Middle East Press On: Germany, Turkiye, Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and EU: New Age Islam's Selection, 22 February 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
22 February 2025
Germany's turning point: Far-right surge's impact on Turkish diaspora
The double standard of Gaza's migration ban
Israel's Lebanon strategy risks undermining our best allies
Why is the EU turning to Turkiye now?
Arab leaders discuss alternative to Trump Gaza plan at Saudi Arabia meet
Hamas turned Yarden Bibas’s life into a horror story—why is the world still negotiating?
Turkish E-Export Consortium's rise in global trade
------
Germany's Turning Point: Far-Right Surge's Impact On Turkish Diaspora
By Esra Sağlam
Feb 22, 2025
The process that began with the withdrawal of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) from the coalition, causing the collapse of the "traffic light" government, and later led to Chancellor Olaf Scholz's failure to secure a vote of confidence in Parliament, has brought Germany to early elections on Feb. 23, 2025. The economic crisis, rising energy costs following the Russia-Ukraine war, domestic political challenges and global conditions have all played crucial roles in bringing Germany to this point.
Polls indicate that in the upcoming elections, the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) candidate, Friedrich Merz, is set to lead with a share of 27%-30%, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is expected to lose support, with 15%-18% of the votes. The far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is predicted to garner 19%-22% of the vote, is likely to become the main opposition party. This possible development is significant enough to potentially break a longstanding taboo in German politics.
Historically, following the devastation caused by World War II, mainstream German parties have maintained a "security wall" approach toward the far-right movements. However, the following questions should no longer be dismissed lightly: How can a far-right party representing the main opposition be ignored? Could these elections mark the collapse of Germany's historical resistance against the far-right? Could the recent passage of a migration bill in the Bundestag, submitted by the CDU and supported by the AfD, be a signal of possible future federal-level cooperation between these two parties?
These difficult questions indicate that the election will be a turning point for Germany and the broader European context. The outcome of the elections will likely enable the AfD to assert greater dominance in political discourse. In a country where a radical right-wing party could potentially become the main opposition, it is foreseeable that the Turkish community in Germany may face challenging days ahead. In particular, the possibility of Merz forming a minority government with AfD support is the most alarming scenario for the Turkish diaspora.
An estimated 1 million people of Turkish descent are expected to vote in these elections. It is generally believed that the Turkish community in Germany tends to support the SPD, due to the party's advocacy for workers' rights and more moderate approaches to immigrants. However, in these elections, Turkish voters appear to be more divided and uncertain. It is difficult to point to a dominant preference, as no party has shown a particular commitment to addressing the rights or problems of the Turkish people. However, while Turkish voters may be undecided on whom to vote for, they are clear on one thing: They will not vote for the AfD.
What does AfD stand for?
Since its founding in 2013, the AfD has grown rapidly, initially driven by economic and anti-EU motives. Over time, however, the party has increasingly embraced anti-immigrant and Islamophobic rhetoric. Having started with an electoral share of around 4%, it is now predicted to garner 18%-21% of the vote in the upcoming elections. The party’s members facing prosecution for Nazi sympathies, its racist and populist rhetoric, and election promises, are sufficient to understand its political stance.
The AfD aims to appeal to those dissatisfied with the migration crisis, the EU's Russian politics and the economic situation. The party’s program explicitly envisions a society where assimilation is prioritized, rejecting multiculturalism and advocating for a homogeneous German national culture (Deutsche Leitkultur). The program also prominently features an anti-Muslim approach, with slogans such as "Islam does not belong to Germany" and proposals to ban headscarves in public spaces and schools. Furthermore, the party rejects the dual citizenship law granted by the current government. The party program also states opposition to Türkiye's EU membership. All of this is quite concerning for the Turkish diaspora, which lies at the intersection of anti-Islam and anti-Türkiye sentiments.
