Middle East Press On: Trump, Hegseth, US-Israeli War on Iran, Hormuz, Gallipoli 1915, Who Is Esmail Khatib, New Age Islam's Selection, 19 March 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
18 March 2026
Trump and Hegseth cannot define the truth of the US-Israeli War on Iran
Indonesia’s religious affairs minister says boycotts of Israel are “not a solution.” He’s wrong
Israeli invasion would punish Lebanon, reward Hezbollah
‘Doomed to Defeat’: Hormuz and the lessons of Gallipoli 1915
PROFILE: Who Is Esmail Khatib, Iran’s Assassinated Intelligence Chief
The Tolstoy Guide to History that Trump and Netanyahu Didn’t Read
Iran, A Nation, Not a Regime: Challenging the Language of War
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Trump and Hegseth cannot define the truth of the US-Israeli War on Iran
March 18, 2026
By Dr Ramzy Baroud
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appears to have little patience for questions that do not conform to his preferred style of declaring unsubstantiated victories, whether against South Americans or in the Middle East.
In a charged press conference on March 13, Hegseth did more than attack journalists for questioning his unverified claims about the course of the war in the Middle East. He singled out CNN, introducing a troubling dimension to the conversation. “The sooner David Ellison takes over that network, the better,” he said.
Ellison, a close ally of President Donald Trump and a strong supporter of Israel, is widely considered the frontrunner to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery, the parent company that owns CNN. If there was any lingering doubt that such acquisitions are driven by political and ideological considerations, Hegseth’s remarks dispelled it.
Such statements reflect a broader shift in how the media is viewed by segments of the US ruling class, particularly under the Trump administration. During both of his presidential terms, Trump has invested much of his public discourse not in unifying the nation but in deploying deeply hostile language against journalists who question his policies, rhetoric, or political conduct.
“The fake news media is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American people,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on February 18, repeating a phrase that has become central to his political lexicon.
Yet American media entered this confrontation with little public trust to begin with, though for reasons that have little to do with Trump’s own political agenda. A 2025 Gallup poll found that only 28 percent of Americans trust the mass media to report the news fully, accurately, and fairly, one of the lowest levels recorded in recent decades.
Historically, this mistrust has coexisted with Americans’ skepticism toward their government—any government, regardless of political orientation. But what is unfolding today appears qualitatively different. The long-standing alignment between political power, corporate interests, and media narratives now seems to be fracturing under the weight of widespread public distrust.
In Israel, however, the situation takes a different form. Mainstream media often mirrors the militant posture of the government itself, translating political belligerence into broad public support for war—whether in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, or wherever Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chooses to expand the battlefield.
Public opinion data illustrates this dynamic clearly.
Such figures reflect a media and political environment in which dissenting voices remain marginal and frequently isolated.
“With this kind of media, there’s no point in fighting for a free press, because the media itself is not on the side of freedom,” Israeli journalist Gideon Levy wrote in Haaretz on March 12.
While there is little that can realistically be done to shift the dominant Israeli narrative from within Israel itself, journalists elsewhere carry an immense responsibility. They must adhere to the most basic standards of journalistic integrity now more than ever.
This responsibility does not apply only to journalists in the United States or across the Western world. It applies equally to journalists throughout the Middle East. After all, it is our region that is being drawn into wars not of its own making, and it is our societies that have the most to gain from a just and lasting peace.
Over the past two years—particularly during Israel’s genocide on Gaza—we have seen just how difficult it has become to convey reality from the ground. Journalists have confronted censorship, propaganda campaigns, algorithmic suppression, intimidation, and outright violence.
Yet the consequences of this information crisis are far from abstract.
For years, many of us warned that if the promoters of war and chaos were not restrained, the entire region could descend into a cycle of deliberate destabilization. If this trajectory continues, our shared aspirations will suffer for generations. Our collective prosperity—already fragile—could be permanently undermined.
This struggle is not merely about journalistic integrity, nor even about truth-telling as an ethical imperative. It is about the fate of entire societies whose futures are deeply interconnected. In our region, we either rise together or fall together.
Governments across the Arab and Muslim world warned against the military adventurism now engulfing the Middle East long before the current escalation. Their warnings went largely unheeded, and the consequences are now unfolding.
At this moment, journalists, intellectuals, and people of conscience must speak the truth in all its manifestations, using every available platform and opportunity.
We reject war.
Politicians and generals risk reputational damage, the loss of office, or perhaps the disappearance of a generous holiday bonus if their wars fail. For the people of the Middle East—and for all victims of war—the stakes are far greater. We risk losing our families, our economies, our homes, and the very possibility of a stable future.
For that reason, gratitude is owed to the courageous individuals who continue to speak truth to power; to those who insist on unity during moments deliberately engineered to produce division; and to those who understand that honest journalism is not merely a profession.
