Middle East Press On: Turkey, Europe’s Future, UAE's OPEC, China’s Legal Shield, Iranian Oil, Lebanon, Germany, Strait of Hormuz, Gaza, New Age Islam's Selection, 09 May 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
09 May 2026
Defense and diplomacy drive Türkiye’s rising power
Türkiye’s strategic place in Europe’s future
Why is the UAE's OPEC exit more than a sudden move?
China’s Legal Shield Against U.S. Sanctions on Iranian Oil
Germany’s moral reckoning in Lebanon
How Strait of Hormuz crisis is reshaping the global economy
‘Gaza – No Words – See Exhibit’: Memory and Resistance at the Venice Biennale
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Defense and diplomacy drive Türkiye’s rising power
BY İHSAN AKTAŞ
MAY 09, 2026
This week, Istanbul is hosting a major defense and aerospace exhibition. In our childhood, we used to talk about exhibitions in Paris or Hannover. Today, the SAHA 2026 Expo at the Istanbul Expo Center has become an event discussed globally.
As I have often noted in my columns, the material infrastructure and institutional ecosystems Türkiye has steadily built have, in the long run, enhanced its leverage in diplomacy.
Looking from the most fundamental level, when the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power, it methodically established an integrated ecosystem covering transportation, health care, technical education infrastructure, energy, and dozens of other fields. Having matured significantly, these ecosystems now satisfy Türkiye’s internal demands while increasingly positioning the country as a provider capable of meeting the needs of neighboring regions and global markets.
Seeing future
History shows that a significant share of technological and managerial innovation has emerged from research and development carried out in the military sphere.
After making breakthroughs in many areas, Türkiye – guided by the high vision of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has calculated the world’s future and the risks facing states – decisively pushed for a revolution in the defense industry over the last decade. The country’s young, hard‑working and idealistic people have supported the president’s vision, giving rise to a genuine revolution in the defense and aerospace industry. As NATO’s secretary-general recently noted, that revolution is now widely recognized.
If we take two aspects together, Türkiye is a country with a historical mission. Looking at the lands left by the Ottoman Empire – almost half the world – one can see that although the doors to Türkiye were largely closed during the last century, today those doors are being opened one by one.
Western states sell very limited technology at high prices. Türkiye, by contrast, uses its historical mission and one‑on‑one relations backed by strong diplomacy to meet the needs of its neighbors, friends, and allied communities with modern, advanced military equipment.
So, which ultimately empowers the other – diplomacy or the defense industry? Does diplomacy strengthen defense capabilities, or does a robust defense industry enhance diplomatic influence?
A telling example comes from Haluk Bayraktar, general manager of Baykar, Türkiye’s leading UAV manufacturer. In one African country, a rebellion erupted, with insurgents advancing to the brink of the presidential palace. Turkish UAVs and UCAVs were subsequently deployed, pushing the rebels back step by step and ultimately restoring stability. As Bayraktar has noted, once a country’s security is ensured and stability is established, the groundwork is laid for broader economic engagement. This, in essence, is the critical point.
Diplomacy tools
Until now, Türkiye’s diplomacy has had various components: Turkish Airlines (THY) flying to many countries, Turkish institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), the Maarif Foundation operating widely, and international students flocking to be welcomed by Türkiye’s youth. These are all instruments of “smart power” alongside Turkish diplomacy.
Once the diplomacy we conduct with states reaches a certain level and maturity, those same countries will be ready to negotiate with you and shape an infrastructure that addresses their people’s security and future concerns.
Today, as sophisticated defense products emerge, Turkish products are finding a growing market step by step – from Indonesia to Latin America, from Spain to Africa, and even Canada.
No other state in the world likely shares a larger intersection of common interests than Türkiye. Consider the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) – those are directly our brother nations. Look at Africa: the balance of power between France and Türkiye is now shifting. In the Balkans, a region where we have lived for centuries, almost every nation – including Serbia – is like a relative society.
Western military assistance is both costly and, at times, of questionable effectiveness – a conclusion that emerged from the recent tensions in the Gulf. Despite investing trillions in U.S. arms, Gulf states were left almost unable to defend themselves during the Iran-U.S. conflict.
Therefore, the most important topic debated in recent years, both in the EU and elsewhere, is the matter of countries providing for their own security. Türkiye has made a 10‑year effort in this direction and has built a sophisticated organization and ecosystem behind it.
Looking to Türkiye’s future from today, we can see that the strong diplomacy and ecosystem built under Erdoğan – together with his experienced bureaucracy – mean that Türkiye now arguably possesses one of the most experienced foreign policy, intelligence and leadership teams in the world.
We foresee that Türkiye’s strong infrastructure has raised its international image. Strong diplomacy will, in turn, reinforce the defense industry, and the strong defense industry will again feed back into Turkish diplomacy.