Far-right future
Such rhetoric and attitudes have historically existed in Germany, but this time the situation is more serious for two main reasons. First, the far-right has increasingly become a mainstream force in European politics, with far-right parties now emerging as the dominant political forces in countries like France and Austria, and even the forming government in Italy. This shift signifies that we are no longer dealing with marginal groups, but large political entities that are shaping mainstream politics and gaining significant public support. Second, these far-right movements are no longer just local phenomena; they are now globally connected and receive support from major international actors like U.S. President Donald Trump. Another example of this is Elon Musk, who took office as a minister in the U.S., openly declaring his support for the AfD.
In Germany, political parties are moving rightward in an attempt to balance the rising far-right, a trend that is also reflected in the society. According to statistics from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in 2023, more than 25,000 far-right crimes were committed, and there are approximately 14,500 far-right extremists prone to violence. Furthermore, 1,464 anti-Muslim racist incidents were reported to the police in 2023, along with 81 attacks on mosques. In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Federal Assembly reported that 1,554 violent acts against Muslims were committed in 2024, a figure that had tripled compared to 2022. When these actions are coupled with unreported acts of violence, the extent of the danger becomes evident.
For the Turkish diaspora, which already struggles with issues of exclusion and prejudice, the rise of far-right ideologies that fuel these biases is a deeply worrying development. It is, of course, disappointing to be seen as a threat and become a target of the far-right in Germany, a country they helped rebuild alongside the Germans since the 1960s. However, they want to believe that common sense will prevail in the country which is still paying the price for its racist historical legacy after World War II.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/germanys-turning-point-far-right-surges-impact-on-turkish-diaspora
--------
The Double Standard Of Gaza's Migration Ban
By Shuki Friedman
February 22, 2025
President Donald Trump sparked global controversy when he announced his intention to “evacuate Gaza and rebuild it.” His critics quickly denounced the idea, arguing that such an action could constitute a war crime: the forced transfer of a civilian population is indeed legally and morally unacceptable.
However, the widespread opposition not only to forced evacuation but also to the possibility of allowing people to migrate voluntarily due to humanitarian distress raises serious questions about the true motives of the countries resisting this move. Circumstances suggest that these nations are willing to perpetuate Palestinian suffering, keeping them trapped in Gaza’s dire conditions in order to sustain the ongoing threat to Israel.
Just like any human being worldwide, Palestinians should have the right to seek a better future elsewhere.
Hamas has turned Gaza’s residents into human shields, digging hundreds of kilometres of tunnels beneath homes, streets, and neighbourhoods. As a result, Israel’s war against terror infrastructure has led to massive destruction of civilian areas: entire neighbourhoods have been wiped out, countless buildings have collapsed, and critical infrastructure – such as water and electricity – has ceased to function.
Rebuilding Gaza could take years and require enormous international resources. While Hamas funnelled vast sums into tunnel construction, civilians were left without protection, vulnerable to attacks, and bearing the brunt of the conflict.
Approximately two million people live in Gaza, and many of them would leave if given the chance. In a region devastated by ongoing disaster, the situation mirrors scenes from Syrian cities during the civil war – when millions fled their homes, and many found refuge in Europe and other countries.
Yet, when it comes to Gaza’s residents, the massive scale of destruction has not been met with a response from the international community that would allow them to choose a different future. On the contrary, during the war, Egypt and other Arab states flatly refused to accept Palestinian refugees, even as it became clear that their suffering was immense and their risk of harm severe.
Leaders across the region and the world rightly assert that forcibly transferring a civilian population is unjustifiable. Yet, many of these same leaders also oppose the voluntary migration of Gazans seeking refuge.
This refusal raises fundamental questions: Are certain actors deliberately perpetuating the suffering of Gaza’s residents as a political tool against Israel? The historical precedents are hard to ignore: for 77 years, Palestinian refugees and their descendants have been denied citizenship in Arab states.
The international community has also played a role in preserving Palestinian statelessness, establishing UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency) – a dedicated UN agency exclusively for Palestinian refugees. This makes them the only refugee group in the world with a separate agency maintaining their status rather than integrating them into host societies.
It seems that the conflict’s surrounding players are determined to keep Palestinians in perpetual refugee status, ensuring that the struggle remains locked in an endless cycle of hostility.
