Middle East Press On: War Crimes, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions, Hamas: New Age Islam's Selection, 20 October 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
20 October 2025
The Triad Of War Crimes, Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, And Global Condemnation Haunting Israel’s Future
Qatar’s Air Force Modernization And Its Ramifications For Israel
Israel Will Likely Never Approve The Second Stage Of The Gaza Plan
Gang War In Gaza: Determining The Future Of Hamas's Rule
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The Triad Of War Crimes, Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, And Global Condemnation Haunting Israel’s Future
by Jasim Al-Azzawi
October 19, 2025
The three ghosts—war crimes, BDS, and global condemnation—will torment Israel for the next few decades, troubling its conscience and eroding its legitimacy. They are not transient criticisms, but eternal indictments that cut across borders and generations. Charges of war crimes bear moral stains that no diplomatic smokescreen can gloss over. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, while disputed and as yet a non-transformative force, continues to galvanise civil society against perceived injustice, gnawing at Israel’s economic and cultural standing. And global condemnation—maintained by visions of destruction, starvation, pulverised children, and the tolerance of silence—gives birth to a shared relentless memory. Each of these puts together a triad of accounting that possibly could cancel out Israel’s moral and political resilience.
War crimes and the decline of moral legitimacy
Israel stands today before a court of global conscience. Accusations of war crimes—of collective punishment and indiscriminate bombardment of refugee camps and hospitals—have prompted official investigations before the International Criminal Court. ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan reminded states in May that “no one is above the law, and those who weaponise starvation or collective punishment will be held accountable.” These are not abstractions of law; they are moral indictments.
International lawyers note that the devastation of Gaza has produced “the most comprehensive evidence of potential war crimes since Bosnia”. The invincible narrative of self-defence is disintegrating in the face of satellite evidence, survivor testimonies, and forensic evidence. In the words of Dr Philippe Sands, author of East West Street, “When legality fails, legitimacy collapses, and with it the moral scaffolding of statehood”.
BDS and the power of civil resistance
The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, once dismissed as a symbolic gesture, has matured into a vital force in civil resistance. What was initially a Palestinian civil society appeal in 2005 now resonates on Western campuses, trade unions, and even places of worship. Europe’s largest pension funds are reevaluating their investments in Israel. Musicians and filmmakers decline performances in Tel Aviv. The cultural walls are closing in.
Desmond Tutu’s ethical imperative still rings true: “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.” BDS forces the world to take sides. International law expert Francis Boyle, author of the initial Palestinian appeal to the ICC, argues that “BDS is the Nuremberg principle applied without armies—the citizen’s trial of power”.
Israel’s backlash—termed the movement antisemitic—has progressively faltered, even among liberal Jewish observers who insist that to speak out against occupation is not hate of Jews. The boycotts themselves do not terrorise Israel’s leadership, but by the realisation that the moral consensus is now at risk of escaping their control.
Global resentment and the loss of narrative control
Israel’s story—once a story of existential survival—has been surpassed by images of destroyed schools and crushed children. Moral isolation is gaining traction. The shift is generational and emotional, and it is irreversible. Young activists and voters in Western capitals increasingly see Gaza as the moral issue of their generation.
Columbia University professor Rashid Khalidi calls this “the end of narrative monopoly,” arguing that “Palestine has become the mirror through which global injustice is reflected”. From Johannesburg to Dublin, from New York to Jakarta, the sympathy previously reserved for Israel’s helplessness is now claimed by Palestinian tenacity.
Blaise Pascal was correct: “The heart has its reasons which reason knows not.” The emotional barometer of the world is changing. And changing with it is Israel’s moral high ground—lost not in the trenches of conflict, but through an acute loss of story control.
A mirror from history: South Africa’s reckoning
History presents ugly mirrors. Apartheid South Africa, too, believed it could endure censure by outlasting military dominance and diplomacy with the West. But moral delegitimisation, sanctions, and mass mobilisation eventually toppled its citadel.
It was in 1986 that the US Congress vetoed President Reagan’s veto to sanction Pretoria. Within a few years, apartheid collapsed not by invasion, but by isolation. Nelson Mandela’s words still resonate true: “We know too well that our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians.” That solidarity has become a reality, rather than rhetoric.
Scholars of comparative politics warn us that Israel’s path is mimicking that of late-apartheid governments: moral depletion, economic hardship, and intra-generational dissent among their own citizens. As Professor Ilan Pappé succinctly puts it, “What brings down an unjust system is not the outrage of its victims, but the shame of its supporters.”
Israel’s destiny will not be determined by Iron Domes or by American vetoes, but by whether or not it confronts its spectres—the crimes, the boycotts, the rage—and refuses to deny them. Power without legitimacy is weak.
