Middle East Press On: Emirate, Sweida, Gaza, Terror, Druze, Jewish Apartheid: New Age Islam's Selection, 18 July 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
18 July 2025
The West Bank Emirate Scheme: Israel’s Desperate Gambit
Syrian Bloodshed In Sweida And Israel’s Insidious Agenda
The Aid That Kills: Gaza And A Game We Never Chose
Conflicting Messages To Syria: US Supports Integrity While Israel Attacks
Terror-Free Türkiye: Disarmament For Conflict Termination
Israel’s Druze Policy In Palestine And Syria
Cartography Of Jewish Apartheid: Gaza And The West Bank, Two Fronts Of Dispossession
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The West Bank Emirate Scheme: Israel’s Desperate Gambit
By Ramzy Baroud
July 17, 2025
Israel is aggressively implementing plans to shape Palestine’s future and the broader region, sculpting its vision for the ‘day after’ its genocide in Gaza.
The latest, bizarre iteration of this strategy proposes fragmenting the occupied West Bank into so-called ’emirates,’ starting with the ’emirate of Hebron.’
This unexpected twist in Israel’s protracted search for alternative Palestinian leadership first surfaced in the staunchly pro-Israeli US newspaper, the Wall Street Journal. It then quickly dominated all Israeli media.
The report details a letter from a person identified by the WSJ as “the leader of Hebron’s most influential clan.” Addressed to Nir Barakat, Jerusalem’s former Israeli mayor, the letter from Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari appeals for “cooperation with Israel” in the name of “co-existence.”
This “co-existence,” according to the “clan leader”, would materialize in the “Emirate of Hebron.” This “emirate” would “recognize the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people,” in exchange for reciprocal recognition of the “Emirate of Hebron as the Representative of the Arab residents in the Hebron District.”
The story may seem perplexing. This is because Palestinian discourse, regardless of geography or political affiliation, has never entertained such an absurd concept as united West Bank “emirates.”
Another element of absurdity is that Palestinian national identity and pride in their people’s unwavering resilience, especially in Gaza, are at an unprecedented apex. To float such clan-based alternatives to legitimate Palestinian leadership seems ill-conceived and is destined to fail.
Israel’s desperation is palpable. In Gaza, it cannot defeat Hamas and other Palestinian factions who have resisted the Israeli takeover of the Strip for 21 months. All attempts to engineer an alternative Palestinian leadership there have utterly collapsed.
This failure has compelled Israel to arm and fund a criminal gang that operated before October 7, 2023, in Gaza. This gang functions under the command of Yasser Abu Shabab.
The gang has been implicated in a litany of violent activities. These include hijacking humanitarian aid to perpetuate famine in Gaza and orchestrating violence associated with aid distribution, among other egregious crimes.
Like the clan leader of Hebron, the Abu Shabab criminal gang possesses no legitimacy and no public support among Palestinians. But why would Israel resort to such disreputable figures when the Palestinian Authority (PA), already engaged in “security coordination” with Israel in the West Bank, is ostensibly willing to comply?
The answer lies in the current Israeli extremist government’s adamant refusal to acknowledge Palestinians as a nation. Thus, even a collaborating Palestinian nationalist entity would be deemed problematic from an Israeli perspective.
While Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is not the first Israeli leadership to explore clan-based alternatives among Palestinians, the Israeli prime minister and his extremist allies are exceptionally determined to dismantle any Palestinian claim to nationhood. This was explicitly stated by extremist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. He famously declared in Paris, in March 2023, that a Palestinian nation is an “invention.”
Thus, despite the PA’s willingness to cooperate with Israel in controlling Gaza, Israel remains apprehensive. Empowering the PA as a nationalist model fundamentally contravenes Israel’s overarching objectives of denying the Palestinian people their very claim to nationhood and, consequently, statehood and sovereignty.
Though Israel has consistently failed to establish and sustain its own alternative Palestinian leadership, its repeated efforts have invariably proven disruptive and violent.
Prior to the Nakba of 1948, the Zionist movement, alongside British authorities colonizing Palestine, heavily invested in undermining the Arab Higher Committee, a nationalist body comprising several political parties. They achieved this by empowering collaborating clans, hoping to dilute the Palestinian nationalist movement.
When Israel occupied the remainder of historic Palestine in 1967, it reverted to the same divide-and-conquer tactics. For instance, it established a Palestinian police force directly commanded by Israeli military administrations, in addition to creating an underground network of collaborators.
Following the overwhelming victory of nationalist candidates in the 1976 elections in occupied Palestine, Israel responded by cracking down on PLO-affiliated politicians, arresting, deporting, and assassinating some.
Two years later, in 1978, it launched its ‘Village Leagues’ project. It hand-picked compliant traditional figures, designating them as the legitimate representatives of Palestinians.
These individuals, armed, protected and financed by the Israeli occupation army, were positioned to represent their respective clans in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Gaza and elsewhere.
Palestinians immediately denounced them as collaborators. They were widely boycotted and socially ostracized.
Eventually, it became evident that Israel had no alternative but to engage directly with the PLO. This culminated in the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the subsequent formation of the PA.
The fundamental problem, however, persisted: the PA’s insistence on a Palestinian state remains anathema to an Israel that has shifted dramatically to the right.
This explains the Netanyahu’s government’s unwavering insistence that the PA has no role in Gaza in any ‘day after’ scenario. While the PA could serve Israel’s interest in containing the rebellious Strip, such a triumph would inevitably recenter the discussion of a Palestinian state—a concept repugnant to most Israelis.
There is no doubt that neither the Abu Shabab gang nor the Hebron emirate will govern Palestinians, either in Gaza or the West Bank. Israel’s insistence on fabricating these alternatives, however, underscores its historic determination to deny Palestinians any sense of nationhood.
