Middle East Press On: War Against Palestine, Indonesia-Qatar Defence Agreement, Gaza, Hind Rajab, Sweden’s Silence, Lebanon, Israel, New Age Islam's Selection, 08 June 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
08 June 2026
Naksa at 59: The colonial war against Palestine never ended
The latest Indonesia-Qatar defence agreement needs deliverables, not diplomacy
Gaza: Hind Rajab’s Last Phone Call and Sweden’s Silence
Whose Flag is Flying? Lebanon’s Leaders Side with Israel against Their Own People
A Regional Crisis or a Protracted International Disorder?
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Naksa at 59: The colonial war against Palestine never ended
June 7, 2026
By Sayid Marcos Tenorio
June 2026 marks the 59th anniversary of the Naksa, the Arabic term meaning “setback” or “defeat”, used by Palestinians to describe the events of June 1967. More than a war between states, the Naksa represented a new stage in a colonial process that had begun decades earlier and continues to this day.
The dominant narrative presents the so-called Six-Day War as a conventional conflict between Israel and neighbouring Arab states. This interpretation, however, ignores the central dimension of the Palestinian question: Palestine has been the site of a settler-colonial project based on land seizure, the displacement of the indigenous population, and the establishment of settler communities on occupied territory.
The Nakba of 1948 expelled more than 750,000 Palestinians from their homes and destroyed hundreds of villages. The Naksa of 1967 deepened that process. In just six days, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Syria’s Golan Heights, bringing almost all of historic Palestine under its control.
This was not a temporary occupation. Since then, colonisation has become a permanent policy.
It was in the aftermath of the Naksa that the system now widely identified by international human rights organisations as apartheid took shape. Palestinians and Israeli settlers live under different legal regimes while inhabiting the same territory.
While settlers enjoy full civil rights and state protection, millions of Palestinians remain subjected to military occupation, restrictions on movement, home demolitions, arbitrary detention and the daily violence of settler expansion.
The separation wall cutting through the West Bank, the military checkpoints, territorial fragmentation and the continuous expansion of settlements are not isolated abuses. They are instruments of a colonial project designed to prevent Palestinian self-determination and transform occupation into a permanent reality.
The Naksa, therefore, did not end in June 1967.
It continues with every new settlement built on occupied land. It continues with every Palestinian family expelled from Jerusalem. It continues in the lives of millions of refugees denied the right to return to their homeland. It continues in the imprisonment of Palestinian political detainees and in the ongoing attempt to erase the national identity of a people who refuse to disappear.
The events that have unfolded since 7 October 2023 demonstrate this historical continuity. The catastrophe that has engulfed Gaza did not emerge in isolation. Rather, it represents the escalation of a process that began with the Nakba and was consolidated by the Naksa.
In light of this reality, a fundamental question arises: what is the legitimacy of Palestinian resistance?
The answer can be found within international law itself. Various United Nations resolutions recognise the right of peoples subjected to colonialism, foreign occupation and racial domination to struggle for self-determination. UN General Assembly Resolutions 3070, 3246 and 37/43 reaffirm the legitimacy of the struggles of colonised peoples to achieve liberation and independence.
This principle was recognised in the national liberation movements of Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Vietnam and South Africa. There is no legal or moral basis for denying Palestinians a right that has been acknowledged for so many other peoples subjected to colonial domination.
For this reason, the memory of the Naksa should not be understood merely as the remembrance of a military defeat, but as the symbol of a struggle that remains alive.
Fifty-nine years later, Palestine remains one of the defining anti-colonial issues of our time.
It is the struggle of a people who, despite massacres, expulsions, sieges and occupation, continue to assert their right to exist, to resist and to live freely in their own land.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260607-naksa-at-59-the-colonial-war-against-palestine-never-ended/
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The latest Indonesia-Qatar defence agreement needs deliverables, not diplomacy
June 7, 2026
By Dr. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat
Indonesia and Qatar this week signed a Statement of Intent on defense cooperation, paving the way for a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement covering military training, personnel exchanges, joint exercises, cybersecurity, and defense industrial collaboration.
