Middle East Press On: Iran's Battle, Strait of Hormuz, Kuwait, Yemen, US-Israel Ties, Saudi Arabia, US Nuclear Deal, Trump, JD Vance’s Israel, New Age Islam's Selection, 23 July 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
23 July 2026
Cost of compromise: US, Iran's battle across borders and within
Oslo on the Strait of Hormuz
Iran moves the battle to Kuwait and Yemen
The Collapse of the Bipartisan Consensus over US-Israel Ties
Saudi Arabia Wins Long-Sought US Nuclear Deal as Trump Drops Israel Condition
The Toxic Israel Brand: JD Vance’s Israel Comments Reflect Much Deeper Shift
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Cost of compromise: US, Iran's battle across borders and within
by Oral Toğa
Jul 23, 2026
In mid-July, the United States resumed strikes on Iranian territory, sustaining them night after night. Iran has answered with missile and drone attacks on the Gulf states hosting American forces. Commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz has effectively ground to a halt, and war-risk insurance premiums have climbed to as much as 10% of a vessel's value. All of this has unfolded barely a month after a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in Islamabad on June 17. Yet, military moves alone do not explain the trajectory. None of the signatory capitals can muster the political will to defend the text to its own public.
The Islamabad MoU is a 14-point interim framework that halted the war. It provides for a 60-day negotiation timetable, the lifting of the blockade, free transit through the Strait of Hormuz, a large reconstruction fund, and the downblending of uranium stockpiles. Yet it did not resolve the parties' most critical disputes. It postponed them.
Mutual accusations of violations surfaced within the first week. In late June, Iranian missiles struck bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. In early July, commercial tankers were hit in the Gulf, and the U.S. hit back with strikes on more than 80 targets. U.S. President Donald Trump declared that war with Iran was about to resume on July 7. Tehran suspended its obligations on July 13. Even so, the two sides have not entirely severed the technical contacts running through Qatari and Pakistani mediation.
Strategies, aims at battlefield
Target selection on the ground points to a systematic purpose beyond punishment. The U.S. first destroyed the coastal radar, anti-ship missile and fast-attack-craft infrastructure, then turned to the bridges and rail lines connecting Bandar Abbas to the interior. A naval blockade and an attempt to impose transit fees on the strait have accompanied the strikes. The real contest, then, is not whether the strait stays open but who sets the rules of passage.
Iran's response follows a similar logic. Tehran has targeted American radar and logistics infrastructure across the region, making the host countries feel the war's cost. Because neither side can sell a step back at home, the escalation feeds itself.
Signals about the next threshold can also be read from the field. Trump has said he is saving energy infrastructure for last but will ultimately strike it. Options reportedly under discussion in Washington include seizing Iranian islands near the strait and hitting the underground nuclear complex near Natanz. That nuclear facilities have gone untouched in the current wave suggests, for now, a pressure instrument held in reserve rather than active preparation. Yet reports that dozens of additional aerial refueling aircraft are moving to the region, Israel among the destinations, suggest the groundwork for an operation reaching deep into the country.
The balance of capacity matters, too. Iran's ballistic missile stockpile, counted in the thousands before the war, is assessed to be seriously depleted, its launchers and production base substantially destroyed. Tehran is working to accelerate production, but the gap between expenditure and replacement is widening. Iran cannot sustain this tempo indefinitely. At the same time, a closed Hormuz imposes costs on everyone through global energy markets, a sign that Washington does not have unlimited time either.
Conflicting groups in Iran
Understanding Tehran requires looking at the leadership transition as much as the war. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not appeared in public since his father's death, making his will known through written messages. In endorsing the MoU, he noted that he thought differently but gave his permission, a position that shields him from responsibility for the outcome. In early July, he defined revenge as the will of the nation. In mid-July, he dismissed Trump's signature as worthless. When the office that authorized diplomacy erodes that channel's legitimacy, the negotiating team is left defenseless.
That team is operating in a shrinking space. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has defended the process while keeping the door ajar, saying there is no point in staying bound to a text from which Iran does not benefit. President Masoud Pezeshkian faced slogans denouncing compromise at the funeral ceremonies, where Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was physically assaulted. What keeps them at the table is, above all, the economy. Official warnings that basic goods will run short if sanctions and the blockade persist have turned negotiation from a preference into a necessity. Indeed, the technical contacts in Doha in early July took up a channel for handling violations and a partial release of frozen assets.
