washington’s role in the escalating war with Iran, warning that the United States has “lost control of its own foreign policy.”
Writing in The Economist on March 18, Albusaidi’s remarks carry particular weight. Oman has long served as the primary backchannel mediator between Tehran and Washington, including the most recent round of nuclear negotiations that were reportedly nearing a breakthrough.
According to Albusaidi, those efforts were abruptly derailed when “just a few hours after the latest and most substantive talks—Israel and America again launched an unlawful military strike against the peace that had briefly appeared really possible.”
For Muscat, the timing was not merely disruptive but deeply consequential, effectively collapsing months of diplomacy and raising serious questions about the reliability of US commitments in ongoing negotiations.
Recent reporting further underscores the depth of Omani frustration. Albusaidi has suggested that Israel played a decisive role in pushing Washington into escalation, effectively steering US policy toward war despite ongoing diplomatic progress.
War Shaped by Israeli Objectives
Albusaidi’s central argument is that the current war was not inevitable, but rather the result of political miscalculation in Washington—one closely tied to Israeli strategic priorities.
“The American administration’s greatest miscalculation,” he writes, “was allowing itself to be drawn into this war in the first place. This is not America’s war.”
His formulation goes further than a general critique. By stressing that Washington was “drawn into” the conflict, Albusaidi implicitly identifies Israel as the primary driver of escalation.
He adds that there is “no likely scenario” in which either the US or Israel achieves its stated objectives, particularly given the scale of escalation required.
While Israel seeks the overthrow of the Iranian government, Albusaidi suggests Washington’s goals are far less defined—and far less aligned with such an outcome.
“Hopefully America’s commitment to regime change is just rhetorical,” he notes, contrasting it with Israel’s explicit objective of dismantling the Islamic Republic.
The underlying message is clear: the war reflects Israeli ambitions, while the United States risks bearing its costs.
Iran’s Response and Regional Fallout
The Omani minister does not endorse Iran’s actions, describing its retaliation as “deeply regrettable and completely unacceptable.” However, he frames it as predictable.
“Faced with what both Israel and America described as a war designed to terminate the Islamic Republic, this was probably the only rational option available to the Iranian leadership.”
For Gulf states, the consequences have been immediate and severe.
Albusaidi writes that countries in the region, long reliant on US security guarantees, now “experience that co-operation as an acute vulnerability, threatening their present security and future prosperity.”
He points to disruptions in maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, rising energy prices, and growing risks to economic diversification strategies across the Gulf.
“If this had not been anticipated by the architects of this war,” he adds, “that was surely a grave miscalculation.”
“Friends of America” Must Intervene
In one of the most striking passages, Albusaidi calls on US allies to play a more assertive role—not in supporting the war, but in helping end it.
“The question for friends of America is simple,” he writes. “What can we do to extricate the superpower from this unwanted entanglement?”
His answer begins with what he calls a responsibility to “tell the truth.”
“That begins with the fact that there are two parties to this war who have nothing to gain from it,” he argues, emphasizing that both Iran and the United States share an interest in ending hostilities as quickly as possible.
But doing so requires confronting an uncomfortable reality: “the extent to which America has lost control of its own foreign policy.”
Such language, particularly from a long-standing US partner in the Gulf, reflects a notable departure from conventional diplomatic messaging.
A Narrow Path Back to Talks
Despite the collapse of negotiations, Albusaidi insists that diplomacy remains the only viable path forward.
“It may be difficult for America to return to the bilateral negotiations from which it was twice diverted by the temptations of war,” he writes.
He also acknowledges the challenge for Tehran, noting it will be “certainly difficult for the Iranian leadership to return to dialogue with an administration that twice switched abruptly from talks to bombing and assassination.”
Yet, he concludes, “the path away from war… may have to lie through precisely this resumption.”
A Regional Framework for De-escalation
Looking beyond immediate ceasefire efforts, Albusaidi proposes a broader diplomatic initiative linking US-Iran negotiations to a regional framework on nuclear transparency and energy transition.
“This could be provided by linking the bilateral negotiations… to a wider regional process,” he suggests, aimed at building confidence and establishing shared standards.
Such a framework, he argues, could align the interests of Gulf states, Iran, and global powers around “secure energy supply chains and renewed investment opportunities.”
He raises the possibility of a regional non-aggression arrangement and a long-term agreement on nuclear energy transparency—an ambitious vision, particularly in the midst of active conflict.
No Normalization, No Alignment
Oman’s message is reinforced by its broader regional posture. In recent days, multiple reports said Albusaidi made clear that Muscat would not normalize relations with Israel and would not join Trump’s proposed “Board of Peace,” distancing Oman from the political architecture taking shape around the Gaza file and the wider regional war.
That position matters because it places Oman outside the camp, treating the current escalation as a pathway to a new regional order anchored in Israeli military primacy and normalization deals. According to recent reporting, Albusaidi also argued that the war’s aims extended beyond the nuclear issue, tying it to efforts to weaken Iran, reshape the region, and advance a broader political project.