The agreement reflects a broader trend. Since President Prabowo Subianto took office, Indonesia has expanded engagement with Gulf countries through strategic dialogues, investment partnerships, and now defense cooperation.
The problem is not the agreement itself.
The problem is that Indonesia has signed many similar agreements before.
Over the years, Jakarta has established defense partnerships with countries across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America. Most promised training, technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and capacity building. Some delivered meaningful results. Many produced little beyond ceremonial exchanges and diplomatic goodwill.
This challenge is particularly important today.
The agreement comes as the Middle East faces one of its most volatile periods in years. The conflict involving Iran has exposed the vulnerability of regional security arrangements, disrupted trade routes, and heightened uncertainty across the Gulf. Governments throughout the region are reassessing their strategic assumptions and searching for new forms of resilience.
For Indonesia, however, the value of the partnership will depend entirely on execution.
The first priority should be defense human capital.
The agreement places significant emphasis on education, training, and personnel exchanges. This is the most realistic area for immediate progress. Rather than focusing on occasional visits by senior officers, both governments should establish long-term exchange programs involving military academies, staff colleges, cyber specialists, and defense planners. Success should be measured by the number of officers trained, joint curricula developed, and institutional partnerships created.
The second priority should be cybersecurity.
Unlike conventional defense cooperation, cybersecurity addresses challenges faced by both countries regardless of geography. Indonesia confronts growing cyber threats targeting government institutions and critical infrastructure. Qatar faces similar concerns, particularly as digital systems become increasingly important to national security and economic resilience.
A practical starting point would be joint cyber exercises, information-sharing mechanisms, and cooperation between cybersecurity agencies. These initiatives are less politically sensitive than weapons procurement and can generate tangible outcomes relatively quickly.
The third priority should be narrowing the focus of defense industrial cooperation.
This is where many defense agreements fail.
The phrase “defense industry cooperation” often sounds ambitious but lacks specificity. Neither Indonesia nor Qatar is likely to become a major defense manufacturing partner for the other. Attempting to pursue broad industrial cooperation across multiple sectors could dilute resources and produce little impact.
Instead, both governments should identify a limited number of niche areas where collaboration is feasible. Cybersecurity technologies, unmanned systems, military logistics, and defense-related digital applications may offer more realistic opportunities than large-scale weapons production.
The fourth priority should be linking defense cooperation to broader strategic dialogue.
Rather than treating defense cooperation as a standalone initiative, Indonesia and Qatar should use it as part of a wider conversation about emerging security risks. This would make the relationship more relevant to contemporary challenges and less dependent on traditional military exchanges.
Most importantly, both sides should establish measurable benchmarks.
How many officers will participate in exchanges each year? What cyber initiatives will be launched? Which industrial projects will receive funding? What outcomes are expected within three or five years?
Without clear targets, the agreement risks becoming another addition to an already crowded list of strategic partnerships.
The timing of the deal offers an opportunity. The instability generated by the Iran conflict has reminded governments across the Middle East that resilience requires more than military hardware. It requires institutions, partnerships, expertise, and adaptability.
Indonesia and Qatar have taken the first step toward building such a partnership.
The harder task begins now.
In defense cooperation, implementation matters far more than intent.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260607-the-latest-indonesia-qatar-defense-agreement-needs-deliverables-not-diplomacy/
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Gaza: Hind Rajab’s Last Phone Call and Sweden’s Silence
June 8, 2026
By Mats Svensson
A six-year-old girl sat trapped in a car surrounded by the bodies of her family. For hours, she pleaded for help over the phone. She called for her mother. She begged not to be left alone. Eventually, the line went silent. Her name was Hind Rajab.
There are moments when statistics fail. When phrases such as “civilian casualties” and “humanitarian crisis” become grotesquely inadequate. Hind Rajab’s story is one of those moments.
Because behind every number is a child with a name, a voice, a family, and a future that should have existed. Hind’s did not.
I attended a screening of The Voice of Hind Rajab with my 15-year-old daughter at the Nordic Palestinian Film Festival. The film reconstructs the final hours of a six-year-old Palestinian girl trapped in a car in Gaza, surrounded by the bodies of her family, pleading for help over the phone as Israeli forces operated around her.
The theater was silent except for crying.