At the center of the opposing camp stand the Paydari front and the wing gathered around fundamentalist Saeed Jalili. This bloc has cast the MoU as capitulation from the outset, insisting Washington never intended to implement it. Lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian leaked the text to the press before it was signed, accused the negotiators of overstepping the Supreme Leader's lines and openly asked whether a coup was underway. The loss of his seat on parliament's National Security Commission in mid-July is read as a sign of the leadership's resolve to contain this wing. The hardline press campaign against the negotiators, the harsh statements from Assembly of Experts members and the parliamentary bill asserting full sovereignty over Hormuz are instruments of the same campaign. The funerals in early July likewise became its show of strength, with slogans of vengeance rising from crowds of millions.
This is not merely a choice between war and diplomacy. Beneath it runs a struggle over who will hold sway in the post-Khamenei order. The hardline wing, lacking access to the new Supreme Leader, is uneasy that decision-making has concentrated in the visible troika of Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian and Araghchi. As the conservative mainstream drifts toward the negotiators, the fear of marginalization in these circles deepens. The coup rhetoric is less a statement of fact than an expression of that fear. There is a paradox here as well. Every American strike on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)' s naval assets weakens the hardliners' instruments, yet the same strikes confirm their thesis that the MoU cannot be trusted.
Domestic pressure in US, Israel
The domestic politics feeding escalation is not unique to Tehran. In Washington, the officials leading the negotiations favor keeping the talks alive, while the security establishment argues for more pressure. The war powers debate in Congress continues, and both chambers have passed resolutions calling for the withdrawal of forces. Polls show support for the war down to around a third, and the questioning comes not only from the opposition but from the media circles that carried Trump to power.
This widening dissent pushes the administration into a narrative that places responsibility on Tehran. The death of two American soldiers in a missile strike on a base in Jordan, the first such losses since March, has moved the debate into a new phase. It strengthens both the pressure for a hard response and the hand of those questioning the war's cost. The White House, even amid the losses, has kept stressing that the door to negotiation remains open.
In Israel, the calendar is decisive. With parliament dissolved, the country heads to elections in late October, and the opposition presents the MoU as a failure that did not durably curb Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the war is not over and signaled readiness for a new wave of strikes.
Washington, for its part, has run the current campaign without involving Israel, though the refueling aircraft now heading its way suggest that distance may not last. Arab capitals are reported to be pressing Washington ever more openly for regional de-escalation. The hardening rhetoric of a government under electoral pressure forms the escalation's third layer.
The MoU did not solve the underlying problems. It froze them. Combined with domestic balances that punish compromise and reward intransigence, those frozen problems have flared up again.
Four indicators are worth watching. The first is whether the strikes cross the threshold of energy and nuclear infrastructure. The second is whether the coastal campaign heralds an amphibious operation. The severed bridges around Bandar Abbas, the layered dismantling of coastal defenses and the landing forces moved into the region largely match what an operation against the strait's islands would require. Whether that preparation has hardened into a decision will show in final-phase steps, such as minesweepers moving toward the strait. The third is whether the mediation channel functions again. The fourth is whether Tehran's suspension, which for now stops short of formal withdrawal, becomes permanent. The real question is not whether the MoU can be saved. It is whether an agreement that now costs more to defend than to break can still stand in any of the three capitals.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/cost-of-compromise-us-irans-battle-across-borders-and-within
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Oslo on the Strait of Hormuz
July 22, 2026
by Junaid S. Ahmad
The most successful peace processes are often those that allow the stronger party to continue the war under diplomatic cover.
Not for those beneath the aircraft. Not for the states ordered to negotiate while under attack. But extremely constructive for empire, which has perfected the art of converting aggression into procedure and coercion into statesmanship.
The emerging American-Iranian “peace process” belongs to this tradition of organised fraud.
A Pakistan-brokered, 14-point memorandum was presented as a path toward ending hostilities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, suspending attacks, and negotiating a durable settlement. Within weeks, the United States resumed strikes across Iran. Tehran retaliated against American military infrastructure and regional facilities used to sustain Washington’s war machine. The diplomats continued talking. The missiles continued flying.
This is not diplomacy failing. This is diplomacy doing its job.
The bulldozer advanced. The communiqué regretted.
Washington now offers Tehran the same poisoned chalice: suspend your momentum, surrender your leverage, enter an endless process, and trust the empire that is bombing you to define what “de-escalation” means.