It is a moral obligation.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260318-trump-and-hegseth-cannot-define-the-truth-of-the-us-israeli-war-on-iran/
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Indonesia’s religious affairs minister says boycotts of Israel are “not a solution.” He’s wrong
March 18, 2026
By Dr. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat
It is a strange moment when a nonviolent act of conscience—refusing to buy a burger, skipping a cup of coffee—draws more concern from public officials than the devastation that inspired it. Indonesia’s Minister of Religious Affairs, Nasaruddin Umar, recently argued that boycotts of companies linked to Israel are “not a solution,” pointing instead to layoffs and economic disruption at home. His remarks reveal a troubling misreading of both history and moral responsibility.
Boycotts are not a new or reckless invention of modern activism. They are among the oldest tools available to ordinary people seeking to exert pressure when governments fail to act. From the anti-war protests in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s to the global campaign against apartheid South Africa, economic non-cooperation has often been the most accessible—and most effective—form of resistance available to civilians. To dismiss boycotts today is to ignore a long tradition in which small, collective acts helped reshape entrenched systems of injustice.
For many, that means participating in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement—an effort to apply economic pressure on institutions seen as complicit in Israel’s policies. Critics often question whether such actions make a difference. But even conservative estimates suggest that BDS could cost Israel billions of dollars annually. Economic pressure, especially when sustained and global, is rarely meaningless.
More importantly, boycotts are not only about immediate economic impact; they are about signalling. They communicate that complicity carries consequences, that consumers are not passive participants in global markets but moral agents. When enough individuals act in concert, corporations notice. And when corporations shift, governments often follow.
The minister’s concern about layoffs—reportedly affecting thousands of workers in Indonesia—is not trivial. Economic pain is real, and workers should never be treated as collateral damage in political struggles. But this framing presents a false dichotomy: that Indonesians must choose between solidarity with Palestinians and the well-being of their own citizens. In reality, these goals are not mutually exclusive.
History again offers a lesson.
It did so not because it was painless, but because it was persistent and morally clear. The question was never whether boycotts would cause disruption; it was whether that disruption was justified in the face of systemic injustice.
Moreover, the assumption that boycotts inevitably harm local economies overlooks a critical dynamic: they can also create space for local growth. As multinational brands face declining demand, domestic businesses often step in to fill the gap. There is already evidence of this in other countries, where local products—from beverages to consumer goods—have seen surges in demand amid boycott campaigns. This is not economic collapse; it is economic redistribution.
Indonesia, with its vast market and entrepreneurial base, is particularly well positioned to benefit from such a shift. Rather than discouraging boycotts, the government could seize this moment to invest in and promote local industries. Supporting small and medium enterprises, strengthening supply chains, and encouraging consumers to “buy local” would not only mitigate job losses but also build a more resilient national economy. Solidarity with Palestinians, in this sense, could go hand in hand with solidarity among Indonesians themselves.
There is also a deeper issue at stake: the role of the state in shaping moral discourse. When officials criticize grassroots movements for being ineffective or harmful, they risk undermining the very civic engagement that sustains democratic societies. People do not boycott because they believe it is a perfect solution; they do so because it is one of the few levers available to them. To dismiss that effort without offering a credible alternative is to ask for passivity in the face of suffering.
No one claims that boycotts alone will resolve the crisis in Gaza. But to argue that they are “not a solution” misses the point. They are not the solution; they are part of a broader ecosystem of pressure, advocacy and awareness. They are a way for individuals, far removed from the corridors of power, to say: we see what is happening, and we refuse to be complicit.
In moments of profound injustice, neutrality is rarely neutral. It is, more often, a quiet endorsement of the status quo. Indonesians who choose to boycott are not undermining their country; they are exercising their conscience. Rather than questioning their motives, the government should ask how it can align economic policy with ethical responsibility.
Because if refusing to buy a product in protest of human suffering is considered too disruptive, then we must ask: what, exactly, would count as an acceptable form of solidarity?
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260318-indonesias-religious-affairs-minister-says-boycotts-of-israel-are-not-a-solution-hes-wrong/
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Israeli invasion would punish Lebanon, reward Hezbollah
MOHAMED CHEBARO
March 18, 2026
Lebanon and the Lebanese people have been here before. Israel has been here before too. Believe it or not, the Iran-aligned Hezbollah militia has also been here before, cornered and struggling for its domestic survival. In the past, Hezbollah has repeatedly been offered a lifeline by Israel’s misconceived, misdirected and disproportionate attacks on Lebanon, instead of it holding the Assad regime or Iran to account.
