Middle East Press On: Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran's Most Advanced Ballistic Missiles, Where Is Netanyahu, Israel's West Bank, Trump, Russia China Gain From US-Iran War, New Age Islam's Selection, 16 March 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
16 March 2026
Why Mojtaba Khamenei was chosen to succeed his father
EXPLAINER: Sejjil and Beyond – A Guide to Iran’s Most Advanced Ballistic Missiles
From ‘Come to Dubai, Habibi’ to ‘Run from Dubai’: War Reshapes Viral Meme
Fact Check: Where Is Netanyahu and Why Are Questions Spreading Online?
Annexation without a declaration- Israel’s quiet seizure of the West Bank
The architects of post-truth: How Netanyahu and Trump are scripting the Apocalypse
Quiet advantage: What Russia and China may gain from US-Iran war
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Why Mojtaba Khamenei was chosen to succeed his father
HASSAN AL-MUSTAFA
March 15, 2026
Mojtaba Khamenei would not have become the supreme leader of Iran had his father, Ali Khamenei, died naturally. The prevailing custom in Shiite “scientific hawza” (seminaries) — whether in Najaf, Karbala, Qom or Mashhad — holds that religious authority is not passed from father to son, as such conduct is regarded as a pursuit of leadership that contradicts the principle of piety.
Throughout Shiite history, when a religious leader died, his sons did not immediately assume authority after him, even when they possessed the necessary qualifications. In the few instances when a form of familial succession occurred, such as within the Kashif Al-Ghita and Al-Shirazi families, it was met with significant disapproval and rejection by senior professors of scientific hawza.
When the religious authority Mohammed Saeed Al-Hakim died in 2021 in the Iraqi city of Najaf, his family broke his seal, the ring he used to authenticate his religious edicts, immediately after his funeral. The seal was broken publicly to ensure that it could not be used illegally or unlawfully by any party.
Grand Ayatollah Al-Hakim was survived by several sons who possessed the qualifications of a “faqih” (Islamic jurist) capable of issuing fatwas, the most prominent among them being Riyadh Al-Hakim, a professor in the scientific hawza in the Iranian city of Qom. However, his sons did not nominate themselves for the position of “marja’iyya” (authority), although they met the criteria required of a mufti.
The late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was well acquainted with this hawza convention. He was aware that his son, Mojtaba — despite holding the rank of “ijtihad” and having taught “Bahth Al-Kharij” at the hawza for several years, an advanced tier of seminary instruction roughly equivalent to doctoral-level studies in the academic world — would not be accepted by the seminaries as his successor. He understood that the hawza would not countenance a hereditary transfer of the marja’iyya. This is precisely what kept him from pursuing the succession of his son to the office of supreme religious authority. Sources close to him reported that he explicitly rejected such a course.
There is also another important reason: the legitimacy of the Islamic revolution in Iran was founded on the rejection of political succession. The late shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown in favor of a republican system that rejected hereditary rule. Iranians did not want to replace a shah wearing a crown with another shah wearing a turban.
So, what changed and how did Mojtaba Khamenei become the third supreme leader?
The fundamental factor behind this radical shift was the assassination of Ali Khamenei in an attack in which he and several members of his family were killed. The event proved pivotal for Iran. It created a profound leadership vacuum and generated a deep emotional and social shock, given Israel’s direct targeting of him from the first day of the war and its demonstrated ability to assassinate him, along with a large number of prominent military and administrative figures on the same day.
The current supreme leader thus emerged as a form of “blood legitimacy” and an heir whose father, mother and several other members of his family were killed. This development also has a mythological dimension deeply rooted in Shiite history, emotionally linked to the events of Karbala, thereby granting it an additional layer of symbolism.
This symbolism was reinforced by the timing of the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader on the 19th day of Ramadan — the first of three nights during which Shiite Muslims celebrate the martyrdom of Ali bin Abi Taleb, believed to include the “Laylat Al-Qadr” (Night of Power), which is considered sacred in Islamic consciousness.
Together, these factors highlight the immense symbolic weight surrounding the context in which Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed as Iran’s faqih.
Moreover, through this decision, the Assembly of Experts sought to stress that the “revolution” would continue along the path of its former leader and that it remained capable of resistance and confrontation.
This is particularly significant because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the hard-line faction allied with it expressed strong anger and resentment toward the initiative of President Masoud Pezeshkian, who apologized to the Arab Gulf states for the attacks that had struck their territories. He announced that the “temporary leadership council” had decided to “halt attacks on neighboring countries unless their territories were used to launch strikes against Iran.” This initiative was aborted as the Guards interpreted it as a sign of weakness and retreat. Consequently, the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei was intended to convey a clear political message: Iran remains strong and its pride has not been broken.