CRITICISM OF Trump’s policy is understandable and expected. Forced displacement violates fundamental human rights and must not occur. However, it is crucial to distinguish between forced expulsion and offering a fair opportunity for voluntary migration based on humanitarian needs.
With life in Gaza becoming increasingly unliveable, the international community should open safe pathways for those who choose to leave in search of a better future. Preventing Gazans from emigrating freely and being accepted by other countries is also a human rights violation – one that endangers those still trapped in Gaza.
The 'Binding of Gaza'
This “Binding of Gaza” serves as a painful reminder that an entire population is being held hostage by narrow political interests that benefit neither Israelis nor Palestinians. The international community must reassess the fundamental difference between forced displacement and free choice, doing everything in its power to allow Gazans – just as it would for any population caught in a war zone – the right to seek safety and a better future beyond Gaza’s borders.
This is a basic human right and a moral obligation of the world toward those caught in an endless cycle of suffering, destruction, and death.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-843055
--------
Israel's Lebanon Strategy Risks Undermining Our Best Allies
By Haim Goloventzitz
February 21, 2025
Israel’s announcement that it would withdraw from southern Lebanon this past week, as agreed upon, except for five outposts that will remain under its control indefinitely, is a correct and necessary decision. However, it could severely undermine the legitimacy of the new government of Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun, potentially leading to a renewed military confrontation below the threshold of war between Israel and Hezbollah.
In January, a carefully orchestrated political upheaval took place in Lebanon. Billionaire and Hezbollah supporter Najib Mikati was replaced by Joseph Aoun, a figure trusted by Saudi Arabia, the US, and France.
Aoun secured a parliamentary majority with 99 votes, including the surprising support of the Amal-Hezbollah bloc following a secret meeting, after which they announced their backing for him.
Aoun’s election was the result of a carefully planned manoeuvre involving significant pressure on all Lebanese political players, primarily by US envoy Amos Hochstein and Saudi envoy Prince Yazid bin Farhan, representing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). These emissaries ensured that everyone understood the expectations from Washington and Riyadh.
Notably, on former president Joe Biden’s last day in office, the US transferred $117 million to support the Lebanese army – both to bolster its capabilities and to strengthen the positions of Aoun and newly elected Prime Minister Salam.
For weeks, tough negotiations took place to form a new government under Salam. Despite US and Saudi statements that Hezbollah would have no place in the new administration, the Shi’ite bloc ultimately secured five key ministerial portfolios, including finance and health, as expected.
Concurrently with Lebanon’s internal political developments, Lebanon and Israel – through the mediation of the “Committee of Five” – agreed to a 60-day ceasefire, after which Israel was to withdraw. As the deadline approached, Hezbollah organized “popular” return protests, resulting in the deaths of 23 Lebanese demonstrators. Following the violence, the ceasefire agreement was extended, pushing back the withdrawal deadline.
To date, Hezbollah has been the only entity providing direct financial relief to the affected Lebanese population, distributing approximately $400 m. – funded by Iran – as a form of de facto Lebanese property compensation.
In contrast, under the Trump administration, the US halted all aid to countries except Israel and Egypt, leaving Aoun financially exposed and reliant on American and Saudi support, which would be contingent on his ability to implement significant reforms in Lebanon.
In recent days, as the extended deadline for Israel’s withdrawal approaches, all parties involved have issued strong warnings against another postponement. Aoun and Salam have pressed the “Committee of Five” to ensure Israel honors its commitments. Even Saad Hariri, as he moves to re-enter Lebanese politics, warned of a creeping Israeli reoccupation.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, who Iran has appointed as its representative in Lebanon, placed full responsibility for the Israeli withdrawal on the Lebanese government, insisting it must occur precisely on schedule.
Qassem reaffirmed the legal and moral justification for Hezbollah’s “resistance,” despite the plans of Salam’s government to omit this principle from its official platform. On this matter, there is a rare, broad Lebanese consensus across political factions, potentially paving the way for Hezbollah to resume its active “resistance” under national – not merely Iranian – pretexts.