My daughter wept. The woman beside me wept. I felt my own composure slipping away. Hind’s terrified voice stripped away every layer of political distance. There were no strategic calculations, no diplomatic euphemisms, no carefully crafted government statements. There was only a child asking for help that never came.
At one point, Hind mentions the name of her school: A Happy Childhood. The cruelty of that detail is difficult to describe. A Happy Childhood. A six-year-old girl trapped among corpses, hoping not to die.
This is Gaza.
And Hind Rajab is not an exception. She is one face among thousands of Palestinian children whose lives have been shattered by a system of occupation, siege, displacement, apartheid and military violence that long predates October 2023. The destruction of Gaza did not emerge from nowhere. It is the culmination of decades of policies that have systematically stripped Palestinians of security, freedom, dignity, and, increasingly, life itself.
Today, Gaza is not simply experiencing a humanitarian crisis. It is experiencing societal destruction on a scale that many international legal experts, genocide scholars, and human rights organizations argue meets the definition of genocide. Whether governments are willing to use that word or not, the reality remains the same: an entire civilian population is being subjected to conditions that make normal human existence impossible.
In this context, UNRWA is not merely another aid organization. It is one of the last remaining structures keeping Gaza alive.
For decades, UNRWA has provided schools, healthcare, food assistance, and basic social services to Palestinian refugees. In Gaza, it has functioned as an essential pillar of civilian survival. Without it, suffering deepens. Hunger spreads. Healthcare collapses further. Children lose access to education. Communities lose one of the few institutions still capable of functioning amid a catastrophe.
I know this because I have worked in Gaza myself.
I have seen UNRWA schools. I have seen its clinics. I have seen the role it plays in the daily lives of ordinary people. When politicians discuss funding decisions, they speak the language of policy. The people affected experience those decisions as food, medicine, shelter, or the absence of all three.
That is why Sweden’s decision in December 2024 to terminate its core funding to UNRWA cannot be dismissed as a routine policy adjustment.
Between December 16 and 18, 2024, Benjamin Dousa, Sweden’s Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade, visited Israel and Palestine. The day after the visit, the government of Ulf Kristersson announced that Sweden would withdraw its core support to UNRWA.
The timing matters. It was a political choice, a conscious choice. A choice made while Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe was accelerating.
While children were being killed; while hospitals were collapsing; while famine warnings were being issued; while the need for humanitarian assistance had reached levels unseen in modern Palestinian history.
At precisely that moment, Sweden chose to pull back.
The Swedish government offered explanations. There were references to oversight mechanisms, concerns regarding the agency, alternative channels of assistance, and administrative reviews. But none of these explanations change the fundamental reality: reducing support for the primary humanitarian lifeline of a besieged civilian population carries consequences that are entirely foreseeable.
Governments often seek refuge in the language of procedure. They speak of reallocations rather than deprivation, suspensions rather than abandonment, reviews rather than responsibility.
But reality is not bureaucratic. Reality is a mother unable to find food for her children; reality is a clinic without medicine; reality is a school that cannot function; reality is a six-year-old girl calling for help from a car surrounded by death.
No, Sweden did not kill Hind Rajab. But the question is not whether Sweden bears responsibility for her death.
The question is whether governments that knowingly weaken the institutions sustaining civilian life in Gaza can honestly claim innocence regarding the suffering that follows.
There is a profound moral comfort in imagining that responsibility belongs only to those pulling triggers or dropping bombs. It allows everyone else to stand at a safe distance and insist they are merely observers.
History rarely judges so generously.
The destruction of civilian populations is never carried out by violence alone. It also depends on political decisions made far from the battlefield—decisions that determine who receives protection, who receives aid, and who is left to fend for themselves.
When governments withdraw support from institutions keeping civilians alive during a humanitarian catastrophe, they are not neutral actors. They are participants in shaping the outcome.
That is the uncomfortable truth that Hind Rajab’s voice forces us to confront.
Hind Rajab never heard the debates in Stockholm. She never knew the names of Ministers, Benjamin Dousa and Ulf Kristersson. She was six years old. She wanted someone to save her. That was impossible.