Another important point is that prominent candidates close to the reformist and moderate currents — such as Hassan Khomeini and Hassan Rouhani — were excluded from consideration, despite the fact they are pillars of the IRGC and possess the credentials that qualify them to assume the position.
Today, Mojtaba Khamenei stands as the faqih of Iran, as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He is also regarded as a figure with deep ties to the IRGC and to the country’s various hard-line currents. Will he adopt a confrontational and uncompromising course or will he seek pragmatic solutions capable of extricating Iran from war, preserving what remains of the regime’s institutional structure and restoring relations with neighboring Gulf countries that have been affected by Iran’s continued attacks?
In politics, all possibilities remain open. The new leader may prove even more uncompromising than his late father or he may emerge as the leader who guides the “revolution” into a new phase.
One crucial consideration, however, is that Mojtaba Khamenei is the only figure who is capable of participating in halting the war without provoking strong resistance from the Revolutionary Guards. This is not only due to his close relationship with them but also because he now holds the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. And, perhaps more importantly, he is widely perceived as the actual heir. For this reason, hard-liners cannot accuse him of betraying the legacy of his father and his family.
Which course will Iran take under Mojtaba Khamenei? The coming days will reveal his direction.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636515
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EXPLAINER: Sejjil and Beyond – A Guide to Iran’s Most Advanced Ballistic Missiles
March 16, 2026
Editorial Note
The missile specifications referenced in this fact sheet are based on official Iranian military statements and publicly reported technical data. As with most strategic weapons programs, full operational details are not publicly disclosed, and the figures cited reflect the characteristics attributed to these systems in official announcements and defense reporting.
Iran’s Missile Arsenal: Key Strategic Systems
Iran’s missile program has become the central pillar of its deterrence strategy, compensating for the absence of a large modern air force.
Over the past two decades Tehran has developed a diverse arsenal of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, many deployed on mobile launchers and designed for rapid launch.
Recent reports that Iran used the Sejjil ballistic missile during the latest wave of attacks have renewed attention on the country’s most advanced missile systems.
Below is a fact sheet outlining several of the most significant missiles in Iran’s inventory.
Sejjil – Long-Range Strategic Missile
The Sejjil is one of the most advanced long-range ballistic missiles developed by Iran.
It is a two-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile, which allows it to be launched quickly compared with older liquid-fuel systems that require longer preparation.
The missile is estimated to have a range of about 2,000 kilometers, allowing it to strike targets across much of West Asia.
Sejjil missiles are believed to carry warheads weighing roughly 500 to 1,000 kilograms, with a reported accuracy that can reach within tens of meters depending on guidance systems.
The missile is road-mobile, meaning it can be launched from transport vehicles rather than fixed silos, increasing its survivability during wartime.
First publicly tested in 2008, the Sejjil marked an important step in Iran’s transition toward solid-fuel missile technology, which is considered more reliable and faster to deploy.
Khorramshahr – Heavy Warhead Missile
The Khorramshahr missile is among the most powerful ballistic missiles in Iran’s arsenal in terms of payload.
The missile has a range of approximately 2,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying very heavy conventional warheads.
Because of its large payload capacity, Khorramshahr missiles are often associated with strategic targets such as military bases, airfields and infrastructure.
Iran has unveiled several variants of the system over time, including upgraded versions designed to improve accuracy and survivability.
The missile’s large warhead capacity distinguishes it from many other systems in Iran’s missile force.
Kheibar Shekan – New Generation Missile
The Kheibar Shekan, unveiled in 2022, represents a newer generation of Iranian ballistic missiles.
It is a solid-fuel missile with a reported range of roughly 1,450 kilometers.
The system was designed with a lighter structure and faster launch preparation compared with earlier missiles.
Iranian officials have described it as part of a broader effort to improve the precision and survivability of Iran’s missile forces.
The missile is also believed to have a maneuverable re-entry vehicle, allowing it to alter its trajectory during the final stage of flight.
Emad – Precision Long-Range Missile
The Emad missile is an upgraded version of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile.
With a range estimated at around 1,700 kilometers, it is capable of reaching targets across much of the Middle East.
One of the key improvements in the Emad system is its guided re-entry vehicle, which allows the missile to adjust its trajectory during descent and improve targeting accuracy.
The missile was unveiled publicly in 2015 and remains a major component of Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile force.
Ghadr – Extended-Range Shahab Variant
The Ghadr missile is another important system derived from the Shahab-3 family.
It has an estimated range between 1,600 and 2,000 kilometers, depending on the variant.
The Ghadr incorporates improvements in propulsion and guidance compared with earlier Shahab missiles.
Because of its range and deployment in significant numbers, it is considered one of the core missiles in Iran’s strategic inventory.
