Middle East Press On: Turkey-Saudi Arabia End Sudan Crisis, End Iran Military Power, Washington's War on Iran, Russia, China, Iran's Arsenal Explained, Missiles, Drones, New Age Islam's Selection, 9 March 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
09 March 2026
A joint road map from Türkiye-Saudi Arabia to end Sudan crisis
The end of Iran as a military power
War in Iran a problem for Republicans as midterms loom
Washington’s War on Iran: A Strategic Gift to Russia and China
FACT SHEET: Iran’s Arsenal Explained — Missiles, Drones and the Military Behind Them
Israel’s Greatest Weapon Was Fear — And It Is Now Failing
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A joint road map from Türkiye-Saudi Arabia to end Sudan crisis
BY MAYADA KAMAL ELDEEN
MAR 09, 2026
As the war launched by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan in April 2023 approaches its fourth year, the military situation in the country shows a geographically entrenched structure at the beginning of 2026.
The process that began with the recapture of the capital Khartoum by the Sudanese army in March 2025 resulted in the strategic center of gravity shifting to the states of Kordofan and Darfur by the end of 2025. The nature of the conflict during this period has been characterized by systematic sieges in these states by RSF militias, rather than large-scale ground operations, the use of starvation as a weapon and ethnic cleansing activities, as well as continued drone attacks on both the war-torn states and safe states, including the capital Khartoum.
Continuing crimes of RSF
Following the major victory in March 2025, the Sudanese army has focused its efforts on restoring security and normalizing civilian life in the capital region, which consists of Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri. With the start of Ramadan, the establishment of communal iftar tables in the streets of Khartoum for the first time in two years was a significant development symbolizing the army's dominance in the region.
However, this image of normalization is overshadowed by the RSF's ongoing drone attacks. The loss of 54 civilian lives in an RSF drone attack on a market in Omdurman in February highlighted how fragile security remains behind the front lines. Most civilians and official state institutions have now declared their full return to Khartoum.
Kordofan was the region with the highest military tension in the last two months. The RSF has surrounded El Obeid, the state capital of North Kordofan, on three sides. In South Kordofan, fighting around the cities of Kadugli and Dilling has intensified. Reports indicate a systematic increase in RSF drone attacks in the region and that over 1 million people have been displaced in this area alone since the beginning of January. Attacks on three health facilities in South Kordofan during one week in February prove once again that health infrastructure has become a direct target of the militias.
The fall of el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, to RSF militias in October 2025 after a 500-day siege completely disrupted the military balance in the region. December-January saw reports of systematic acts of violence following this fall.
Allegations that the RSF attempted to destroy evidence by burning or burying tens of thousands of bodies after seizing El Fasher have been brought to international attention. While the RSF's institutionalization efforts continue in the rest of Darfur, cities such as Nyala have now become the de facto capitals of the RSF's parallel administration.
Inadequacy of the 'Quad'
As part of international efforts to resolve the Sudan crisis, the donor conference held at the Donald J. Trump Institute for Peace in Washington last month is seen as a turning point in Sudanese diplomacy. Massad Boulos, advisor to the U.S. president on Arab and African affairs, announced that the Quad group (the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE) had agreed on a peace document that was “temporarily acceptable” to both sides.
The details of the plan include an initial three-month, unconditional cease-fire to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Under United Nations supervision, it also includes the withdrawal of militias from certain city centers and their gathering in designated camps, the integration of armed groups and the establishment of a single national army. Although a new $1.5 billion humanitarian aid fund was pledged (with $200 million from the U.S. and $500 million from the UAE), the Quad initiative has, for now, failed due to the Sudanese government's objections to the UAE's presence in the Quad because of its reported support for the RSF.
Road map for Sudan crisis
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's official visit to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, is a landmark event that goes beyond bilateral relations between Ankara and Riyadh and represents a turning point in the restructuring of the regional security architecture. The 31-point joint statement issued at the end of the visit is a diplomatic document reflecting the two countries' consensus and strategic depth on regional issues. One of the most noteworthy and operationally significant sections of this statement is the perspective presented on the ongoing war in Sudan.
The statements regarding Sudan in the joint communique show that both states agree on preserving the status quo and establishing legitimacy in Sudan. The fact that the war in Sudan has gone beyond being an internal matter and has become a threat to Red Sea security and the stability of East Africa is the main reason for the emphasis on Sudan in the communique.