What is not impossible is deciding whether the survivors of Gaza deserve food, schools, healthcare, and humanitarian protection. That decision was made in Stockholm.
The people who made it have names. And they should be asked to defend it.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/gaza-hind-rajabs-last-phone-call-and-swedens-silence/
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Whose Flag is Flying? Lebanon’s Leaders Side with Israel against Their Own People
June 7, 2026
By Robert Inlakesh
The current leadership of Lebanon is arguing that Iran is using them “as a bargaining chip” and insists on pursuing Hezbollah’s weapons, arguing that everyone except Israel is an impediment to “peace”. Not only are these claims blatantly false, but they may also have rendered the government of Beirut completely illegitimate.
Earlier this week, yet another “ceasefire agreement” was formally announced by the United States, coming after a third round of direct negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli officials in Washington. However, the only place the ceasefire actually existed was in the imaginations of Lebanese officials and on the White House’s website. On the ground, these declarations have no bearing on what Israel does, nor how Hezbollah responds.
Come Friday, a frustrated Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and his Prime Minister Nawaf Salam publicly lashed out at both Hezbollah and Iran. Despite speaking to the media separately, they carried precisely the same pro-Israeli talking points.
Although some have chosen to hold their tongues on the nature of Nawaf Salam and Joseph Aoun’s behavior, they are now making charges that must be systematically debunked.
Living in Beirut, Working for Washington
To begin with, the Lebanese PM and President both claim that Hezbollah does not represent the will of the Lebanese people. Putting it bluntly, neither do they.
Although there is no official census proving definitively what percentage of the Lebanese public is of each specific religious denomination, the consensus opinion is that the Shia are the largest group. This is important to begin with, as Lebanon is a country that you cannot talk about without including sect.
Beirut has a confessionalist system of government, meaning that the President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim. In addition to this, the public does not elect the PM or President as they do in other countries, but they do elect members of parliament and can have their say in local elections.
Hezbollah is the biggest political Party in the country, and alongside the Amal movement, which is also popular amongst the Shia of Lebanon, neither Nawaf Salam nor Joseph Aoun would have been elected to power. Aoun was the former commander of the Lebanese Army and the US’s favored pick, while Salam left his post as a judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to assume his current role, making him a relative outsider that the Lebanese public knew little about before he assumed office.
Without the vote of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, the current Lebanese government would not be in power at all, meaning both the President and Prime Minister are allowed to be there. In 2022, the will of the Lebanese people was to vote in a way that created an enormous divide between parliamentary blocs.
The Lebanese Parliament itself has half its seats reserved for Muslims and the other half for Christians; this does not change depending upon whether one group is a larger percentage of the population or not. In the last elections, instead of the Free Patriotic Movement taking the largest number of Christian assigned seats – a Party that has cooperated with Hezbollah and Amal – the right-wing Lebanese Forces (LF) gained the largest number of seats amongst Christian Parties.
For those who are not aware, the LF have their roots in the Israeli-backed fascist militias and is led by a staunchly pro-US former warlord, Samir Geagea, a convicted murderer who was later pardoned. This created a political deadlock, where neither side would agree upon forming a government.
That was until Israel launched its full-scale attack and invasion of Lebanon in September of 2024. In order to try to stabilize Lebanon, following the war, Hezbollah and Amal essentially ceded to their political rivals, allowing Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam to assume power.
Therefore, the government formed in February of 2025 is not the representation of the Lebanese public’s will; it was imposed upon a nation that had just suffered the costs of Israel’s indiscriminate attacks against it. Additionally, the polling data released earlier this year clearly shows that a plurality of Lebanese oppose disarming their country’s resistance without a proper defense plan in place and that they view Israel as the number one threat.
‘Hezbollah Started the War on Iran’s Orders’
Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam contend that Hezbollah is responsible for the ongoing war in Lebanon and that it was launched on orders sent to its Secretary General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, from Tehran. This is nothing more than an Israeli hasbara talking point and can be easily demonstrated.
To begin with, Hezbollah began launching retaliatory strikes against Israel on March 2, 2026; they did not “start the war”. Israel and Lebanon agreed to a ceasefire on November 27, 2024. Hezbollah did not violate the agreement by firing upon Israel even a single time, yet for 15 whole months, the Israelis never stopped bombing the south of the country, occasionally bombing Beirut and the north.