While distant Middle Eastern and European states experience grave security anxieties, it is admirable that Türkiye has foreseen this vision and built its corresponding infrastructure. We wholeheartedly congratulate everyone working in the defense and aerospace industry – the young people, institutions and businesses – and wish them every success.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/defense-and-diplomacy-drive-turkiyes-rising-power
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Türkiye’s strategic place in Europe’s future
BY EGEMEN BAĞIŞ
MAY 08, 2026
Europe Day is traditionally celebrated as a symbol of peace, reconciliation and shared prosperity. For decades, the European Union represented one of humanity’s most ambitious political achievements: transforming a continent once defined by war into a zone of cooperation and economic integration. Yet today, Europe finds itself at a historic juncture.
The geopolitical assumptions that shaped the post-Cold War era are rapidly eroding. The Russia-Ukraine war has fundamentally altered Europe’s security architecture. Energy dependence has become a strategic vulnerability. Migration pressures continue to reshape domestic politics across the continent. Meanwhile, the rise of far-right movements and growing transatlantic disagreements have exposed deep structural anxieties within the European project itself.
The central question Europe now faces is no longer merely economic; it is strategic.
Can Europe remain a serious geopolitical actor in an era increasingly defined not by ideals alone, but by power, resilience and strategic capacity?
In this new reality, Türkiye is no longer simply a candidate country waiting at Europe’s door. Türkiye has become a strategic necessity for Europe itself. From energy corridors to Black Sea security, from migration management to NATO’s southern flank, Türkiye sits at the center of virtually every major geopolitical equation shaping Europe’s future.
The continent’s search for strategic autonomy cannot realistically succeed while overlooking a country that possesses NATO’s second-largest army, one of the region’s most dynamic diplomatic networks, critical energy transit routes and a young, productive population of over 85 million people.
The world is entering an age where geography matters again. And Türkiye’s geography is a strategic leverage.
For years, Türkiye-EU relations were slowed not only by technical criteria but also by political hesitation and cultural prejudice. Debates that should have focused on strategic convergence too often drifted into identity politics. But the global environment is changing rapidly.
Today, the real issue is not whether Türkiye is “European enough.” The real question is whether Europe can afford to weaken its relationship with a country that has become indispensable to the continent’s long-term security and economic competitiveness. This is particularly evident in the field of energy.
Following the Ukraine war, Europe discovered the risks of excessive dependence on a single supplier. Energy security is now inseparable from national security. In this context, Türkiye’s position as a corridor connecting Europe to the Caspian basin, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean has become increasingly valuable.
Likewise, in defense and regional diplomacy, Türkiye’s role has expanded considerably. Ankara’s balancing policy during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, its mediation efforts, grain corridor diplomacy and engagement across the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East demonstrate that Türkiye is actively shaping outcomes.
Yet geopolitics alone is not the whole story. Economics may ultimately become the defining dimension of the next phase of Türkiye-EU relations.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent statements reaffirming Türkiye’s commitment to the EU should therefore not be viewed merely as diplomatic messaging. They also reflect a broader economic and strategic calculation.
In today’s global economy, international investors no longer seek only low costs or short-term incentives. They seek predictability, institutional credibility, legal security and strategic stability.
This is precisely why Türkiye’s commitment to reform, particularly reforms aligned with European standards, carries significance far beyond the accession process itself.
A stronger rule-based economic environment does not merely improve Türkiye’s relations with Europe; it also increases Türkiye’s attractiveness as a destination for global capital.
The competition for investment is no longer regional. It is global. Supply chains are being reorganized. Manufacturing hubs are shifting. Trade corridors are being redesigned. Countries capable of combining geopolitical relevance with economic reliability will emerge stronger in the coming decade.
Türkiye has the potential to become one of those countries. Its industrial infrastructure, logistics capabilities, entrepreneurial private sector, young workforce and strategic access to multiple regions create enormous advantages.
But potential alone is not enough. Confidence also matters. And confidence is built through reform, institutional quality and long-term strategic vision.
This is why discussions surrounding the modernization of the customs union, visa liberalization, technological cooperation and deeper economic integration should not be treated as symbolic political gestures. They are strategic investments in Europe’s future competitiveness as much as Türkiye’s.
At the same time, Türkiye itself must continue investing in its greatest long-term asset: human capital.
During a recent Europe Day discussion with university students in Istanbul, I emphasized a simple reality: strong countries are built by capable individuals.
In the emerging global order, knowledge, technology and language skills are no longer optional advantages — they are instruments of national power.
Young people must therefore focus not merely on passing exams, but on genuinely learning, developing expertise and becoming globally competitive individuals.
Türkiye’s recent successes in areas such as defense technologies, unmanned aerial systems and digital entrepreneurship demonstrate what can happen when talent, vision and strategic investment come together. The rise of companies like Baykar is not simply a corporate success story. It reflects a broader transformation in Türkiye’s technological self-confidence.
Europe should recognize this transformation not as a threat, but as an opportunity. Because the future stability and competitiveness of Europe will not be secured by exclusionary politics or outdated stereotypes. It will be secured through strategic cooperation, mutual respect and a realistic understanding of the changing global order.