Israel’s persistent fantasies of control invariably fail. Despite their profound wounds, Palestinians are more unified than ever, their collective identity and nationhood hardened by relentless resistance and countless sacrifices.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-west-bank-emirate-scheme-israels-desperate-gambit/
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Syrian Bloodshed in Sweida and Israel’s Insidious Agenda
By Robert Inlakesh
July 17, 2025
The invasion of the Druze majority city of Sweida, by forces aligned with the Syrian government, opened the stage for further Israeli land-grabs in the south of the country and all at the expense of Syria’s civilian population. Yet, the dangerous escalation could also breed new opportunities in the long run.
While some may find the ongoing bloodshed in southern Syria confusing, it is rather simple to understand when the events transpiring are put into the proper context and the sectarian talking points are exposed for what they are.
Taking advantage of a bloodbath in southern Syria, Israel has swept in to pursue its own expansionist agenda in the region, launching airstrikes that have killed both Syrian security forces and civilians alike. Meanwhile, the debate rages on over who is truly fighting who and for what reasons.
How Did This Start?
The internecine conflict began earlier this week, after a group of Bedouin Arab militants kidnapped a Druze trader who was travelling on the road to Damascus, on July 11.
These groups also reportedly carried out an armed assault against Druze forces at a checkpoint in the Sweida province. The incident led to an armed response from Druze militia forces, followed by a string of kidnappings committed by Bedouin fighters.
By Sunday, this had escalated into gun battles in the streets between Druze and Bedouin militias. In response to this, groups of soldiers belonging to the government in Damascus were sent south, claiming to be acting under orders to de-escalate tensions and negotiate a truce.
Instead, the local Druze population reported that the Syrian Army was siding with the Bedouin militiamen. The next event to be reported were clashes between Druze militias and the Syrian government forces.
Suddenly there then came a larger mobilization of tribal forces, alongside al-Qaeda linked fighters that decided to join in the battle against the Druze minority groups armed forces. Videos began emerging, from eastern Syria’s Deir Ezzor province, of militants wielding arms and jumping on pick up trucks, heading towards Sweida.
Footage was also published of the capture of an elderly Druze man, who was blindfolded and subjected to sectarian insults by militants sporting Daesh patches on their uniforms.
Next, came a larger mobilization of Syrian government forces from Damascus, which the authorities claimed was geared towards safeguarding civilians and de-escalating tensions. Yet, it soon became clear that they were acting on orders to capture the City of Sweida and defeat the Druze Military Council militia that had entered the fight.
It wasn’t long before horror stories began emerging of sectarian violence impacting Druze civilians. Although many claims have not been verified, evidence was produced that confirmed the murder of civilians, including women and children.
Many of these reports do appear to match the kinds of field executions that took place a few months ago against the Alawite minority sect in Syria’s coastal regime, where thousands of civilians were murdered by Syrian government-aligned militants.
At the same time, the narrative adopted by local Syrian media aligned with the government in Damascus claims that Druze separatists started the fight, both with the Syrian Armed Forces and Bedouin clans. While it is unclear who started the violence between the army and Druze forces, it is clear that Bedouin militiamen were the first to initiate the conflict.
There are indeed groups of Druze separatists, some of whom are aligned with Israel. However, the majority of the Syrian Druze population along with their leadership are opposed to the Israelis, favoring an agreement with the government in Damascus instead of operating under the offered “protection” of the Israeli military.
One of the most divisive figures in the Druze spiritual leadership is Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been making demands of the Syrian leadership that some have claimed are aimed at granting sectarian concessions, although this is a disputed interpretation. Most of the Druze leaders in Syria have repeatedly sought to strike deals with Syria’s government that is led by Ahmed al-Shara’a.
Then there are local armed groups from whom separatist sentiments are expressed, normally these militants fall under the banner of what is known as the Karama groups.
How Israel has Used The Bloodshed to Its Favor
Soon after the Syrian Army and its allied militia forces – who travelled from places like Idlib, Damascus and Homs to fight – reached the outskirts of the city of Sweida, Israel began launching airstrikes against their positions.
According to Axios News, the authorities in Damascus had even coordinated the movement of their tanks towards Sweida with Israel, as a precautionary measure to demonstrate they would not pose a threat to the Israelis. The Israeli military decided to strike the Syrian Army forces anyway.
Eventually the Israeli bombing campaign in southern Syria escalated and over 100 airstrikes were committed within 24 hours, leading up to the dramatic bombardment of the Syrian ministry of defence building in Damascus. Initial reports estimated that at least 700 Syrian government aligned fighters were wiped out by Israel’s airstrikes.
In order to make sense of what is currently transpiring, it is essential to understand that although there is technically a government in Damascus, it does not have much control over the country at all. Instead, local militias control areas throughout Syria and hold more power than the government’s security forces in many cases.
Also, when we look at the new Syrian Army, it is more akin to a collection of militias than a regular military, as the Syrian Arab Army under the previous government was dismantled. This army doesn’t have access to many long range missile systems, it possesses no aircraft, no navy and has very limited experience.
Therefore, the Syrian Army relies upon its allied militant groups who are composed of often hardline sectarian fighters who adhere to an al-Qaeda type mentality. Many of these groups openly brandish Daesh flags and sport Al-Qaeda emblems. They are, honestly put, extremist sectarian death squads that often openly advocate for the slaughter of Shia’s, Christians, Alawites, Kurds, Druze and other Sunnis who do not adhere to their Salafist ideology.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is the Party of Ahmed al-Shara’a, is cut from the same exact cloth itself. HTS has long been a Takfiri group, which means that it believes in its power to determine that fellow Muslims and minority religious groups who don’t follow their interpretation of Islam, are disbelievers who should be killed or forced to “repent”.
Why this is all relevant, is because viewing the ongoing tensions in southern Syria as the “government” against “the Druze” is totally inaccurate. And this is where Israel comes in.
Back in 2013, Israel began working on a project to expand its so-called “buffer zone” deep into southern Syria and for it to eventually seize more territory in the illegally occupied Golan Heights, which it formally annexed in 1981.