Israel committed over 15,400 violations of the ceasefire agreement, according to the United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNIFIL) stationed in southern Lebanon, including by attacking UNIFIL positions and using chemical weapons.
According to the November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement, Israeli forces that had invaded southern Lebanon were supposed to withdraw from the nation’s territory completely by January 26, 2025. This deadline was later extended to February 18, after Israel gave excuses about needing more time. However, the Israelis never withdrew; instead, they would go on to establish more military positions inside Lebanese territory and destroy farmland, along with civilian infrastructure.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese government did nothing to pressure the Israelis to withdraw from occupied Lebanese lands. Instead, the US sent a plan to the government in Beirut, demanding that they completely disarm Hezbollah and all other resistance groups operating inside the country. By August of 2025, the Lebanese government adopted legislation regarding a disarmament plan.
For 15 months, Hezbollah repeatedly told the Lebanese government that they had agreed to put in power, that they would not discuss the handing over of their weapons before Israel had withdrawn from the south and ended its constant bombing attacks against southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s position has long been clear: they have been willing to discuss integrating with the Lebanese Army and have even fought alongside them in the past to stop Daesh from seizing Lebanese lands.
Instead of achieving anything through diplomacy, the rhetoric coming from the Lebanese government only grew more and more hostile against Hezbollah and its chief backer, Iran, while refusing to do anything about the occupation of the south. In most cases, Salam refused to even address Israeli attacks on civilians in south Lebanon.
Then came March 2, 2026. Israel and the US launched an illegal war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Now, regardless of whether you believe that Hezbollah got involved for Iran’s sake or on their orders or not, it is undoubtedly true that if they were ever going to resist Israel’s non-stop aggression and expansion into Lebanese territory, it was going to be in the context of a wider war that would put them in a stronger position.
‘Iran is Using Lebanon as a Bargaining Chip’
The Lebanese President claimed that Tehran is using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the United States, the same charge that Nawaf Salam also makes. How they even managed to keep straight faces while stating this is beyond human comprehension. It really is that ridiculous.
If anything, Iran’s insistence that Lebanon be included in any ceasefire agreement holds them back from achieving their own national goals. While the latest “ceasefire” deal that was accepted by Salam and Aoun does not guarantee a total end to Israeli strikes in Lebanon and refuses to guarantee any withdrawal from Lebanese lands, Iran demands that, in order for them to sign any agreement, there must be a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and a guarantee that it won’t launch attacks inside the country.
Instead, the Lebanese government is publicly complaining that its “ceasefire agreement” isn’t being respected by Hezbollah. It proposes “experimental zones” where the Lebanese Army would be permitted by Israel to enter the south of its own country, with no guarantees that Israel would end its attacks. The agreement they made only compels Hezbollah to withdraw from the south of the country – so abandoning the Shia population it represents – while it must stop firing at Israeli forces occupying its country and then disarm fully, with no guarantees from Tel Aviv about anything.
The Lebanese government seeks to normalize ties with Israel and immediately sided with Israel when Hezbollah began retaliating in March of this year by condemning Hezbollah for daring to resist and claiming they have “dragged” the country into a new war. What this exposes is that, yet again, the people of South Lebanon are not considered equal in the eyes of the government, because for them, many could not return home to their villages, there was no reconstruction guaranteed despite there being a 15-month ‘ceasefire’, and the war never truly ended.
Similarly, following Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon – a time when Hezbollah didn’t even exist – they killed around 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese, then claimed they were operating in a “buffer zone” in southern Lebanon. This followed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s decision to relocate its leadership to Tunisia and its fighters relocated to other countries. The government of Lebanon did nothing for the people of the south during the “buffer zone” period, and by 1985, the Israelis had established a fully fledged illegal occupation of southern Lebanon, complete with torture centers and the infamous “South Lebanon Army” fascist proxy forces.
