Middle East Press On: Syria, Turkish-Greek Relation, Palestine, Australia, Pro-Palestine Political Action Committee, Israel's Permanent State Warning to The World, 13 February 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
13 February 2026
In Syria, reality sets the terms
Is changing zero-sum game in Turkish-Greek relations possible?
Beyond Oslo: Engineering a new reality in Palestine
Australia should not provide a platform for Israel’s security narrative
Pro-Palestine Political Action Committee Enters US Midterm Arena
The Death of Law: Israel’s Permanent State of Exception is a Warning to the World
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In Syria, reality sets the terms
BY DOĞAN EŞKINAT
FEB 12, 2026
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s remarks this week regarding Syria were notable not for their rhetoric, but for their clarity. After more than a decade of bloodshed, proxy wars, frozen front lines and fragile arrangements, the contours of a new regional reality are emerging. The message from Ankara is simple: it is time to align with that reality. Resistance is futile.
For years, the Syrian conflict operated on suspended assumptions. Actors across the board behaved as though time itself were a negotiable variable. Armed groups calculated that geopolitical rivalries would indefinitely preserve their room for manoeuvre. Regional powers hedged, while international actors delayed. Yet reality, eventually, asserted itself when the Syrian opposition evitably, perhaps even belatedly, turned the tables.
There is a line from the film "Zero Dark Thirty" that captures this dynamic with uncomfortable bluntness: "You should never be caught holding a dog collar when the music stops." Crude, perhaps, but geopolitics is not a polite game. It rewards those who understand when the music is about to stop and punishes those who misread the room. This deafening silence is absolutely bad news for the terrorist organization PKK and its local components.
The PKK’s Syrian branch, YPG, had ample opportunity to recalibrate. More than a year has passed since former regime leader Bashar Assad was toppled by the Syrian opposition, and a new political configuration began to take shape. The regional balance shifted and international patience narrowed, as deadlines were set and the trajectory became clear.
Yet instead of adapting to the new parameters, the organization appears to have continued betting on time, assuming that extensions would materialize, that strategic ambiguity would persist, that autonomy could still be extracted from a shrinking window of leverage. That assumption has proven costly.
The end-of-year deadline marked more than a bureaucratic milestone. It signalled that the era of indefinite tactical manoeuvring had concluded. What went up in the summer of 2015, when the PKK abandoned the peace process in Türkiye and chose escalation by executing two police officers, has, in many ways, now come down. History has a rhythm. Strategic overreach carries a shelf life.
Ironically, the peace process that the PKK sabotaged in 2015 has resurfaced in a different form a decade later, not as a concession to militancy, but as part of a broader recalibration across the region. The framework Erdoğan described as "one army, one state, one Syria" reflects not maximalism, but consolidation. Fragmentation has exhausted itself.
This is not merely about territorial control. It is about accepting structural limits. Syria’s war has produced immense human suffering across Arab, Turkmen, Kurd and Nusayri communities alike. Erdoğan’s emphasis on reconstruction, economic revival and inclusive governance underscores a bigger change: stability now depends less on battlefield advantage and more on institutional coherence.
The same principle applies beyond Syria. In a multipolar environment defined by compressed timelines and accelerated crises, actors cannot afford to operate on outdated assumptions. Clashing with reality is not an act of defiance; it is a strategic miscalculation.
This does not mean that every actor’s interests will be fully satisfied. It means that the parameters of possibility have narrowed. The region is transitioning from revolutionary fluidity to post-conflict structuring. Those who recognize this early position themselves for influence within the new order. Those who resist it risk marginalization.
Türkiye, after a turbulent decade that included cross-border threats, domestic terrorism and regional uncertainty, appears to be emerging from the most volatile phase. That does not mean challenges have disappeared. It means that the direction of travel has changed.
In geopolitics, timing is everything. Knowing when the music will stop is as important as knowing how to dance. And in Syria today, the music has changed.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/in-syria-reality-sets-the-terms
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Is changing zero-sum game in Turkish-Greek relations possible?