In order to do this, the Israelis drew up a number of plans, with the help of both Jordan and the United States. One major issue on Israel’s agenda was to back Druze separatists to carve out a pro-Israeli Druze ethno-State in southern Syria.
Also in 2013, Tel Aviv began backing some dozen Syrian opposition groups in south Syria, most of whom were tied to al-Qaeda, Daesh or both. One of those groups was Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch that was actively fighting alongside Daesh at the time, before falling out with the extremist group later.
Jabhat al-Nusra would later be rebranded as HTS, but back during the days when it was receiving Israel medical, financial and military support, it was also busy committing sectarian massacres against the Druze in Syria.
For Israel it was a simple formula, back the strongest groups fighting the Syrian State and those who were killing minorities, thus dividing the Syrian population, then also make inroads with the persecuted minority groups to use them against their own countrymen too.
On top of Israel’s agenda to annex more territory from Syria under the banner of its “Greater Israel Project”, it is also launching airstrikes against Syrian government forces and their allies for two other reasons. The first is to ensure Syria remains militarily divided and crippled, while the second is to appease the Israeli Druze population.
It was reported on Wednesday that over 1,000 Israeli Druze had crossed into Syria, on their own, in order to fight for the Syrian Druze population in Sweida. For Israel’s Druze population, this issue is non-negotiable, they demand the Israeli military’s intervention.
Although the Druze minority in occupied Palestine are technically second class citizens, they still serve in the Israeli military and hold key positions within it. So for Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, when he sees that Israeli Druze are burning tires in the streets and protesting in favour of intervention, he understands that action should be taken in order to avoid turmoil within Israel itself.
This is where things could potentially backfire for Tel Aviv, because if they end up getting bogged down in Syria at some point, it may cause a major military strain. However, so far the Syrian government has allowed Israel to steal its territory, occupy its villages, kill hundreds of fighters and civilians, while destroying its strategic military arsenal.
The Syrian leadership decided it would hand over its national sovereignty in exchange for becoming a puppet regime of the US, UK, EU and to some extent Turkiye also. It has cracked down on the Palestinian resistance inside the country, blocked weapons flowing to Hezbollah in Lebanon and branded the Iranian led Axis of Resistance as its only enemy.
It is important to understand that the Syrian leadership decided to exchange economic relief for all of its national pride and sovereignty, setting up an equation where it is forced to follow the dictates of its Western allies, all of which place Israel as their regional priority. Therefore, everytime that Ahmed al-Shara’a steps slightly out of line, his men are killed and Damascus is subjected to bombardment.
The HTS government established ties with Israel within three days of capturing Damascus, since then it has worked on “security coordination” and even participated in normalisation talks. Syria’s national media agency, SANA, even opened up a Hebrew language webpage, and Israeli journalists are invited to the nation’s capital. The body of an Israeli soldier captured in 1982, was handed over to Israel. The belongings of the infamous Israeli spy Eli Cohen were also returned as a good will gesture.
In other words, up until this moment the Syrian State has bowed down to Israel at every turn and accepted a slave to master relationship. Truthfully, Damascus only has two options; full capitulation and the relinquishing of its sovereignty, as it has been doing; or resistance that will probably result in an Israeli decapitation strike on its leadership, followed by war.
A war with Israel could be the only route to reviving Syria as a nation, it will prove extremely costly. Ultimately, the Israelis are not in the position to fight a long war with Syria, especially considering how drained their military is and the multitude of fronts that they are currently fighting on. Yet, this appears to be an extremely unlikely outcome.
The only reason why Ahmed al-Shara’a would decide to take retaliatory action against Israel, is in the event that his own allied militant forces become so enraged over his inaction against Tel Aviv’s unprovoked aggression that they threaten his rule.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/syrian-bloodshed-in-sweida-and-israels-insidious-agenda/
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The Aid that Kills: Gaza and a Game We Never Chose
By Munia Jamal Abu Sayma
July 17, 2025
I watched a video last week that I wish I couldn’t see: A small boy, no older than nine, crying over the body of his martyred mother in front of a journalist’s camera. His eyes were red, his shoulders shaking, dust still clinging to his face.
“She went out to bring us aid,” he said. “She never came back.”
That boy is Ahmed Zidan. And I haven’t been able to forget his face since. His mother had left that day just to get food. That’s all: A little flour, a few canned goods, if she got lucky. But she never returned. She was killed in western Rafah, surrounded by gunfire, panic, and chaos.
Ahmed’s mother was just trying to feed her children. But like so many others, she became a victim of what the world dares to call “The American humanitarian aid.”
Ahmed’s tearful face was shared on the news, across social media, and around the world. But for him, it wasn’t a story, it wasn’t content, it was the moment his world collapsed.
The Aid that Kills
When the first Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) site opened on May 26, 2025, it came with bold promises. It was billed as the solution of four centralized aid hubs, guarded by US private contractors, coordinated with Israeli oversight, and allegedly designed to bring order to the chaos of Gaza’s hunger crisis.
According to Israeli and US officials’ claims, aid was supposed to flow safely to the most vulnerable. But just two days later, tanks, tear gas, and bullets greeted the crowds who gathered in Rafah. Instead of food, they found death. So far, nearly 900 Palestinians have been killed and over 5,000 wounded recorded at aid sites. Mothers, children, and elders are all caught between hunger and bullets.
It’s hard to explain the feeling of being watched while trying to survive, of having your basic needs locked behind fences, guards, and guns. And with any wrong move, you could be shot.
They called it online “the real-life Squid Game.”
And honestly? They’re right. Because in Gaza, we run for food and get shot for it. Not for prize money, but for a bag of flour. It’s not an exaggeration; it’s the daily reality for the hungry in Gaza.
‘Forgive Me’
Israa is from Khan Yunis, but today she lives in a tent in Al-Mawasi, one of Gaza’s last so-called “safe zones.” Her family was forced to flee months ago. “We’ve lost our home,” she said, “but losing Abdullah… that broke something deeper.”