Europe Day should therefore not only commemorate Europe’s past achievements. It should also encourage a more honest discussion about Europe’s future. And that future will be far stronger with Türkiye than without it.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkiyes-strategic-place-in-europes-future
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Why is the UAE's OPEC exit more than a sudden move?
BY HÜSEYIN BAHRI KURT
MAY 08, 2026
The United Arab Emirates’ decision, announced in Abu Dhabi on April 28, to exit the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and OPEC+ as of May 1 reflects long-standing strategic calculations rather than a reactive, overnight shift. While immediate market reactions were limited, largely due to ongoing disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the implications of this move are likely to unfold more significantly over time. The UAE’s departure is not simply about oil markets. It is a strategic signal embedded in an intensifying economic rivalry with Saudi Arabia, one that is increasingly shaping the post-war Gulf order.
Trajectory of diversification
The UAE’s decision to exit OPEC did not extend to a complete rejection of the cartel. On the contrary, Abu Dhabi had long remained one of its most committed members, contributing roughly 14% of total output. The core source of tension, however, lay in its persistent reservations over production quotas, an issue that increasingly placed the UAE at odds with Saudi Arabia and exposed a deeper divergence in their economic strategies.
At the heart of this divergence is the UAE’s relatively low dependence on oil revenues. Since the early 2010s, sustained investment and reform programs have enabled the country to diversify away from hydrocarbons toward sectors such as tourism, logistics and finance. By the first quarter of 2025, non-oil sectors accounted for 77.3% of the UAE’s real GDP, compared to approximately 56% in Saudi Arabia by early 2026. This structural shift reduces the long-term centrality of oil for the UAE, even if it remains important in the short-term rebuilding.
A second point of divergence lies in fiscal breakeven oil prices. The UAE’s breakeven level is projected to fall to around $38 per barrel by 2030, while Saudi Arabia’s is expected to remain significantly higher, at approximately $83. This gap has important strategic implications: whereas Riyadh prioritizes higher prices to sustain fiscal stability, Abu Dhabi is better positioned to tolerate lower prices and instead favors expanding production volumes. Accordingly, the UAE’s medium- to long-term strategy has focused on increasing its share of global output, supported by investments aimed at raising production capacity to over 5 million barrels per day by 2030, well above its former OPEC quota.
Post-war competition
The UAE’s move can also be seen as a response to Riyadh’s increasing efforts to attract investment and erode the UAE’s position as the region’s leading economic hub. Riyadh’s growing effort to attract investment away from the UAE’s Dubai-centered economic hub reflects a competitive dynamic that has been building since the post-pandemic period but has intensified in the aftermath of recent regional disruptions. Prior to the war, Saudi Arabia had already experienced 11 consecutive quarters of economic contraction, largely driven by persistently low oil revenues. In response, the government undertook a significant reprioritization of public spending, suspending or scaling back several mega-projects, most notably The Line, a flagship initiative of Vision 2030.
This turn toward fiscal discipline has been accompanied by key leadership changes. In February, Fahad al-Saif, previously the investment strategy director at the Public Investment Fund, was appointed to replace Khalid al-Falih as minister of investment. Framed as part of a broader bureaucratic restructuring, this transition signals that the kingdom has entered a critical phase in which mounting fiscal pressures are forcing a recalibration of both spending priorities and investment strategy. The initial pillar of this strategy is to attract investment in sectors where the UAE has a competitive advantage, namely tourism, finance and logistics. Since Riyadh has been less affected than the UAE during the war, it has preserved a greater degree of economic resilience and can more easily adopt this new strategy.
In this context, economic competition is becoming a central axis of Gulf politics, with investment flows, regulatory incentives and strategic positioning increasingly shaping the balance of power between the two states. Seen in this light, the UAE’s exit from OPEC is a strategic move that advantages the UAE by enhancing its policy flexibility, while simultaneously weakening Saudi Arabia’s economic gains.
Future scenarios
Looking ahead, competition between the two is likely to shift further toward economic and diplomatic domains rather than direct political or military confrontation. Recent signals, such as Saudi Arabia’s reported withdrawal from a defense-related arrangement involving Pakistan and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of Sudan, suggest a recalibration of priorities. Gulf states increasingly recognize the need to conserve financial resources to rebuild and strengthen their economic and institutional capacities.
At the same time, both countries are likely to place greater emphasis on restoring and maintaining their reputations as stable and attractive investment hubs, particularly in Western markets. This will require not only financial capital but also a more cautious regional posture, one that avoids entanglement in conflict zones, military engagement or associations with destabilizing actors.
Ultimately, intensifying competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE will produce mixed outcomes for the wider region. Smaller states may benefit from increased investment both economically and politically, but they may also face new pressures to align, balance, or bandwagon. As this rivalry expands beyond the Gulf into regions such as Africa, its economic and geopolitical implications are likely to become more pronounced.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/why-is-the-uaes-opec-exit-more-than-a-sudden-move
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China’s Legal Shield Against U.S. Sanctions on Iranian Oil
May 8, 2026
by Dr Umud Shokri
On May 2, 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued a landmark prohibition order under its 2021 Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, commonly known as China’s Blocking Rules. The order bars the recognition, enforcement, or compliance inside China with U.S. sanctions imposed on five Chinese refineries accused of buying Iranian crude: Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery, Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group, Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group, Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical, and Shandong Shengxing Chemical.