Fattah – Hypersonic Missile Program
Iran has also announced the development of hypersonic missile technology, most notably the Fattah missile family.
The Fattah-1, unveiled in 2023, was described by Iranian officials as capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds and maneuvering during flight.
Iran later presented a follow-up design known as Fattah-2, which was described as incorporating a hypersonic glide vehicle.
According to Iranian statements, these missiles have a range of approximately 1,400 kilometers.
Hypersonic weapons travel at extremely high speeds and can maneuver during flight, making interception significantly more difficult than with traditional ballistic missiles.
A Missile-Centered Defense Doctrine
Iran’s missile program reflects a strategic choice to rely heavily on missile power rather than air superiority.
Mobile launchers, underground missile facilities and solid-fuel technology allow Iran to deploy missiles quickly while protecting them from pre-emptive strikes.
The combination of long-range ballistic missiles, heavy payload systems and emerging hypersonic technology has significantly expanded Iran’s ability to project military power across the region.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/explainer-sejjil-and-beyond-a-guide-to-irans-most-advanced-ballistic-missiles/
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From ‘Come to Dubai, Habibi’ to ‘Run from Dubai’: War Reshapes Viral Meme
March 15, 2026
When a Meme Meets War
For years, Dubai and the United Arab Emirates cultivated a powerful image online: a glamorous global hub where luxury, safety, and opportunity converged.
Social media played a central role in spreading that narrative. Influencers across TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube popularized the phrase ‘Come to Dubai, Habibi’, inviting viewers to relocate to the emirate for a life of wealth and comfort.
Videos often followed a familiar formula: influencers driving Lamborghinis, showcasing penthouses overlooking the Burj Khalifa, or relaxing on yachts in the Persian Gulf. Dubai seemed to represent the ultimate lifestyle upgrade.
The slogan itself became a viral meme across platforms. A single Instagram reel using the phrase accumulated hundreds of thousands of likes while repeating the invitation: “Habibi, come to Dubai.” Over time, the phrase evolved beyond tourism marketing. It became shorthand for a broader social media fantasy: a tax-free global city insulated from the turbulence of the Middle East.
That perception, however, began to shift dramatically once war reached the Gulf.
War Reaches the Gulf
Following the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, the regional war quickly expanded beyond the immediate battlefield when Tehran launched missile and drone attacks across the region, targeting countries that host American military infrastructure.
Among those countries was the United Arab Emirates. Iranian strikes were primarily aimed at US-linked facilities such as Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi and Al Minhad Air Base near Dubai, both of which host foreign military forces.
But even when the targets were military, the effects were felt in civilian areas.
Explosions and falling debris from intercepted projectiles were reported across the Emirates, including Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Fires and infrastructure damage occurred after fragments landed in residential districts and commercial areas.
According to UAE defense officials, nearly 300 ballistic missiles and more than 1,600 drones have been launched toward the country since the conflict began, with most intercepted by air-defense systems.
The idea of Dubai as a completely insulated “luxury bubble” suddenly appeared far less convincing.
Why UAE is Targeted
The attacks on the UAE were not random. Analysts say Iran’s strategy was to target countries hosting US military infrastructure while avoiding full-scale war with the Gulf states themselves.
Tehran warned civilians in the UAE to avoid ports, docks, and sites hosting US forces, suggesting those locations could become targets in retaliation for attacks on Iran.
The strategy reflected a broader geopolitical calculation. By striking locations associated with US military operations, Iran aimed to signal that countries facilitating American military action could become part of the battlefield.
The UAE occupies a particularly sensitive position in this strategy. It hosts several major US military facilities and logistics hubs while also serving as a central financial and commercial gateway for the region. The country’s ports, airports, and financial centers are deeply integrated into global trade networks.
At the same time, the UAE normalized relations with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords, further complicating its position in the regional conflict.
For Iran, this combination of military presence and geopolitical alignment makes the UAE more than just another Gulf state. It represents both a logistical hub for Western operations and a symbolic extension of the broader alliance confronting Tehran.
The Meme Reversal
As the war escalated, social media users began reinterpreting the original influencer slogan. The result was a wave of parody videos and memes replacing “Come to Dubai, Habibi” with “Run from Dubai, Habibi.”
Many clips juxtapose old influencer footage, featuring luxury cars, penthouses, and beaches, with new images of explosions, missile interceptions, or air-defense systems.
Some posts show influencers enthusiastically promoting Dubai’s safety, followed immediately by footage of intercepted missiles lighting up the night sky.
Others mock the silence of influencers who once promoted Dubai’s lifestyle but stopped posting as the conflict intensified. The meme has spread widely across TikTok, Instagram, and X, where users increasingly question the gap between online branding and geopolitical reality.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/from-come-to-dubai-habibi-to-run-from-dubai-war-reshapes-viral-meme/
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Fact Check: Where Is Netanyahu and Why Are Questions Spreading Online?