Abdullah was her cousin — 31 years old, an orphan, and a caretaker to his younger siblings. He lived with his younger brother and sister in the tent. The rest of the family is scattered, most of them are married and displaced in different parts of Gaza.
He used to work as a cleaner, even during the war, hired by Doctors Without Borders when everything else shut down. He was engaged to be married at the end of July. “His fiancée was sewing her wedding dress,” Israa told me. “Now, she’s burying his clothes.”
On July 3, 2025, Abdullah went to the American aid center in Khan Younis. He went there almost every day. “Not because he wanted to,” Israa said, “but because he had to. There was no other way to feed the family.”
That day, an Israeli artillery shell struck the crowd. Abdullah was killed instantly.
“It wasn’t random,” Israa said. “They were aiming at the people. He told us before he left, ‘If I don’t come back today, forgive me.’ It’s like he knew. Like he could feel it.”
When we heard the news, the family was shocked. “We couldn’t believe it. Even now, it doesn’t feel real. He had dreams. He wanted a family. He wanted peace.”
Why do people still go to these centers? Israa answered without hesitation: “Because people are starving. There’s no other choice. We know it’s dangerous. But what’s worse, dying slowly from hunger, or all at once from a bomb?”
I ask if there’s anything she wants to say to the world. She looked at me tired, but clear. “Tell them we are not numbers. Tell them Abdullah had dreams. A fiancée. A wedding date. A heart. He was human. We all are. But this world doesn’t treat us like that anymore.”
It’s a Trap
Sameh is 40, from Beit Lahia, now displaced in Al-Shati refugee camp. When I spoke to him, he didn’t start with anger. He started with exhaustion, the kind that comes from hunger, from fear, from waiting in line not for bread, but for a chance at it.
“They starved us for over 100 days,” Sameh told me. “No food was allowed in. Nothing. Then they opened these so-called American aid centers protected by Israeli soldiers and said, “It’s not food. It’s a trap.”
He was talking about the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation centers. Sameh made his way to the Wadi Gaza center near Netzarim in the middle of the strip. “It was like a playground surrounded by barbed wire, and the aid was inside. They open the gate at random. No one knows when. It could be in the morning or at night. A green flare means the center is open. Red means it’s closed. If it’s daytime, you hear a drone announce it. And that’s when the chaos begins.”
Sameh described how people — sometimes 20,000 to 30,000 at a time — wait all day in the heat. When the gate opens, they surge forward, crashing through barbed wire, trampling over each other, trying to grab whatever they can from the aid.
He said it never lasts more than ten minutes. “I’ve gone twice. The first time, I left with nothing. The second time, I found a few things on the ground — a kilo of lentils, a kilo of chickpeas, a kilo of peas, and some salt. That’s what I brought home to my kids.”
Sameh told me that only about 10% of these people actually get anything. Organized gangs always push to the front, looting the best items — flour, sugar, oil — and then reselling them at outrageous prices.
He said the Israeli army watches and lets it happen. In fact, it feels like they want it that way. “There’s no safety. No system. Just weapons, fear, and starvation. The gangs take what they want. The rest of us crawl on the ground like animals. That’s what they made us.”
Sameh has seen more than just hunger. “I saw a young man next to me get shot in the leg. He fell down and screamed, but no one could help him — they were too busy trying to grab food. Another time, a boy no older than 17 — he was right next to me — took a sniper bullet between the eyes. Dead. Just like that. Another guy next to him was hit in the chest.”
Sameh paused before adding something that shook me. “You know what? I’d rather die trying to feed my children than watch them die of hunger in front of me. I have no money. I can’t buy anything. If I don’t go, we starve. If I do go, I might not come back.”
He said Israel allows this violence to continue because it wants disorder. When trucks entered through Netzarim or Zikim in the north, he said, the tribes once organized a secure delivery to UN warehouses.
It worked — until Israel blocked it. “They don’t want dignity. They want panic,” he told me. “These centers are just a show. They open them so the world can say, ‘Look, Gaza is getting help.’ But what does that help even mean if we can’t reach it? If we have to risk our lives just to get a bag of flour? What kind of aid is this, if we can’t even survive the line to receive it?”
Sameh’s voice didn’t crack when he told me this. It hardened. Because in Gaza today, even hope feels like something we have to fight for.
Creating Monsters
Sabri is 23. He’s the oldest of five, and ever since his father died, he’s had no choice but to become everything — brother, provider, protector. “I walked from Al-Shati camp to Rafah,” he said. “I left at 4 in the afternoon. I didn’t get back until 3 the next day.”
Twenty-three hours. All of that — the walking, the waiting, the risk — for just three kilos of flour. But it’s not just the distance. It’s what you face when you get there.
Sabri told me the crowds are like groups. “At the front, there are gangs. They’re not like us. They come to steal the valuable stuff and throw the rest on the ground.”
Behind them, a few desperate people try to collect what’s left. And the ones who truly need the aid? They usually leave empty-handed. Sabri was one of them. “Some people don’t even go for food,” he told me. “They just collect the empty cardboard boxes to burn for fire.”
He said he was lucky this time. He got something. But that luck came with a price. “The shooting started in front of me. People were screaming and trying to cover. But I stayed. Because my brothers were hungry. What else could I do?”
Hunger doesn’t scare him anymore, not the way the silence at home does, when his siblings look at him with tired faces, waiting for food. “I didn’t care if I died. I just wanted to come back with something.”
Then, Sabri said something that stuck with me: “This war — this way of helping — it’s made monsters out of people. People kill each other for a sack of flour. That’s what they’ve done to us.”
He says that it’s normal now. Like that’s what life should be: risking death for food.
But it’s not normal. Nothing about this is.
It feels like a game, but we are not playing. What kind of help is this? Where feeding your family feels like breaking the law; where aid comes wrapped in barbed wire and guarded by snipers; Where people must risk their lives just to eat.