A recent incident further strained tensions: the torching of a UNIFIL vehicle by Hezbollah supporters drew widespread condemnation domestically and internationally, embarrassing the Lebanese government. Additionally, protests by Hezbollah supporters at Beirut Airport over the Iranian-Lebanese flight crisis – resulting in tear gas dispersals and several arrests – sparked Hezbollah’s anger.
Bringing Lebanon into the Abraham Accords
The group views these actions as signs that the US-Saudi plan to bring Lebanon into the Abraham Accords under Aoun-Salam’s leadership is taking shape at the expense of Lebanon’s national dignity. This airport incident even created a rift within the Shi’ite bloc itself, as evidenced by Amal leader Nabih Berri’s swift condemnation of the violence – at Hezbollah’s expense.
All these developments – combined with Israel’s recent airstrike in Lebanon targeting a senior Hamas figure, ongoing Israeli violations of what Hezbollah sees as its red lines, and Hezbollah’s planned grand show of force at the anticipated funeral of its former leader Hassan Nasrallah – signal that the terrorist organization may soon act against Israel’s presence in Lebanon.
Such actions are expected to remain below the threshold of full-scale war, which no faction in Lebanon desires. Nevertheless, they could enable Hezbollah to restore its battered image, reassert its position as the defender of Lebanon’s national interest (distinct from Iranian interests), and reclaim its role as the central force of “resistance” in the country.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-843071
--------
Why Is The Eu Turning To Turkiye Now?
Dr. Sinem Cengiz
February 21, 2025
The EU is facing increasing insecurity due to several factors that bring Turkiye’s role in European security to the forefront. Historically, Turkiye’s relations with the EU have been affected by both domestic and international shifts. Major developments at the international level, such as the end of the Cold War, or more recently, the Syrian crisis at the regional level, have affected the EU’s security and its relations with Turkiye.
Recently, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Following the meeting, in a post on X, Kos said that “Turkiye is a candidate country and a strategic partner in southeast Europe, as well as the Eastern neighbourhood.”
Every element of her statement carries significant weight. With Europe’s growing vulnerability, the EU has come to realize Turkiye’s strategic importance more than ever. It has been years since Brussels last emphasized the value of Ankara’s EU membership and Turkiye’s place in Europe. However, it was not surprising that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made one of her first foreign visits of her second term to Turkiye in December, where she met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Analysts following Turkish-EU relations highlight the rapprochement between the EU and Turkiye, and agree that progress toward Ankara’s membership is more likely than at any point in the past two decades.
The primary drivers behind this shift are the current geopolitical dynamics in Europe, particularly the war in Ukraine, and the Middle East, including the Gaza conflict and the situation in Syria. However, the most important factor is Washington’s approach toward Europe. These developments have left the EU with little choice but to develop a new approach toward Turkiye, a NATO member with the second-largest military force within the alliance.
The EU’s revised approach seems to be centred on a defence strategy that requires closer security cooperation with Turkiye. For Europe, Turkiye’s role has long been tied to its own security concerns, and Europe is now more dependent on Turkiye, militarily and politically, than ever.
Obviously, Turkiye is well aware of this situation and is likely to use the opportunity to advance its own interests.
The historical context of Turkiye’s relationship with Europe is important. On Sept. 9, 1979, during a conference in Istanbul, Bernard Lewis quoted Field Marshal Sir William Slim as saying: “Turkiye is the only European country in the Middle East (and) the only Middle Eastern country in Europe.” Turkiye remains a central player in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea regions, where European and Russian interests often clash.
The EU has also clashed with Turkiye when it came to the Eastern Mediterranean, where there has now been a de-escalation mood, thanks to the improvement in Turkish-Greek relations. Some EU member states, such as Greece and France, have even vetoed Ukraine’s request to buy Turkish drones and artillery shells from Turkiye with EU funds.
Although Turkiye refrained from joining Western sanctions on Russia, it has consistently supported Ukraine’s security. For much of the past decade, some EU member states have viewed Turkiye more as a rival than a partner, and missed the opportunity to cooperate with Turkiye at a time when Russia continued bolstering its power at the expense of Europe.