This was not just another diplomatic complaint from Beijing about U.S. “long-arm jurisdiction.” It was the first formal use of China’s Blocking Rules and marked a sharper legal response to Washington’s secondary sanctions. By invoking the measure, Beijing signaled that it is prepared to defend its energy trade with Iran not only through rhetoric, but through domestic law, court remedies, and regulatory pressure.
U.S. Sanctions and China’s Iranian Oil Trade
The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has intensified sanctions enforcement against Chinese buyers of Iranian oil, especially independent refiners often described as “teapot” refineries. Under the Trump administration’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign, also referred to as “Operation Economic Fury,” OFAC designated several Chinese refiners for allegedly importing Iranian crude and helping Tehran sustain oil revenue despite sanctions.
On April 24,, OFAC added Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) to the Specially Designated Nationals list, citing large-scale purchases of Iranian oil, including transactions linked to shadow fleet vessels. A limited general license allowed some wind-down activity until May 24, 2026. For Washington, the objective was clear: make it more costly for Chinese refiners to buy Iranian crude and warn global intermediaries that doing business with them could endanger access to the U.S. financial system.
Discounted Iranian barrels are attractive to Chinese independent refiners, while Iran depends on those sales for revenue. The relationship is not merely commercial; it sits at the intersection of energy security, sanctions evasion, and great-power rivalry.
China’s Blocking Rules Move from Symbol to Tool
On May 2,, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued its first prohibition order under the 2021 Blocking Rules, barring Chinese entities from recognizing, enforcing, or complying with U.S. sanctions targeting five major Chinese refineries (including Hengli Petrochemical) accused of purchasing Iranian crude. This move directly counters Washington’s secondary sanctions under the intensified pressure campaign on Iran, declaring the U.S. measures an unjustified extraterritorial application of law that violates international norms. By activating its legal architecture including the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law Beijing provides a formal shield for its refineries and energy trade, reducing over-compliance risks and encouraging RMB settlements and de-dollarized channels.
The order challenges the effectiveness of U.S. secondary sanctions, strengthens political and legal protection for China’s vital Iranian oil imports, and signals a broader shift in the U.S.-China-Iran sanctions contest. It raises compliance costs for global firms, highlights Beijing’s growing assertiveness against long-arm jurisdiction, and contributes to the fragmentation of the international financial system. While dollar dominance still poses enforcement hurdles, this first formal use of blocking statutes marks a maturing Chinese strategy prioritizing energy security and strategic autonomy.
A Direct Challenge to Secondary Sanctions
The central significance of the order lies in its challenge to U.S. secondary sanctions. Primary sanctions apply directly to U.S. persons and U.S.-linked transactions. China’s order cannot change those rules. But secondary sanctions are different: they pressure non-U.S. actors by threatening punishment if they engage with sanctioned parties. Beijing’s order is aimed precisely at weakening that pressure.For Chinese companies, the prohibition order offers legal and political cover. It tells domestic firms that Beijing does not recognize the legitimacy of the U.S. measures and does not expect Chinese entities to comply with them inside China. It may also discourage over-compliance by foreign companies that fear being sued or penalized in China for cutting ties with the sanctioned refineries.
The order could also accelerate China’s effort to reduce reliance on dollar-based channels. Trade involving Iranian oil may increasingly rely on renminbi settlement, China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, barter-like arrangements, or other structures designed to avoid U.S.-controlled financial chokepoints. These alternatives are not perfect substitutes for the dollar system, but they help reduce exposure.
Many multinational firms will likely remain cautious. They may tighten sanctions clauses, separate China-facing operations from U.S.-exposed businesses or avoid high-risk transactions entirely. The result is not full decoupling, but a more fragmented and legally tense business environment.
Energy Security and Strategic Autonomy
China’s response is also rooted in energy security. Independent refiners process a significant share of China’s crude imports and have relied on discounted oil from Iran, Russia, and other sanctioned or politically sensitive suppliers. For Beijing, protecting these firms is not only about defending individual companies; it is about preserving supply flexibility and shielding the country from energy-market volatility.
Iranian crude gives China leverage. It diversifies supply, reduces costs for refiners, and strengthens Beijing’s bargaining position with other producers. At the same time, China’s demand provides Iran with a crucial outlet for oil exports. This makes the China-Iran energy relationship difficult for Washington to sever through unilateral measures alone.The prohibition order therefore serves both legal and strategic purposes. Legally, it rejects U.S. jurisdiction over Chinese trade with Iran. Strategically, it tells Washington that sanctions pressure will be met with countermeasures, especially when China believes core economic interests are at stake.