How did we get to a place where a single bag of flour can cost someone their life? Where hunger turns people fight each other, forget who they are — just to survive.
If the world truly wants to help Gaza, start by treating us like human beings.
We don’t need pity, we need protection; we need a future; we want to live, not die trying to eat.
We are not players in a game; we are not your footage; we are not actors in a show, we are not numbers on a screen.
At the end of Squid Game, the player 456 whispers: “We are not horses. We are humans. Humans are…”
He never finishes. Neither do we. Because in Gaza, we’re never given the chance.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-aid-that-kills-gaza-and-a-game-we-never-chose/
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Conflicting Messages To Syria: US Supports Integrity While Israel Attacks
By Hamza Haşil
JUL 18, 2025
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the U.S. has undergone a notable recalibration of its Syria policy. The partial lifting of sanctions on Damascus in May 2025 marked a turning point, signaling a shift in Washington’s approach toward a more pragmatic and multidimensional diplomacy on the ground. At the forefront of this diplomatic transformation stands Tom Barrack, U.S. ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy for Syria. His successive visits to Beirut and Damascus in July 2025 have not only redefined bilateral dynamics but also hinted at a broader reconfiguration of the regional power balance.
In Beirut, Barrack met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and other senior officials, presenting disarmament proposals targeting Hezbollah and stressing that Lebanon’s future is intrinsically linked to developments centred on Syria. His use of historically evocative language, such as calls for a “return to Bilad al-Sham,” resonated deeply with segments of the Lebanese public. However, the core strategic engagement took place in Damascus. There, Barrack held separate meetings with Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa and the leader of the PKK terrorist group's Syrian wing, Ferhat Abdi Şahin, code-named Mazloum Kobani, signalling Washington’s intent to establish a functional line of communication with both the regime and the PKK/YPG wings it uses to fight Daesh.
At the core of this revised U.S. approach lies the principle of “One country, one people, one army.” Barrack presents this as a basic condition for any negotiations. Instead of offering the PKK/YPG a formal political status, Washington aims to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity through the gradual integration of the militants into the central state structure.
Barrack's statements on YPG
Following his meetings in Damascus, Barrack held a press conference in New York on July 11, where he declared that the eight-point integration agreement signed between Damascus and the YPG-dominated SDF on March 10 had failed to yield results. Reaffirming Washington’s desire for a durable settlement, Barrack cautioned the PKK/YPG against pursuing maximalist ambitions and urged them to remain within the bounds of “reasonable” demands.
At the same briefing, Barrack stated unequivocally, “The SDF is the YPG. The YPG is a derivative of the PKK.” With this framing, Barrack effectively curtailed the SDF’s efforts to seek international legitimacy. His remarks also signaled a clear convergence between U.S. and Turkish perspectives on Syria, particularly in relation to the PKK and its wings.
Despite earlier commitments, the YPG continues to resist key elements of the political process. Although it publicly declared its acceptance of the March 10 agreement, the YPG has failed to implement any of its core provisions. While it has expressed willingness to accept the central authority over defense and foreign policy, it simultaneously insists on maintaining autonomous control over certain sectors. This selective approach to integration undermines efforts toward national unity and prolongs political fragmentation in Syria.
In short, the July 2025 developments show that while the U.S. supports Syria’s territorial integrity and pluralistic governance, it remains reluctant to endorse any form of structural autonomy. Washington continues to act as a facilitator in the Damascus-PKK/YPG talks, yet ongoing tensions and mutual suspicion reveal the fragile foundation on which this policy rests.
Why does Israel attack Syria?
While developments in Damascus after Barrack’s visit drew regional and international attention, focus soon shifted to Syria’s southern border. In Suwayda, clashes broke out between government forces and Druze groups led by Hikmat al-Hijri, a well-known cleric with pro-Israel views. Tensions rose sharply when Israel intervened directly, launching airstrikes on Syrian military targets. The attacks quickly spread beyond Suwayda, hitting key sites in Damascus, including the General Staff building. The scale of the strikes, combined with sharp statements from Israeli officials, made it clear that the real aim was to pressure the new Syrian leadership rather than protect the Druze community.
A fundamental question thus emerges: Why did Israel initiate such attacks at a time when a U.S.-mediated rapprochement between Damascus and Tel Aviv appeared to be taking shape? If Israel's intent was solely to protect the Druze, the military action would likely have remained confined to Suwayda. Two key motivations stand out. First, rooted in its longstanding strategic doctrine, Israel seeks to prevent the Syrian government from fully consolidating control over territories near the Golan Heights, thereby maintaining a buffer zone.
Yet the matter goes beyond border security. As discussions surrounding Syria’s potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords gain momentum, Israel’s escalation can be interpreted as a maneuver to raise the stakes ahead of normalization talks. These strikes constrain Damascus’ ability to manage internal sectarian tensions and reduce its diplomatic flexibility on the international stage.
This situation directly affects the already fragile negotiations between Damascus and the PKK/YPG. As instability grows in southern Syria, the central government has focused on strengthening internal security, while its dialogue with the terrorist group continues to weaken. The delicate balance the U.S. has tried to maintain – between restoring Syria’s international standing and supporting the PKK/YPG in the northeast – has become more fragile under Israeli pressure.
Although the YPG has officially agreed to join the Syrian army, it seems to be deliberately slowing the process. Ongoing government operations against separatist and foreign-backed groups in the southern provinces may give the PKK/YPG a reason to keep its armed presence. This likely aims to delay disarmament and increase its bargaining power, but it also risks weakening U.S. mediation efforts under Barrack and could harm broader American interests in the region.
Can diplomacy prevail despite distrust?
The July 2025 developments revealed the continued fragility of Syria’s post-conflict recovery. While U.S.-brokered talks between Damascus and the YPG had gained critical momentum, Israeli strikes on Damascus and Suwayda disrupted the process, undermining dialogue and reigniting mistrust under the guise of protecting the Druze and ensuring border security.