For Europe, Russia continues to be the most immediate threat. Additionally, there is now a growing concern that Europe and the US may soon diverge on policy toward Russia and Ukraine. With growing scepticism about US foreign policy toward Russia, Europe feels an immediate need to bolster its defence capabilities, particularly on its southeastern flank. This scepticism is pushing the EU to consider integrating Turkiye into its security framework to strengthen collective defence and manage migration effectively.
However, Turkiye is not an “every-minute-ready” player to enter the EU’s game whenever needed. There must be an alignment of strategic interests by both sides and a careful navigation of the existing thorny issues between two sides if a new chapter is set to start. More importantly, Turkiye has had long-standing expectations from the EU in regard to its membership. In 1987, Turkiye took one of the most important and promising steps toward further integration when Ankara applied for EU membership.
Accession talks officially began in 2005, but the application has been repeatedly delayed. Thus, the decades-long process between Turkiye and the EU turned into a “never-promised membership.” The EU has failed to offer Turkiye a fair and realistic accession process. In response to the EU’s dubious approach, Turkiye has leveraged its position, using migration control and relations with Russia as bargaining tools. Meanwhile, the Turkish elite and public have also lost any enthusiasm about joining the EU.
In recalling the history of Turkish-EU relations, one wonders whether the bloc’s new approach will be another failed attempt to advance Turkiye’s EU membership. Now, Turkiye’s position is stronger than ever, and this could be understood from Fidan’s statement that “EU could become a more influential power in the region with Turkiye’s participation, and this is a critical opportunity for Europe’s security.” Yes, this is an opportunity for the EU to reassess its policy toward Ankara’s membership and consider integrating the country into the EU security architecture. Thus, the EU cannot hope to deter Russia effectively, in the absence of US support, without closer cooperation with Ankara. However, EU member states must have an unified stance toward Turkiye and then expect Ankara to respond to their call for closer cooperation.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2591098
--------
Arab Leaders Discuss Alternative To Trump Gaza Plan At Saudi Arabia Meet
By Al Jazeera Staff
21 Feb 2025
The leaders of seven Arab countries have held talks in Saudi Arabia in an attempt to hash out a plan for the future of Gaza.
The gathering on Friday in Riyadh was meant to respond to a plan raised by US President Donald Trump for the US to “take over” Gaza, permanently forcibly displace its residents and turn the Palestinian enclave into the “Riviera” of the Middle East.
Arab leaders have roundly rejected Trump’s proposal, saying it throws out decades of work towards Palestinian self-determination, treads on the rights of residents of Gaza and will perpetuate a regional cycle of violence.
They hope to present an alternative plan with unified support at a March 4 Arab League meeting in Cairo, Egypt.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had called the Riyadh meeting, which was attended by Jordan’s King Abdullah II, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Meshal al-Ahmad Al Sabah and Bahrain Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa.
No official account of the meeting had been released Friday by any of the countries involved, and it was not immediately clear if any details of a plan had been agreed to.
Seeking a ‘united front’
Reporting from Riyadh, Al Jazeera’s Hashem Ahelbarra said Friday’s meeting began with the presentation of a reconstruction plan developed by Egypt and envisioned as part of a three-phase ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel.
Only the first phase of that agreement, which has seen a pause in fighting and the exchange of captives, has so far been agreed to. A second phase would see a complete end of fighting, while a third phase aims to address rebuilding the devastated Palestinian enclave.
Ahelbarra said the Arab leaders are hoping to build off of the Egyptian plan before the Cairo meeting, so they can “put on a united front with a new proposal that can be easily sold to the Americans and the international audience”.
“We’re talking about extremely difficult things that could shape the entire region for many years to come,” he said.
Still left to be decided was the question of how reconstruction would be funded in an Arab-led plan, he added. Earlier this week, the World Bank, United Nations and European Union said it cost over $53bn to rebuild Gaza, including $20bn in the first three years.
Any reconstruction plan also overlaps with the wider questions of political and security control of Gaza when the war ends, Ahelbarra said.
Speaking to Al Jazeera, former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister Hussein Haridy said the gathering comes at “a crucial moment for the Palestinians and for the Arab nations”.
“Allow me to quote William Shakespeare, it’s ‘to be, or not to be’ for the Arab world today,” he said.