The Wider U.S.-China-Iran Sanctions Contest
For years, China benefited from U.S. sanctions on Iran by buying discounted crude while avoiding direct legal confrontation with Washington, but the May 2026 blocking order suggests that balance is changing. Beijing now appears more willing to challenge U.S. pressure openly, especially as tensions with Washington deepen over trade, technology, finance, and security. For Iran, the order strengthens the argument that U.S. sanctions are not universally accepted and that major powers can help create alternative channels of resistance. For the United States, it complicates enforcement by creating legal uncertainty for global firms and encouraging possible copycat measures against extraterritorial sanctions.
Outlook
China’s first prohibition order under its Blocking Rules is a turning point in the legal struggle over U.S. sanctions and Iranian oil. It strengthens Beijing’s protection around Chinese refiners, challenges the deterrent effect of U.S. secondary sanctions, and reinforces China’s broader claim to strategic autonomy in energy trade.The practical impact will depend on enforcement. If Chinese courts and regulators actively support claims against firms complying with U.S. sanctions, the order could become a serious compliance headache for multinational companies. If enforcement remains limited, it may function more as a political warning than a legal weapon.
For global energy markets, the order adds another layer of uncertainty. Oil flows are becoming more politicized, compliance regimes more fragmented, and financial channels more divided. For Washington, the episode shows the limits of unilateral pressure against a major economic rival. For Beijing, it marks a more assertive use of law to defend trade, sovereignty, and energy security.
In the long run, China’s legal shield against U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil may be remembered less as a single dispute over five refineries and more as an early sign of a multipolar sanctions order, one in which economic coercion is increasingly met by legal counter-coercion. The age of sanctions was already messy. Now it is becoming institutionalized on both sides, because apparently global governance needed more paperwork and fewer exits.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260508-chinas-legal-shield-against-u-s-sanctions-on-iranian-oil/
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Germany’s moral reckoning in Lebanon
May 8, 2026
by Kurniawan Arif Maspul
Germany has long spoken of Israel not merely as a partner, but as a matter of Staatsräson — a reason of state, a moral obligation etched into the national conscience after the Holocaust. Angela Merkel declared in 2008 that Israel’s security was ‘never negotiable’. Annalena Baerbock echoed that sentiment after October 2023 with the stark phrase: ‘In these days we are all Israelis’. Yet history, when turned into doctrine without moral balance, can become not remembrance but blindness.
The question confronting Berlin today is no longer whether Germany should support Israel’s security. It is whether that support has become detached from the very universal principles Germany claims to defend.
Nowhere is this contradiction more visible than in Lebanon and Gaza. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul recently defended Israel’s military presence in southern Lebanon as ‘necessary’, insisting Israel has ‘every right to be there’ to stop Hezbollah attacks. Simultaneously, Berlin insists annexation of Lebanese territory would be illegal and ‘not accepted’ by Germany.
Now, in southern Lebanon, the shadow stretches toward the Litani River, where military occupation risks hardening into territorial permanence. Bombardment is framed as defence, displacement as necessity, and annexation as strategy. What is presented as temporary security begins to look disturbingly like permanent conquest.
For Beirut, Tyre, and Nabatieh, such distinctions sound less like law and more like semantics spoken from safe European capitals.
Lebanon is once again becoming a theatre where civilians pay the price for strategic abstractions. German officials themselves have warned precisely this. Wadephul cautioned that ‘Lebanon must not become a theatre of war where civilians pay the price’, stressing that attacks on schools, hospitals, and churches destroy not only infrastructure but the possibility of future peace. Yet these warnings arrive while Berlin remains one of Israel’s most significant arms suppliers and among its strongest diplomatic defenders in Europe.
The contradiction is not subtle. It is structural. Germany’s support rests on the language of self-defence. Hezbollah rockets justify military necessity. Security demands hard choices.
UN experts have gone further, demanding an immediate halt to arms exports to Israel, noting that the United States and Germany remain its largest suppliers.
This is where Berlin’s moral architecture begins to crack. Germany insists on legality while materially enabling the very conduct drawing global legal scrutiny. South Africa’s genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice changed the diplomatic vocabulary of the war in Gaza. Nicaragua’s subsequent case against Germany for facilitating atrocities through arms transfers transformed the scrutiny from indirect to personal. Berlin quietly withdrew its support for Israel’s intervention at the ICJ in March 2026, not out of ethical reconsideration, but because it feared damage to its own legal defence.
Behind the bombs and diplomatic statements lies another battlefield—one powered not only by tanks and fighter jets, but by algorithms, cloud servers, and surveillance architecture built in Silicon Valley. From Google and Amazon’s $1.2 billion Project Nimbus to Microsoft’s Azure systems, Palantir’s targeting software, and IBM’s biometric databases, major Western technology firms have become embedded in Israel’s military and intelligence infrastructure. UN experts and global rights groups have increasingly identified these corporations as the digital backbone of occupation and war, transforming warfare into a seamless fusion of code and destruction.