This time, however, there is a key difference. A Lebanese leadership is in place that is meeting directly with the Israelis, and it is openly attempting to normalize ties. In 1982, Bashir Gemayel became President of Lebanon, a figure who had close ties with the Israeli Mossad. Even Gemayel didn’t publicly advertise his desire to normalize ties in the way we see the current leadership. He was assassinated by a fellow Maronite Christian within a month of taking office.
The Israelis and the US have long promoted the narrative of an “Iranian occupation of Lebanon”, offering a weak argument that because Tehran backed Hezbollah, it is holding the country hostage. But this couldn’t be further from the truth.
Hezbollah is militarily powerful enough to take over Lebanon, but it doesn’t. Even when the leadership that it decided to permit to take power, openly turns against it, abandons the entire south of the country, and sits at the table with the enemy while it continues to massacre civilians, Hezbollah still has not acted violently towards the government.
On the contrary to Hezbollah being a “security burden” and “dragging Lebanon into war”, it was Hezbollah that liberated south Lebanon in 2000. It was then Hezbollah that forced Israel out of Lebanese territory in 2006, allowing for 17 years of deterrence, during which Israel would not dare bomb the country. When it came to an “Iranian occupation”, and there was a major fuel shortage in Lebanon, Iran sent shipments of fuel that were facilitated by Hezbollah in 2021. A year later, Tehran offered free fuel to Beirut.
In 2022, as the country was suffering economically, Hezbollah made another historic achievement in the interests of the Lebanese State: it managed to force Israel to acknowledge Lebanon’s maritime borders. Threatening all-out war if the Israelis attempted to seize Lebanon’s gas fields, Hezbollah pressured Tel Aviv into recognizing the rights of the Lebanese State.
There is simply nothing that the Lebanese government has ever achieved against Israel in the way of sovereignty, security, or even in the economic sphere. It refuses to allow its armed forces to even resist when its nation is invaded. Nawaf Salam even summoned the current Commander of the Lebanese Army, Rudolphe Haykal, when he not only refused to go after Hezbollah’s weapons in March but even aided in repelling an Israeli landing operation in the Bekaa Valley.
In order to communicate the idea that Iran is “using Lebanon as a bargaining chip” implies that the Iranians gain something from their position. Instead, Tehran’s position is attempting to save Lebanon from Israeli occupation and continued bombardment.
When Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to bombard Beirut on Monday, this pledge was made with direct Lebanese-Israeli talks in Washington scheduled the very next day. The only reason that Netanyahu refrained from ordering the strikes was that Iran stepped in and pledged to retaliate directly.
Iran directly threatens to fight for the sovereignty of Lebanon and imposes red lines in its negotiations that include protecting the Lebanese people from Israeli attacks, but the Lebanese government refuses to do either.
Whose Flag is Flying?
Nawaf Salam and Joseph Aoun do not represent the Lebanese people; they represent foreign entities that manipulate them. They point the finger at Iran for two reasons:
They are not sovereign representatives of their own State; they are clearly working on behalf of foreign influences.
If Hezbollah and Iran do secure a victory that requires Israel to withdraw, their careers are permanently over, and they lose the small amount of legitimacy they have left.
Other governments in the region have long collaborated with or directly maintained ties with the Israelis, but Salam and Aoun have taken this to an entirely different level. They are willing to literally hand over their own territory and allow Israel freedom of action to attack their people, if it means that their owners will be pleased.
Some could even argue that they are proponents of separatism because they completely overlook the predicament of South Lebanon. The Shia population of the country is frequently undermined, and the government’s statements read as if they came right out of Washington-based Zionist think-tanks like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) or Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).
Another key point to take from all of this is that Hezbollah would not exist without grassroots support. If the Lebanese people overwhelmingly opposed it, how could it survive and consistently perform well in both the national and local elections?
When we talk about Hezbollah, we aren’t talking about an armed militia alone. Hezbollah is a political Party within which it has doctors, architects, engineers, politicians, scholars, and so on. It represents the people of the society it comes from, because it is a totally organic national resistance organization, not some foreign militia. Considering that the Shia are the biggest single religious sect in the country, Hezbollah and their Amal allies do represent a considerable portion of the Lebanese public, all of which are totally ignored by the US-proxies in Beirut.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/whose-flag-is-flying-lebanons-leaders-side-with-israel-against-their-own-people/
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A Regional Crisis or a Protracted International Disorder?