The Lebanese people have seen their country bombed and destroyed before. Once for hosting Palestinian resistance forces and time and again due to their nation being hijacked by Syria and its desire to resist and fight Israel through Lebanese armed groups. In 2005, the Assad regime handed the torch to Iran, which established a so-called axis of resistance and, through Hezbollah, hijacked the Lebanese state and put it at the service of its own agenda.
Fast forward to 2026 and the Lebanese people had, before March 1, tried for 15 months to reclaim their sovereignty and independence, attempting to peacefully disarm Hezbollah. However, that dream became the latest to be shattered by Israeli short-sightedness and Hezbollah’s emboldened, pro-Iranian, sectarian stance.
The salvo of missiles and drones launched by Hezbollah against Israel in support of a Tehran regime under deadly attack by the US and Tel Aviv has once again drawn Lebanon into something far bigger than this multicultural, multireligious, small nation on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean.
This time, despite assurances from the political leadership of Hezbollah that it would keep Lebanon neutral and save it from Tehran’s anti-US, anti-Israel and anti-Arab calculations, the militia preferred to engulf the region in a ball of fire. The aim was purely to defend the Iranian regime, its despotic government and its revolutionary stance that has been exporting discord, meddling and fear throughout the Middle East and the world since its inception 47 years ago.
As Israeli troops gather on the border in ever bigger numbers, this time Lebanon looks set to lose big. And it is no exaggeration to say that those leaving their villages in the south could be kissing goodbye to their land and the livelihoods they knew before March 2026, just like the many Palestinians who never returned home after 1948, 1967 or the Israeli genocide in Gaza.
Hezbollah’s military action on behalf of Iran is making Lebanon stare doom in the eye. This time, the gloves are off. No one is likely to prevent Israel from carving off parts of Lebanon and turning them into a security buffer until further notice. The equation is simple: either the Lebanese government and people reign in, disarm and disband Hezbollah or Israel will empty villages and destroy livelihoods.
This will not be designed and executed like previous Israeli incursions against the Palestinian forces and later Hezbollah in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996, 2006 or 2024. The writing on the wall is the displacement of civilians from Christian and Muslim villages alike. This tells us that something new is cooking and it will not be far from the death and destruction dished out by Israel in Gaza since October 2023.
Lebanon and the Lebanese people that support Hezbollah could change that. But the window of opportunity is very narrow.
In the changing world we live in, the discord between superpowers means that the rules-based international order has been weakened and, as a consequence, it is possible no one will come to the rescue. The second-term version of US President Donald Trump believes that might reigns supreme, eroding the standing of multilateralism.
The UN, even with the recent visit of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to Beirut and his pleading for an end to the violence, has been unable to make a difference. The clout and guardrails offered by UN Security Council resolutions — which for a long time protected people’s rights when all justice and reason was walked over — has withered.
Unfortunately, pessimism is written all over Lebanon, the Middle East and the world at the moment, as bombs and missiles fly everywhere and inflamed rhetoric dominates.
The initiative of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is maybe the only way to avert the catastrophe that is about to befall Lebanon. He has proposed starting direct negotiations with Israel to achieve an immediate ceasefire and even go all the way to a peace settlement that protects Lebanon’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, meaning the country is ready to live in peace alongside Israel.
Yes, the record of the current government is not very promising. It has tried, since Israel’s last war with Hezbollah, to push the armed militia back to areas north of the Litani River. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has pledged to ban all armed groups. But as Lebanon’s diverse religious and sectarian fabric dictates, consensus, compromise and practical steps to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure remain elusive.
As the clouds of yet another Israeli ground incursion gather on Lebanon’s southern border, preceded by Israeli warnings for all civilians to leave their villages, Aoun and Salam are facing an existential situation that implores them to act and even risk civil peace.
Those in Lebanon and across the region that still believe Hezbollah is a national Lebanese resistance movement are in for a surprise. The missiles and drones it launched against Israel and Cyprus were on the orders of Tehran. This time, the fallout awaiting Lebanon is going to be unprecedented. There is still time to avert that fate, but only if those Lebanese that support Iran for religious and ideological reasons put their national interests and their own survival first and refrain from blindly following Iran’s orders.
Only then can they and Lebanon as a whole prevent Israel’s ground incursion and avoid a lethal blow to the country, its stability and its future territorial integrity and independence. The Lebanese should unite behind their flag and allow the government to gather all the weapons and infrastructure deployed in the country to the benefit of a foreign power and its agenda before it is too late.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636817
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‘Doomed to Defeat’: Hormuz and the lessons of Gallipoli 1915
March 19, 2026
By Jeremy Salt
In an article for Consortium News, Alfred McCoy has drawn a parallel between the current blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez War of 1956, when Egypt’s President Nasser blocked the Suez Canal with sunken ships.
Where this might have led, we don’t know because President Eisenhower, furious at being deceived by Britain, France and Israel, intervened and forced an end to the war 10 days after it had been launched.