BY İSMAIL ŞAHIN
FEB 13, 2026
In international relations, the pursuit of power and security often triggers a dynamic that fosters mutual distrust rather than cooperation. This pattern can be clearly observed in Turkish-Greek relations. In this respect, the steps taken and the achievements made by Türkiye in the field of defence industry are perceived as a threat by Greece. This emerging threat perception, in turn, pushes Athens toward armament, military fortification and the search for alliances. Similarly, Greece’s efforts to strengthen its defense capacity and expand its external alliances are perceived by Ankara as a security risk, giving rise to a process that reinforces mutual distrust and tension between the two countries.
As long as this cycle persists, every step taken in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean can be interpreted through a zero-sum game logic, whereby one side’s gain is assessed as the other’s loss. However, breaking out of this spiral requires moving beyond a sole focus on military competition and instead prioritizing confidence-building measures, the institutionalization of dialogue channels and the development of cooperation models based on shared interests. Otherwise, competition risks turning into a costly and enduring deadlock for both parties. Therefore, a paradigm shift aimed primarily at overcoming deeply entrenched mistrust is urgently needed.
Building a good neighbourhood
Türkiye and Greece are two democratic states and NATO allies. Liberal theorists argue that democracies and allied states tend to prefer cooperation over conflict. Therefore, both countries are expected to prioritize cooperation rather than confrontation. Strengthening commercial and economic ties and enhancing cultural relations would make the costs of conflict unbearable for both sides, thereby encouraging peaceful relations between Athens and Ankara.
In this context, the articulation of a target of $10 billion in trade volume between Türkiye and Greece, along with the prospect of potential partnerships in the energy sector, particularly in renewable energy and natural gas pipelines, constitutes a solid starting point for a positive agenda. Indeed, steps taken in this direction would align with the general expectations of both societies. Within this framework, strengthening good neighbourly relations and prioritizing cooperation over confrontational rhetoric could lay the foundation for lasting stability.
Moreover, Turkish foreign policy has recently been shaped around the principles of “regional ownership,” “peaceful diplomacy” and “economic integration” in light of developments at the regional level. In this framework, Ankara, on the one hand, advocates that regional problems should be resolved by regional actors themselves, while on the other hand embraces diplomacy as the most appropriate method for managing and resolving crises. In addition, as evidenced in the cases of Syria, Libya, Sudan and Somalia, defending the territorial integrity and political unity of neighbouring countries constitutes a core priority of Turkish foreign policy.
Focusing on low-politics issues
As is well known, tensions between Türkiye and Greece are largely fuelled by mutually constructed “enemy” identities. The persistence of the image of an “eternal enemy” produces little more than economic and political harm for both countries. Replacing this perception with a sense of being “neighbours and partners” would therefore constitute a far more rational approach. Indeed, the annual tourism flows between the two countries, reaching more than 2.5 million people, clearly demonstrate that confrontational rhetoric does not resonate strongly with their societies. For this reason, political leaders temporarily freezing chronic disputes and instead turning toward cooperation in “low-politics” areas, such as trade, tourism, environmental protection and disaster management, could further expand the scope of cooperation between the two countries.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Greece at the end of 2023, within the framework of the 5th High-Level Cooperation Council Meeting, followed by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s visit to Türkiye in 2024, marked a critical turning point in terms of restoring the functionality of dialogue channels in Turkish-Greek relations. The discussions held during these meetings on cooperation opportunities in areas such as trade, health and culture demonstrated a concrete political will to move relations beyond a narrowly security-centred framework.
In this relatively moderate atmosphere observed between the parties in recent years, Mitsotakis’s visit to Türkiye on Feb. 11, and the 6th High-Level Cooperation Council Meeting within this framework are significant not only for ensuring the continuity of diplomatic engagement but also for aiming at the institutionalization of a positive agenda. This process carries strategic importance in that it demonstrates the possibility of constructing a relationship model in which communication is not disrupted, and cooperation remains feasible, even if chronic issues are not fully resolved.