In the imperial dictionary, American violence is never violence. It is “deterrence,” “force protection,” “stabilisation,” or some other phrase embalmed in Pentagon varnish. Israeli violence enjoys the same miraculous purification. Occupation becomes security. Siege becomes self-defence. Mass killing becomes an operational necessity. The victims, meanwhile, are accused of escalation the moment they refuse to die quietly.
Empire’s greatest privilege is not military superiority. It is control over chronology. History begins when the target retaliates.
The memorandum’s asymmetry is therefore not accidental. Iran is expected to prove good faith materially: restrain its forces, facilitate shipping, limit retaliation, and enter negotiations over sanctions, reconstruction, regional security, and its nuclear program. Washington proves good faith rhetorically, usually while refuelling the aircraft.
Negotiations become a waiting room in which the besieged are ordered to sit patiently while the empire rearranges the battlefield.
The Israeli precedent makes the danger unmistakable. For decades, Israel has negotiated precisely as it wages war: to gain time, divide opponents, neutralize pressure, and convert temporary advantage into permanent domination. Its “peace process” with the Palestinians was never designed to end colonialism. It was designed to make colonialism
administratively respectable.
Washington learned the lesson well because Washington financed it. The choice of Switzerland for subsequent talks merely perfects the obscenity. Imperial violence has always preferred beautiful scenery. There is something reassuringly civilized about discussing missile strikes beneath snow-covered mountains while people elsewhere are
reduced to ash. The coffee is excellent. The language is measured. The corpses, mercifully, remain offstage.
From Oslo to the Alps, the scenery changes. The choreography does not.
Iran should negotiate, but it should not confuse negotiation with peace. States negotiate because war is costly and strategy requires flexibility. The question is whether talks restrain coercion or merely reorganize it. A process that permits one side to bomb, sanction, blockade, threaten, and sabotage while demanding “confidence-building
measures” from the other is not diplomacy.
It is war translated into bureaucratic prose.
Oslo’s warning is brutal: what empire cannot destroy militarily, it will attempt to dissolve procedurally. The Palestinians entered Oslo with an uprising and emerged with an authority compelled to administer fragments of their own dispossession. Iran must not enter negotiations possessing deterrence and emerge possessing minutes from meetings.
The United States will continue bombing in the name of peace because contradiction is the operating system of empire. It destroys a facility on Monday, demands restraint on Tuesday, and convenes talks on Wednesday about Iran’s troubling lack of trust. The satire writes itself. The dead cannot laugh.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260722-oslo-on-the-strait-of-hormuz/
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Iran moves the battle to Kuwait and Yemen
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
July 22, 2026
On the ground, the Iranian regime has begun executing its threats to expand the conflict by igniting two new border fronts. The first is in the southern Red Sea, threatening to close the Bab Al-Mandab Strait via the Houthis. The second is in the northern Arabian Gulf, through direct and unprecedented threats aimed at Kuwait.
The gravity of this shift is not confined to Kuwait or the Red Sea; it extends to the entire regional security architecture. Iran is no longer limiting the confrontation to its original adversaries, the US and Israel, but is instead shifting the conflict toward neighboring countries and strategic waterways. This behavior does not represent a defensive reaction as much as it reflects a strategic trajectory that the Iranian military project has been building for decades, grounded in expanding its influence and geopolitical control over surrounding nations.
Statements issued by Iranian institutions warrant close attention, as the intensity of threats against Kuwait has escalated. The Tasnim news agency has released statements that closely mirror those issued by Baghdad prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Tehran cites the limited American military presence in Kuwait as a pretext for an attack, completely ignoring the fact that this presence dates back decades and serves primarily as a deterrent against any potential invasion, rather than acting as a major base for the recent US operations against Iran.
The question raised today is: how can Kuwait, and the Gulf states along with it, deal with this threat?
The challenge surpasses individual national capabilities and demands a return to the concept of collective action, through building a cohesive regional front backed by an international alliance that explicitly rejects any pretexts for expanding the war or legitimizing aggression against neighboring countries.
While Washington, amid its preoccupation with managing the military confrontation, may not be expected to lead the diplomatic initiative, it can draw clear red lines confirming that the security of the Gulf and its maritime waterways falls within its vital strategic interests. Iran has not confined itself to verbal threats against Kuwait; rather, it has repeatedly struck water and electricity facilities and expanded the circle of threat to include Bahrain as well.