Threatened with financial sanctions, Britain and France withdrew immediately. Israel refused to leave occupied Sinai until pressure from the US worked in 1957.
Thus, while the sunken ships would have threatened the global economy, the blockade lasted only until Eisenhower brought the war to an end.
A closer parallel to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz might be Gallipoli in 1915. The Bosporus Strait or ‘throat’ (bogaz) connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, which then debouches into the Aegean Sea through the Canakkale Strait, better known in the west since antiquity as the Dardanelles. The Gallipoli peninsula separates the Sea of Marmara from the Aegean.
The strait, a major global trade route in the 19th century, like the Strait of Hormuz now, was always vulnerable to wartime pressure. This was demonstrated anew after Italy invaded Libya, then an Ottoman sovereign possession, in 1911.
Italian claims of disorder and threats to Christians in Libya were lies, but accepted by the British government as justification for the invasion. The bottom line was that the imperial powers were carving up Africa, and a new member of the club, Italy, was entitled to its share.
The Libyan coast was quickly occupied, but the Italians were blocked from penetrating the interior by the joint resistance of the tribes and a small Ottoman force. Frustrated, the Italians began looking for targets around the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean to put pressure on the sultan and his government.
In May, Italy occupied Rhodes and subsequently all islands in the Dodecanese (southern Aegean) except Kastellorizo.
In November, Italian warships shelled the Yemeni coast. In January, ‘Aqaba and the Ottoman garrison at Qunfidha, also on the Red Sea coast, were bombarded.
As this did not force the Ottomans to submit, a flotilla was sent to Beirut in February 1912. When the Ottomans refused to surrender, a destroyer, the Italian flagship, the Garibaldi, sent a torpedo into the side of a coastal vessel, killing eight officers and 55 men.
It then went on to sink the destroyer and bomb the city, killing 66 people, wounding hundreds of others, and severely damaging government buildings and banks. As again, this did not break Ottoman resistance, the Italians turned their attention to the Canakkale straits.
In April, a flotilla of 14 ships was sent to the entrance of the Canakkale Strait. Ottoman telegraph communications were cut with the islands of Imroz (Gokceada), Tenedos (Bozcaada), and Lemnos (Limni), as well as Selanik (Salonica) and towns down the Aegean coast.
The forts lining the strait were then bombarded. The Ottoman government responded by closing the strait and mining the Gulf of Izmir. The US-flagged steamer Texas hit one of the mines and sank, with the loss of 70 lives.
By April 30, about 150 ships carrying grain, corn, petroleum (from Romania), iron ore, timber, coal, naptha, and other goods, including perishables such as maize, were trapped between the Canakkale strait and the Black Sea. This threat to trade was the real crisis for British and European governments, not Italy’s war of aggression against Libya
The British response was the suggestion to Russia that Italy be asked not to bomb the strait or other targets nearby, to which the Russian foreign secretary responded that Russia wanted to keep on the friendliest terms with Italy as it was “a valuable counterpoise to Austria in the Balkans.”
Under European pressure, the strait was finally opened. The Ottoman defence of Libya was soon brought to an abrupt end in October when four Balkan states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro) attacked the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia and Thrace. Libya had to be abandoned in the defence of the near homeland.
Commenting on the final settlement (the Treaty of Lausanne) between the Ottoman and Italian governments, the British Foreign Secretary said that “We should have no political objection to recognise the full and entire sovereignty of Italy over Libya.” With Britain invading and colonizing other countries itself, Italy was allowed to seize Libya as long as British commercial interests were not damaged.
In 1915, the Gallipoli campaign began with a failed attempt in March by French and British warships to force the Canakkale Strait and sail through the Sea of Marmara all the way to Istanbul. As the city had been promised to Russia in the wartime agreements, what would have happened if they had succeeded in overthrowing the Ottoman government in its capital has to remain a moot point.
In the event, apart from the batteries on the coast, mines had been laid in the strait. They were far more dangerous. The British and French thought they knew where they were, but their intelligence was outdated.
New mines had been laid, and the French and British warships sailed straight into them. A French battleship was destroyed, two British ships sank, and others were abandoned. Hundreds of lives were lost. For Britain, the loss of ships was the greatest since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.
It was then decided to launch a land campaign, which is where another comparison with the Strait of Hormuz begins. The Strait of Hormuz is more than 160 kms in length and is bounded on the Iranian side by rugged cliffs. The Gallipoli peninsula is about 60 kms long and bounded for much of its length on the Aegean side by steep hills and cliffs set back from the beach.
With the Turks commanding the high ground – as Iran would against any invading force entering the Strait of Hormuz – the allied land campaign began to fail at the start. Soldiers were shot as they jumped from the landing craft. The Ottomans repelled repeated attempts to scale the heights, leaving the invaders trapped below. This went on for months. In December, the retreat of the allied forces was ordered, and by early 1916, all had gone.