The world is watching. History is taking stock. And the arc—long, slow, unforgiving—is bending toward justice.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251019-the-triad-of-war-crimes-bds-and-global-condemnation-haunting-israels-future/
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Qatar’s Air Force Modernization And Its Ramifications For Israel
By Noa Lazimi
October 20, 2025
As part of its alignment with US President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, and thanks to its close ties with the United States, Qatar has received another security-related concession from Washington.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently met with his Qatari counterpart, thanked him for Doha’s involvement in the ongoing talks, and announced that the United States would establish a fighter jet training facility at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho for Qatari pilots and fighter jets. This announcement comes shortly after the signing of a presidential order granting Qatar, possibly subject to congressional approval, a US commitment to defend it in the event of an attack by a foreign entity.
The significance of this step should be understood in light of Doha’s considerable investments in recent years in modernizing its air force as part of a broader policy aimed at strengthening its military capabilities. The small emirate is known less for its military might and more for its immense wealth, given its status as a key player in the global gas market, its vast investments in infrastructure and assets abroad, and its deep penetration into Western academia and economies.
Volatile security environment
At the same time, Qatar is acutely aware of the volatile security environment in the Middle East and the growing need for both defensive and offensive capabilities – a need that intensified following Israel’s attempted assassination of senior Hamas officials in Doha.
Accordingly, Qatar has focused its efforts on upgrading its air force, which has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
A monitoring report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute shows that in 2014, Doha’s air fleet included only 12 fighter jets (nine of them operational) – a modest force compared to its regional competitors.
Today, following an accelerated armament strategy, the fleet numbers roughly 100 combat aircraft, including US-made F-15QA jets, French Rafales, and Eurofighter Typhoons produced by a European consortium (a joint venture of the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France).
Israel's concerns
Israel views these developments with concern, and justifiably so. While the Qataris are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to use their fighter jets for a direct attack on Israel, the trend of acquiring advanced offensive air capabilities could undermine Israeli interests in other forms.
Given that the United States and European countries remain Qatar’s principal suppliers of defense technology and equipment, experts warn that Doha could serve as a conduit for the transfer of advanced Western technologies and tactics to actors hostile to Israel. This concern is heightened by the Qatari air force’s occasional participation in joint exercises with countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, as well as by its proximity to Iran.
Moreover, the West appears increasingly willing to normalize Qatar’s presence in the international security arena, including through its participation in joint exercises with Western nations. This trend risks obscuring the potential harm inherent in Qatar’s emerging military relationships.
In May of this year, the Qatari air force took part in Anatolian Phoenix, a combined air exercise held twice annually since 2012 under Turkish auspices, attended by the United States, Germany, Italy, and others. A month earlier, Doha participated in the international Iniochos 2025 exercise in Greece, focused on air combat training, strike missions, and operational coordination – an exercise in which an Israel Air Force delegation also participated.
Military edge erosion
While enhanced defense cooperation with Qatar through arms deals and international forums has already become a fait accompli in both Europe and the United States, Israel would be wise to carefully examine the ways in which it may, directly or indirectly, be contributing to this process – whether through tacit acceptance and willingness to take part in such forums attended by Doha or by refraining from defining Qatar as a hostile state and the strategic implications such a designation entails.
Finally, Israel must consider the potential erosion of its qualitative military edge in the region. Thus far, Qatar’s requests to acquire F-35 aircraft from the United States have been denied. However, if the current trend of deepening US-Qatari relations continues, driven by economic interests, among others, such a scenario cannot be ruled out in the future.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870918
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Israel Will Likely Never Approve The Second Stage Of The Gaza Plan
By Susan Hattis Rolef
October 19, 2025
The last 20 live hostages and the remains of 12 of 28 deceased hostages have been returned by Hamas, including the two murdered hostages returned on Saturday night. This does not end the struggle to bring back the remaining 16 hostages – a struggle that might or might not succeed.
This is because, as Hamas claims, some of the hostages are unreachable as a result of remains left under the rubble following Israeli bombardments in the areas where they were held. Others, Hamas says, are/were held by smaller terror organizations over which it has no control, or whose keepers were killed and are unavailable to provide information about the whereabouts of remains.
There might be some truth in what Hamas says, but Israel believes that the number of hostages to whom this might apply is far fewer than 16.
Whatever the truth, the hostage problem has not yet been resolved, and the gesture by Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana of removing his hostage ribbon during US President Donald Trump’s Knesset visit last Monday was, at best, premature. It was certainly not viewed favorably by the families who had not yet received the bodies of their loved ones for proper burial.
Nevertheless, perhaps we should give Ohana the benefit of the doubt – that he let his desire to express his appreciation for Trump’s contribution to the release of the hostages get the better of his perception of reality.
Israel's dilemma with the peace plan
Hopefully, all the hostages will end up being released. The real dilemma Israel faces is whether the continued process of Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan afterward will sufficiently take into account Israel’s concerns regarding some of the plan’s provisions.