It appears that Tehran realizes that the tightening naval blockade on its ports, along with the potential expansion of US operations along its coastlines, could strip it of its influence over the Strait of Hormuz — the most critical leverage it has utilized in both the war and the negotiations. Consequently, it is attempting to manufacture alternative leverage. Among these efforts is transforming Bab Al-Mandab into a strategic blackmail point through the Houthis and seeking to impose a new security reality in the northern Gulf — an attempt that invokes, despite differing circumstances, some features of the fait accompli policy pursued by Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1990.
It is notable that Iran’s behavior has become cyclical; whenever it loses a strategic card, it hastens to open a new front to reproduce its tools of pressure and blackmail. To mitigate the political and legal costs, and to avoid appearing as a direct aggressor state, it is highly likely to rely more heavily on its regional proxies, such as the Yemeni and Iraqi militias.
What are the prospects of success for this new Iranian positioning?
The answer is not easy because analyzing Iranian behavior cannot rely solely on assumptions of traditional rationality. The Iranian leadership also faces complex domestic equations and it fears that any impression of defeat could destabilize its internal position, after spending the country’s resources for decades on building military capabilities and financing wars.
It appears that the Houthis in Yemen have been tasked with transforming Bab Al-Mandab into an operational alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, given Iran’s declining ability to use the latter as leverage due to American military strikes. With the Houthis already rushing to threaten navigation, Yemeni forces — alongside the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen — are highly likely to find regional and international support to prevent the disruption of one of the world’s most vital trade arteries.
The expected response is not confined to the military dimension; rather, the diplomatic arena could be wider on this specific front. Major powers relying on navigation in the Red Sea — foremost among them China and India, in addition to European nations — possess a direct interest in ensuring freedom of navigation. Consequently, any military action aimed at ending the Houthi threat to the maritime waterway may enjoy a broader international consensus because it would be a defense of the principle of international freedom of navigation, rather than an extension of the ongoing war in the Gulf.
In any case, building this regional and international bloc is no longer a political option. It has become a strategic necessity — not only to confront current threats but also to deal with any arrangements that the outcomes of the war may impose in the future.
Iran is not merely seeking to manage a temporary crisis; rather, it is attempting to redraw the strategic map of the region according to its new narrative so that it emerges from the war, even if it stops early, with zones of influence and rules of engagement different from those that existed before the war. Consequently, the discussion is no longer just about how to end the war but about the shape of the regional order that will form next.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2651921
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The Collapse of the Bipartisan Consensus over US-Israel Ties
July 23, 2026
By Dan Steinbock
For decades, US support for Israel rested on one of Washington’s strongest bipartisan assumptions: that military assistance was strategically necessary and politically untouchable. But Gaza has weakened that consensus.
Critics now see Israeli military aid as a misguided strategy and political target. The most visible shift has occurred inside the Democratic Party.
A Collapsing Bipartisan Consensus on Israel
Driven by voter and demographic shifts, humanitarian concerns in Gaza, and the unwarranted conflict with Iran, more than 100 House Democrats recently supported an amendment seeking to block billions of dollars in Israel-related assistance, an extraordinary departure from previous voting patterns.
House Democratic leadership (including Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries) has officially called for a “major reset” in US-Israel relations.
Senate efforts to restrict weapons transfers have also attracted substantial Democratic support, reflecting growing concern about civilian casualties, international law, and US responsibility.
The Republican coalition is also less unified than before. While most Republican lawmakers remain strongly supportive of Israel, MAGA-aligned figures influenced by anti-interventionism, “America First” priorities, and skepticism toward foreign aid have increasingly questioned open-ended commitments.
Growing opposition within the MAGA movement to US arms transfers centers on a deep ideological rift over foreign interventionism. Former Georgia Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene left office in January 2026 after a bitter falling out with President Trump.
While much of the base supports President Trump’s foreign policy, a growing, vocal faction—backed by prominent voices like Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, and Representative Thomas Massie—challenges continued, unconditional weapons shipments.
The result is a new political landscape: traditional pro-Israel Democrats, evangelical conservatives, progressive Democrats, libertarian Republicans, and anti-interventionist conservatives now approach the issue from fundamentally different premises.
The debate is therefore no longer simply “pro-Israel versus anti-Israel.” It concerns whether US strategic interests, domestic law, international obligations, and humanitarian concerns can continue to be reconciled under existing policy.
From Political Controversy to Legal Challenges
At the same time, legal initiatives accusing US officials of complicity or failure to prevent alleged Israeli violations have moved the debate from politics into courts, international institutions, and questions of historical accountability.