It was a great triumph for the Ottomans, to be repeated in 1916 when the siege of Kut in Iraq ended with the surrender of the British-Indian army. 13,000 soldiers were captured. The commanding officer, Charles Townshend, was treated with respect and sent to the island of Heybeliada, where he spent the rest of the war in comfort, even inviting his wife to join him.
Britain tried to put the best propaganda face on Gallipoli by turning defeat into some kind of victory, because it had been effected without the Turks knowing. This was nonsense. The Turks could see from the heights that the allied forces were leaving and were just glad to get rid of them.
The Gallipoli parallel indicates the even worse dangers facing any expeditionary force sent to the Strait of Hormuz. In such a narrow stretch of water, its ships would be immediately under threat from Iranian missiles. On land, the whole Iranian coastline has been seeded with a network of defensive installations, many deep underground and difficult, if not impossible, to destroy.
While there are beaches, the terrain is generally very rugged, with cliffs ranging in height from 75 to 2040 meters. The challenge would be infinitely greater than Gallipoli if any attacking force attempted to scale these heights.
Like Gallipoli, again, any attempt to control the Strait of Hormuz from land or sea or actually launch a ground invasion of Iran from the sea would seem doomed to defeat and humiliation, as US military planners and strategists must realize, even if Donald Trump and the cohort around him don’t.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/doomed-to-defeat-hormuz-and-the-lessons-of-gallipoli-1915/
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PROFILE: Who Is Esmail Khatib, Iran’s Assassinated Intelligence Chief
March 18, 2026
Early Formation
Esmail Khatib was born in 1961 into a religious environment that shaped his early intellectual and ideological development.
He pursued religious studies at a young age, joining the hawza system, where he was influenced by leading clerical figures, including Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior religious authorities.
His early immersion in religious education positioned him within the ideological core of the Islamic Republic, at a time when the country was undergoing profound transformation following the 1979 revolution. This dual grounding in theology and revolutionary politics would later define his career trajectory.
Intelligence Beginnings
Khatib’s entry into Iran’s intelligence world came in the early 1980s, during a formative period for the country’s security institutions.
He joined the intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), at a time when Iran was consolidating its internal security structure amid regional and domestic challenges.
This period was crucial in shaping a generation of intelligence officials whose roles extended beyond traditional security functions, embedding them deeply within the political and ideological framework of the state.
Khatib’s early experience in this environment provided him with operational knowledge and institutional connections that would support his steady rise through the ranks.
Institutional Rise
Over the following decades, Khatib advanced through a series of increasingly significant intelligence positions. In 1991, he was appointed head of the General Intelligence Directorate in Qom, a key religious and political centre.
He later became head of the office responsible for protecting the Supreme Leader’s institution in Qom, further strengthening his proximity to the highest levels of authority.
His career expanded into the judiciary, where he served, between 2012 and 2019, as head of the Centre for Protection and Intelligence of the Judicial Authority. This role reinforced his influence across multiple branches of the state, bridging intelligence and legal oversight.
His progression reflects a pattern typical of senior Iranian officials: movement across interconnected institutions, consolidating influence within the broader security architecture.
Intelligence Minister
In 2021, Khatib was nominated by then-President Ebrahim Raisi to serve as Iran’s Minister of Intelligence, following approval by the Supreme Leader. He received strong parliamentary backing and assumed one of the most sensitive positions within the Iranian government.
As intelligence minister, Khatib oversaw domestic and foreign intelligence operations, playing a central role in safeguarding the state’s internal security and managing external threats.
He remained in office even after significant political changes, including the death of President Raisi in 2024 and the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as president, underscoring his institutional importance and continuity within Iran’s security framework.
Sanctions Controversy
In September 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on him, accusing him of involvement in cyber activities targeting the US and its allies, including an alleged cyberattack on Albania.
Iranian authorities rejected these accusations, framing them as part of broader political pressure against the country’s leadership.
The sanctions highlighted the extent to which Khatib had become a visible figure in the confrontation between Iran and Western powers, particularly in the realm of cyber and intelligence operations.
Assassination
Khatib was assassinated in March 2026 in a strike in Tehran, in what Iranian officials described as part of a coordinated US-Israeli campaign targeting senior leadership figures.
His killing followed closely after the assassination of other high-ranking officials, including Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, reflecting a widening pattern of targeted operations.
Reports had also indicated earlier strikes in March that killed several of Khatib’s aides, suggesting that the campaign against Iran’s intelligence leadership had been unfolding in stages.
Strategic Role
Throughout his career, Khatib operated at the intersection of religion, intelligence, and state power. His trajectory illustrates the structure of Iran’s governing system, where clerical authority and security institutions are deeply intertwined.