The sections of the joint statement primarily express an unwavering stance on Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The parties have declared that they will continue to provide all kinds of support to protect Sudan's unity, security and stability. The use of the phrase “parallel structures outside legitimate institutions” in the statement reflects the shared understanding that the legitimacy of actors outside the Sudanese army, particularly the RSF militias, is being questioned and that state authority must be centralized.
This stance is clear evidence that the RSF militias have no place in Sudan and that an “institutional state” approach has been adopted in resolving the crisis. By supporting the institutions they view as the legitimate representatives of the Sudanese people, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia aim to create a diplomatic shield against the risk of the country's fragmentation.
The most concrete and field-oriented decisions in the statement concern the opening of logistical corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia welcomed the active use of airports and border crossings necessary for humanitarian aid to reach the most remote areas, supporting the strategic decisions taken by the Sudanese army. In this context, the decision to keep the Adre Border Gate on the Sudan-Chad border open for a longer period has been considered a critical step in alleviating the worsening humanitarian tragedy, particularly in the Darfur region, as a result of the attacks and siege continued by RSF militias.
The statement also welcomed the decision to open strategic and important airports in the Sudanese cities of Kassala, Dongola and el-Obeid, as well as the Kadugli border crossing, for humanitarian aid operations. The selection of these locations is not random, as each is a strategic hub providing access to different geographical regions of Sudan where the flow of logistics has been disrupted due to conflict. The opening of Kassala is vital for managing the influx of refugees in eastern Sudan, while el-Obeid is crucial for reaching the central parts of the country and the Kordofan region.
Consequently, this joint stance toward resolving the war in Sudan is expected to have a decisive impact on other actors in the region in the future. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia's rejection of “parallel structures” and defense of the legitimate state sends a strong message against militia-focused policies in the region. This stance is highly likely to act as a catalyst that will force the RSF militias, which are parties to the war in Sudan, to sit down at the negotiating table and enable the international community to unite based on legitimacy.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/a-joint-road-map-from-turkiye-saudi-arabia-to-end-sudan-crisis
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The end of Iran as a military power
ABDULRAHMAN AL-RASHED
March 08, 2026
Although only one week has passed since the outbreak of large-scale war, the imbalance in the balance of power is already undermining the capabilities of Iran’s regime, which had long refused to give up these capabilities through negotiations. The outcome is largely expected, despite Iran’s extensive propaganda.
From an analytical perspective, the early results can be viewed as a success in containing the Iranian threat, even if they fall short of a complete victory. At the same time, however, the regime itself remains intact. Current assessments suggest the fighting could end within a few weeks, perhaps even sooner if the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which effectively controls decision-making in Tehran, accepts a form of partial surrender that allows the system to survive.
So far, the signs of what will come after the war do not suggest that the regime is on the verge of collapse, either through internal unrest or external pressure.
That may mean the world will have to accept living with a weakened but still functioning regime. This recalls the “Safwan tent” scenario, when Iraq signed its surrender after its defeat in Kuwait and the destruction of much of its military. Saddam Hussein’s regime remained in power for another 12 years before it was finally removed in 2003. A similar pattern may now be unfolding.
The early conclusion, based on available military analyses, is that the existential threat Iran once posed to the region through its arsenal has effectively been neutralized.
This war has demonstrated clearly that the regime had both the plans and the capability to devastate the Gulf region.
Its attacks have targeted more than 10 countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Jordan and Iraq. Although the regime claimed its strikes were directed at military targets, many of them hit civilian sites, including ports, airports, hotels and residential neighborhoods.
Iran built these capabilities with the aim of dominating the region. Tehran’s strategy of developing destructive capacities capable of paralyzing or even toppling neighboring states was never a secret. The question was always when “zero hour” would arrive, perhaps after the regime achieved nuclear deterrence, which would have granted Tehran protection from international military intervention.
From this perspective, the collapse of what could be described as Iran’s “weapons empire” represents an extremely significant political development, one that will have far-reaching consequences.