The legal debate has developed along several tracks. The most significant US case was Defense for Children International–Palestine v. Biden, brought by Palestinian organizations, Gaza residents, and Palestinian-Americans against President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, for their alleged “failure to prevent and complicity in the unfolding genocide against Gaza.”
Along with the human rights organizations, the lawsuit was promoted by Josh Paul who had resigned from the US State Department over arms shipments to Israel; Jewish Voice for Peace; and genocide and Holocaust scholars spearheaded by international lawyer William Schabas.
The plaintiffs proposed that a genocide, or serious risk of genocide, of Palestinians in Gaza was occurring. They also argued the US is violating its duties under international law to prevent and not be complicit in the genocide. Those US failures were seen to contribute to the erosion of “long and widely held norms of international law,” including the Genocide Convention and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Palestine et al. v. Biden et al. case was dismissed by the US Court with a ruling that “while it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide,” US foreign policy was a political question over which courts lacked jurisdiction. In a written decision, US District Judge Jeffrey White quoted approvingly from a prior preliminary ruling (by the ICJ in the case brought against Israel by South Africa). It found Israel’s conduct in Gaza may amount to genocide and ordered it to stop killing and wounding Palestinians.
Other initiatives include advocacy and legal campaigns by groups such as Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), which warned US officials that continued assistance after awareness of alleged violations could raise questions of aiding and abetting.
DAWN wanted the ICC to investigate Biden, Blinken, and Austin for violating Articles 25(3)(c) and (d) of the Rome Statute. These crimes featured those identified in the ICC arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Intriguingly, the DAWN submission widened the net of “accessorial liability” to include several other US officials as well.
More recently, DAWN and allied organizations have also challenged the Trump administration’s measures targeting ICC-related advocacy.
Genocide scholar William Schabas and other international-law experts have supported arguments that third-party states may face responsibility if they knowingly facilitate atrocities. In the mainstream corporate media, these remain contested (though increasingly popular) legal interpretations. Yet, the latter have expanded the debate beyond Israel itself to states providing weapons, diplomatic protection, or political cover.
Biden Cabinet’s Accessorial Liability
Critics of the Biden administration argue that responsibility cannot be limited to the president alone. They point to a broader decision-making network involving arms transfers, diplomatic protection, intelligence coordination, and political messaging.
During her failed presidential campaign, Vice President Kamala Harris touted her readiness for executive responsibility by supporting continued military aid to Israel. Although she acknowledged that Gaza was a “humanitarian catastrophe,” she said that she would not shift policy from Biden. Nor would she end arms sales to Israel.
The role of Secretary of State Antony Blinken was most critical because he served as Biden’s right-hand in the Middle East and led the administration’s (largely futile) diplomacy in the region. The State Department oversees diplomatic relations, arms approvals, and implementation of human-rights-related foreign assistance standards.
US military support relied on his subordinates who failed to raise the alarm on the use of arms transfers to Israel in disregard of US foreign policy, domestic legal standards, and international obligations, including Bonnie Jenkins, the Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security, and Stanley L. Brown, acting as Assistant Secretary Political-Military Affairs, which coordinates between the State and Defense Departments on arms transfers and oversees the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
Along with Blinken, the Pentagon had a vital role. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and senior officials were involved because the Department manages military assistance and security cooperation. Israel’s military support relied on senior officials like Amanda Dory, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who provided strategic direction for international arms sales, and Mike Miller, as Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Other officials identified by critics include National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who advised the President on the strategic implications of arms transfers and ensured coordination between defense, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies. In turn, UN Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield had a high-profile role in the UN Security Council. She vetoed seven resolutions calling for immediate ceasefire, humanitarian assistance and limits to Israeli attacks against civilians. She was the public face of a cabinet that was more willing to finance arms for genocide than to end the atrocities.
As Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen may look like a gentle grandmother, but she also pledged the US could afford to offer huge amounts of military aid to Ukraine and Israel at the same time, enabling the ceaseless flow of arms in both wars. She warned Iran that nothing was “off the table” for sanctions if Tehran were to be linked to the Hamas-led attack on Israel.
Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo oversaw dual-use technology exports. CIA Director William J. Burner and the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines were intimately linked with the Biden cabinet’s actions regarding Gaza.
So, in addition to the big three and the supportive six members of the Biden cabinet, the widening net of accessorial liability includes at least half a dozen other heads of executive departments and some ten cabinet-level officials.