According to the discipline of international relations, states may engage in rational cooperation in the face of a common external threat or to safeguard their own survival. In today’s geopolitical landscape shaped by the Russia-Ukraine war, both countries have become strategic partners for Europe’s energy security. Before the definitive delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, the joint exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources or renewable energy sources (such as wind and solar) would constitute a peaceful and pragmatic model.
Catalyst role of energy coop
Unlike fossil fuels, renewable energy does not directly trigger sovereignty disputes, making it a more feasible starting point for cooperation. Joint platforms and infrastructure projects to be established in the energy sector could function as a “peace catalyst” by interlinking the two countries and reducing the risk of conflict. Acting together in energy transmission and supply could also transform Türkiye and Greece into indispensable “energy security assets” for the European Union.
This approach could enable Greece to be positioned not merely as a consumer or a competitor, but as a strategic partner alongside Türkiye in ensuring Europe’s energy supply security. Establishing energy cooperation among littoral states would reduce geopolitical and security risks in the region, thereby lowering the costs of investment projects. This, in turn, would pave the way for more sustainable and financially viable energy projects for the Greek economy.
For a long time, Greece employed diplomacy as a tool to exclude Türkiye from the regional energy equation and to “otherize” it by forging anti-Türkiye alignments with countries such as Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration. However, the flagship of this strategy, the East Med pipeline project, lost its economic feasibility due to technical challenges and extremely high construction costs and effectively collapsed following the withdrawal of U.S. support. These developments have once again confirmed that Athens’ exclusionary policies toward Türkiye are not sustainable in the face of geopolitical realities.
In transporting Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to the European market, Türkiye, owing to its geographical advantages, constitutes the most cost-effective and secure route. Within this framework, Greece stands to benefit by opting for cooperation rather than confrontation. Indeed, interconnectivity and mutual interdependence to be established in the energy sector could bring relations to a point of stability and strengthen the normalization process between the two countries. Cooperation initiated in a technical field such as energy is likely, over time, to spill over into other political issue areas, thereby serving as a leverage mechanism for resolving long-standing political disputes between the two states.
In conclusion, the two states currently frame their relations within a “zero-sum game” logic, whereby one side’s gain is perceived as the other’s loss. However, as rational actors, a shift toward cooperation, rather than conflictual choices driven by mutual mistrust (defection), would enable both countries to move into a “positive-sum game” phase capable of generating significantly higher returns. Failure to realize this transformation would leave the parties trapped in an unsustainable spiral of competition marked by rising economic and strategic costs.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/is-changing-zero-sum-game-in-turkish-greek-relations-possible
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Beyond Oslo: Engineering a new reality in Palestine
February 12, 2026
By Dr Sania Faisal El-Husseini
It has become clear that Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing government are seeking to leverage their current alignment with the administration of US President Donald Trump, a government that strongly backs Israeli policies, to cement a reality in Palestine that will be difficult to reverse in the future.
Under Israeli law, general elections are ordinarily held in October of the fourth year of the Knesset’s term, unless the Knesset is dissolved earlier. Although the term can, in theory, be extended, such a step is subject to strict and exceptional conditions, such as a full-scale war or a grave security emergency that makes elections impossible. A postponement cannot be affected through government emergency regulations, nor through an administrative decision suspending the Basic Law governing elections. If such a step were to be taken, it would require the passage of a special law by the Knesset, approved by at least 80 of its 120 members, a threshold that is rarely attainable in practice. This has occurred only once before, during the October War of 1973, when elections were briefly delayed.
A poll conducted last month indicated that the opposition bloc would secure 61 out of 120 seats, compared with 49 for the parties currently participating in Netanyahu’s governing coalition, and 10 seats for Arab parties if they were to run separately. Such an outcome would, on paper, allow the opposition to form an alternative government. Yet the central complication lies elsewhere. Netanyahu’s Likud party continues to lead all major opinion polls, with projected support ranging between 26 and 31 seats, positioning it as the single largest party and the most viable anchor for the next governing coalition. While recent surveys show a modest decline in Likud’s support, and a more pronounced drop in the popularity of the Religious Zionism party led by Bezalel Smotrich, the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, along with the far-right Jewish Power party led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, have maintained relative stability.