Amid escalating tensions, Türkiye has taken on a broader diplomatic role in Syria, extending beyond its traditional focus on border security. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s coordinated phone diplomacy with Damascus, Riyadh, Amman and the U.S. special envoy underscores Ankara’s efforts to shape a regional response to Israeli aggression. Defining the attacks as a threat to regional peace, Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity and emphasized inclusive diplomatic solutions. Ankara maintains its rejection of the YPG’s legitimacy, prioritizing demilitarization and reintegration under central authority, while pursuing tactical coordination with the U.S. and advocating for regional dialogue to facilitate a political transition.
As of July 2025, Syria remains in a fragile transition. Developments on the ground continue to shape not only the relations between Damascus and the YPG but also the broader regional order. While Israeli interventions risk reigniting conflict, growing U.S.-Türkiye diplomatic alignment offers a potential stabilizing force. Realizing this, however, depends on the SDF’s integration into the state, inclusive governance in Damascus, and limits on external interference. Sustained political dialogue, rather than military calculation, will be key to securing lasting stability in Syria and beyond.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/conflicting-messages-to-syria-us-supports-integrity-while-israel-attacks
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Terror-Free Türkiye: Disarmament For Conflict Termination
By Sibel Düz
JUL 18, 2025
As Türkiye advances toward what may become one of the most significant security turning points in its modern history, the disarmament of the PKK, the framework guiding this transformation requires careful conceptual and strategic interpretation. The terror-free Türkiye process does not follow the conventional models of negotiated settlement or reconciliation. Instead, it is a Turkish-specific formulation, rooted in a new operational paradigm, shaped by geopolitical disruptions, and reinforced by national consensus. The disarmament of the PKK, far from being the culmination of concessions, is emerging as a strategic necessity, driven by the transformation of Türkiye’s military capabilities, security doctrine and the diminishing strategic value of armed “struggle” for non-state actors and terrorist organizations in the region.
Organizational erosion
The process was made possible through Türkiye’s transition from area control-based counterterrorism to an effect-based operational approach. Since 2016, Türkiye has pursued a systematic degradation of the PKK’s organizational capacity through targeted kinetic actions and multidomain intelligence operations. The National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has played a pivotal role in decapitating the PKK's executive leadership, with operations in Qandil, Sinjar, and even across Europe. The state’s increasing use of SIGINT/ELINT, target identification and armed drones has reduced the survivability of the PKK's leadership cadre, weakening its command structure and decision-making processes. The operational tempo was not only maintained but intensified after neutralizing key figures such as PKK member Cemil Bayık’s inner circle, pointing to a long-term attritional strategy rather than reactive deterrence. The “cadre vacuum” began to alter the internal calculus of the terrorist organization, especially under conditions of regional instability and isolation.
The regional context has played a decisive role in transforming the structural foundations that once enabled the PKK’s persistence. The Oct. 7 Hamas incursion led to a regional security recalibration, where the prioritization of state-centric stability re-emerged as a dominant trend. This development, followed by the Dec. 8 regime change in Syria, shattered the PKK’s long-standing expectation of maintaining semiautonomous safe havens in northeast Syria. This fragmentation of the terrorist group’s regional architecture not only undermined its strategic depth but also exposed its affiliates to state-centric stabilization pressures. The PKK has been rendered increasingly disconnected from the political realities of the region, with little leverage and few functional alliances remaining.
Attainable objectives, consensus
One of the process’s most notable features is its departure from the expansive demands historically made under the guise of a “Kurdish question.” Instead of framing the disarmament as the outcome of a broader ethno-political resolution process, both the state and segments within the Kurdish political space have prioritized a concrete and achievable objective: the deactivation of an armed “struggle.” This represents a strategic minimalism based on the recognition that disarmament is not the product of political bargaining but a prerequisite for any future political inclusion. This diverges from the dominant narratives in conflict resolution literature, which often posit demobilization as the final phase of a peace agreement. Türkiye’s model inverts this logic; disarmament is the entry point, not the exit.
Notably, Abdullah Öcalan’s rhetoric in his latest calls supports this sequencing. He frames disarmament not as a concession, but as a response to historically and geopolitically altered conditions. This discursive strategy has allowed the Turkish government to control the narrative while maintaining political legitimacy and national unity.
Contrary to earlier initiatives that were obstructed by nationalist political forces, the 2025 process has been marked by active support from figures, particularly Devlet Bahçeli and other members of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). These figures have become institutional monitors and proactive contributors, ensuring it stays within the framework and avoids the pitfalls of earlier attempts. This political convergence represents a paradigm shift in Türkiye’s internal cohesion on national security matters. Where previous peace initiatives failed due to partisan polarization, the current process is marked by a rare cross-party alignment on national integrity, strategic deterrence and the non-negotiability of armed “struggle.”
A security-led model
The terror-free Türkiye process can be analytically divided into two main phases: Phase I, disarmament and organizational demobilization; and Phase II, neutralizing the structural conditions that once allowed the PKK to claim representation over Kurdish grievances.
This initial stage involves structured political and security consultations between the Turkish government, Abdullah Öcalan and segments of the PKK’s leadership. However, this is not a negotiation in the traditional sense; it is a managed disengagement process, coordinated through intelligence channels, with a focus on safe surrender, weapons decommissioning and deactivation. Unlike the 2013–2015 resolution process, there are no legislative preconditions or public dialogues. The objective is clear: the complete termination of the PKK’s armed presence, regardless of ideological evolution or political positions.
Once disarmament is achieved, the second phase will focus on stabilizing affected regions, confidence-building and fostering a more inclusive political environment.The process seeks to prevent re-radicalization and sustain a post-conflict order that is locally owned and nationally aligned.