For example, one may wonder whether Trump is sufficiently sensitive to Israel’s concerns with regard to Turkey’s and Qatar’s diplomatic and material support for Hamas, when he demonstrates great eagerness to reserve for these two states major roles in the future administration of the Gaza Strip.
Even before the release of all the hostages has been completed, Hamas is reported to be rebuilding its administrative and military hold in the territories from which Israel withdrew just over a week ago. Even if the reports on this issue are exaggerated, one cannot help wondering whether the leaders of both Turkey and Qatar might be actively supportive of Hamas in its current survival endeavors.
It should not be ruled out that Israel also feels that Trump’s blooming relations with Turkey and Qatar, which involve both diplomatic and business interests, have downgraded its own status as the closest ally of the US in the Middle East.
Yet the opposite might also apply. We have indications, both from Trump himself and from his two key negotiators in the attempt to implement his plan – Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – that they consider many of Israel’s moves to be inconsistent with American interests.
Regarding Israel’s decision to attack part of the Hamas leadership in Doha on September 9, while negotiations were in progress there on a deal for the release of the hostages, Witkoff stated in an interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes show, which aired yesterday, that he and Kushner had heard about the attack only after it had taken place and “felt a little bit betrayed.”
It was a typical Witkoff understatement. Kushner added, after the interviewer remarked that he heard Trump had been furious on that occasion, “I think he felt like the Israelis were getting a little bit out of control in what they were doing, and that it was time to be very strong and stop them from doing things that he felt were not in their long-term interests.” This, too, was a diplomatic understatement.
Israel lacks a plan for the Gaza Strip
Amid Hamas's attempts to regain power in the Gaza Strip, especially shocking have been its acts of revenge against the members of several local Gazan militias and extended family clans that Israel had armed and used in various parts of the Gaza Strip.
Many such militia and clan members are being shot dead these days in public, in an effort to frighten off opponent groups. Israel has apparently done nothing to try to save its former lackeys, whom it had previously tried to present as possible alternatives to Hamas.
So, we are back to one of Israel’s lacunae since the war in Gaza began, which is to prepare a plan for an alternative administration for the Gaza Strip after Hamas is finally beaten and ousted.
As mentioned above, the next stage of Trump’s Gaza peace plan includes the setting up of a temporary administration for the Gaza Strip.
Israel does not have any clear ideas of its own for such an interim administration, besides the option of reestablishing an Israeli military administration for the Gaza Strip for the third time – the first such administration existed in 1956-1957, following the Sinai Campaign, and the second existed in 1967-2005, following the Six Day War – an idea which IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir does not support.
Israel was not party to what is written in the Gaza peace plan on this subject, because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ultimately declined to join Trump in his trip to Sharm el-Sheikh after the president’s brief visit to Israel last Monday, where the plan was formally signed.
If and when negotiations are actually opened on the implementation of an international administration for the Gaza Strip as proposed within the framework of the plan, the Israeli negotiators will undoubtedly have a difficult time accepting some of the ideas presented on the subject. For example, Israel will certainly reject the idea that eventually the Palestinian Authority, after undergoing reforms, will become part of this administration.
Thus, the prospects for any progress being made in negotiations on the second stage of the Gaza peace plan, with Israel’s consent, are almost nonexistent, even if Trump will try to use the same negotiating tactics that he used to get the first stage of the plan through.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870939
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Gang War In Gaza: Determining The Future Of Hamas's Rule
By Neville Teller
October 19, 2025
The past few weeks have seen the emergence within Gaza of armed factions challenging Hamas. Simmering for some time, this intra-Palestinian conflict came to the boil after the ceasefire on October 10. Hamas is now facing open defiance from not just one or two, but multiple armed groups emboldened by the power vacuum and security chaos within Gaza.
Hamas propaganda seeks to downplay talk of the growing Palestinian opposition, preferring to report operations directed against individuals accused of collaborating with Israel.
On October 12, the Palestinian Home Front, a Telegram news distribution channel affiliated with Hamas, announced: “The security services and the resistance are conducting a wide-scale field campaign across all areas of the Gaza Strip, from north to south, to locate and arrest collaborators and informants.”
Several were apprehended in Gaza City, it said, “after they were proved to be involved in spying for the enemy [and] participating in the assassination of several resistance members.”
Hamas's violent crackdown
The statement made no mention of what happened to them. However, multiple independent accounts confirm that shortly afterward, in full view of the public, they were blindfolded, made to kneel on the sidewalk, and shot dead. More video footage circulated in October shows Hamas’s armed wing, the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, executing individuals by shooting them in the head in the streets of Gaza City.
These individuals undergo no judicial procedure or legal process. They are simply accused and then assassinated in public, with the aim of instilling the greatest possible fear in any who might be tempted to oppose Hamas’s rule.