The legal question is not whether every official who supported policy decisions shares identical responsibility. The narrower issue is whether individuals who knowingly continued, facilitated, or defended policies that allegedly contributed to unlawful acts and mass atrocities could or should face political, reputational, or legal consequences.
Historically, accountability after mass atrocities has increasingly examined not only battlefield actors but also the widening web of political leaders, administrators, financiers, and institutions that enable military campaigns.
Are Mass Atrocities Crimes without Punishment?
In Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov thought he was above ordinary morality. Since some are destined to rise beyond good and evil for a higher purpose, he commits a murder but discovers that he will gain no salvation without atonement. Raskolnikov’s unraveling reveals a deeper truth. No mind, no matter how brilliant, can erase its own humanity.
But perhaps things have changed since Dostoyevsky.
After leaving office, many senior Biden officials moved into academia, consulting, publishing, advisory boards, and policy institutions. Today they pontificate on their great achievements in the Biden cabinet.
After leaving office on January 20, 2025, former President Joe Biden has been writing his White House memoir. Thanks to a deal with Creative Artists Agency (CAA), a Hollywood giant, he hopes to cash in on future opportunities. He has made only selective public appearances due to ongoing treatment for prostate cancer.
Having served as Biden’s echo chamber on Gaza, Vice-President Kamala Harris moved to Los Angeles with her family. Like Biden, she, too, signed with CAA to focus on speaking and publishing.
Former State Secretary Blinken entered the policy and academic circuit. He has a book deal with Crown Publishing. The memoir promises to provide a “candid” and “rare glimpse” of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza. Blinken is likely hoping a new post in a post-Trump Democratic administration or a return to lucrative private sector consulting.
Former Defense Secretary Austin has also returned to defense-policy and advisory circles. Prior to the Biden White House, he earned seven figures from defense companies, while working alongside Blinken at Pine Island Capital Partners, a private equity firm investing in defense companies. In summer 2025, he rejoined the Carnegie Corp., while launching a consulting firm, Clarion Strategies, with former NATO officials. As CEO and co-founder, he now stood to benefit from the global defense industry.
Jake Sullivan, the former National Security Advisor, joined Harvard Kennedy School as the inaugural Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order. After the Gaza genocide, he teaches international affairs and global strategy.
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the public face of the Biden cabinet in the UN, works as a senior advisor at the global advisory and advocacy firm APCO Worldwide. Over the years, APCO’s multiple controversies include corporate campaigns for the tobacco industry, lobbying for foreign governments with poor human rights records, ties to Israeli defense contractors, and investigations into spying on journalists.
Gina Raimondo, former Secretary of Commerce, joined the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) as a distinguished fellow, co-chairing a task force on economic security.
After her role in arms transfers to Israel and the Gaza genocide, Bonnie Jenkins serves as a visiting professor of international affairs at George Washington University. Specializing in security assistance, weapons destruction, and international security operations, Stanley Brown continues to do what he did during the Gaza genocide.
Janet Yellen, William Burns, and other former officials transitioned into advisory, institutional, or private-sector roles.
Supporters argue these transitions reflect normal democratic circulation between government, academia, and policy institutions. Critics say they demonstrate a structural problem. Officials involved in controversial foreign-policy decisions often face limited consequences and can continue operating within elite networks. Revolving doors between the White House and the private sector compound the problem.
The broader issue is institutional rather than personal. If officials who design or defend disputed policies face no meaningful review, future administrations are likely to conclude that reputational costs are manageable and legal risks minimal.
The Trump Escalation
The second Trump administration has transformed the Gaza debate from a question of US military support into a broader confrontation over the limits of executive power, international law, and American responsibility for allied conduct.
Critics argue that President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Mike Waltz, ex-Security Adviser and current US Ambassador to the UN, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have moved beyond Biden-era policies by rejecting many external constraints on US and Israeli actions.
On Gaza, the Trump administration has supported positions that critics describe as facilitating potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, or forced displacement.
The most controversial proposal was Trump’s suggestion that the US could take control of Gaza and relocate its Palestinian population — a plan critics argued raised serious questions under international humanitarian law, while supporters presented it as a reconstruction and security initiative.
As the Trump administration pursued policies hostile to international accountability mechanisms, the confrontation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) became a defining issue. Trump issued Executive Order 14203 imposing sanctions and other restrictions on ICC officials involved in investigations affecting US personnel or Israeli officials, arguing that the Court had acted illegitimately against American sovereignty and its allies.
Critics argue that attacking the ICC while shielding Israeli officials facing allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity severely risks weakening global accountability mechanisms.