March 15, 2026
Iranian Statement Fuels Speculation
Questions about the whereabouts of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intensified after a statement by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The IRGC said in a statement on Saturday that it would continue pursuing the Israeli leader as part of its retaliation campaign. “If the criminal and child-killer Netanyahu is still alive, we will continue pursuing him until he receives his punishment,” the statement said.
The remark immediately triggered speculation online, with some commentators interpreting the phrasing as suggesting uncertainty about Netanyahu’s status.
However, the statement itself did not provide any evidence that Netanyahu had been harmed, and Iranian officials did not elaborate further.
Limited Public Appearances
Online discussions have focused on Netanyahu’s recent media presence.
The Israeli prime minister’s last clearly identifiable public appearance appears to date to early March, when a video was posted on his official social media accounts.
Since then, several statements have been released through Netanyahu’s X (formerly Twitter) account. These videos were filmed against neutral backgrounds without visible location markers, leading some observers to suggest they may have been pre-recorded.
However, such recording styles are common during wartime communications and do not by themselves indicate anything unusual.
Claims of AI-Generated Video
A separate online claim alleges that a video published on March 13 may have been generated using artificial intelligence.
The claim circulated widely on social media after viewers pointed to what they believed were visual irregularities.
At present, no credible forensic analysis or independent verification has confirmed that the video was AI-generated.
Media reports examining the claims have noted that viral speculation about altered videos or “deepfakes” has become common during wartime information campaigns.
Security Cabinet Absence Raises Questions
Additional speculation emerged after reports that a security cabinet meeting on March 14 was chaired by Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz.
Some commentators interpreted Netanyahu’s absence as unusual. However, wartime security meetings are often held under strict secrecy, and the Israeli government has not publicly explained the circumstances of that meeting.
There is also no confirmed evidence that Netanyahu was incapacitated or unable to perform his duties.
What We Actually Know
At this stage, publicly available evidence indicates:
Netanyahu continues to issue statements through official government channels and social media.
Iranian officials have threatened the Israeli prime minister but have not confirmed to have targeted or harmed him.
Online claims about AI-generated videos remain unverified.
No credible government or intelligence source has confirmed that Netanyahu is missing or dead.
Given the intense information warfare accompanying the regional conflict, analysts caution that rumors and manipulated narratives are likely to circulate widely.
Until verified information emerges from reliable sources, claims regarding Netanyahu’s disappearance or death remain unsubstantiated and cannot be independently confirmed or dismissed.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/fact-check-where-is-netanyahu-and-why-are-questions-spreading-online/\
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Annexation without a declaration- Israel’s quiet seizure of the West Bank
March 15, 2026
By Ranjan Solomon
Israel has not formally declared the annexation of the occupied West Bank. No dramatic parliamentary vote has proclaimed sovereignty over the territory. Yet on the ground, step by step, law by law, road by road, Israel is doing precisely that. Through administrative restructuring, settlement expansion, legal engineering and the steady displacement of Palestinians, the Israeli state is effectively absorbing large portions of the West Bank into its national system. It is annexation not by proclamation, but by practice.
This strategy—often described as creeping or de facto annexation—allows Israel to transform the political geography of the occupied territory while avoiding the diplomatic shockwaves that a formal declaration would trigger. But the consequences are no less profound. What is unfolding today is the systematic dismantling of the territorial basis for Palestinian statehood.
Administrative control becomes civilian governance
For decades, Israel maintained that the West Bank was administered by a military authority because it was occupied territory. That distinction, however thin, preserved the legal fiction that the occupation was temporary.
Recent changes are erasing that line.
Authority over key civilian functions in Area C—the 60 percent of the West Bank that remains under full Israeli control—has increasingly been transferred from military administrators to Israeli civilian ministries. These ministries now oversee land registration, planning approvals, infrastructure development and settlement administration. In practice, Israeli domestic governance structures are being extended into occupied territory.
When the institutions of the occupying state begin to govern the territory directly, the transformation from occupation to incorporation is already underway.
Settlements: The engine of territorial absorption
The most visible instrument of annexation remains the Israeli settlement enterprise.
More than 700,000 Israeli settlers now live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Over the past decade, the pace of settlement expansion has accelerated sharply. New housing units are approved in waves; informal outposts appear on hilltops and are later legalized; infrastructure networks link settlements seamlessly to cities inside Israel.
These settlements do not function as isolated communities. They are connected through highways, security zones, industrial parks and agricultural land allocations that bind them economically and administratively to Israel itself.
Under international law, the transfer of a state’s civilian population into occupied territory violates the Fourth Geneva Convention. Yet the settlement project continues to expand with the open support of powerful political factions inside Israel.