Iran’s plan to project itself as a dominant military power and a source of danger to its neighbors is now being dismantled. In the coming weeks, estimates suggest that the remaining elements of Iran’s weapons arsenal, along with its factories and military institutions built over three decades, will be destroyed. This could grant the region a reprieve from Iranian threats for perhaps a decade, assuming a negative “Saddam scenario,” in which a weakened but surviving regime attempts to rebuild its capabilities.
Another possibility, however, is that Tehran itself may change, either through a transformation of the regime or its policies, becoming a more normal state focused on development and regional cooperation.
The human and material losses suffered by our countries are painful. The Iranian people themselves are also at the heart of the war and are the most exposed to destruction, largely because of what the regime has done to them and to the region.
Even so, the cost of the war may ultimately be manageable.
Stripping the regime of its military claws would represent a historic achievement of enormous significance. It would serve the interests of the region, including the Iranian people themselves, whose country’s resources have long been diverted toward military ambitions.
What remains uncertain is what comes next in Tehran. Even after the elimination of many senior Iranian leaders, it may not be possible to impose a “friendly regime,” as Washington might hope. No internal Iranian forces have yet emerged that are willing to support the restoration of the shah, nor are there any signs of division within the military establishment, which for now appears loyal and disciplined.
Today, the regime in Tehran is facing the most dangerous crisis in its history and is struggling to survive. The outcome of this difficult transition remains uncertain. So far, however, there is no opposition force on the ground that is capable of challenging the wounded regime. Nor has a broad popular movement emerged that could attract members of the military establishment and trigger widespread defections.
Some believe it is only a matter of time before local forces move against the weakened regime but, without support from elements within the military, meaningful change remains unlikely.
History offers a comparison: after Iraq’s defeat in Kuwait, despite major military campaigns and a decade of suffocating sanctions, neither internal Iraqi uprisings nor external opposition groups succeeded in toppling Saddam. Ultimately, the US removed him by force, deploying roughly a quarter of a million troops with international support. A similar invasion scenario is unlikely to be repeated in Iran for several reasons.
In light of this, the US may find itself with limited options, the most prominent being to deal with whoever emerges from within the existing system to take power. Washington possesses the military leverage that could allow it to impose its conditions if it chooses to work with the new reality. The White House has previously indicated that it would be willing to cooperate, on its terms, with leaders who emerge from within the regime itself.
Regardless of whether the current regime survives or a successor emerges from within it, Iran’s ability to threaten the region will have been largely eliminated by the end of the war and its regional tools of influence will likely disappear.
The destruction of Iran as a dominant regional power marks the beginning of a new and significant chapter, the consequences of which will be discussed later.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2635695
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War in Iran a problem for Republicans as midterms loom
RAY HANANIA
March 08, 2026
While the focus for US President Donald Trump during the Iran war is naturally on avoiding human casualties, what he also needs to consider is the damaging impact it is having on the Republican Party.
Without Republican control of the House and the Senate, many of his programs will be reversed and he will struggle to achieve his goals. It could even end his presidency. It is almost certain that a Democratic-controlled House would impeach the president, although it would take a significant loss in the Senate to take that further.
The war with Iran comes at a bad time politically for Trump, who was elected on a platform of putting “America First” and staying out of foreign wars. Despite public animosity toward Iran, most Americans do not want this war and they do not perceive Iran as a direct military threat.
Recent polling shows most Americans lack confidence in Trump’s policies. Trump may have been the better choice in the 2024 election in the face of a Democratic Party dominated by the extreme left, but many Democrats, especially conservative-leaning members of the party, are now shifting to the political center.
A Gallup poll in November showed Trump’s approval rating had dropped to just 36 percent. But the real issue is how that change will impact the upcoming midterm elections. Can the Republican Party maintain control of the House and Senate and give Trump support for his actions?
Polling in the last week shows Trump’s popularity continuing to fall, alongside worsening support for Republicans. The public is focused on the Iran war, but not just on winning. They are concerned about the cost and the impact on the economy and their everyday lives.
According to an NBC poll, 54 percent of voters disapprove of Trump’s handling of Iran, compared with 41 percent who approve. A similar share, 52 percent, say the US should not have taken military action, while 41 percent say it should have. And polling across a dozen agencies monitored by CNN shows that the numbers have worsened since the start of the war.
Trump’s problem has never been the far left. His power is built on maintaining his base of Republicans and conservative Democrats. But as public concerns about the economy rise, conservative Democrats are shifting. That shift could be politically dramatic.