These trends unfold against a broader current within Israeli public opinion. Multiple polls suggest that between 57 and 59 percent of the Israeli Jewish public oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state under any circumstances. Between 58 and 70 percent support expanding Israeli sovereignty and control over the West Bank, while 42 percent Favor annexing the territory without granting equal rights to Palestinians. Taken together, these indicators suggest that what is unfolding in the Palestinian territories is not a passing political phase. Rather, it reflects a deeper Israeli trajectory, one embraced and advanced by Netanyahu’s government, that is reshaping realities on the ground in ways that may prove difficult to reverse in the foreseeable future.
What is unfolding in Gaza after the war amounts to a comprehensive re-engineering of the Strip, security-wise and demographically, in ways designed to preclude any meaningful form of Palestinian sovereignty. This is evident in the conditioning of reconstruction on the disarmament of Gaza, coupled with the rejection of any political or administrative role for either the Palestinian Authority or Hamas. In their place, what is being advanced is a technocratic Palestinian administrative body confined to service provision, structured according to American and Israeli parameters. This approach aligns with Israel’s repeated assertion that it has no intention of relinquishing security control over the territory. Official Israeli statements have made clear that Israel intends to retain security control “from the river to the sea,” including in Gaza, even after a ceasefire. Such declarations effectively drain any proposed “second phase” of its political substance. In this context, the promise of reconstruction functions less as a humanitarian commitment and more as an instrument of political and security leverage. The daily human suffering produced by the war is being folded into a broader strategy, one that seeks to secure Israel’s stated objectives by reshaping the political and territorial realities on the ground.
Israel’s objectives in Gaza extend beyond territorial control and security dominance. They also encompass the reordering of the Strip’s geographic and demographic reality. Plans to empty densely populated areas, confine residents to limited zones, and construct monitored encampments in the far south of the Strip near the Egyptian border point to a strategy that goes well beyond managing a civilian population. They align more closely with prior statements by Israeli officials regarding population transfer. The trajectory suggests not merely oversight, but structural transformation. This approach is reinforced by Israel’s insistence on full control over border crossings, as well as the movement of people and goods. Such control would effectively preserve the conditions of siege and sustained oversight of the territory. In that environment, future measures, whatever form they take, would be easier to implement.
On the other side of Palestine, the West Bank, including Jerusalem, is subject to coercive measures no less severe than those imposed on Gaza, despite having been politically removed from the events of 7th October. The Israeli authorities appear to be pursuing a calibrated policy aimed at eroding the standing of the Palestinian Authority, weakening it economically while steadily stripping it of administrative prerogatives in areas nominally under its control. Between the withholding of clearance revenues, the exhaustion of the Palestinian economy, mounting constraints on banking operations, and tighter restrictions on workers’ permits, the Authority finds itself under acute financial strain. These pressures are compounded by what increasingly resembles a deliberate effort to render the Authority functionally ineffective. This is visible in the sustained military incursions into Palestinian cities and towns, whether for arrests, demolition operations, or displays of force, alongside the accelerating pace of settler attacks on Palestinian lives and property. In such circumstances, the Authority’s ability to respond, let alone assert control, has been steadily diminished.
These measures are not aimed solely at diminishing the Palestinian Authority’s standing. At their core lies a broader policy: consolidating control over land while making daily life increasingly untenable for Palestinians in their own country. Israel no longer limits itself to tight security control over the West Bank, nor to the gradual incorporation of Palestinian land through incremental expansion. Its intentions are now articulated with greater candor. Settlement activity is no longer confined to roughly two-thirds of the West Bank, the areas designated as “Area C.” It has extended into the remaining third, Areas “A” and “B,” despite the dense Palestinian population in those zones. This expansion unfolds alongside legislation and government decisions that facilitate the confiscation of Palestinian land, the demolition of structures, and, in certain cases, the formal transfer of those properties into Israeli hands.