The result is a dense web of Israeli communities embedded across the West Bank landscape, fragmenting Palestinian territory into disconnected enclaves.
Land registration and legal transformation
One of the most consequential yet less widely understood developments is the resumption of land registration processes in the West Bank.
Land registration may appear technical, but it has immense political implications. By reclassifying large areas of land under Israeli legal categories—particularly “state land”—the process can transfer effective ownership and control away from Palestinian communities.
This legal restructuring is accompanied by changes that ease the purchase of Palestinian land by Israeli settlers. Laws that once restricted such transactions are being modified or repealed. In combination with the settlement expansion policies, these legal adjustments create the infrastructure for permanent territorial transfer.
Land, once reclassified, rarely returns to its original owners.
Infrastructure that redraws geography
Roads, tunnels and settlement corridors are quietly reshaping the map of the West Bank.
One particularly contentious project is the proposed settlement corridor linking Jerusalem to the large settlement bloc east of the city. If completed, this corridor would effectively divide the West Bank into northern and southern segments, cutting off Palestinian East Jerusalem from the rest of the territory.
Infrastructure of this kind does more than facilitate mobility. It establishes irreversible facts on the ground.
In geopolitical terms, infrastructure is destiny.
Violence and displacement
Alongside legal and administrative changes, Palestinians face increasing violence and displacement.
Reports from human rights organizations and humanitarian agencies document a sharp rise in attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian communities. Villages have been burned, agricultural land seized and residents harassed until entire communities abandon their homes.
At the same time, Palestinians face nearly insurmountable barriers when seeking building permits in Area C. Structures built without permits—often the only option available—are regularly demolished by Israeli authorities.
This combination of violence, demolition and legal pressure creates what observers describe as a “coercive environment.” The aim is rarely stated openly, but its effects are unmistakable: Palestinians are pushed off their land while Israeli control expands.
International law and global alarm
These developments have drawn widespread international condemnation.
Diplomats, legal scholars and multilateral institutions have warned that the cumulative effect of Israel’s policies constitutes a violation of international law and threatens any possibility of a negotiated peace.
Numerous governments have echoed similar concerns, warning that continued territorial absorption undermines the framework for a two-state solution.
Yet condemnation has rarely translated into effective pressure.
Strategic risks for Israel
While annexation may appear to strengthen Israel’s territorial position, it carries profound risks.
First, it deepens Israel’s diplomatic isolation. Even governments historically sympathetic to Israel face growing pressure from their publics to respond more forcefully to the occupation and settlement expansion.
Second, annexation exposes Israeli leaders and officials to increasing legal scrutiny in international courts. Allegations related to settlement expansion and population transfer are already the subject of legal investigations.
Third, annexation risks igniting wider instability. The West Bank remains politically volatile, and continued land seizures and displacement could trigger a new wave of Palestinian uprising. Such unrest would stretch Israel’s security apparatus already engaged in conflict on multiple fronts.
Finally, annexation threatens Israel’s own political future. If millions of Palestinians remain under Israeli control without citizenship or equal rights, the state will confront an unavoidable question: how long can a system of unequal political rights be sustained?
The Palestinian horizon narrows
For Palestinians, the implications are existential.
The gradual absorption of land erodes the territorial basis for statehood. Palestinian communities are confined to islands of limited autonomy surrounded by settlements, military zones and Israeli-controlled infrastructure.
Economic development becomes nearly impossible under such fragmentation. Movement restrictions, land confiscations and limited access to natural resources deepen dependency and poverty.
Most critically, the political horizon shrinks. Without land, sovereignty becomes a hollow promise.
The likely outcome
If current trends continue, the future will not resemble the two-state solution once envisioned in diplomatic negotiations.
A choice that cannot be deferred
Israel now stands at a historic crossroads.
It can continue expanding control over Palestinian territory, consolidating a system that much of the world views as unlawful and unjust. That path may yield short-term territorial gains but will almost certainly deepen international isolation and perpetuate cycles of violence.
Or Israel can recognize a harder truth: security built on permanent domination cannot endure.
Peace requires a fundamentally different course—one rooted in international law, political equality and genuine self-determination for Palestinians. Without such a shift, the quiet annexation of the West Bank may ultimately prove not a strategic triumph, but the beginning of a far deeper crisis for Israel and the region alike.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260315-annexation-without-a-declaration-israels-quiet-seizure-of-the-west-bank/
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The architects of post-truth: How Netanyahu and Trump are scripting the Apocalypse
March 15, 2026
By Dr Sahar Huneidi
For decades, American foreign policy was built on a hybrid of realism, self -interest and idealism. Today, it is being rebuilt on the hallucinatory terrain of a ‘post-truth’ era where Benjamin Netanyahu acts as the master architect. By framing a modern regional war as a biblical struggle against ‘Amalek’, Netanyahu has successfully aligned his own political survival with the fever dreams of American evangelical eschatology. It is a high-stakes strategy that offers Donald Trump exactly what he craves: a world where geopolitical strategy is replaced by a transactional theatre of ‘good versus evil,’ and where the machinery of the state is used as a personal shield against the accountability of facts. Together, they are no longer just fighting a war; they are inviting the Apocalypse to the negotiating table.