Implications for Türkiye
The process has already begun to reshape Türkiye’s broader strategic orientation in several dimensions. In terms of its security doctrine, the country has shifted from a reactive defence posture to one centred on pre-emptive deterrence, increasingly integrating technological capabilities such as drone warfare, electronic intelligence, and satellite-based surveillance into a unified and anticipatory national security strategy. This evolution has simultaneously bolstered the military-industrial complex; the operational success of domestically produced systems ranging from armed UAVs to advanced ISR platforms has reinforced Türkiye’s defence ecosystem, expanded its export capacity, and elevated its position as a model for regional counterterrorism.
Diplomatically, the disarmament of the PKK enhances Türkiye’s geopolitical leverage within NATO by showcasing its proficiency in hybrid warfare and counterterrorism operations. Moreover, it opens new avenues for normalized and cooperative security arrangements with neighbouring states such as Iraq and Syria, where shared concerns over non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations create a foundation for renewed engagement.
In conclusion, the terror-free Türkiye process is not a peace process in the traditional sense. It is a strategically sequenced national security initiative, designed to eliminate armed “struggle” as a political instrument and to create the space for long-term social and political stabilization. By placing disarmament at the beginning, not the end, of the process, Türkiye is proposing a new model of conflict termination, one that is grounded in realism, driven by institutional consensus and backed by technological superiority. This model does not legitimize terrorism; it renders it obsolete.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/terror-free-turkiye-disarmament-for-conflict-termination
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Israel’s Druze policy in Palestine and Syria
by Ahmet Vefa Rende
July 17, 2025
Israel, with its small population, has a socially and politically fragile structure due to its different minority groups. The fact that Arabs are the largest minority group has led Israel to establish more careful relations with other groups and to try to strengthen the ties between these minorities and Jewish elements. In this context, Israel’s relations with the Druze, its efforts to integrate them into society, and how this group is used as a political lever should be examined.
There are approximately 150,000 Druze in Israel; they live mainly in the Carmel, Galilee, and Golan regions. Druze, which emerged in Egypt in the 11th century, is seen as a common interpretation of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The Druze, who do not intermarry with other religious groups, have a very closed social structure. The exact number of Druze is unknown, but today they live as a small minority group in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.
The Druze are being integrated into Israeli society
After the Ottoman Empire withdrew from Palestine, Zionist leaders sought to establish close relations with the Druze in order to benefit from their support in the process of establishing a state. These leaders positioned the Druze as a group distinct from the Arabs and attempted to gain the support of this minority by claiming that there was a religious connection between them.
Although a paramilitary alliance between Jews and Druze began in the late 1930s, it cannot be said that this alliance encompassed the entire Druze minority. This is because part of this minority participated in the Arab uprising that began in 1936 and then fought against the Jews in 1948.
Israel, given its demographic structure, sought to strengthen its ties with small minority groups other than Arabs. The state’s policies and privileges toward the Druze were intended to separate this community from the Arab community and bring it closer to the Jewish community. In this context, the Druze were defined as a separate nationality in 1962 and separated from their Arab identity. This situation has created a perception that the Druze are favoured both in state institutions and in Jewish society. In addition, in 1976, a separate Druze education sector was established to protect the Druze culture, and this community was made subject to compulsory military service.
Israel applied this policy against the Palestinian Druze and, after occupying the Golan Heights, also applied it to the Syrian Druze. After occupying the Golan, Israel forced a large part of the 130,000-strong population to migrate, while allowing 6,396 Druze to remain in the region, adopting a moderate approach similar to that toward the Palestinian Druze in order to separate them from the Arabs. However, the Syrian Druze did not respond in kind to Israel’s policy. Although they did not like the Syrian regime, they continued to see themselves as part of Syria and dreamed of becoming part of Syria again.
Role of the army in establishing special relations with the Druze
In Israel, the army is seen as an institution that unites different segments of society. The army serves to strengthen the ties between the state and both Jews who have immigrated to Israel and minority groups who are drafted into military service. In particular, members of minority groups who serve in the military are viewed with a certain degree of respect by the Jewish community. Therefore, the conscription of the Druze minority has been part of Israel’s policy to integrate them into Jewish society. After October 2023, many Druze soldiers served in the Israeli army that entered Gaza, and more than 430 Druze lost their lives as a result of Hamas attacks.
In response to Israel’s policy of separating the Druze from the Arabs and integrating them into Jewish society, Druze leaders have also been receptive to serving in the army in order to gain certain advantages. Through this approach, Druze leaders hoped to overcome structural issues such as insufficient investment in Arab and Druze villages and employment problems resulting from the state’s institutional discrimination.
Israel lifts the veil of institutionalised discrimination against Druze
Despite the Israeli government’s policy toward the Druze, they continue to face discrimination from the Jewish community. Although the Druze sought to escape discrimination by serving in the army, they reported that they were subjected to discrimination by the Jewish community after leaving military service. Indeed, Druze Member of Parliament Said Nafaa said, “We hoped that serving in the army would give us equal rights with other Israelis. However, we soon discovered that this was an illusion.” For this reason, some Druze men today refuse to enter military service. For example, although Druze do not face problems in terms of education, most encounter difficulties in finding employment. Additionally, Druze who wish to live in Jewish areas are required to pay above-average rent. These and similar problems faced by the Druze do not currently pose a security threat in Israel. However, if Israel does not improve its policy toward the Druze, there is a possibility that the Druze could become a security threat by separating themselves from Jewish society. Israel’s latest move to address this issue has been the approval of a five-year plan worth $1.1 billion to solve the housing problem of the Druze minority living in the north of the country.