Decisions issued days ago by Israel’s Security and Political Cabinet signal a qualitative shift in the management of the West Bank. What had long been framed as a model of “temporary military administration” is giving way to one of entrenched civil-legal control. The implications are far-reaching: the status of land and property, the scope of the Palestinian Authority’s powers, the viability of the two-state framework, and even the legal character of the occupation itself all stand to be affected. For all their gravity, these decisions do not emerge in isolation. They reflect a continuum, from the military and settlement-driven policies that predated Oslo, to the security-centred and expansionist approach that followed it, and, more recently, to the sharp escalation since the end of 2022 with the rise of Netanyahu’s right-wing government. The trajectory points toward the imposition of a decisive reality in the Palestinian territories, one increasingly difficult to reverse.
The Cabinet decisions focused in particular on annulling the Jordanian law in force prior to 1967 that prohibited the sale of land in the West Bank to non-Palestinians. Its cancellation now opens the door for Israelis to acquire Palestinian land in the territory. The measures also authorize the opening and publication of Palestinian land registries, which had previously been closed to Israeli access. This step facilitates sales, purchases, and systematic monitoring of ownership procedures by Israeli authorities. In effect, Palestinian land would be drawn into Israel’s own legal framework governing property and land registration, integrating it into the Israeli land registry system. At the same time, the decisions expand Israeli authorities’ powers to apply Israeli law in areas populated by Palestinians. Planning and building powers in certain Palestinian zones have been transferred to Israeli bodies, including in Hebron and the area surrounding the Ibrahimi Mosque. This shift enables Israel to determine the scope and limits of Palestinian urban development, while opening the way for settlement expansion in locations where such expansion had previously not been authorised.
The decision also broadens Israel’s authority to regulate environmental matters, antiquities, water resources, and even building violations in Areas “A” and “B”, zones that, under the Oslo framework, fall under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. In practice, this strips the Authority of core administrative powers in territories that were formally designated as being under its jurisdiction. These steps come against the backdrop of an established Israeli trajectory: reducing the overt military character of governance in the occupied West Bank while strengthening a system of civil and administrative control over Palestinians. Israeli law had already been extended to settlers residing in the West Bank; what is now unfolding suggests a gradual institutionalization of Israeli governance structures across the territory, moving toward a more permanent and systematized form of rule.
Even in the absence of a formal Israeli declaration of annexation, the Cabinet’s executive measures, opening Palestinian land registries to Israeli access and ownership, transferring planning powers to Israeli authorities, expanding enforcement authority, and imposing what amounts to functional Israeli sovereignty on the ground, constitute a significant step toward integrating the West Bank into Israel’s legal system. These policies erode the Palestinian Authority’s powers and hollow out its functional role. They amount to a unilateral alteration of the Oslo framework. As a bilateral agreement, Oslo rests on reciprocal obligations; a fundamental change imposed by one party raises the legal question of whether the other party retains the right, under international law governing treaties, to withdraw from the agreement.
Paradoxically, these Israeli decisions may also reinforce the Palestinian legal argument that the transitional framework established by Oslo has effectively run its course. They do not alter the underlying condition of curtailed sovereignty imposed by occupation. Sovereignty, in the Palestinian case, derives in essence from popular representation, from a people living under occupation, rather than from the limited administrative competences defined by interim arrangements. What these measures affect are the functional boundaries of governance that were granted to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo understandings. They do not extinguish the broader legal foundation upon which Palestinian legitimacy rests. That legitimacy draws from the peremptory norm of the right to self-determination, from the corpus of international legality, from the wide international recognition of the State of Palestine, and from its acknowledgment by the United Nations, numerous international organizations and treaty bodies, as well as from opinions issued by international courts.