The incumbent US president’s party has lost seats in the House in 20 of the 22 midterm elections held since 1938, marking a 90 percent loss rate over the last 80 years. Only twice (in 1998 and 2002) did the incumbent gain seats in the House. The average loss is 28 seats. Meanwhile, the president’s party loses Senate seats about 70 percent of the time.
Trump currently has the support of the Republican Party, which is holding on to razor-thin majorities in both the House and the Senate, enough to give him support so far and to prevent interference in his policies from Democrats. But that will undoubtedly change after November’s midterms.
What we have started to see in party elections in the past week — beginning in Texas, a traditionally strong base for the Republican Party and Trump — is a substantial shift in voter attitudes.
In the Democratic Senate primary there, a more centrist candidate easily defeated a far-left liberal, something that could only happen if conservative Democrats were gaining a stronger voice within their party.
James Talarico beat Jasmine Crockett after winning more than 52 percent of the votes cast. More importantly, the Democratic race attracted far more voters than the Republican election to nominate a candidate for the US Senate.
Among Talarico’s campaign messages were emphasizing common ground with disaffected Republicans and seeking to restore religious values away from the pro-Trump evangelical movement.
More than 2.3 million voters came out for the Talarico-Crockett race, while only 1.7 million voted in the Republican contest, in which the state’s incumbent Sen. John Cornyn was forced into a May 26 run-off with challenger Ken Paxton, the Texas attorney general.
It is not just that Talarico, a conservative Democrat with strong religious values, stands to take the Texas Senate seat. It is that Democrats who have voted Republican in the past are apparently shifting back to a more conservative Democratic Party.
Texas was among the first states to hold their primary elections last week. The rest will follow during the spring and summer.
What is driving this change? It is not the fighting involved in the war on Iran or the endless wars in Gaza and Ukraine. It is the cost of these wars and the negative impact they are having on the American economy.
The price of oil surged 35 percent last week, the largest weekly gain since 1983. That drives up gasoline costs. Higher gas prices hurt Trump because he singled out this issue in his State of the Union speech, bragging that they had fallen during his presidency.
Trump insisted that the economy was recovering and told Americans to expect a jobs increase. But a report released last week showed the exact opposite, with 92,000 jobs lost in February after an erratic roller coaster ride since he took office last January.
The Iran war is already adding an estimated $1 billion-plus a day to the costs of the Gaza and Ukraine wars. If the Iran war lasts four weeks, as Trump has stated, the cost to US taxpayers will easily exceed $100 billion and the economy will slump even more.
But it is not just gasoline or jobs. Everyday items like groceries are rising, while wages continue to slump. Income levels are not keeping pace with inflation.
The dollar buys far less today than it did a year ago. This might lead to a seismic shift in American politics that could, at best, push the president and the Democrats into a stalemate of indecision.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2635705
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Washington’s War on Iran: A Strategic Gift to Russia and China
March 9, 2026
By Ramzy Baroud
A Note on the Analytical Framework
This analysis evaluates the US-Israeli aggression on Iran through the lens of realpolitik and traditional American strategic calculations. It asks whether the war advances Washington’s own geopolitical interests.
This should not be mistaken for moral endorsement of those assumptions. The United States has no inherent right to contain rivals, manipulate alliances, or impose dominance across distant regions.
The argument here is simply that even by the narrow standards of American statecraft, the war on Iran represents a profound strategic miscalculation.
The War America Never Needed
The US-Israeli aggression on Iran is among the most dangerous and irrational escalations in recent Middle Eastern history. Unlike previous American wars in the region, this one cannot even hide behind the tired vocabulary of liberal intervention. There is no serious talk of democracy, no convincing invocation of human rights, and no coherent legal claim that could justify such a devastating act of aggression. What remains is naked force, stripped of pretense.
This is, above all else, Israel’s war. It is Israel that has the clearest motive, the deepest desperation, and the greatest political need to expand the battlefield. After months of genocide in Gaza, Israel’s image has been shattered across much of the world. Even where Western governments continued to shield it diplomatically, the war exposed the limits of Israeli power. Israel demonstrated enormous capacity for destruction, but very little ability to convert destruction into lasting strategic gain.