These field executions of Palestinians accused of treason and collaboration with Israel are part of a wider campaign by Hamas’s so-called “security forces.” Not only are they making a determined effort to restore their authority by regaining control of that part of Gaza from which Israeli forces have withdrawn, but they are sending a message to the powerful Palestinian gangs and clans that are openly challenging Hamas.
If it is to retain any presence in Gaza, Hamas must try to counter the upsurge of attacks aimed at undermining its control.
In early October, Hamas conducted a large raid in Khan Yunis on the al-Mujaida clan, which had previously been involved in assassinating Hamas operatives, and has been accused by Hamas of collaboration with Israel. Dozens of Hamas gunmen stormed a clan stronghold, resulting in deaths on both sides.
On October 12, violent confrontations erupted between Hamas security forces and the Doghmush clan, a powerful local family with members connected to different political factions. Some 300 Hamas fighters were reported to have stormed a residential area where the clan gunmen had taken refuge. The clashes killed at least 27 people, including eight Hamas members and 19 clan members.
These clans are major players in Gaza’s internal power struggles. Their distinct leadership structures and political-militant affiliations have shaped recent armed conflict.
Active clans in Gaza
Leadership of the Doghmush clan is centered around Mumtaz Doghmush, who has led the Army of Islam, a militia linked to al-Qaeda. Doghmush family members have in the past been active in Fatah, Hamas, and other terror circles. Despite past collaboration with Hamas on high-profile operations – notably the kidnapping and subsequent prisoner exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit – relations have soured due to competition over smuggling networks, local authority, and postwar power.
Other Doghmush elders and warlords operate semi-independently, each commanding armed gangs or criminal cells, making the clan a loose confederation. The Doghmush clan is reportedly involved in arms smuggling and extortion networks throughout Gaza’s black market ecosystem.
The al-Mujaida clan is led by several prominent family elders in Khan Yunis, holding sway through extensive family networks. Affiliated primarily with the Fatah movement, the al-Mujaida clan occasionally supports other Palestinian groups opposed to Hamas, especially in southern Gaza.
They have resisted Hamas-imposed security measures and are accused by Hamas of collaborating with Israeli and Egyptian officials, particularly when it concerns smuggling or resource distribution.
These two clans continue to be the main flashpoints of intra-Palestinian factional rivalry, blending local leadership traditions and criminal syndicate models with political-militant operations. Yet they are far from the only centers of clan-based anti-Hamas activity.
Numerous smaller armed groups and coalition factions have also appeared, usually linked to local clans or neighborhoods in Gaza. As of the end of September, over a dozen new anti-Hamas armed groups had emerged, reflecting a widespread societal breakdown and the virtual collapse of Hamas’s monopoly on territorial control and security.
To name but a few, there is the Rafah-based Bedouin clan Abu Shabab. Its head, Yasser Abu Shabab, currently recognized as a leading anti-Hamas clan leader, commands a personal militia of about 400 fighters. Hamas accuses Abu Shabab of collaborating with Israel – a charge he denies.
Then there is the Hellis clan, led by Rami Hellis. Operating in the Shejaia neighborhood of Gaza City, it has formed a coalition with other local families specifically aimed at resisting Hamas’s attempts to reassert control.
The Fatah-affiliated Khalas clan, based in eastern Gaza City and led by Ahmed Khalas, has received Israeli protection and military aid. It is notable for having openly resisted Hamas from the moment it took control of Gaza in 2007.
Khalas serves on the Fatah Central Committee, and through him, anti-Hamas clan activity as a whole is plugged into the Palestinian Authority and its structures. In fact, Khalas serves as the representative of PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Gaza.
Centered in Khan Yunis, the Khanidak clan, led by Yasser Khanidak, has also benefited from Israeli support and weaponry. Although not as large as the Doghmush clan, Khanidak fighters have actively opposed Hamas forces during recent battles in southern Gaza.
Other militant clans who have opposed, or are currently opposing Hamas, include the Barbakh clan, based in Khan Yunis and Rafah; the Abu Ziyad clan located in Zawaida near Deir al-Balah; and the Abu Werda clan based near the Port of Gaza, which frequently leads smaller, neighborhood-based defense groups that join larger clan battles as needed.
Opposition to Hamas
It is clear that the Hamas regime now faces widespread opposition from Palestinian leaders at the grassroots. The organization is understandably being held accountable not only for the decision to mount its barbarous assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, but crucially for underestimating the force, extent, and persistence of the Israeli reprisal that followed, and the consequential devastating result for Gaza and its people.
This upsurge in armed opposition, which has undoubtedly weakened Hamas’s former iron grip on the governance of Gaza, must have influenced its decision to pay lip service to the Trump plan. Gang warfare may yet play a crucial part in determining Hamas’s future role, if any, in Gaza.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870943
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