That retreat spoke louder than any parliamentary speech. The symbolism has been devastating across the Global South. Namibia, whose people carry their own memory of German colonial genocide, delivered perhaps the sharpest rebuke. President Hage Geingob accused Berlin of demonstrating ‘Germany’s inability to draw lessons from its horrific history’, questioning how a state professing commitment to the Genocide Convention could defend what many increasingly describe as genocidal destruction in Gaza.
The moral wound here is profound. Germany invokes ‘Never Again’ as if it belongs to one people alone. But memory that protects only one victim while rationalising another’s suffering ceases to be memory. It becomes a hierarchy.
Even within Germany, the old consensus is cracking. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has criticised the intensity of Israeli strikes in Lebanon as ‘beyond comprehension’, warning that such violence risks destroying any pathway to peace. Polling cited by genocide scholars suggests around 60 per cent of Germans now view Israel’s operations as genocidal, while two-thirds believe foreign policy should be guided by international law rather than moralised Staatsräson.
Civil society has paid a price for voicing that view. The CIVICUS Monitor downgraded Germany’s civic freedoms to ‘Obstructed’ in 2025, citing severe crackdowns on pro-Palestinian protests, nearly 9,000 demonstrators charged, and a growing tendency to conflate anti-war activism with antisemitism. A democracy that suppresses dissent to preserve moral certainty is not preserving democracy at all.
The broader strategic consequences are equally severe. Germany has built its post-war identity on being a champion of multilateralism, human rights, and rules-based order. Yet selective enforcement of these values erodes trust far beyond Europe. In Arab capitals, in African forums, in Asian diplomacy, the lesson being absorbed is simple: international law applies unevenly, and moral outrage depends on geography.
This perception is not merely reputational damage; it is geopolitical erosion. As trust declines, the West loses authority. Middle Eastern states look increasingly toward China, Russia, and regional alignments rather than Brussels or Berlin.
Lebanon illustrates this most painfully. Berlin supports the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and Hezbollah’s disarmament, rightly arguing that only a political settlement can end the cyclical war. But diplomacy cannot grow from the rubble of villages treated as expendable buffers. Security built on ruins is not security; it is deferred catastrophe.
There is another path. Germany could condition arms exports on independent investigations into civilian harm. It could support an EU review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, as UN experts have urged, calling suspension a “minimum requirement” under international law. It could defend Israeli security while openly rejecting collective punishment, permanent occupation, and the normalisation of devastation from Gaza to southern Lebanon.
Most importantly, Germany could remember that ‘Never Again’ was never meant to be tribal. It was meant to be universal. The true test of moral responsibility is not loyalty to an ally, but consistency in the face of suffering. It is easy to defend principles when they cost nothing. It is far harder when they require confronting a friend.
Berlin stands before that mirror now. History is watching not whether Germany supports Israel, but whether Germany still recognises itself.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260508-germanys-moral-reckoning-in-lebanon/
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How Strait of Hormuz crisis is reshaping the global economy
ZAID M. BELBAGI
May 08, 2026
For decades, the global economy has operated on the assumption that oil will always flow, tankers will move across the seas, prices will fluctuate within predictable limits and the arteries of international trade will continue to support the functioning of the world. The 2026 conflict in Iran has fundamentally challenged this assumption.
The situation now constitutes the most severe stress test the entire global energy supply system has ever known. At the center of this challenge is the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway that is only 39 km wide at its narrowest point yet through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil and liquefied natural gas usually pass every day. This passage accounts for between 20 percent and 25 percent of all global energy trade. The current crisis is more than geopolitical, as it carries profound economic consequences with implications that extend across the entire world.
The geography of the Strait of Hormuz is the first point of vulnerability. Iran understands that it does not need to match the US in terms of conventional military power to pose a serious threat. Instead, it relies on other tactics, such as placing sea mines in narrow shipping lanes — a strategy designed to block or slow access and make passage dangerous and costly. Large commercial tankers, which are slow and difficult to defend, are particularly exposed to these threats.
The gap between the military capabilities in the region and the vulnerability of the ships carrying the world’s energy is striking and Iran has long understood how to exploit it. In this conflict, control over the strait is the most effective instrument of influence.
Once the strait was effectively closed, the market reacted immediately and the response was severe. Brent crude surged past $120 a barrel within weeks, reaching levels not seen since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. There is, however, an important distinction. Unlike previous disruptions caused by a supplier exiting the market, the 2026 crisis involves a strategic chokepoint effectively going dark. This is structurally different and, in many ways, far more difficult to compensate for.
OPEC’s position shifted almost overnight. The organization that spent much of 2025 managing a surplus and curbing output to prevent a price collapse now faces a shortfall it cannot fully fill. Alternative pipelines, such as the East-West Pipeline in Saudi Arabia and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, have absorbed what they can and production increases from major non-Gulf producers have begun. Still, these measures offset only about half of the lost supply. Nearly 130 million barrels of crude are now stuck in floating storage in the Gulf, loaded onto tankers that cannot deliver, while Washington and Tehran remain far from reaching any agreement.