As intelligence minister, he played a central role in maintaining internal stability and navigating external threats during a period of escalating regional tensions.
His assassination marks not only the loss of a senior official but also a significant moment in the ongoing war, where leadership figures themselves have become primary targets.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/profile-who-is-esmail-khatib-irans-assassinated-intelligence-chief/
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The Tolstoy Guide to History that Trump and Netanyahu Didn’t Read
March 18, 2026
By Ramzy Baroud
How do you bomb a country “without mercy”—and end up strengthening it?
When US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declared that Washington would show “no quarter, no mercy for our enemies,” the message was unmistakable: this was not a limited war, but an overwhelming campaign meant to break Iran—militarily, politically, and socially.
The logic behind such a position is not new. A country under years of sanctions, strained by economic hardship, and periodically shaken by protests would, under sustained attack, fracture from within. Pressure would compound, divisions would deepen, and the political system would eventually collapse.
That was the expectation. But the result has been the opposite. Across Iran, millions have taken to the streets—not only rejecting the war, but expressing support for their country’s military, political institutions, and leadership. Instead of collapse, there has been consolidation. Instead of fragmentation, cohesion.
This is not simply a miscalculation. It is the failure of an entire way of thinking about history.
For decades, much of US and Israeli strategic thinking has relied—implicitly or explicitly—on the assumption that political systems can be weakened and reshaped from the outside. Economic pressure, psychological operations, military escalation, and the targeting of leadership are all seen as levers that, if applied with sufficient intensity, will produce predictable outcomes.
In Iran’s case, this approach was reinforced by visible internal tensions: economic grievances, social unrest, and waves of protest that seemed to signal a society under strain.
Yet these indicators were read in isolation. They were treated as signs of imminent collapse, rather than as expressions of a complex and dynamic society. What was missing from this analysis was not data, but depth.
More than a century ago, Leo Tolstoy offered a framework that helps explain precisely this kind of failure. In War and Peace, particularly in its second epilogue, Tolstoy dismantles elite-centered explanations of history—what would later be called the ‘Great Man’ theory. He rejects the idea that leaders, generals, and political elites determine events, challenging instead the very foundations of how history is understood.
Tolstoy argues that history is not shaped from the top down. It is not the product of individual will imposed on passive societies. Instead, it emerges from the interaction of countless individual actions—each shaped by circumstance, culture, memory, and necessity. As he put it, “in historical events great men… are but labels… having the least possible connection with the event itself.”
What appears, in hindsight, as the decisive role of leaders is often an illusion. Tolstoy insists that those we consider powerful are, in fact, constrained by forces far greater than themselves. “Kings are the slaves of history,” he writes, describing history itself as “the unconscious, general… life of mankind,” which uses individuals as instruments rather than obeying them.
In this view, power is not located in the individual, but in the collective. Leaders do not create history; they are carried by it.
This perspective leads to what can be described as a “beehive” model of history. Society functions like a hive, where no single actor directs the whole, yet a coherent pattern emerges from the interaction of countless parts. Tolstoy himself approached this idea through a different language, arguing that to understand history, one must shift attention away from rulers and toward the countless small actions that, taken together, determine outcomes.
Modern strategic thinking struggles precisely at this point. It is highly effective at measuring what can be quantified: economic decline, protest frequency, military capability, political rhetoric. But it struggles to account for what cannot be easily measured—the accumulated weight of collective experience, the cultural and historical frameworks through which societies interpret events, and the ways in which populations respond not mechanically, but adaptively, to external pressure.
Iran’s national unity, in this context, is not an anomaly. It is a reflection of these deeper forces.
Iranian society has been shaped by a long history of upheaval and resistance: revolution, war, foreign intervention, and sustained economic pressure. These experiences do not produce a simple or uniform political outlook. They generate a layered and often contradictory social reality—one in which dissent and cohesion coexist. But under conditions of external threat, these layers can align in unexpected ways.
What may appear as fragmentation in times of relative stability can become unity when the threat is perceived as existential. This is not the result of central coordination or propaganda alone, as is often suggested. It is the outcome of countless individual decisions—people reassessing priorities, recalibrating their positions, and responding to a shared sense of danger.
Tolstoy observed a similar dynamic in Russia during the 1812 invasion by Napoleon. The defeat of the French army was not simply the result of strategic brilliance or centralized command. It emerged from the cumulative effect of local actions: peasants refusing cooperation, communities adapting to invasion, individuals making decisions that, taken together, shaped the course of the war. These actions were not coordinated in any formal sense, yet they produced a coherent outcome.
This is what Tolstoy meant when he challenged historians to look beyond rulers and to focus instead on the countless human actions that actually produce historical change.