Gaza did not submit. Hezbollah was attacked repeatedly, including in the most recent and ongoing confrontation, yet it was not defeated. Ansarallah in Yemen also remained capable of projecting force and disrupting strategic calculations in the region. Israel’s long-cultivated image as an untouchable military giant has been bruised, perhaps more deeply than at any time in decades. That reality helps explain why Tel Aviv has pushed for a wider war.
For Israel, Iran is not simply another adversary. It is the state that sits at the center of a regional balance Israel has long sought to break. Tel Aviv’s ambition is not merely security in the narrow sense; it is supremacy. It seeks uncontested hegemony, strategic dominance over Arab capitals, and access to a region whose wealth and political geography it hopes to reshape in its favor. A weakened or shattered Iran would remove the most formidable obstacle to that project.
Yet Israel cannot accomplish this alone. Its failures in Gaza, in Lebanon, and against Ansarallah demonstrate that it lacks the capacity to impose decisive outcomes even on non-state actors and neighboring fronts, let alone on a large and heavily armed regional power such as Iran. It therefore turns, as it always has at decisive moments, to the United States.
A War Without American Logic
If the war makes sense from the standpoint of Israeli ambition, it makes far less sense from the standpoint of American interests.
The United States has historically justified its regional wars through carefully manufactured narratives. Iraq was invaded under the lie of weapons of mass destruction. Afghanistan was framed as a war of necessity after 9/11. Syria was repeatedly discussed through the language of chemical weapons, red lines, and humanitarian urgency. Those narratives were dishonest, but they at least attempted to align war with a declared American rationale.
This time, even that performance is largely absent.
There is no credible case that Iran posed an imminent threat to the United States. There is no broad domestic consensus around this war, nor any obvious material gain for Washington. The Trump administration, in particular, has shown little interest in dressing military aggression in the language of values. That leaves the war exposed as what it is: a massive intervention undertaken largely because Israel wants it and because Washington remains structurally incapable of telling Israel no.
From a cold strategic standpoint, the timing is especially irrational. The United States has other priorities that are far more central to its global position: containing China, exhausting Russia, disciplining Europe into continued dependency, and reasserting leverage over the Global South. Opening a new and volatile front in the Middle East disrupts all of these objectives at once.
The economic risks alone are severe. The war has already intensified pressure on oil markets, shaken global shipping, and renewed fears surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint vital to world energy flows. Even if the United States itself is less dependent on Gulf oil than in previous decades, the American economy remains tied to a globalized system in which energy shocks raise prices, disrupt supply chains, and harm consumers.
This means Washington is effectively helping to ignite a crisis that can boomerang directly onto its own economy. At the same time, it is alarming the very Gulf monarchies that have become major investors in the United States. These governments did not seek regional chaos. They sought predictability, protection, and profitable continuity. Instead, they are now watching American power drag the region into deeper uncertainty.
The American Security Myth
Perhaps the most politically revealing dimension of this war is what it says to America’s Arab allies.
For decades, Gulf states accepted the architecture of American military dominance on the assumption that Washington would guarantee their security. Bases, defense contracts, naval patrols, and missile systems were all sold as proof that the United States was the indispensable protector of regional order. But that order was always selective. It was never built around Arab sovereignty. It was built around Israeli supremacy and American profit.
Now the mask is slipping.
As Iran retaliates against US-linked assets and regional infrastructure, Arab governments are learning that American priorities remain unchanged. Washington mobilizes immense force when Israel is threatened, but it does not show the same urgency when Gulf states absorb the consequences of escalation. Even where military support exists, the hierarchy is unmistakable: Israel first, everyone else after.
This realization may have lasting consequences. The myth that the United States exists in the region as an impartial guarantor of stability has never been less credible. Arab elites are being reminded that they are not equal partners in a strategic alliance; they are instruments within a regional order designed elsewhere. That is a profound political loss for Washington, one that cannot easily be repaired with more weapons sales or more official visits.
Why Russia and China Stand to Gain
Every empire in decline eventually reveals its weakness through overreach, and this war bears all the signs of dangerous overextension.
Russia benefits when Washington is forced to divide its military focus, diplomatic energy, and financial resources across multiple theaters. The more the United States is pulled into the Middle East, the harder it becomes to sustain pressure on Moscow in Ukraine and beyond. Rising energy prices also tend to favor Russian exports, creating an additional material benefit for the Kremlin.