Energy shocks of this magnitude do not remain confined to oil markets. They ripple outward through fertilizer, freight and food. About a third of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz and disruptions to those shipments are already pushing up agricultural input costs. The effects on the next growing cycle are only now beginning to emerge. Analysts project a 16 percent rise in global commodity prices. For economies with deep fiscal buffers and diverse import sources, this may appear manageable. For those without such advantages, the consequences are devastating.
Asia has borne the brunt of the crisis. The region receives around 85 percent of all crude shipments from the Gulf and oil imports fell by 30 percent year-on-year in April alone, reaching their lowest level since October 2015. Responses have been improvised and costly.
Japan, which relies on the Middle East for 95 percent of its oil, has turned to American crude, purchasing it at spot market prices inflated by a war premium and shouldering the added shipping costs for a journey that takes twice as long. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, is seeking alternative suppliers in Africa and Latin America and has committed to purchasing 150 million barrels from Russia by the end of the year.
Vietnam, which depends on the Middle East for at least 85 percent of its crude imports, is among the continent’s most-exposed economies. The irony is acute, as the country’s export-oriented manufacturing sector relies on affordable energy to remain competitive. Thailand, which usually imports up to 70 percent of its crude from the Middle East, has introduced government-mandated energy-saving measures, including encouraging remote work to reduce fuel consumption. These responses are real indications of a structural realignment in global energy flows.
The impact on the Global South goes far beyond energy bills. In South Asia and East Africa, higher import costs and currency depreciation are creating serious fiscal stress. Governments are spending billions on duty waivers and fuel subsidies to shield households from the full impact of the crisis — measures that provide short-term relief but add to long-term debt.
In economies where most household income is spent on food, the link between energy prices and food security is immediate. Fertilizer costs rise, food prices follow and purchasing power falls, leaving little margin for error. In 2026, this dilemma between food and fuel is being imposed on governments that neither caused the conflict nor have any ability to resolve it.
The Middle East and North Africa region is at the heart of this global energy transformation. Gulf states are the world’s leading energy exporters, yet they are also directly exposed to the ripple effects of the crisis, with the UAE alone accounting for 18 percent of vessel traffic through the strait. Their wealth provides resilience that neighbors cannot match, but it does not guarantee immunity.
For the broader region, the situation is a defining moment. Some countries, such as Turkiye, could seize this opportunity to establish themselves as hubs for international trade. Buyers are diversifying because the route to market has become uncertain. If that uncertainty persists, it will leave a lasting mark on Gulf export relationships.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis has reminded the world, and the region itself, that geography may not dictate destiny but, in moments like this, it comes perilously close.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2642800
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‘Gaza – No Words – See Exhibit’: Memory and Resistance at the Venice Biennale
May 8, 2026
By Tawfiq Al-Ghussein & Rania Hammad
Faisal Saleh is the founder of the Palestine Museum US, the first museum in the Americas dedicated to Palestinian history, art, and culture. Founded in April 2018 in Woodbridge, Connecticut, the museum is not simply a cultural institution — it is an act. An act that builds a field of meaning in which practices, memories and languages can be read as part of a single historical and political structure.
The museum’s mission is clear: to give Palestine and Palestinians a space in which their own history can be told, preserved and understood — in an international context in which that history is often silenced, distorted or ignored. This is not simply about making content visible, but about building the conditions in which that content can be perceived, understood, and situated.
This work has not remained confined to the United States. On May 17, 2026, the first European museum dedicated to contemporary Palestinian art opened in Edinburgh — a permanent space, run entirely by volunteers, created to offer Palestinian artists a place to tell their own story and counter dehumanizing narratives.
These initiatives are narrative infrastructures. Built in the places where Palestinian representation is most marginalized, they find their most important expression in the great international spaces of art.
Venice: Presence Without a Pavilion
At the Venice Biennale, Palestine has no national pavilion. This is not a cultural matter. It is a political one.
The mechanism is specific. Under the Biennale’s own rules, only states recognized by Italy are eligible to mount a national pavilion. Italy has yet to recognize Palestine, placing it among a dwindling minority of Western European countries that have not done so. The United Kingdom, France, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, and Slovenia have all taken that step. Italy has not. The result is that a bureaucratic distinction, a diplomatic choice Italy has yet to make, becomes the lock on the door of one of the world’s most visible cultural stages.
While Israel — a state carrying out a documented genocide against the Palestinian people — continues to have its national pavilion at the Biennale, Palestine is forced to appear only through Collateral Events. This asymmetry is not neutral. It reflects the same structures of power that allow Israeli war crimes to be committed before the eyes of the world without anyone being held to account. Allowing Israel to continue participating in major international cultural events while it massacres Palestinians is an act of complicity. This is what is called art-washing: using culture to clean an image stained with blood.
It is in this space — a space not formally granted, but occupied with determination — that the Palestine Museum US returns to the Biennale for the second time. The first participation was in 2022, with the exhibition “From Palestine With Art” at the 59th Venice Biennale. That presence opened a path. This one confirms it.