These rapid shifts under Netanyahu’s government are unfolding through tools deployed on a wide scale and with an unprecedented degree of simultaneity. Chief among them is the extensive destruction of infrastructure in Palestinian cities and villages, not only in Gaza, but increasingly in the West Bank as well, including in Areas “A” and “B,” which fall under the Palestinian Authority’s administration. The occupation has also relied on a policy of large-scale lethal force against Palestinian civilians. While the death toll in Gaza has reached into the tens of thousands, the West Bank faces a structured pattern that combines the killing of hundreds of Palestinians with escalating settler attacks, often deadly and destructive, alongside mounting restrictions on movement and daily life. The steadily intensifying constraints on freedom of movement in both the West Bank and Gaza, even in the aftermath of declared ceasefires, suggest that Israeli military policy continues in practice. The formal announcement of a halt to hostilities has not translated into a substantive end to the measures reshaping Palestinian life on the ground.
These Israeli policies in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and in Gaza cannot be dismissed as temporary or episodic. They form part of an integrated strategic vision directed at Palestinians and at the future of their presence on their land in both territories. Developments in the West Bank cannot be read in isolation from what is unfolding in Gaza. Together, they aim to entrench a reality that is difficult to reverse, while clearing the path for plans that Israeli officials have articulated with unusual openness. Such shifts require a decisive and unified Palestinian policy, one that confronts the risks head-on, strengthens steadfastness on the ground, and articulates a forward-looking vision beyond the Oslo era. Arab states, too, face a moment of choice. A coordinated and firm Arab position toward the occupying power and its policies is essential, coupled with the use of political and economic leverage with Western partners to press for meaningful action, not merely statements of concern. The current conflict in Palestine stands at a crossroads. It is not a moment that allows for further deferral.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260212-beyond-oslo-engineering-a-new-reality-in-palestine/
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Australia should not provide a platform for Israel’s security narrative
February 12, 2026
By Ramona Wadi
Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Australia was largely tied to the Bondi memorial. However, in a Q&A session with Jewish students attending Moriah College in Sydney, the tone shifted to Israel’s security narrative.
“I know that the demonstrators and protesters who are cursing us, saying the biggest lies and affirmations against our nation, do not want to hear this, but I believe that the silent majority of Australians definitely want to hear and move back on track,” Herzog stated, conflating criticism of Israel and opposition to Israel’s genocide with antisemitism.
Opposition to Herzog’s visit has been weeks in the making. Referencing Herzog’s statements that incite genocide against Palestinians, the Jewish Council of Australia issued a statement partly reading, “We refuse to let our grief for the Bondi massacre be used to legitimise a leader who has played an active role in the ongoing destruction of Gaza, including the murder of tens of thousands of Palestinians, and the displacement of millions.”
In August 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had accused Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of abandoning Australia’s Jewish community and betraying Israel, after the government’s announcement that it would recognise a Palestinian state.
As pressure increased on the Australian government to rescind the invitation, Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong described Herzog’s visit as “coming to provide support to the Australian Jewish community.” For Jewish people living in Australia, most likely Australian citizens, it should fall on the Australian government to provide support for the Jewish community. The President of Israel has no say over the lives of Australia citizens. Wong also stated that the Jewish community in Australia requested Herzog’s visit. However, not all members of the Jewish community have actively demanded Herzog’s visit, while some have outrightly rejected legitimising the visit, as did the Jewish Council of Australia.
While protestors are pointing out the discrepancies and getting punished by state violence for their clarity, the Australian government is upholding Israel’s security narrative. If Herzog was truly visiting Australia to honour the Bondi victims, why would he bring up Israel in a Q&A with high school students? Why is Australia allowing another head of state, and one that has explicitly incited for genocide against Palestinians, to interfere in Australian society?
At Bondi, Herzog announced, “My visit to Australia, to all of you, is one of solidarity, strength, and sincere friendship from the State of Israel and the people of Israel. Together, we must confront the evils of antisemitism, extremism, and terror here in Australia and around the world.” Drawing Australia into Israel’s security narrative is not a move that protects Jewish people.
On the contrary, the conflation is dangerous and plays with Jewish lives to further the Zionist agenda, which many Jewish people do not stand for. If Australia truly stands for social cohesion, which is doubtful given its colonial history, why would the government agree to allow Herzog a platform which can jeopardise the security of Australian Jewish citizens?