China’s gains may prove even more consequential. Beijing has spent years cultivating influence through trade, energy partnerships, infrastructure, and diplomacy rather than permanent war. As the United States once again appears before the world as a force of chaos, China can present itself as the more stable and rational power, especially to countries across the Global South that have grown weary of American militarism.
A prolonged war also threatens the very international environment Washington needs to concentrate on containing China. Instead of narrowing its strategic agenda, the United States is widening it catastrophically. Instead of isolating its rivals, it is handing them opportunities. Russia gains room. China gains relevance. America gains another war without a clear exit and without a clear purpose.
That may be the central irony of this aggression. A war launched to reinforce dominance may end by accelerating decline. Israel may believe it is remaking the Middle East through fire. But for Washington, the likely result is diminished credibility, deeper instability, and a further transfer of strategic advantage to the very powers it claims to be confronting.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/washingtons-war-on-iran-a-strategic-gift-to-russia-and-china/
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FACT SHEET: Iran’s Arsenal Explained — Missiles, Drones and the Military Behind Them
March 8, 2026
What missiles form the backbone of Iran’s arsenal?
Ballistic missiles are widely considered the central pillar of Iran’s military doctrine. Over the past two decades, Tehran has invested heavily in developing a large and diverse missile inventory capable of striking targets across the region.
US military assessments have suggested that Iran possesses more than 3,000 ballistic missiles (a commonly cited estimate, though analysts stress that the exact size of the stockpile is unknown).
Other defense research groups and regional intelligence estimates place the number closer to around 2,500 missiles before the current war, again noting that such figures are approximations rather than confirmed totals.
The arsenal includes multiple families of medium-range ballistic missiles such as Emad, Ghadr, Sejjil, Kheibar, and Khorramshahr, many of which are designed to reach targets 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers away.
Iranian doctrine emphasizes missiles partly because of the country’s limited modern combat aircraft fleet. Instead of relying heavily on airpower, Tehran has focused on developing mobile launch platforms, underground missile bases, and large salvo capabilities.
Among the newest additions to the arsenal is the Fattah hypersonic missile, which Iranian officials say can travel at speeds above Mach 10.
Heavier systems such as the Khorramshahr missile are designed to carry larger warheads, with payload capacities estimated at over one ton (figures vary depending on the missile variant and reporting source).
Together, these missile systems create a layered strike capability combining range, payload, and speed.
How important are drones to Iran’s strategy?
Drones have become the second major pillar of Iran’s military doctrine. In recent years, Iran has developed a wide range of unmanned aerial vehicles designed for reconnaissance, strike missions, and long-range attacks.
The most widely known system is the Shahed-136 loitering munition, a drone designed to travel long distances before striking a target.
Estimates of its operational range vary but often fall between 1,500 and 2,500 kilometers (figures vary depending on payload, flight profile, and reporting source).
Iran’s drone industry has expanded significantly in recent years. Analysts say the country may be capable of producing thousands of drones per year.
Some coordinated drone attacks in recent conflicts have reportedly involved hundreds of drones launched in a single wave.
Iran also operates larger drones capable of reconnaissance and precision strike missions. These include the Shahed-129, Shahed-191, and Mohajer families, which can remain airborne for extended periods while conducting surveillance or guiding attacks.
Because drones are relatively inexpensive compared to ballistic missiles, they allow Iran to sustain pressure during prolonged conflicts.
In practice, drones and missiles often operate together: drones can distract or exhaust air defenses while missiles deliver heavier payloads.
What role does the IRGC play in Iran’s war strategy?
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) occupies a central position in Iran’s military structure and is widely seen as the institution responsible for managing the country’s strategic weapons.
Iran’s armed forces include approximately 600,000 active personnel, a figure that includes both the regular military and the IRGC (numbers vary depending on how reserve and paramilitary forces are counted).
Within the IRGC, the Aerospace Force oversees Iran’s ballistic missile and advanced drone programs. This branch manages missile production, testing, and launch operations.
The IRGC also operates its own ground forces, naval forces, and intelligence networks separate from the regular military, allowing it to conduct specialized operations and coordinate strategic strikes.