June 7, 2026
By Dan Steinbock
On May 31, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam gave a televised address in which he condemned Israel’s invasion and intensified attacks on southern Lebanon as a dangerous escalation, warning that a “scorched-earth policy” will never bring security to Tel Aviv: “Israel must understand that with its scorched-earth policy, collective punishment, and the bulldozing of villages and towns, it will gain neither security nor stability.”
As Salam said, this process is now advancing. “Israel is practicing mass displacement that amounts to collective punishment. It no longer targets only specific locations or areas, but has adopted a policy of comprehensive destruction of cities, towns, and all aspects of life within them.”
Tactical Wins, Strategic Devastation
Israel’s Obliteration Doctrine is a lethal mix of scorched earth policy, collective punishment and civilian victimization, coupled with massive indiscriminate bombardment and systematic use of artificial intelligence (AI), as I have demonstrated in The Obliteration Doctrine (2025) and The Fall of Israel (2024).
This doctrine often goes hand in hand with ecocide, which Israel has committed in Gaza and is committing in Lebanon. The net effect is ethnic cleansing and, given continued and unhindered escalation, genocidal atrocities.
Whether Prime Minister Netanyahu, former PM Naftali Bennett or former head of the Israeli defense forces Gadi Eisenkot will win the 2026 Israeli legislative election is effectively immaterial. With or without Netanyahu, the Obliteration Doctrine will prevail.
Netanyahu brought to power the most far-right Messianic government in Israeli history. Naftali Bennett is a millionaire politician and the ex-leader of a religious Zionist far-right party. Ironically, the more “moderate” of the three is the ex-military chief Gadi Eisenkot who first tested the Obliteration Doctrine in Dahiya, a Shia enclave in Beirut in 2006.
The greatest threat to Israel’s long-term future is not external enemies alone, but the transformation of military escalation into a permanent governing principle. Once security policy becomes inseparable from territorial expansion, ethnic cleansing and perpetual warfare, the consequences extend far beyond the battlefield.
From Gaza to Lebanon and Iran – and Back
The Gaza war has already produced one of the gravest humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Across much of the Global South, public opinion increasingly interprets the destruction of Gaza through the lens of displacement, collective punishment and ethnic cleansing. Understandably, the expansion of military operations into Lebanon has reinforced those perceptions.
This divergence in perception is becoming one of the defining geopolitical fault lines of our era. In the view of the Global South, military realities on the ground continue to outpace diplomacy. The question is no longer whether the conflict will reshape the region, but how extensive that transformation will become.
In The Obliteration Doctrine, my greatest concern was that “what happens in Gaza won’t stay in Gaza.” It is now a lethal blueprint and a broader regional template. Hence, the large-scale destruction of towns, repeated displacement of civilians, and continuing cross-border operations in Lebanon.
The broader US-Israel-Iran confrontation has become increasingly intertwined with the Lebanon-Gaza conflict, with attacks, counter-attacks and continuing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz generating major energy-market disruptions.
The Energy Crisis Connection
The strategic significance of the conflict has increased dramatically because it now intersects directly with the US-Israel-Iran confrontation. Even partial disruptions have triggered sharp increases in oil and gas prices and heightened concerns regarding inflation, growth and supply security.
Since the escalation of regional conflicts stretching from Gaza and Lebanon to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, energy markets have become increasingly vulnerable to disruption. Shipping routes, insurance costs, strategic chokepoints and investment decisions have all been affected by growing instability. What began as the devastation of Gaza has evolved into a crisis with potentially global economic consequences.
The Middle East remains the world’s most important energy-producing region. Even when actual supply disruptions remain limited, the risk premium generated by military escalation can significantly increase energy prices. Such increases function as a global tax on growth – as the epicenter of the crisis, Asia is a prime example.
For advanced economies already burdened by high debt levels and slow productivity growth, persistent energy inflation undermines economic recovery. For developing countries dependent on imported energy, the consequences are even more severe. Rising fuel costs translate into higher food prices, greater fiscal deficits and heightened social instability.