In Iran and the wider Middle East, the administration adopted a “maximum-pressure” strategy, restoring sanctions and intensifying efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, regional networks, and military capabilities. Critics warn that escalation policies — including support for Israeli military actions against Iran and threats of overwhelming retaliation — risk expanding regional warfare, generating new civilian harm and participating in war crimes and mass atrocities.
The central legal argument against the administration is not that every official personally committed crimes, but that senior policymakers may incur political or legal exposure if they knowingly authorize, facilitate, or shield actions that violate international humanitarian law.
The historical question is whether these policies will be remembered as necessary exercises of state power — or as a precedent where a great power increasingly exempts itself and its partners from the rules they claim to defend.
Collapse of Credibility
The central question is whether controversial wartime policies become temporary exceptions or permanent precedents. If extensive civilian harm, unrestricted weapons transfers, collective punishment allegations, or attacks on the accountability of institutions become politically acceptable, the consequences will extend beyond Gaza.
The United States has historically promoted international legal norms with strategic exceptions. The Gaza debate exposes that contradiction more sharply than many previous conflicts because Washington is simultaneously a military supplier, presumed diplomatic protector, and global advocate of a “rules-based order.”
The ultimate issue is therefore the collapse of US institutional credibility, due to the fatal gap between Washington’s stated values and observable events.
There is no return to status quo ante Gaza.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-collapse-of-the-bipartisan-consensus-over-us-israel-ties/
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Saudi Arabia Wins Long-Sought US Nuclear Deal as Trump Drops Israel Condition
July 22, 2026
Landmark Deal
US President Donald Trump has approved a landmark 30-year civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that could eventually allow uranium enrichment inside the kingdom under American oversight, according to administration officials cited by the Wall Street Journal.
The agreement, expected to be signed this week by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, is reportedly valued at tens of billions of dollars and is designed to place American companies at the center of Saudi Arabia’s emerging nuclear industry while excluding competing foreign powers.
According to the WSJ, the deal is expected to be submitted to Congress in the coming days.
Uranium Enrichment Option
A central feature of the agreement would permit the construction of a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia if a joint US-Saudi feasibility study concludes that domestic enrichment is commercially justified.
The WSJ reported that, under the arrangement, any enrichment facility would be designed, built and operated by American companies through a so-called “black box” system intended to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi authorities.
Administration officials argue the American role would ensure that enriched uranium could not be diverted for military purposes and that spent nuclear fuel would not be reprocessed into weapons-grade material.
If Washington ultimately rejects domestic enrichment following the study, Saudi Arabia would be prohibited from pursuing enrichment independently or with another foreign partner for ten years, according to the report.
Congressional Scrutiny
Although the agreement is expected to face criticism on Capitol Hill, lawmakers will face significant procedural hurdles if they seek to block it, according to the WSJ.
Preventing the deal from taking effect would require a joint congressional resolution and potentially a two-thirds majority to override a presidential veto.
The agreement departs from longstanding US policy discouraging uranium enrichment by Middle Eastern states.
Unlike the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia has refused to adopt the so-called “gold standard,” under which countries permanently renounce domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.
Proliferation Concerns
According to the report, supporters argue that the agreement strengthens US influence over Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions while preventing Russia or China from becoming Riyadh’s principal nuclear partners.
“The agreement could help revitalize the US nuclear industry, strengthen US-Saudi ties and deny Russia and China a strategically important role in the Saudi nuclear program,” Robert Einhorn, a former senior State Department nonproliferation official, said.
“But unless it contains adequate constraints, including on enrichment, it could increase nuclear proliferation risks in the Middle East and beyond,” he reportedly added.
Critics argue the deal risks encouraging neighboring states to pursue similar nuclear capabilities.
“Whither goes Saudi Arabia, so goes the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Egypt,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. “The idea that this will have a happy ending is delusional.”
Questions have also been raised over nuclear inspections after Saudi Arabia declined to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which provides expanded inspection authority.
US officials insist separate monitoring arrangements included in the bilateral agreement will provide sufficient oversight of American-built facilities.
Shift in US Policy
The agreement also marks a significant shift from the approach adopted by former US President Joe Biden.
The Biden administration had linked civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia to normalization of relations between Riyadh and Israel.
Trump, while continuing to encourage Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords, has removed normalization with Israel as a prerequisite for nuclear cooperation.