Because the missile and drone programs fall under IRGC authority, the organization plays a leading role in Iran’s deterrence and retaliatory strategy.
What capabilities does Iran’s regular army provide?
Iran’s conventional armed forces, known as the Artesh, include the army, air force, and navy.
Together with the IRGC, Iran’s military totals roughly 600,000 active troops (again an approximate figure based on multiple defense estimates rather than an officially confirmed number).
The regular army provides large-scale ground forces responsible for territorial defense and border security.
Iran’s air force operates a mix of older aircraft, many dating back to the pre-1979 era, but it still contributes to national defense through air patrols, logistics, and air defense coordination.
Iran has also invested heavily in air defense systems, including domestically produced missile defense platforms designed to protect strategic infrastructure and military bases.
How significant is Iran’s naval power?
Iran’s naval doctrine focuses on asymmetric maritime warfare rather than conventional fleets.
Two naval forces operate in parallel: the Iranian Navy and the IRGC Navy.
The IRGC Navy operates hundreds of fast attack boats (exact fleet numbers are uncertain and fluctuate over time) along with coastal missile batteries and naval drones.
Iran has also developed long-range anti-ship missiles capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometers away, creating a defensive barrier around key maritime routes.
These capabilities are designed to allow Iran to threaten shipping lanes or naval vessels in nearby waters if a wider conflict develops.
Could volunteers and reserves play a role?
Beyond its regular armed forces, Iran possesses a large paramilitary reserve known as the Basij.
The Basij operates under the authority of the IRGC and functions as a mass mobilization network capable of supporting the military during national emergencies.
Although precise figures vary, analysts estimate the Basij includes hundreds of thousands of active members and potentially millions of registered volunteers.
These forces are typically used for internal security, logistical support, and civil defense rather than operating advanced weapons systems.
However, their size provides Iran with significant manpower reserves in the event of a prolonged conflict.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/fact-sheet-irans-arsenal-explained-missiles-drones-and-the-military-behind-them/
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Israel’s Greatest Weapon Was Fear — And It Is Now Failing
March 8, 2026
By Ramzy Baroud
Origins of Israel’s Psychological Warfare
Wars are rarely fought only on battlefields. They are also fought in the minds of societies, in the perception of power and vulnerability, and in the political imagination of entire regions. Israel understood this principle early in its history, and psychological dominance became a central component of its military doctrine.
From the earliest years of the Zionist project, the idea that power must appear overwhelming was openly articulated. In 1923, the Revisionist Zionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky wrote in his famous essay The Iron Wall that Zionism would only succeed once the indigenous population became convinced that resistance was hopeless. Only when Palestinians realized they could not defeat the Zionist project, he argued, would they accept its permanence.
The events surrounding the Nakba of 1947–48 reflected this logic. Between 800,000 and 900,000 Palestinians were expelled or forced to flee their homes, as hundreds of villages were destroyed or depopulated. The expulsions occurred through a combination of direct military assault, forced displacement, and the collapse of Palestinian society under war.
Massacres played a crucial role in spreading fear. The killings at Deir Yassin in April 1948, in which more than one hundred civilians were killed by Zionist militias, quickly reverberated across Palestine. But Deir Yassin was only one among many massacres that occurred during that period. Killings in places such as Lydda, Tantura, Safsaf, and numerous other villages contributed to a climate of terror that accelerated the depopulation of Palestinian communities.
The psychological impact of these events was enormous. News of massacres spread from village to village, convincing many Palestinians that remaining in their homes meant risking annihilation. The lesson was clear: war could function not only as a tool of conquest but as an instrument of psychological domination.
The Doctrine of Fear
Over time, this approach evolved into a broader strategic culture that emphasized deterrence through overwhelming violence. Israel’s wars were designed not only to defeat enemies militarily but to reinforce a perception that resistance against Israel would always end in devastating consequences.
Israeli leaders have frequently expressed this philosophy openly. In the early years of the state, Moshe Dayan, one of Israel’s most influential military figures, famously declared that Israelis must be prepared to live by the sword. The remark captured the belief that Israel’s survival depended on constant readiness to use force and on maintaining a reputation for military ruthlessness.