There is no “sincere friendship from the State of Israel.” But there is exploitation of the Jewish people from the State of Israel across the world, which in turn is used to legitimise colonial violence against Palestinians. Jewish people who stand against genocide and colonialism have long recognised the fact.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260212-australia-should-not-provide-a-platform-for-israels-security-narrative/
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Pro-Palestine Political Action Committee Enters US Midterm Arena
February 13, 2026
A New Actor
The newly established Peace, Accountability, and Leadership PAC (PAL PAC)ì was created to financially and politically support congressional candidates who advocate Palestinian human rights and a reassessment of unconditional US support for Israel.
The launch was first reported by the American outlet Zeteo, which described the organization as an attempt to convert grassroots activism surrounding Gaza into measurable electoral leverage. According to that report, the PAC intends to endorse candidates willing to promote equality under international law and challenge policies enabling the Israeli occupation.
Unlike traditional advocacy campaigns centered on protests or campus organizing, the group is reportedly structured around campaign finance.
Challenging the Existing Lobby
For decades, pro-Israel lobbying networks have exercised significant influence in US elections, particularly through large-scale political donations. Therefore, the emergence of a pro-Palestine PAC signals a strategic shift: entering the same institutional arena rather than operating outside it.
Media investigations have documented tens of millions of dollars spent by pro-Israel organizations to defeat candidates critical of Israeli policy.
Statements from pro-Israel organizations, such as Democratic Majority for Israel (DMFI PAC) — which has already issued a broad list of endorsements for the same election cycle — underscore how campaign financing functions as a primary mechanism through which US Middle East policy positions are enforced.
By directing funds toward aligned candidates and against critics, these groups influence not only election outcomes but also the range of positions considered politically viable in Congress.
Candidates and Political Messaging
The newly-formed PAC is expected to support progressive lawmakers who have publicly called for ceasefires, accountability for war crimes, or restrictions on military aid. International reporting identified figures such as Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar, Summer Lee, and Delia Ramirez as among those aligned with the political platform the PAC promotes.
The message reportedly centers not only on Gaza but also on broader US foreign policy doctrine: conditioning aid, prioritizing civilian protection, and applying international law standards universally.
This reflects a wider ideological shift in US politics, with growing divisions within the Democratic Party over Israel policy and the increasing salience of Gaza among primary voters.
Public Opinion and Political Momentum
The creation of the PAC follows months of sustained mobilization across the United States — protests, campus encampments, and local resolutions demanding ceasefires. While activism has influenced public discourse, organizers now appear to be testing whether it can also influence Congress.
The PAC seeks to institutionalize that shift, where an emerging foreign-policy framework among younger politicians tends to emphasize human rights rather than strategic alliances alone.
In parallel, heavy spending against Israel-critical candidates has often discouraged political dissent; the new initiative attempts to neutralize that deterrent effect by guaranteeing financial backing.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/pro-palestine-political-action-committee-enters-us-midterm-arena/
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The Death of Law: Israel’s Permanent State of Exception is a Warning to the World
February 12, 2026
By Ramzy Baroud
While many nations occasionally resort to a “state of exception” to deal with temporary crises, Israel exists in a permanent state of exception. This Israeli exceptionalism is the very essence of the instability that plagues the Middle East.
The concept of the state of exception dates back to the Roman justitium, a legal mechanism for suspending law during times of civil unrest. However, the modern understanding was shaped by the German jurist Carl Schmitt, who famously wrote that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” While Schmitt’s own history as a jurist for the Third Reich serves as a chilling reminder of where such theories can lead, his work provides an undeniably accurate anatomy of raw power: it reveals how a ruler who institutes laws also holds the power to dismiss them, under the pretext that no constitution can foresee every possible crisis.