The agreement also comes as Washington continues pressing Iran to scale back its nuclear program and surrender its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
Critics argue the administration risks appearing to apply different standards to rival regional powers, while administration officials maintain that Saudi Arabia’s program will remain entirely civilian because of extensive US safeguards.
“Rest assured, these agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation,” Energy Secretary Chris Wright claimed, adding.
“Thanks to President Trump, the American nuclear renaissance is underway and will deliver long-term benefits to the American and Saudi people.”
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/saudi-arabia-wins-long-sought-us-nuclear-deal-as-trump-drops-israel-condition/
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The Toxic Israel Brand: JD Vance’s Israel Comments Reflect Much Deeper Shift
July 22, 2026
By Robert Inlakesh
The recent comments made by US Vice President JD Vance to Joe Rogan are indicative of just how toxic the Israel brand has become. Yet his comments have been largely pulled out of context in order to invent an image of a totally different politician to the man who is actually operating as America’s second in command.
In a recent episode of the Joe Rogan Experience, JD Vance made some notable comments on Israel when pushed on the topic – ranging from admitting an Israeli Mossad connection to the infamous Jeffrey Epstein to Israeli interference in the negotiation process he led with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Understanding the nature of these comments first requires a little background information on who JD Vance actually is. This is a man whose political rise has largely been attributed to Palantir co-founder Peter Thiel.
Vance’s relationship with Thiel began to form back in 2011, when the German-American entrepreneur gave a speech at Yale Law School, which would lead to a relationship whereby Vance would be brought into the world of big tech and venture capital.
The Palantir co-founder later granted Vance $15 million dollars – the largest single sum ever donated to a Senate candidate – to buy him into politics. While JD Vance had previously criticized US President Donald Trump’s character vociferously, Thiel is credited with having successfully convinced Trump to make him his VP.
It is clear that Vance has broader political ambitions, including winning the Presidency in the future. Paramount to understanding his recent shift on the question of Israel is understanding all of this context. What has presented as a shift on the question of Israel began with the comments he previously made regarding Israeli opposition to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) the US briefly secured with Iran.
At the time, the Vice President had stated that those Israelis who had become critical of Washington’s strategy needed to “wake up and smell the reality of the situation that country is in”, after noting that the US taxpayer had footed the bill for defending it and reminding those critics that Donald Trump was their last true ally.
Again, on the Joe Rogan Podcast, he attempted to replicate this sentiment, but was subjected to follow-up questions which ended up making what he was trying to pull off fall flat.
While Vance has proven capable of questioning some Israelis and their supporters, he is deliberately ambiguous. This is because he is siding with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and trying to criticize the current Israeli opposition, without actually going as far as naming anyone consequential.
He even told Joe Rogan that Jeffrey Epstein was connected to both the CIA and Mossad, but made it clear that former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barrack was responsible for coordinating with the convicted sex trafficker. The American official then tries to pass off the situation as if Netanyahu is an opponent of Epstein’s affiliates.
When discussing Israeli influence on the United States, he does not deny that it exists, but instead argues that this is normal and even tries to compare it to Qatar’s limited role in influencing Washington.
All this being said, it is clear that JD Vance is not making radical critiques of Israel; it is a strategy that hopes to put him on the record as having been a voice within the Trump administration who has pushed back against the disastrous pro-Tel Aviv policy choices.
What is significant about this, however, is that a politician like him feels it to be necessary to present himself as critical of the Israelis. It reflects a substantial shift in American politics across the board, especially amongst voters 35 years old and younger.
In the Democratic Party, the base has become so incredibly pro-Palestinian that taking contributions from AIPAC and stating a pro-Israel position has gone from being a net positive to now being a position that could even lose an establishment Democrat their position in Congress.
On the Republican side, there is still remaining support for Israel amongst its base, but the vast majority of these sentiments come from older voters. If you look at young Republicans, the picture is very different, and according to the polls, the 35-year-old and under bracket is gradually shifting more and more towards an anti-Israel position. There is, therefore, a need for even Republican candidates to begin treading a fine line on the issue.
For a large segment of American voters, a politician’s position on Israel is a primary indicator of whether they are genuine actors or not. If they are seen to be identifying with the Israel Lobby, the assumption is that they are not going to prioritize their constituents and instead will work to please the donor class.
It represents a radical change in US politics and is a major loss for the Zionists, who have now become so unpopular that the Vice President feels the need to appear critical of Israel in order to avoid committing political suicide.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-toxic-israel-brand-jd-vances-israel-comments-reflect-much-deeper-shift/
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