The Gaza-Lebanon crisis is therefore not merely a regional conflict. It is part of a wider process linking geopolitical fragmentation, energy insecurity and economic deceleration.
US-Israel Connection
Washington remains Israel’s indispensable strategic partner. Military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support continue to provide the foundation of Israel’s security architecture. Yet the relationship faces growing contradictions.
American policymakers increasingly confront a centrifugal dilemma. On one hand, they seek to preserve Israel’s military superiority and deterrence capabilities. On the other hand, they must manage the economic and geopolitical consequences of prolonged regional conflict.
At the same time, these policymakers are challenged by the increasingly vocal Israel lobby, the export exigencies of the US military contractors, and the rising opposition of the American electorate, particularly the younger voter cohorts.
Every expansion of the war imposes costs on broader American interests. Energy volatility threatens global growth. Escalation risks confrontation with regional powers. Humanitarian devastation fuels anti-American sentiment across much of the Global South.
So, Washington’s objectives are becoming increasingly complex and self-defeating. It seeks Israeli security without regional war, deterrence without escalation, and strategic dominance without bearing the full economic and political costs of prolonged conflict.
As those goals are proving increasingly difficult to reconcile, Washington is burdened by both Israeli insecurity and a regional war, escalation without deterrence, the full spectrum of costs of the prolonged conflict – and increasing concerns about crumbling strategic dominance in the region.
Expanding Arc of War – And Risks of Miscalculation
The most significant recent development is the gradual fusion of multiple conflicts into a single strategic theater. Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and the Persian Gulf increasingly form interconnected fronts within a broader contest between the US-Israel partnership and Iran’s regional network.
Military actions in one arena now generate repercussions across the others.
This expanding arc of war magnifies the risks of miscalculation. A localized confrontation that might once have remained contained now possesses the potential to trigger regional escalation, energy shocks and wider geopolitical fragmentation.
This is precisely how localized wars become systemic crises.
Israel risks validating the warning implicit in both The Fall of Israel and The Obliteration Doctrine: that a state can achieve tactical successes while simultaneously undermining the foundations of its own long-term security and legitimacy.
Every tactical win is setting the stage for further strategic failure, deeper divides internally, and greater international estrangement.
International Crisis of Credibility
The international response has exposed a growing crisis in global governance. Until the devastation of Gaza, many Western governments emphasized Israel’s security concerns while expressing futile concern about civilian casualties in the Middle East.
Many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have a markedly different perspective, focusing on humanitarian suffering, displacement and alleged violations of international law. As these narratives diverge, confidence in international institutions continues to erode.
For much of the Global South, the perception of selective enforcement of international norms has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If international law appears applicable to some states but not others, its legitimacy inevitably suffers. This credibility gap may prove one of the most enduring consequences of the conflict.
The central question is no longer whether the Gaza war has transformed the Middle East. It has. The question is whether the region is moving toward stabilization or toward a broader doctrine of permanent conflict.
If military escalation continues, the consequences will extend far beyond Israel, Lebanon and Gaza. Energy insecurity, economic fragmentation, humanitarian crises and geopolitical polarization will increasingly shape the international system.
The tragedy is that all parties face mounting risks. Lebanon risks further devastation. Gaza faces a reconstruction challenge of historic proportions. The United States risks strategic overstretch. The international community risks institutional irrelevance.
The Road ahead
Modern conflicts are no longer judged solely by military outcomes. They are judged by their developmental consequences. A military victory that produces permanent economic devastation can become a strategic defeat.
The tragedy of the current moment is that every actor increasingly perceives escalation as necessary while simultaneously fearing its consequences.
Lebanon risks deeper devastation. Gaza faces a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe and an uncertain political future. Iran confronts mounting economic and military pressures. The United States faces growing strategic commitments. Israel confronts rising diplomatic isolation even as it seeks greater security.
In the resulting obliteration dynamic, military escalation progressively destroys the political and economic foundations needed for lasting peace.
In this view, the debate over ethnic cleansing, genocide, and obliteration is not merely a legal or moral argument. It is a debate about whether the region can escape a cycle in which every military victory plants the seeds of the next catastrophe – and possibly of an overwhelming global downturn.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/a-regional-crisis-or-a-protracted-international-disorder/
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