The key to understanding the current moment is recognising that these elements – evangelical end of times theology, Zionist expansionism, Trump’s transactional politics, and the post- truth information environment, are not merely parallel phenomena. They are symbiotic. Each feeds the other, creating a self-sustaining cycle of chaos that makes the dystopian feel normal.
And while the missiles dominate the headlines, the Epstein files are the unspoken context: a potential byproduct of a compromised leadership across the political spectrum. Their full release and their potential for blackmail would be catastrophic, not just for Trump, but for an entire network of elites who have spent years ensuring the truth stays buried. This war has now pushed every inconvenient story off the frontpage, and any congressional inquiries onto the back burner.
Narcissist incentives:
Trump’s need for adoration is clinical; his view of power is absolute. Everything is a deal: money, loyalty, missiles. He sees war not as a human tragedy, but as ratings, as distraction, as the thing that finally makes people stop talking about whatever scandal is currently circling his legal team. In Trump’s binary world, there are only winners and losers, good guys and bad guys. He speaks of the Middle East the way a fourth grader describes a video game: ‘we hit them hard’ he says, ‘they’re tough guys, but we’re tougher’. On a scale of 1 to 10 on how the Iran war was going in the first 48 hours, Trump stated it was 1 out of 15. On day nine, he said the war is ‘very complete, pretty much’, adding ‘We’ve already won in many ways, but we haven’t won enough’. As of 13th March, POTUS declared he would end the US/Israeli war on Iran ‘when I feel it in my bones’.
The vocabulary is simple and the syntax is stunted. Pundits have for years dismissed this as colourful rhetoric, but this is missing the point.
For a man who measures his worth in victories, the temptation is irresistible. He has already commented on 7th March that Iran had effectively ‘ surrendered’ and that ‘it is the first time that Iran has ever lost, in thousands of years, to surrounding Middle Eastern Countries.’
The master and his blueprint
Taking a step back, a different figure comes into focus. In 1982, an Israeli journalist and diplomat named Oded Yinon published an article in a Hebrew journal called Kivunim setting the strategy for Israel in the 1980s. Israel’s long term security and existence he maintained, depends on breaking up the Arab world into its constituent ethnic and sectarian parts – a Maronite state in Lebanon, a Druze state in southern Syria, a Kurdish entity in the north, an Alawite state on the coast, a Sunni leftover in between. A mosaic of weak, warring mini-states, none capable of challenging Israeli regional supremacy, which ‘naturalises’ a Jewish state in such a mosaic.
For decades this was dismissed as conspiracy theory. But Benjamin Netanyahu who entered politics in the same year the Yinon plan was published, has spent his career making this a reality. It has been argued that Yinon’s plan was adopted and refined in a 1996 policy document entitled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, written by a research group at the Israeli-affiliated Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Washington, led by the neoconservative Richard Perle.
Look at the map today: Iraq has been fragmented into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish entities. Syria is disjointing before our eyes, with Israeli forces entrenching well beyond the Golan heights, currently positioned 21-25 kilometres from Damascus. Lebanon, the original laboratory of this strategy, is a failed state consumed by sectarian paralysis. The plan was always on the shelf, waiting the moment.
A match made in hell
The dynamic between the two men is critical to understand. Netanyahu does not need Trump to understand the Yinon plan. He needs him to execute it without looking too closely at the details. And the exchange has been remarkably clear: Trump gets the ‘wins’ he craves, in return, Netanyahu’s lobby delivers the political muscle and campaign cash that keeps Trump’s coalition intact.
When Trump announced nuclear negotiations with Iran in April 2025, blindsiding Netanyahu during a Washington visit, it looked like betrayal. Within weeks, the strikes came anyway. The lesson was clear: Trump would pose for the cameras, but Netanyahu would get what he wanted. The master understands his instrument.
And when Netanyahu recently unveiled his ‘hexagon of alliances’ a fantasy coalition including Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and two unnamed Arab states, the press treated it as statesmanship, while analysts called it a ‘fantasy world’ and a ‘branding exercise’. No government has endorsed it. As Greece and Cyprus are members of the International Criminal Court, which has an arrest warrant for Netanyahu, they would be legally obliged to detain him. This is the bottom line: when an unhinged leader retreats into fantasy alliances that exist only in press releases, it is because the actual alliances are crumbling. Rather than forming alliances with Israel, Sunni majority states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have been coordinating diplomatically against Israeli aggression and moving away from previous normalisation trends. Nothing, however, prepared the public for the true bombshell.