It is often argued that Israel, a self-described democracy, still lacks a formal constitution because such a document would force it to define its borders—a problematic prospect for a settler-colonial regime with an insatiable appetite for expansion. But there is another explanation: by operating on “Basic Laws” rather than a constitution, Israel avoids a comprehensive legal system that would align it with the globally accepted foundations of international law. Without a constitution, Israel exists in a legal vacuum where the “exception” is the rule. In this space, racial laws, territorial expansion, and even genocide are permitted so long as they fit the state’s immediate agenda.
Isolating specific examples to illustrate this point is a daunting task, primarily because nearly every relevant pronouncement from Israeli officials—particularly during the genocide in Gaza—is a textbook study in Israeli exceptionalism. Consider Israel’s relentless assault on UNRWA, the UN-mandated body responsible for the survival of millions of Palestinian refugees. For decades, Israel has sought the dismantling of UNRWA for one reason: it is the only global institution that prevents the total erasure of Palestinian refugee rights. These rights are not mere grievances; they are firmly anchored in international law, most notably via UN Resolution 194.
While UNRWA is not a political organization in a functional sense, its very existence is profoundly political. First, it stands as the institutional legacy of a specific political history; second, and more crucially, its presence ensures the Palestinian refugee remains a recognized political entity. By existing, UNRWA preserves the status of the refugee as a subject with the legal right to demand a return to historic Palestine—a demand that the “state of exception” seeks to permanently silence.
In October 2024, Israel unilaterally legislated the closure of UNRWA, once more asserting its “exception” over the entire framework of the United Nations. “It is time the international community (…) realizes that UNRWA’s mission must end,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had already declared on January 31, 2024, signaling the coming erasure. This rhetoric reached its physical conclusion on January 20, when the UNRWA headquarters in occupied Jerusalem were demolished by the Israeli military in the presence of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.
“A historic day!” Ben-Gvir announced on that same date. “Today these supporters of terror are being driven out.” This horrific act was met with bashful responses, mute concerns, or total silence by the very powers tasked with preventing states from positioning themselves above the law.
By allowing this Israeli “exception” to stand unchallenged, the international community has effectively sanctioned the demolition of its own legal foundations.
In the past, Israeli leaders masked their true intentions with the language of a “light unto the nations,” projecting a beacon of morality while practicing violence, ethnic cleansing, and military occupation on the ground. The genocide in Gaza, however, has stripped away these pretenses. For the first time, Israeli rhetoric fully reflects a state of exception where the law is not just ignored, but structurally suspended.
“No one in the world will let us starve two million citizens, even though it may be justified and moral until they return the hostages to us,” Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich admitted on August 5, 2024. This “justified and moral” stance reveals a localized morality that permits the extermination of a population as an ethically defensible act. Yet Smotrich also lied; the world has done nothing practical to dissuade Israel from its savage pulverization of Gaza.
The global community remained idle even when Smotrich declared on May 6, 2025, that Gaza would be “entirely destroyed” and the population “concentrated in a narrow strip.” Today, that vision is a reality: a genocide-fatigued population is confined to roughly 45% of the territory, while the remainder stays empty under Israeli military control.
Netanyahu himself, who has stretched the state of exception beyond any predecessor, defined this new reality during a cabinet meeting on October 26, 2025: “Israel is a sovereign state… Our security policy is in our own hands. Israel does not seek anyone’s approval for that.” Here, Netanyahu defines sovereignty as the raw power to act—genocide included—without regard for international law or human rights.
If all states adopted this, the world would fall into a lawless frenzy. In his seminal State of Exception, Giorgio Agamben diagnosed this “void”—a space where law is suspended but “force of law” remains as pure violence. While his recent stances have divided the academic community, his critique of the exception as a permanent tool of governance remains an indispensable lens for understanding the erasure of Palestinian life.
Israel has already created that void. In the hands of a genocidal settler-colonial society, the state of exception is a relentless nightmare that will not stop at the borders of Palestine. If this “exception” is allowed to become the permanent regional rule, no nation in the Middle East will be spared. Time is of the essence.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-death-of-law-israels-permanent-state-of-exception-is-a-warning-to-the-world/
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