“Gaza – No Words – See Exhibit” is an official collateral event of the 61st Venice Biennale 2026. Opened on May 9, 2026, at Palazzo Mora and open until November 22, with free admission, it is not simply an artistic exhibition. It is an act of cultural resistance.
Gaza in Venice: Bringing a Genocide before the World
Faisal Saleh has been clear about why this exhibition, and why now. “I had to bring Gaza to the Biennale. There is an ongoing genocide against our people. I want the world to see what was allowed to happen — and what continues to happen. I want people to look reality in the face and demand that those responsible be held to account,” he told the Palestine Chronicle.
Saleh has also said that this exhibition will be an archival work: a permanent historical testimony, a document that will remain as evidence of what happened in Gaza.
The exhibition presents one hundred panels embroidered in tatreez, made by sixty Palestinian women across the West Bank, Jordan, and Lebanon. Open to the public free of charge, it sits between art and documentation — preserving memory, bearing witness to destruction, affirming the cultural continuity of a people under siege.
Tatreez: A Living Archive
Tatreez is traditional Palestinian embroidery. It is not simply a craft practice or a decorative element. It is a system for transmitting knowledge, memory and identity. UNESCO has recognized tatreez as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity — recognition that attests to its historical depth and cultural value, and that at the same time exposes one of the most cynically contradictory aspects of the current situation:
Israel claims tatreez as its own, appropriating cultural practices such as tatreez and cuisine — hummus and falafel — traditions that belong to the very people it is trying to erase.
Each panel on display in Venice is composed of approximately 55,000 stitches. Each one requires months of work — two, three months — not weeks. This is where the difference from photography becomes crucial.
A photograph fixes an instant. It is taken in a second. Tatreez builds the image over time. Each stitch is a decision, a gesture that requires presence, concentration, and duration. What appears as an immediate image is in reality the result of months of patient, intentional work. Photography documents. Tatreez incorporates: it carries within it the time, the memory, and the body of the person who made it.
The motifs of tatreez do not simply record geographical or social belonging. They articulate a relationship between memory, space and continuity. They do not represent an event — they move through it. They do not merely bear witness to a history — they keep it active in the present. In the absence of institutions that guarantee the stability of memory, the body of the embroiderer becomes the place of its inscription.
The Women Have Become the Story
Palestinian women in Gaza have for generations produced refined tatreez embroidery. Through this practice, they passed on values, identity, and memory. Today, those same women can no longer tell their own reality through art. They have themselves become the story.
The embroiderers who made the panels in this exhibition are not passive executors of a tradition. They are active agents in the production and transmission of meaning. Every color choice, every variation, every stitch introduces a shift that holds together fidelity and transformation. To embroider Gaza is to decide what of Gaza deserves to be passed on. In a context of systematic destruction, this is a political act.
Their names, brought into an international artistic space, interrupt a double invisibility — political and economic. Their work is inseparable from the object they produce. Their presence in this exhibition does not affirm only survival, but cultural continuity.
As Saleh has said:
“This exhibition is also a response to Israel’s attempts to appropriate Palestinian embroidery. With this exhibition, the embroideries become evidence of Israeli crimes in Gaza. I want the world to see what it had allowed to happen, and for this not to go without consequence. The world must reckon with the crimes committed and to demand accountability.”
Art, Testimony, Accountability
‘Gaza – No Words – See Exhibit’ is not an exhibition that evokes suffering from a safe distance. It is an exhibition that demands a direct gaze. It does not simply make content visible — it intervenes on the very criteria through which that content can be recognized, understood, and confronted.
The question is not how to insert Palestine within a given system. The question is how to transform the criteria through which that system recognizes and makes the world legible. Faisal Saleh and the Palestine Museum US do this by bringing to Venice — to the heart of one of the most important international art events in the world — the hands and memory of Palestinian women, and the voice of an entire people that has waited too long for its right to self-determination to be recognized.
In a context where Israel is still granted a national pavilion while it carries out a genocide, the presence of the Palestine Museum US at the Biennale is an act of resistance and an appeal to the conscience of the world. Until 22 November 2026, Palazzo Mora holds something no one should allow themselves not to see.
– Tawfiq Al-Ghussein is a writer and researcher specializing in international law, geopolitical strategy, and the political economy of the Middle East. His work has been published in Mondoweiss, L’Antidiplomatico, Elaph, Al-Hayat Washington, Arab News and the Britain Palestine Project. He is a contributor to Gaza Is Dying While the World Remains Silent (L.A.D. Edizioni, 2026).
– Rania Hammad is a writer and activist based in Italy. She is a member of the Global Network on the Question of Palestine and national coordinator for Italy of the Palestine International Friends Alliance. She is the author of Palestina nel cuore, Vita tua Vita mea and Ritorno a Gaza.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/gaza-no-words-see-exhibit-memory-and-resistance-at-the-venice-biennale/
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