The situation took a surreal turn when Netanyahu reportedly stated ‘I believe we all recognise the fact that we will reach the kingdom. We will make it to the return of the Messiah, but this will not happen next Thursday.’
The fog
None of this would be possible without a fourth layer of this catastrophe: the complete collapse of a shared factual reality. We are living in Orwell’s 1984, where the past is constantly rewritten and the present is what whatever the last headline said. Trump’s ‘alternative facts’, his very own Ministry of Truth Social and the sheer speed of the news cycle create a memory hole. Yesterday’s Epstein story is buried by today’s Iran strike. Today’s civilian casualties are buried by tomorrow’s diplomatic summit. The public cannot keep up, cannot verify, and eventually stops trying.
The fog allows all three groups to operate without accountability. The evangelicals see miracles. The strategist high priest sees his blueprint materialising. The narcissist sees winning headlines. And the rest of the world sees chaos and turns away, unable to distinguish fact from fiction, prophecy from policy, strategy from madness.
The reckoning
Will it work? Can Netanyahu succeed in fragmenting the entire region into sectarian statelets, with a ‘Greater Israel’ sitting securely at the centre?
The evidence suggests otherwise. The strikes on Iran have not eliminated its nuclear program, they have driven it underground. The genocidal devastation of Gaza has not produced security; it has produced a generation of orphans who will remember exactly who killed their parents. The unrelenting aggression on all fronts has not produced allies, rather the opposite.
Trump’s declining popularity and constant need for validation are liabilities, not strengths. A president fighting for his political survival is unpredictable. When the reckoning arrives, – and it will- historians will trace the arc from Netanyahu’s phone calls stroking Trump’s gullible ego, to AIPAC’s cash flooding American elections, to the bodies piling up in Gaza, Beirut and Iran. They will ask how the strongest nation on earth allowed its military and foreign policy to be outsourced to a foreign leader’s disturbed fantasies.
We are not watching a master plan unfold. We are watching a psychological case study, a theological fever dream, and a colonial project collide in real time. The architect believes he can control the forces he has unleashed. The narcissist believes the victories are his own. The prophets believe they are witnessing the end of days.
The rest of us are left to pick up the pieces, unsure if we are living through history or the end of it. If there is a glimmer of hope amidst all this insanity, it is that the Netanyahu /Trump fantasies are so messy, so self-contradictory, so obviously detached from reality that people are refusing to live in them.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260315-the-architects-of-post-truth-how-netanyahu-and-trump-are-scripting-the-apocalypse/
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Quiet advantage: What Russia and China may gain from US-Iran war
BY BASEL HAJ JASEM
MAR 16, 2026
At first glance, a military confrontation involving the U.S., Israel and Iran appears to be a conflict largely confined to the Middle East. Indeed, the immediate consequences would likely be felt most intensely across the region through security instability, economic disruption and shifting alliances. Yet wars of this scale rarely remain regional in their strategic impact. Beyond the visible front lines, the geopolitical ripple effects would reach far into the global balance of power, particularly affecting how Russia and China position themselves in the evolving international order.
In the early stages of such a conflict, it might seem that both Moscow and Beijing stand to lose. Iran has become an important partner for each in different ways. For China, Iran represents a significant source of energy supply and an important node in the broader infrastructure and connectivity networks that Beijing has promoted across Eurasia. For Russia, cooperation with Iran has deepened in recent years, particularly in the context of Moscow’s war in Ukraine, where Iranian-made drones have reportedly played a role in Russian military operations. From this perspective, any serious weakening of Iran or instability that undermines its state structure could deprive both powers of a useful strategic partner.
However, geopolitical outcomes are rarely so straightforward. If the conflict were to expand or drag on for an extended period, the broader strategic picture could look very different. A prolonged confrontation in the Middle East would inevitably demand substantial American military, financial and diplomatic resources. The U.S. would likely need to reinforce regional deployments, strengthen air and missile defenses, protect shipping lanes, and maintain a sustained operational presence across several theaters.
Modern warfare is extraordinarily resource-intensive. Precision-guided munitions, air defense interceptors, surveillance platforms and logistical infrastructure are consumed at a pace that few peacetime planners anticipate. Recent conflicts have demonstrated how quickly even large stockpiles can be depleted once large-scale military operations begin. If Washington were drawn deeply into another extended military commitment in the Middle East, the strain on its military inventory and operational planning could become significant.