A comparable logic can be seen in the Palestinian concept of sumud, or steadfastness. Over decades of occupation and dispossession, Palestinian resilience has not been sustained primarily by centralized structures or formal strategies, but by the people themselves—their social fabric, cultural continuity, and collective memory. As many thinkers, from Antonio Gramsci to Ghassan Kanafani and Howard Zinn, have argued in different contexts, history is not simply imposed from above; it is constructed from below.
This does not mean that leadership, institutions, or strategy are irrelevant. It means that they are not sufficient to explain historical outcomes on their own.
The expectation that Iran would fracture under military pressure failed because it relied on the wrong unit of analysis. It treated society as a system that could be manipulated through external force, rather than as a living, adaptive organism shaped by its own internal dynamics. It interpreted internal dissent as weakness, rather than as part of a broader and more complex social process.
Most importantly, it assumed that history can be engineered.
But history is not a linear sequence of inputs and outputs. It is not a program that can be executed according to plan. It is an emergent process, shaped by the interaction of forces that cannot be fully predicted or controlled.
In such a system, overwhelming force does not guarantee the intended outcome. In some cases, it produces the opposite effect—strengthening the very structures it was meant to weaken.
If Tolstoy were to observe the current moment, he would likely reject the dominant narratives that center on leaders, strategies, and geopolitical calculations. He would not begin with presidents or generals. He would begin with the people—the millions whose actions, taken together, are shaping the course of events in ways that no model can fully anticipate.
The national unity visible in Iran today is not simply a political phenomenon. It is a historical one. It reflects the deeper ‘hive-life’ of a society responding to external pressure—not as a passive object, but as an active force.
This is the lesson that remains consistently overlooked. This maxim is consistent with Gramsci’s revision of the famous Cicero’s saying, “Historia magistra vitae” (History is the teacher of life). For Gramsci, an important caveat needed to be added: History is the teacher of life, but it has no disciples.
History is not made in war rooms or think tanks. It is made in the accumulated choices of ordinary people, acting within the constraints and possibilities of their own lived realities. Power, in this sense, does not reside solely in states or leaders. It resides in the collective—distributed, dynamic, and often invisible until moments of crisis bring it into view.
What we are witnessing is not an exception to the rules of history.
It is the rule itself.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-tolstoy-guide-to-history-that-trump-and-netanyahu-didnt-read/
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Iran, A Nation, Not a Regime: Challenging the Language of War
March 18, 2026
By Dr. M. Reza Behnam
Every day, my frustration grows as American politicians and corporate media churn out mindless rhetoric regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran.
They have shown little curiosity or interest in uncovering the reasons and motives behind the unwarranted and illegal US-Israeli war of choice against Iran. Instead, they parrot demonizing language; most notably, the reflexive use of “regime” to delegitimize the Iranian nation and its government.
It is curious that the media has avoided asking why Iran, with no record of modern territorial aggression, and that signed a politically binding agreement to strictly limit its civil nuclear program in 2015, should be referred to as an enemy “regime”.
Do they know that after World War II, the term became associated with totalitarian forms of government, including fascist, communist, and dictatorial systems? And are they willing to acknowledge that branding the Islamic Republic a regime is inaccurate, as it does not meet the definition?
The contradictions between what the Iranian nation is and what is said about it by American officials and their media scribes are rooted in the country’s ideological rejection of US and Israeli hegemony in West Asia, and its principled commitment to free Palestine.
That repudiation is evidenced in Article 152 (Principles) of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic:
“The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, nonalignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.”
The struggle for the liberation of all oppressed peoples, notably the Palestinians, has always been a core principle of the government.
As Israel continues to stoke chaos and instability throughout the region, the early warnings of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first Supreme Leader, have renewed relevance. He presciently argued that if Israel was not stopped in Palestine, its expansionist aims would eventually threaten the entire region.
Although the US and Israel have serially invaded and violated the territorial integrity of other countries, abrogated agreements and treaties, and humiliated citizens of other nations, the legacy media and its pundits have not branded either government as “regimes”.
The charged rhetoric has made military action legitimate in the eyes of a public steeped in anti-Iran propaganda. That treatment has rationalized violence against Iran and its leaders.
Much like any other nation, Iran is not without faults. Washington has, however, amplified its shortcomings to justify war against it. Uninformed comments and loaded rhetoric have obscured the reality of Iran, a country of 93 million.
With a written constitution, the Islamic Republic stands out in a region dominated by absolute monarchs, military dictators, and a supremacist apartheid Israel that has no written constitution and no defined borders. Ironically, the United States has been more comfortable with it and with Arab despots.