Israel’s intention to use the Druze as leverage in Syria
Just as it did during its occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel is currently attempting to intervene in areas of Syria with a high Druze population. On the one hand, Israel is inciting the Druze population in the region against the new Syrian government, while on the other hand, it is attempting to gain their support by offering them certain opportunities. In this context, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz recently announced that Syrian Druze would soon be allowed to enter the country for work purposes. In addition, during the recent tensions in the Druze neighbourhood of Cermana in Damascus, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered to send military forces to Cermana to protect the Druze. However, the Druze rejected this offer. In the recent events in Suwayda, Israel launched attacks on the Syrian army to support the Druze in their conflict with the Syrian army. Israel wants to use the Druze in Syria for its own strategic purposes, just as it has done with the Druze in Palestine, by offering them various opportunities. Thus, Israel, which sees stability in Syria as a threat to its interests, is stirring up the Druze issue that has arisen in the new Syria and supporting the Druze in order to destabilise the region and prepare it for its own occupation.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250717-israels-druze-policy-in-palestine-and-syria/
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Cartography of Jewish Apartheid: Gaza and the West Bank, Two Fronts of Dispossession
By Jamal Kanj
July 17, 2025
While global attention remains fixed—yet helpless—by the horrors of the genocide in Gaza, a quieter but equally bedevilled Israeli plan is being implemented in the occupied West Bank.
Under the fog of war, and aided by a willful placid Western media—Israel has intensified a second front of dispossession: bulldozing homes, and displacing families to reshape the demography in the West Bank. Armed Jewish settler mobs—Zionist Youth—have been unleashed, burning homes, olive groves, torching cars, and killing Palestinian, including American citizens.
Last February, bulldozers stormed the village of Khalet Al-Dab in Masafer Yatta, razing nine homes, leaving residents searching for their belongings amidst dust and rubble. Israel claimed those structures were supposedly built in an area designated as a closed military zone.
Palestinian-owned land is routinely seized by Israel under the pretext of being closed military zones. And, nearly every Jewish-only colony is built on these same “closed military zones,” later rezoned exclusively for Jewish civilian use. This Zio deception is not about land management; it’s about “legalizing” ethnic cleansing, cloaked in bureaucracy and executed by American made caterpillar bulldozers.
In the refugee camps of Tulkarm and Jenin in the northern West Bank, the campaign is more militarized but equally destructive. Since January, Israel’s so-called “Operation Iron Wall” has turned the camps into war zones. Organized demolitions have leveled entire neighbourhoods forcing people from their homes. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has warned that Israeli actions are not just displacing people but attempting to permanently alter the character of the camps. As a result, 40,000 Palestinians have been forcibly displaced. Camps like Nur Shams near Tulkarem and the Jenin camp have been turned into ghost towns.
Much of this demolition campaign is taking place in Area A, which under the Oslo Accords, is meant to be under full civil and security control of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Yet the PA remains conspicuously impassive as Israeli bulldozers tear through homes in the refugee camps. Instead of asserting its jurisdiction, the PA appears paralyzed—or simply too reluctant, obviously fearing a confrontation with the occupation forces might jeopardize the Israeli issued VIP passes to its leadership.
Meanwhile, the world is paralyzed by apathy. And Western media—despite having less restrictions in the West Bank—barely report critically on these immoral policies. This self-censorship is not due to lack of access, but rather a deeply embedded moral blind spot. Even when the media report, their coverage is often watered down.
For instance, they use passive language, such as depicting recent lynching of Palestinian American, Sayfollah Musallet, by Israeli settlers, as merely “died.” Western media normalize the violence of the settler mobs by adopting Israeli hasbara and using oblique lingo—portraying these attacks as “clashes.” This insidious framing creates a false equivalence between the armed Jewish settlers and unarmed Palestinian farmers and villagers.
We witnessed the same indifference in the lead-up to October 7. Israel had imposed decades of a crippling siege on Gaza where its population was subjected to a starvation diet—euphemistically and cynically referred to by Israeli officials as a “calorie diet.” In the West Bank, Palestinians have been treated like slaves, prevented from reaching their farms, murdered, and arrested.
The global outrage comes to life only after Israeli blood is spilled. And then, suddenly, the timeline begins. The Zio managed western media wants us to believe that history began on October 7, and Palestinian suffering before that date—and to that matter, even after—was either irrelevant or unworthy.
The Western media’s blind eye to Israel’s underlying crimes reveals a deeper, more disturbing dynamic: a duality of both subconscious and conscious racism. Reporting is filtered through a biased lens, where Israel-first ideologically driven, American and European journalists, and editors, selectively choose moderated language, controlling what unsuspected Western readers can and can’t read.
Murdered Palestinians, when mentioned, are reduced to statistics—rarely named, rarely shown—often undeserving of attention or acknowledgment, while Jewish Israeli lives trigger outrage and front-page headlines.
This moral asymmetry is not by accident; it is the product of a bias Western culture that has treated Israel not only as a state, but as a European redemptive project—a “Jewish state” implanted in the heart of the Arab world to atone for Europe’s crimes in WWII. In this construct, Germans murdered Jews—and Palestinians paid for it. Palestinians, and their right to live in dignity in a state of their own have been sacrificed on the altar of someone else’s historical reckoning.
The Israeli malign destruction of Palestinian communities and land confiscation in the West Bank are not separate from the genocide and ethnic cleansing in Gaza; they are part of the same Israeli strategy reengineering the demographic and geographic facts on both sides of the Green Line. It is a blueprint of Israeli Jewish apartheid designed to erase the non-Jewish, Muslim and Christian, presence and history: one home, one mosque, one church, and one olive grove at a time, quietly redrawing the map of Palestine.
In a perfect display of this blueprint, the Israeli government is flattening Palestinian neighborhoods while simultaneously legalizing Jewish-only colonies. Whereas a people is erased, while another is rewarded with the stolen land. This is not double standards, this is what a Jewish supremacist state would look like.
The question before us isn’t if the ethnic cleansing and Israeli policies are legal or not. The challenge is whether the world—and the PA leadership—will ever find the resolve to take action against an apartheid state that uses war crimes as a mental fog for the slow-motion dispossession of an entire nation.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/cartography-of-jewish-apartheid-gaza-and-the-west-bank-two-fronts-of-dispossession/
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