Set alongside his Economist essay — in which he wrote that the United States had been “drawn into this war” and had “lost control of its own foreign policy” — Oman’s rejection of normalization sharpens the broader meaning of his intervention: Muscat is signaling that this conflict is being driven above all by Israeli strategic objectives, while Gulf states are being asked to absorb the consequences.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/grave-miscalculation-oman-points-to-the-hidden-driver-of-americas-war-on-iran/
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FACT CHECK: Inside Trump’s Contradictory Narrative on the Iran War
March 19, 2026
By Romana Rubeo
Denial and Escalation: The South Pars Gas Field
A central contradiction emerges in US President Donald Trump’s response to the attack on Iran’s South Pars gas field, where his public statements diverge sharply from verified reporting.
In a Truth Social post on Wednesday, Trump wrote that “Israel, out of anger for what has taken place in the Middle East, has violently lashed out at a major facility known as South Pars Gas Field in Iran,” insisting that “The United States knew nothing about this particular attack.” He further added that Qatar “was in no way, shape, or form, involved with it.”
However, according to the Wall Street Journal, citing US officials, Trump “ knew about the Israeli strike on South Pars in advance (and) supported it as a message to Tehran over its block of the Strait of Hormuz.”
The contradiction is further reinforced by Trump’s own escalation within the same statement. While denying US involvement, he warned that “the United States of America… will massively blow up the entirety of the South Pars Gas Field at an amount of strength and power that Iran has never seen or witnessed before.”
Total Defeat vs Continuing Threat
Trump’s repeated claims that Iran has been completely defeated are contradicted both internally and by external reporting.
In multiple posts, he asserted that “We have already destroyed 100% of Iran’s Military capability,” and that “The United States of America has beaten and completely decimated Iran, both Militarily, Economically, and in every other way.”
He further stated that “Iran’s Navy is gone, their Air Force is gone… their leaders have been wiped from the face of the earth.”
Yet these sweeping claims are undermined by his own acknowledgment that Iran retains operational capacity.
In the same sequence of statements, Trump noted that “it’s easy for them to send a drone or two, drop a mine, or deliver a close range missile,” while warning that any interference would prompt immediate escalation.
This contradiction is reflected in reporting by ABC News, which documented that Trump’s messaging presents Iran as both destroyed and an ongoing threat, often within the same speech or timeframe. In one instance, Trump declared that US operations had “obliterated the regime’s nuclear program,” while simultaneously describing Iran as a looming danger that required continued military attention.
ABC further noted that these inconsistencies extend beyond rhetoric into broader policy ambiguity. Trump has repeatedly suggested that the war could end “very soon,” while officials within his own administration have described the conflict as “just the beginning,” revealing a gap between presidential messaging and military assessments.
More broadly, ABC’s analysis concludes that “we’ve been getting mixed messages,” with the White House offering shifting and sometimes contradictory explanations for the war itself, including justifications that have been challenged by senior officials and even close allies.
This pattern aligns with additional assessments indicating that Iran’s capabilities, while degraded, remain intact in key areas.
US intelligence testimony and international reporting have consistently emphasized that the Iranian state and its military infrastructure have not been eliminated, contradicting claims of total destruction.
Allies: Unnecessary or Essential?
Trump’s statements on the role of US allies reveal a clear and repeated contradiction, presenting allies as unnecessary, indispensable, and unwilling — often within the same timeframe.
In one Truth Social post on Tuesday, Trump asserted unilateral US capability in absolute terms: “WE DO NOT NEED THE HELP OF ANYONE!”
Yet this position is directly contradicted by his repeated calls for allied intervention, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
In another post on Wednesday, he urged that “US allies need to get a grip – step up and help open the Strait of Hormuz,” while also claiming that “many Countries… will be sending War Ships… to keep the Strait open and safe.”
At the same time, Trump suggested that allies were reluctant to participate, stating that “most of our NATO ‘Allies’… don’t want to get involved with our Military Operation.”
This contradiction is reflected in external reporting.
The Guardian reported that US pressure on allies to join maritime and military operations in the region has been met with hesitation, with several governments expressing concern over escalation risks and domestic political constraints.
The report notes that while Washington has sought broader coalition support, European and regional partners have been cautious about direct involvement in a widening conflict.
Hyperbole, “Fake News,” and Narrative Control
Beyond direct contradictions, Trump’s messaging is characterized by the repeated use of absolute and expansive language, often accompanied by efforts to discredit conflicting accounts.
He describes Iran as “totally defeated,” “decimated,” and “being annihilated by the day,” while asserting that “We have unparalleled firepower, unlimited ammunition, and plenty of time.” In another post, he declared that Iran had plans of “completely obliterating Israel,” adding that “THOSE PLANS ARE NOW DEAD!”
At the same time, Trump dismisses opposing narratives, claiming that reports of damage or setbacks are “FAKE NEWS… generated by A.I.”
This attempt to discredit external reporting stands in contrast with the continued stream of information from international media and officials indicating that the conflict remains ongoing and unresolved.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/fact-check-inside-trumps-contradictory-narrative-on-the-iran-war/
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