After the Revolution of 1979, Iranians transitioned from a monarchical political structure to a participatory government based on the ideals of Islam, rooted in justice, independence, and equality. That they have survived US-Israeli maniacal wars, economic sanctions, sabotage, and the assassination of their leaders and scientists speaks to their perseverance and the foundational strength of the country’s governing bodies.
An objective review reveals a sophisticated political culture and intricate state structure that has combined the conflicting principles of republicanism and theocracy; essentially, an Islamic democratic system.
Adopted by public referendum, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, a comprehensive document with numerous checks and balances, went into effect on December 3, 1979. What follows are the core structures of the government.
Supreme Leader (Rahbar): The office of the Supreme Leader is the central institution in the governmental structure of the Islamic Republic. He is the head of state and the highest authority in Iran.
The position is rooted in the doctrine of Vilayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), wherein political authority stems from religious expertise. The Supreme Leader is required to demonstrate religious scholarship, political competence, and moral authority.
The Assembly of Experts, whose members select the Supreme Leader, has the power to remove him if he is incapable of fulfilling the duties of the office.
The Leader sets national policy, appoints the Head of the Judiciary and other key officials, commands the armed forces, and has the power to declare war. Through his control of the Guardian Council, he vets electoral candidates and vetoes parliamentary laws.
President: The president is the head of government and the second-highest-ranking official after the Supreme Leader. Candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council.
Elected by direct popular vote for a four-year term, the constitution permits the president to serve only two consecutive terms; after which the incumbent must step down for one term before being eligible to run again.
As administrator of the executive branch, the president leads the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council, signs legislation and treaties, and serves as deputy commander of the Iranian army.
Islamic Consultative Assembly: The Majlis, known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, is the unicameral legislative branch of government.
Members are elected by popular vote to the 290-member assembly (40 additional seats were approved in 2025) for four-year terms. Five seats are reserved for recognized religious minorities (Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians).
To qualify for parliament, candidates must be: Iranian citizens, aged 30-75; possess an associate degree (or equivalent); demonstrate a belief in Islam and the principles of the Islamic Republic; express loyalty to the constitution and to the Supreme Leader; and be in good physical health.
The Majlis drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, examines and approves the national budget, investigates national affairs, and removes cabinet members when necessary.
Guardian Council: The Council ensures that legislation and elections conform with the constitution and Islamic principles. The 12-member body consists of 6 legal scholars, approved by the Majlis, and 6 Islamic law experts appointed by the Supreme Leader.
It has veto power over legislation passed by the Majlis; and supervision over elections, with authority to vet candidates seeking office in local, parliamentary, presidential and Assembly of Experts elections.
Assembly of Experts: The Assembly of Experts for the Leadership, established after the Revolution to draft the constitution, is mandated to appoint, monitor and remove (if necessary) the Supreme Leader.
Elected by popular vote every eight years to the 88-member body of Islamic jurists, representatives meet twice a year during their tenure.
Candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council and must demonstrate mastery of Islamic law; be of good moral character, and be familiar with the issues of the day.
The Assembly, on March 8, 2026, elected Mojtaba Khamenei as the country’s third Supreme Leader, following the US-Israeli assassination of his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Expediency Discernment Council: The Expediency Council was integrated into the constitution when it was amended in 1989. The 27-member body, appointed by the Supreme Leader for 5-year terms, is made up largely of senior clerics, political leaders, and military officers.
Formed to advise the Supreme Leader, it acts as final arbiter in legislative disputes and helps manage the transition if the Supreme Leader dies or is incapacitated.
Judiciary: The Iranian constitution is the supreme law of the land.
The judiciary, which operates within a framework of Islamic and civil law, is overseen by the Head of the Judiciary, a senior Islamic jurist, appointed by the Supreme Leader for a five-year term. He is responsible for judicial administration and the appointment of judges.
The Supreme Court, public prosecutor and lower courts (criminal and civil) are the key components of the judicial system. Separate revolutionary and special clerical courts also exercise legal authority. Although the Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal, it does not have judicial review authority over legislation.
Elections are governed by the constitution and electoral laws. Campaigns are typically short and financed through a mix of private donations (individuals and businesses) and personal assets. Although the state does not allocate funds directly to political campaigns, it provides free access to radio and television and some public spaces for advertising.
Iran moved away from monarchical absolutism into a new political reality in 1979. One can only imagine how the country might have thrived if it had not been vital to divert its talent and resources to defending the nation.
After more than four decades of US and Israeli harassment, hostilities, and now war, Iran has retained its independence under the Constitutional Islamic Republic. That its institutions have survived, and its social contract is intact, speaks to its coherence and endurance.
Iranians are now in a defensive war for survival. Resistance is their only option, as they fight to retain the country’s sovereignty against two of the world’s most militarily powerful and brutal hegemonic bullies.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/iran-a-nation-not-a-regime-challenging-the-language-of-war/
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