Decades later, Israeli leaders continued to frame the country’s identity in similar terms. In the mid-2000s, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak described Israel as a “villa in the jungle,” a phrase that reflected a worldview in which Israel saw itself as a fortified island of civilization surrounded by hostile and supposedly barbaric surroundings.
This perception reinforced the idea that Israel must always project overwhelming strength. Any sign of weakness, according to this logic, would invite attack.
The doctrine took more concrete form in the early twenty-first century. During the 2006 war in Lebanon, Israeli strategists articulated what later became known as the Dahiya Doctrine, named after the Beirut suburb that was heavily bombed during the conflict. The doctrine advocated massive and disproportionate force against civilian infrastructure associated with resistance movements.
The purpose was not only to destroy military targets but to inflict such devastation that entire societies would be deterred from supporting resistance groups.
A similar philosophy guided Israel’s repeated wars on Gaza. Israeli strategists began referring to these periodic campaigns as “mowing the grass.” The phrase suggested that Palestinian resistance could never be permanently eliminated but could be periodically weakened through short and devastating military operations designed to restore Israeli deterrence.
For decades, this strategy appeared to work. Israel’s military superiority, combined with unwavering American support, reinforced an image of invincibility that shaped political calculations across the Middle East.
But psychological dominance depends on belief, and belief can erode.
Gaza and the Crisis of Deterrence
The first major rupture in Israel’s aura of invincibility occurred in May 2000, when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after years of occupation and sustained resistance from Hezbollah. Across the Arab world, the withdrawal was widely interpreted as the first time Israel had been forced to retreat under military pressure.
Israel attempted to restore its dominance in the 2006 Lebanon war, but the outcome again challenged the image of decisive Israeli military superiority. Despite massive bombardment and ground operations, Hezbollah remained intact and continued to launch rockets until the final days of the conflict.
Yet the most profound blow to Israel’s psychological doctrine occurred decades later with the events surrounding October 7 and the war that followed.
Israel’s response to October 7 was the devastating Gaza genocide. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were killed or wounded, and nearly the entire Strip was destroyed,
The scale of violence was unprecedented even by the standards of previous Israeli wars on Gaza. Yet the objective was not merely military retaliation or collective punishment. It was also an attempt to restore the psychological balance that Israel believed had been shattered.
This logic had been expressed years earlier by Israeli leaders. During Israel’s earlier war on Gaza in 2008–09, then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni openly suggested that Israel must respond in a way that demonstrates overwhelming force: When Israel is attacked, “it responds by going wild – and this is a good thing”.
In other words, war itself functioned as psychological theatre. But the Gaza genocide produced a very different outcome.
The Myth Begins to Collapse
Modern wars unfold not only through military operations but through images that circulate instantly across the world. During the Gaza genocide, countless videos spread across social media showing Israeli armored vehicles—including the once-feared Merkava tanks—being struck by relatively simple Palestinian anti-tank weapons.
For generations, Israel’s military power had been associated with technological invincibility. Suddenly, millions of viewers were witnessing something entirely different: a powerful army struggling against resistance fighters operating under siege conditions.
The war on Iran has intensified this psychological transformation.
For decades, Israeli society—and much of the region—believed that Israel’s territory was protected by an almost impenetrable defensive shield. The sight of waves of Iranian missiles striking targets inside Israel has therefore carried enormous symbolic weight.
These images challenge one of the most deeply embedded assumptions in Middle Eastern politics: that Israel is militarily untouchable.
At the same time, other actors are exploiting this shift in perception. Hezbollah continues to maintain significant military capabilities despite repeated Israeli attacks. Palestinian resistance groups remain active despite the devastation of Gaza. Meanwhile, Ansarallah in Yemen has disrupted shipping routes in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, demonstrating how even non-state actors can reshape strategic realities.
Israeli leaders themselves increasingly frame the current confrontation as existential. Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly described the war as a struggle for Israel’s survival, echoing earlier language about living by the sword.
Yet the deeper crisis may not be purely military. Israel remains one of the most heavily armed states in the world. But the aura of invincibility that once magnified that power is fading.
Once fear begins to disappear, restoring it becomes extraordinarily difficult.
And that may be the most important consequence of the war on Iran: not the destruction it produces, but the collapse of the psychological doctrine that sustained Israeli power for decades.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/israels-greatest-weapon-was-fear-and-it-is-now-failing/
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