Losers and winners of the war
For Russia, such a shift could bring indirect advantages. Western support for Ukraine has relied heavily on American military assistance, particularly in the supply of ammunition, air defense systems and other advanced capabilities. If the U.S. found itself diverting a meaningful share of these resources to another theater, the scale or speed of aid to Kyiv could face new constraints. Even a modest slowdown in Western military support might provide Moscow with strategic breathing space on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.
China, meanwhile, would likely view such a scenario through a different but equally strategic lens. Beijing has long been attentive to how the U.S. manages complex military operations and balances commitments across multiple regions. Any large-scale conflict involving American forces provides a rare opportunity for careful observation. Military planners in Beijing would study operational patterns, logistical vulnerabilities and the performance of advanced weapon systems under real combat conditions.
Beyond the purely military dimension, there is also a broader strategic calculation. For several years, Washington’s strategic focus has increasingly shifted toward the Indo-Pacific, where competition with China is widely seen as the defining geopolitical contest of the coming decades. The U.S. has strengthened alliances, expanded regional military cooperation and invested diplomatic energy in counterbalancing China’s growing influence.
If Washington were forced to devote greater attention and resources to a major conflict in the Middle East, that shift could slow or complicate its strategic reorientation toward Asia. Even without a dramatic policy change, the practical demands of managing a new war could dilute the intensity of American engagement in the Indo-Pacific. For Beijing, any reduction in pressure along its immediate strategic periphery from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea would be carefully noted.
Necessarily cautious
At the same time, both Russia and China would likely proceed with caution. Neither power has an interest in becoming directly entangled in a military confrontation with the U.S. over Iran. China in particular remains deeply integrated into the global economy, with extensive trade and financial ties to Western markets. An overt military alignment with Tehran against Washington and its allies could carry significant economic risks for Beijing, potentially jeopardizing the stability that underpins China’s continued growth.
Moreover, despite its expanding global influence, China still maintains only a limited military presence in the Middle East. While Beijing has developed economic partnerships and infrastructure projects throughout the region, it has not built the kind of security architecture that would allow it to play a decisive military role in a regional war. As a result, China’s most likely approach would be one of cautious observation, protecting its economic interests, advocating diplomatic solutions, and avoiding direct involvement in hostilities.
Russia faces a more complex calculation. Its political and military cooperation with Iran has deepened in recent years, yet Moscow is also aware that its strategic priorities remain concentrated in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin would need to balance its interest in maintaining partnerships in the Middle East with the potential benefits that might arise from a shift in American attention elsewhere.
Another factor that deserves attention lies in the technological and industrial foundations of modern warfare. Contemporary conflicts depend heavily on global supply chains that include semiconductors, advanced manufacturing components, rare earth minerals and sophisticated electronic systems. Many of these supply chains remain deeply interconnected with China’s industrial capacity.
In the event of a prolonged conflict involving Western militaries, the strain on these supply networks could become more visible. Increased demand for high-tech components and strategic materials might expose vulnerabilities within the global defense industrial ecosystem. In such circumstances, China’s central role in global manufacturing, especially in areas indirectly connected to defense production, could become a source of strategic leverage.
This does not mean that Beijing would seek confrontation. On the contrary, Chinese policymakers have consistently emphasized stability as a prerequisite for economic development. Yet structural advantages within global supply chains may quietly shape the balance of power over time, particularly during periods of prolonged geopolitical tension.
What will pragmatism bring?
It is also worth remembering that both Russia and China tend to approach international politics with a pragmatic outlook. If internal political changes were to occur in Iran as a result of conflict or instability, neither Moscow nor Beijing would necessarily remain tied to a specific political leadership in Tehran. Historically, both powers have shown a willingness to adapt quickly to new political realities, prioritizing the preservation of strategic and economic interests over ideological alignment.
In this sense, the broader geopolitical consequences of a war involving Iran could prove far more complex than initial impressions suggest. While Tehran might bear the immediate costs of military confrontation, the indirect effects could reshape the strategic environment in ways that extend well beyond the Middle East.
The paradox is striking. A conflict that appears at first to weaken a network of states loosely aligned against Western influence could, under certain conditions, produce dynamics that ultimately benefit those same powers. If a prolonged war were to absorb American attention, stretch military resources, and complicate Washington’s global priorities, the strategic landscape could gradually shift in ways that favor competitors operating outside the immediate battlefield.
History has repeatedly shown that the outcomes of wars are not determined solely by victories or losses on the front lines. Often, the most significant geopolitical consequences unfold in the quieter arenas of resource allocation, strategic focus and long-term power competition. In such a scenario, the most consequential winners may not be the countries directly involved in the fighting, but those observing carefully from a distance, waiting for the balance of global attention to tilt in their favor.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/quiet-advantage-what-russia-and-china-may-gain-from-us-iran-war
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