“Because if the Trump proposal comes to carry the day, then that would be the end of the struggle – the Arab struggle and the Palestinian struggle – of seven decades.”
Israel and many of its Western allies have rejected the prospect of Hamas remaining in control of the enclave following the war. Israel has also rejected the Palestinian Authority taking control of Gaza, despite more support from the international community for that possibility.
Observers say the urgency of reaching an agreement is particularly acute for Egypt and Jordan, who Trump has pressured to accept displaced Palestinians en masse.
The US president has threatened to withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in aid if they do not comply. Both countries have rejected the scheme.
Alternative to Trump
For its part, Cairo has not publicly released its preliminary reconstruction plan.
However, former Egyptian diplomat Mohamed Hegazy had previously outlined a plan in what he described as “three technical phases over a period of three to five years”.
A first six-month phase would focus on “early recovery” and the removal of debris, he said.
The second phase would see an international conference set out a detailed plan for restoring infrastructure and rebuilding Gaza.
A final phase would see the provision of housing and services and the establishment of a “political track to implement the two-state solution”, he said, referring to eventual Palestinian statehood.
Speaking to Al Jazeera, Abdulaziz al-Ghashian, the director of research at Riyadh-based Observer Research Foundation Middle East, said all the countries involved in Friday’s meeting are determining how to respond to an “administration in the United States that is almost proud of trying to support [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu blindly”.
“And we have a prime minister in Israel that is trying to really try his luck and maximise his effort,” he said.
Al-Gashian said that any Arab-led plan “cannot discern between economy, politics and security”, including a path to Palestinian self-determination.
“The reality is, all these things are very interconnected,” he said. “And we need to start thinking about this in a more interconnected, synergetic way.”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/21/arab-leaders-discuss-alternative-to-trump-gaza-plan-at-saudi-arabia-meet
--------
Hamas Turned Yarden Bibas’s Life Into A Horror Story—Why Is The World Still Negotiating?
February 21, 2025
Everyone wants to know: Where is Shiri Bibas?
Put yourself in the shoes of Yarden Bibas, her husband.
Kidnapped from his own home early in the morning, in his pajamas, alongside his wife and two small sons. A family, together, torn from one another by Hamas terrorists. Pulled beneath the earth into the darkness of Gaza's tunnels, where there is no sunlight, no fresh air, no comfort—just terror. Days upon days of psychological anguish, hunger, squalor, and the agonizing crush of not knowing.
For almost 500 days, Yarden waited in the darkness, tormented by questions with no answers. Was his wife alive? Were his children all right? Were they suffering? He could only wait, tormented by each ticking moment. Then, suddenly, he was released. But not them. He came out of Gaza alone, his wife and children still hostages of Hamas.
He held on to hope, for what else did he have? And then the news came: his family's remains were finally coming home. Not the homecoming he'd prayed for, but at least he'd have them back.
Except he didn't.
Ariel and Kfir Bibas—his babies—were killed. Not casualties of war. Not by accident. Hamas killed them in captivity. They were taken alive, and they were killed. A boy of four years old and his ten-month-old baby brother. What monsters do this?
Hamas lied
And Shiri? Hamas said they were returning her too, but they lied. The body they brought back was not hers. Another woman, a stranger, a lie so vile as to be unfathomable. After everything Yarden has been through, he is left to face another unimaginable question: Where is Shiri?
How does he survive this? How does he wake up in the morning knowing that the family he built, the love of his life, his precious children, are dead? He lived, but at what cost? He left Gaza emaciated, his body a shadow of its former self, his soul broken.
And yet, the world negotiates. The world still preaches restraint. The world still tells Israel to sit down at the table with Hamas, as if Hamas is anything but butchers. The world looks away.
But Yarden cannot look away. Nor can we.
There can be no question what must be done now. Hamas must be annihilated, completely and without mercy. There can be no peace while they still live, no justice while even one hostage remains in their hands. And there can be no rest until Yarden Bibas receives his answer to such a simple question: Where is Shiri?
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-843168
--------
Turkish E-Export Consortium's Rise In Global Trade
By Filiz Bağci
Feb 22, 2025
The E-Export Consortium is a comprehensive platform that offers all the services that brands need under one roof when entering international markets. The main purpose of e-export consortiums is to pave the way for export companies to trade and do e-export across borders. It has become an important method of trade with the spread of the internet and the global growth of e-commerce.
E-export offers great opportunities for exporters by both increasing and strengthening competition in the global market. To further advance the export potential in the country and to ensure that Turkish products take a greater place in global markets, the Ministry of Trade continues to offer new generation incentives to support e-export. When we examine e-export incentives in this sense, the E-Export Consortium comes into play.
The e-export support provided by the Ministry of Trade is offered to enable exporters to be more effective and competitive in the global market. It includes support in various areas such as digital marketplace promotion, order fulfillment services, e-export promotion, overseas warehouse rental and international e-commerce consultancy. Thanks to these incentives, exporters can more easily promote their products in foreign marketplaces and digital platforms, reduce logistics and storage costs, strengthen their marketing and advertising activities and export to more countries.
What is e-export consortia?
An e-export consortium is a cooperative structure formed by various businesses to promote and sell their products and services in international markets. Such consortia are formed to facilitate access to global markets, reduce costs and increase the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Consortium members can operate more effectively and competitively in global markets through shared resources and information sharing. Companies that receive e-export consortium status benefit from financial incentives, market research support, logistics and storage services and other important support items. In addition, this status is seen as a confidence-building factor for international buyers and marketplaces.
To be included in the E-Export Consortium, companies must meet the following criteria: the company must be registered in Türkiye; it must have the status of a capital company with a paid-in capital of more than TL 5 million ($140,000); it must not have current tax, insurance premium and customs penalties; it must keep transparent and regular commercial records; it must comply with security standards such as ISO 27001 and company managers must not have any financial crime records. There are of course other criteria stipulated in the legislation.
Companies that meet all these criteria must submit their applications to the e-export department, which operates under the coordination of the Ministry of Trade, during the specified period of the year. In the final stage, with the approval of the Ministry of Trade, the applicant companies gain “e-export consortium status.”
Companies with e-export consortium status are generally companies that focus on a common goal and benefit from each other’s experiences and resources. These companies can operate more effectively in international markets thanks to the advantages offered by the consortium.
Advantages, incentives
The E-Export Consortium aims to facilitate SMEs’ access to international markets, reduce costs with common logistics, storage and marketing strategies, share the necessary information and resources to compete in global markets and bring the companies that come together to a stronger position in the market. Its advantages are reducing costs by sharing logistics, marketing and other operational costs among the consortium members and discovering new market opportunities by sharing information and experience among the members; providing opportunities to reach wider audiences with common marketing strategies and reducing risks encountered in e-export processes by acting together.
The increasing e-export figures in recent years show how important an impact incentives have. In addition to e-export incentives, it is clear that e-export consortiums will also create the same effect. Türkiye's increasing potential in e-export is obvious. Türkiye has great potential for e-export both in terms of its strategic geographical location and its strong production capacity. Acting as a bridge between Asia, Europe and the Middle East, Türkiye provides easy access to global markets with its logistic advantages. Thanks to e-export consortiums, Turkish brands can attract the attention of consumers worldwide with their high-quality products and gain an important place. In addition, I think that Türkiye's rich cultural heritage and diverse product range will offer attractive opportunities for international consumers.
With the development of technological infrastructure and the acceleration of digital transformation, Turkish companies will achieve more success in e-export compared to previous years. Thanks to the companies in the consortium, the integration of companies into digital markets will be easier and will cause them to have a strong presence in the global trade network. Turkish brands will be more effective and competitive in the global market with the advantages provided by e-export consortiums. Likewise, they will be more successful in the international arena by reducing their costs, sharing risks and increasing their knowledge. As a result, e-export consortiums will contribute significantly to Türkiye's economic growth and strengthen its role in global trade.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkish-e-export-consortiums-rise-in-global-trade
---------
URL: https://newageislam.com/middle-east-press/germany-turkiye-gaza-lebanon-israel/d/134698
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism