Middle East Press On: ADF 2026, Turkey Diplomatic Outreach, Israel-Iran Rivalry Reach Africa, US, Iran War, Egypt, Lebanon, Trump, Netanyahu, New Age Islam's Selection, 23 April 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
23 April 2026
ADF 2026 marks Türkiye’s diplomatic outreach, rising global role
Frontiers of influence: Will Israel-Iran rivalry reach Africa?
Indefinite ceasefire is a strategic defeat for the US in the face of Iran
Iran war used as a pretext for harsh measures in Egypt
Israel, Lebanon and the elasticity of ‘security’
A ‘Slow Killing Ends: Finding My Father in the Dust of Khan Yunis
‘Art of the Deal’ Reversed: How Netanyahu Exploited Trump, Accelerated American Decline
UK Universities Paid Intelligence Firm to Monitor Pro-Palestine Students
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ADF 2026 marks Türkiye’s diplomatic outreach, rising global role
BY MUHITTIN ATAMAN
APR 22, 2026
Türkiye hosted 6,400 participants from 150 different countries, including 23 heads of state, 13 vice presidents or prime ministers and 50 ministers, during the fifth edition of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF), held on April 17-19 in Antalya. A total of 52 activities and sessions were organized during the forum, which was held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the auspices of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Politicians, diplomats, academics, students, journalists, lawmakers, security experts, businesspeople, activists and representatives of intergovernmental and civil society organizations discussed various regional and global issues. This year’s theme was “Dealing with Uncertainties When Designing the Future.” Speakers and presenters focused on both existing and potential regional and global challenges.
Most speakers were critical of the Western perspective, arguing that it undermines fundamental norms and principles of international relations. Therefore, the ADF has been largely considered an alternative global platform. Unlike Western platforms, it enables diverse opinions to be discussed. Most participants in the forum emphasized issues often overlooked by Western countries. For example, participants, including state representatives, expressed their concerns regarding the Gaza genocide and the unilateral and aggressive policies of Western countries, particularly the United States.
Tool of Turkish diplomacy
The ADF is an effective tool of Turkish diplomacy, which brings together representatives of different political actors from all continents. Thus, it embraces all parts of the world, including the West. This and similar platforms, such as the International Strategic Summit (Stratcom) and the TRT World Forum, help increase Türkiye's strategic autonomy. It shows that Türkiye can bring representatives from every nation-state and indicates that Türkiye is a global actor. Through these forums, Türkiye has become a center of international politics.
The ADF provides Türkiye with many advantages. This annual forum enables Türkiye to exchange views with representatives from different countries at various levels, thereby helping to improve Turkish foreign policy and strengthen its relations with other countries. Turkish officials meet with their colleagues, while nongovernmental actors discuss bilateral, regional and global issues with their counterparts.
Second, Türkiye uses this platform to set the international agenda and seek solutions to international crises. For example, Türkiye used this forum to discuss and mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Ukraine and Russia. In addition, Türkiye utilizes the ADF to contribute to the development of international cooperation in protecting universal values, promoting moral values and human rights in international politics.
Third, the forum allows Türkiye to convey its national perspective to other countries. Turkish representatives share their country’s main expectations and concerns regarding the international system. Türkiye presents its foreign policy orientation to the international community as being based on a moral realist understanding. In other words, it calls on other countries to respect and consider human rights while defending and maximizing their national interests.
Influential global platform
The ADF has become an effective Turkish brand of global diplomacy, which represents the opposition to the collapsed system and the dominant political understanding. The world, especially the non-Western part of the world, is no longer very interested in Western global platforms, including the Davos Economic Forum and the Munich Security Conference. Western states, institutions and platforms have largely lost the trust of other actors.
There are several significant additional contributions of the ADF to international politics. First of all, similar to the United Nations General Assembly, the ADF provides a global platform for small and medium-sized states to interact with other countries. Many states are unable to find a suitable international platform and a free environment to discuss related international problems. Dozens of open and closed sessions were held during the forum. Effective international media outlets closely watched and covered the event. The participants have discussed regional and global problems and offered alternative solutions.
At a time when traditional international platforms do nothing to address international crises, Türkiye provides an alternative global platform in which any state can discuss international political and economic problems. It is now clearer than ever that Western countries are often considered the main sources of regional and global problems. Therefore, non-Western states seek solutions in alternative platforms such as the ADF, where they can call for a moral and order-centered international system.
The ADF brings together not only representatives of like-minded countries but also those of conflicting countries. The forum hosted representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2021, and foreign ministers of Ukraine and Russia in 2022, being the first platform of direct talks between the two warring countries. At this year’s edition, Iranian representatives had the opportunity to meet with representatives from different countries and convey their perspective on the American-Israeli-Iranian conflict to representatives of other states.
As for the gathering of like-minded regional states, multilateral meetings of the three regional platforms were particularly important. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosted the 3rd Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Balkans Peace Platform on the margins of the ADF. Similarly, Fidan hosted the Informal Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States. He also hosted the 3rd Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to discuss the possibility of establishing a regional pact and reaching a lasting solution to the American-Israeli-Iranian war.
It was proven that the ADF will continue to serve as an important platform for Turkish diplomacy, to set the agenda of international politics, and to propose alternative solutions to regional and global problems.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/adf-2026-marks-turkiyes-diplomatic-outreach-rising-global-role
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Frontiers of influence: Will Israel-Iran rivalry reach Africa?
BY HURIYE YILDIRIM ÇINAR
APR 23, 2026
In addition to the crimes against humanity that Israel committed in Gaza, its aggressive stance in the Middle East has become increasingly uncontrollable, leading its ally, the U.S., into a war with Iran. At the same time, its expansionist approach toward Palestine and its strikes on Iran have constrained the Tel Aviv administration, compelling it to reassess and adapt its foreign policy. In this search for new spheres of influence, Africa has emerged as a potential focus.
During the Cold War, Israeli foreign policy focused on forming alliances with non-Arab actors in the Middle East to neutralize potential threats, as it was surrounded by hostile Arab states in the region. Today, Israel perceives Iran and the Houthis in Yemen as its biggest threats in the Middle East. Tel Aviv is trying to create a new containment strategy to both neutralize these threats and ensure the smooth functioning of global maritime trade, which is vital for its economy.
To this end, it has been trying to establish new spheres of influence in Africa, especially in strategically located East Africa, in recent years. For example, with the Abraham Accords signed in 2020 with U.S. support, Israel aimed to normalize diplomatic relations with Morocco and Sudan, in addition to the UAE and Bahrain. Efforts have also been made to strengthen contacts with Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Ethiopia and Kenya.
In recent years, Israel's rather bold strategic moves in the Horn of Africa, located near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, have attracted attention. Israel has long since developed cooperation with numerous countries in East Africa on defense and military matters, conducting intelligence operations, counter-terrorism activities and transferring military technology. However, since the mid-2010s, Israel has placed greater emphasis on controlling military bases in the region. Israeli investments in the Berbera Port of Somaliland, a region in Somalia, have made it a crucial logistical location for military strategies in the area. Therefore, Israel's decision to recognize Somaliland on Dec. 26, 2025, which was met with significant international condemnation, can be interpreted as part of this strategy.
Furthermore, while tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia were being resolved through Türkiye's mediation via the Ankara Declaration, Israel, acting in its own interests, escalated tensions in the region through Somaliland and Ethiopia. It is also necessary to state that Türkiye's increasingly growing presence in the Horn of Africa is unsettling for Tel Aviv. Therefore, in recent years, Israel has placed importance on limiting Türkiye's influence in the region. Indeed, the increased visits of Israeli officials to Ethiopia in recent months, a country they prefer to see as a strategic partner and with which Türkiye has developing relations, is an indication of this.
Aside from Somaliland, Sudan has also been one of the countries Israel considers important for its military presence on the continent. The Red Sea coast of Sudan, with which Israel aimed for normalization through the Abraham Accords, was of interest to Tel Aviv. However, the civil war that erupted in Sudan on April 15, 2023, prevented Israel from achieving this goal. Finally, Israel is also interested in establishing a base in Djibouti, where many countries have military bases. However, Tel Aviv's decision to recognize Somaliland has been harshly condemned by Djibouti.
Israel-Iran rivalry in Africa
Israel's efforts to increase its presence in Africa may intensify following the war with Iran, and competition with Iran on the continent is also a possibility. Indeed, in previous years, Israel, benefiting from the normalization atmosphere created by the Abraham Accords, increased its diplomatic and strategic contacts in Africa. Parallel to this process, Iran also accelerated its outreach to the continent. In this context, the visits of then-President Ebrahim Raisi to Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe in July 2023 were a concrete demonstration of Iran's efforts to build its own sphere of influence in the face of the growing Israeli presence in the region. This visit marked the first official contact by an Iranian president with Africa in 11 years.
The increasing competition between regional powers in Africa creates a positive scenario for the continent, potentially increasing the bargaining power of African countries in foreign policy, military and trade cooperation. However, the increased competition and military presence of Israel and Iran, two warring parties, in Africa, a continent with highly fragile structures, also poses certain risks to regional security.
Tel Aviv's Africa policy focuses primarily on cooperation in military and intelligence areas and the transfer of defense technology. Iran, on the other hand, could establish spheres of influence in the continent by using proxy actors such as the "Islamic Movement of Nigeria," a Shiite group led by Ibrahim Zakzaky in Nigeria. These spheres of influence created by Iran could be manipulated with ideological rhetoric and motivations against Israel, bringing about new pressures on regional security. The competition between Iran and Israel over Africa is likely to lead to a more militaristic approach to Israel's Africa policy. This could indirectly create negative repercussions, particularly in East Africa, regarding security dynamics.
The intensifying competition and security risks in Africa will disrupt investment and fund transfers to the region. In particular, the potential spillover of the Iran-Israel conflict into the Gulf states and their potential involvement in a regional war pose a significant risk to aid and investments from Gulf countries to Africa in recent years.
In Africa, where security and development are closely intertwined, this situation could bring about profound risks. Therefore, many African states may view Israel as responsible for this environment where development policies are disrupted, and regional security is jeopardized. The strengthening of this perception could lead to questioning and public backlash against the diplomatic and economic contacts that Israel has recently been trying to establish and strengthen in the future. In African countries with large Muslim populations and where foreign policy is closely followed by the public, relations with Israel could provoke a negative reaction.
At this point, if Iran manipulates these reactions and develops the right strategies, its influence in Africa could increase. However, the question of how Iran can make this influence permanent also arises since the country does not have sufficient potential to provide the investment, development aid and diplomatic support that African states need.
In conclusion, with the Israeli-Iranian rivalry becoming more pronounced and the Gulf states being drawn into a regional conflict atmosphere, African countries will assume a more active role in foreign policy. African states will strive to balance different actors and maximize their interests, particularly during these critical periods when global maritime trade and energy supply are disrupted. However, in areas where global and regional competition intensifies, development projects may become more vulnerable to security threats, and this crisis environment could allow many radical organizations to expand their spheres of influence. This, in turn, could cyclically create the risk of security and development issues in Africa becoming chronic.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/frontiers-of-influence-will-israel-iran-rivalry-reach-africa
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Indefinite ceasefire is a strategic defeat for the US in the face of Iran
by Sayid Marcos Tenorio
April 22, 2026
The decision by Donald Trump to unilaterally announce an indefinite extension of the ceasefire with Iran, without any request from Tehran, reveals more than an attempt at mediation. It exposes the failure of Washington’s military approach and the difficulty the United States faces in sustaining escalation against an adversary that does not yield to the logic of intimidation.
By tying the ceasefire to uncertain negotiations, the White House signals that it has lost the ability to unilaterally impose the terms of the conflict. The most immediate reading is that of a tactical retreat.
After testing different war scenarios, the United States encountered the concrete limits of an offensive that failed to produce strategic gains. Iran’s response capability, combined with the resilience of its infrastructure and the regional coordination of the resistance axis, raised the costs of confrontation to an unsustainable level.
However, there is a second layer of interpretation that cannot be ignored. The history of US interventions shows that ceasefires often function as instruments of repositioning.
This so-called “extension” may serve as cover for indirect actions, clandestine operations, or selective strikes carried out by the United States itself or by its allies. Iran, aware of this pattern, has already made it clear that it does not underestimate such a scenario and maintains its strategic readiness. In other words, the ceasefire, far from signaling peace, may simply represent an operational pause.
Within this framework, the role of the Zionist entity of Israel remains central. One of the most sensitive hypotheses is that Washington may seek to reduce its direct exposure, leaving Tel Aviv to assume the leading role in continuing the war, under pretexts such as alleged violations in Lebanon.
This reflects a well-known US strategy of outsourcing conflicts, maintaining pressure without fully bearing the costs. However, Tehran has already warned that it will not accept such artificial dissociation, stressing that any aggression will be treated as a shared responsibility.
The element that fundamentally reshapes this equation is Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil passes, now a key strategic lever for Tehran.
The continuation of maritime blockades by its adversaries automatically implies the continuation of the conflict. Iran has already stated that it will not reopen the strait under such conditions and may, if necessary, impose a total closure.
This constitutes a pressure mechanism with immediate impact on the global energy system, capable of shifting the center of gravity of the conflict beyond the military sphere.
The US attempt to maintain a “shadow of war”, a permanent state of tension designed to paralyse Iran’s economy and politics, also encounters concrete limits.
Unlike previous moments, the current scenario includes a decisive variable: Iran’s capacity to directly influence global energy flows. This means that prolonging instability indefinitely does not only penalise Tehran but threatens the broader international economic balance, including Western allies themselves.
What is unfolding, therefore, is a reconfiguration of the very pattern of power.
In this context, Iran does not appear as a passive actor, but as an active subject redefining the rules of the game.
By rejecting the extension as a concession and maintaining its deterrent capacity, Tehran imposes a new balance of forces in which the cost of war can no longer be fully transferred to the other side.
Trump’s gesture, far from demonstrating control, lays bare a historical inflection point, revealing the decline of the United States’ ability to impose its will through force.
The indefinite ceasefire is, in practice, an acknowledgment of a limit. And in this new scenario, the central question is no longer whether the war will continue, but who, in fact, still has the capacity to sustain it.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260422-indefinite-ceasefire-is-a-strategic-defeat-for-the-us-in-the-face-of-iran/
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Iran war used as a pretext for harsh measures in Egypt
April 22, 2026
by Mahmoud Hassan
The Egyptian government has launched a media campaign featuring prominent actors and footballers, urging people to stay at home and reduce energy consumption amid rising energy pressures linked to the war with Iran. However, the resulting restrictions have brought significant hardship for Egyptians.
Egyptians did not expect that the sound of explosions in a country on another continent, around 2,200 kilometres away, would leave the streets and neighbourhoods of Cairo, and cities across the country, in darkness.
At 9pm (later extended to 11pm), shops are closed, street lighting is switched off on public roads and on bridges and overpasses, while police vehicles patrol the streets and arrest those who defy the measures.
Blackouts
“It feels unsafe to walk through the streets of the Egyptian capital, as much of Cairo’s neighbourhoods and squares are in darkness, with packs of stray dogs roaming the streets.”
This is how Sayed Ibrahim, 60, described his experience of the blackouts. Egyptian TV host Amr Adib, who is known to be close to the authorities, also criticised the situation on air during his programme Al-Hekaya on the privately owned MBC Masr channel, saying: “There are many places in Cairo that look strange… the streetlights are off and the streets are pitch dark. Giza is dark… very dark.”
Less than two weeks after the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran on 28 February, the Egyptian government moved quickly to raise fuel and gas prices by 14 and 30 percent, marking the third increase in the past 12 months, according to a statement by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.
Further increases followed, extending to railway and metro fares, which rose by 25 percent, according to Egypt’s Ministry of Transport.
The wave of price increases quickly extended to public and mass transit buses, rising by 8 to 14 percent, while minibus and taxi fares increased by 15 to 20 percent, depending on routes and distances.
Any increase in transport costs forces households to reallocate their budgets, with spending on other essential needs such as food being reduced, according to rights activist Mohamed Ramadan.
Earlier this month, the government also implemented a further increase in electricity prices, with commercial consumption across all tiers rising by an average of around 20 percent, and higher household consumption tiers increasing by an average of 16 percent, while keeping tariffs unchanged for all consumption levels up to 2,000 kilowatts per month.
Annual urban inflation continued to rise in March to 15.2 percent, its highest level in 10 months. The Egyptian pound was also among the worst-performing currencies against the dollar, trading at around 52 to the dollar, compared with nearly 55 during the war.
Additional Taxes
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi said the country is in a “near state of economic emergency” as a result of the ongoing war in the Middle East, warning of the impact of the current crisis on prices. Egypt has not been directly affected by the US-Israeli-Iranian war, while its Gulf allies have been targeted by Iranian missile and drone attacks.
Egyptian media have praised the energy-saving measures, saying they have led to daily fuel savings of between 33 and 40 million Egyptian pounds ($650,000 to $750,000), as well as a reduction in demand on the national electricity grid of around 1,000 megawatts, equivalent to the output of a medium-sized power plant, according to Al-Masry Al-Youm.
Economic analyst and researcher Mohamed Fouad told Middle East Monitor that the early closures have caused significant losses to Egypt’s tourism sector and to commercial activity in the “night-time economy”. They have also reduced the incomes of evening workers and revenues from cinemas, theatres, restaurants and cafés, while projecting a negative image of Cairo as a “dark” city.
According to observers, the blackouts and energy-saving measures linked to the war have served as cover for advancing government decisions, aimed at phasing out support for low-income groups while implementing pre-planned measures, including imposing additional taxes, seeking new loans and accelerating the sale of state assets.
The Egyptian government is targeting an increase in tax revenues of around 745 billion Egyptian pounds ($14 billion), representing growth of 27 percent, in the 2026–2027 fiscal year budget (July 2026 to June 2027), according to Finance Minister Ahmed Kouchouk.
Cairo is also considering an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund that could reach $3 billion. The government is also preparing to offer 60 state-owned companies to the private sector before the end of the current month, including 40 to be transferred to Egypt’s Sovereign Fund and 20 to be listed on the Egyptian Exchange, according to the state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper.
Public discontent
“War in Iran and darkness in Egypt,” said an Egyptian man in his fifties, who asked not to be named, arguing that there was a deliberate intent to introduce harsh measures. He added that, if that were not the case, why did prices not fall when the war ended and oil prices declined?
The truce between Iran and the United States has not been reflected in prices in Egypt, which have remained unchanged amid ongoing uncertainty, increased demand for foreign currency and a continued decline in the value of the local currency. This coincides with the government’s continued focus on financing costly real estate projects, most recently the construction of a new city in eastern Cairo, “The Spine”, with investments exceeding 1.4 trillion Egyptian pounds ($27 billion) and paid-in capital of 69 billion pounds ($1.3 billion), with the participation of the state-owned National Bank of Egypt.
Political Messages
Egyptians are bracing for the worst as state-aligned media prepares the public for a difficult summer, possibly including power cuts and a new wave of price increases, citing the continuing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and tensions in the Gulf. MP Freddy Elbaiady said in a press statement that this reflects a continued government approach of gradually lifting subsidies, with the state not bearing part of the burden but instead passing the full cost on to people, according to the independent platform Zawya Thalitha.
The “darkness” measures send negative signals, coming alongside reports that Egypt is required to repay around $38.65 billion, including instalments on external loans and interest, between April this year and the end of 2026, according to World Bank data.
All signs point to a severe economic and financial crisis facing El-Sisi’s government, similar to that seen two years ago, when it was eased by the sale of Ras El-Hekma on the Mediterranean coast to the UAE, which brought in $35 billion at the time. The current blackout measures appear to be part of a plan to reduce public spending through electricity rationing, price increases and the imposition of additional taxes, levies, fines, settlements, government service fees and prosecution bail payments. In an already fragile economy, and in the absence of Gulf assistance and Western support, the government is likely to face significant pressure in the coming period, leaving it with little option but to rely further on already strained household resources, according to economic expert Amer Al-Masri.
Egyptians are heading towards a new wave of hardship, increased government revenue collection, subsidy cuts, higher prices and renewed borrowing, citing the war, in a country that has not fought a full-scale conventional military conflict since the October 1973 war.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260422-iran-war-used-as-a-pretext-for-harsh-measures-in-egypt/
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Israel, Lebanon and the elasticity of ‘security’
HANI HAZAIMEH
April 22, 2026
In the lexicon of Middle Eastern diplomacy, few words have been stretched as thin — or as often — as “ceasefire.” The recent understandings between Israel and Lebanon, reportedly backed by US assurances aimed at preventing further escalation, were meant to signal a pause and, ultimately, a pathway toward de-escalation. Yet, on the ground, the pattern is familiar: violations persist, tensions simmer and the line between deterrence and provocation continues to blur.
This is not a new dynamic. Israel’s security doctrine has long relied on preemption, ambiguity and the creation of what it frames as necessary “buffer zones.” In practice, however, these measures often evolve into something more durable — territorial footholds justified by security narratives that are rarely relinquished once established. Lebanon, particularly its southern frontier, has historically been the testing ground for this approach.
The current moment is shaped by overlapping crises. The war in Gaza has recalibrated regional threat perceptions, while the risk of a wider confrontation involving Iran and its network of allies — most notably Hezbollah — has elevated Lebanon’s strategic significance. Against this backdrop, any Israeli military activity, even when framed as limited or preventive, carries broader implications. It is not merely about tactical strikes; it is about redefining the rules of engagement in a region already on edge.
What raises concern is the apparent disconnect between diplomatic commitments and operational realities. If Washington has indeed conveyed assurances regarding Israeli restraint, the continuation of cross-border actions — whether aerial incursions, targeted strikes or surveillance operations — undermines their credibility. It also reinforces a long-standing perception in the region: that ceasefires involving Israel are often conditional, flexible and subject to unilateral reinterpretation.
From Beirut’s perspective, this creates a strategic dilemma. The Lebanese state, already constrained by internal political fragmentation and economic collapse, lacks both the capacity and the leverage to enforce the terms of any truce. Hezbollah, meanwhile, operates according to its own calculus, one that is closely tied to Iran’s regional posture. The result is a fragmented deterrence structure, in which multiple actors operate under different thresholds for escalation.
The comparison to Gaza is not incidental. In both theaters, Israel has demonstrated a willingness to reshape geographic and security realities using the justification of neutralizing threats. In Gaza, this has manifested in large-scale military operations and the effective reconfiguration of territory. In Lebanon, the approach is more incremental but follows a similar logic: establish facts on the ground, normalize them over time and integrate them into a broader security architecture.
This raises a critical question: Where does temporary security end and de facto territorial change begin?
International law offers a clear framework regarding sovereignty and the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force. Yet enforcement remains elusive, particularly when geopolitical alignments shield certain actions from meaningful accountability. The absence of consequences does not merely enable repetition, it institutionalizes it.
For the US, the stakes are equally significant. As both a strategic ally of Israel and a self-declared broker of regional stability, Washington’s credibility hinges on its ability — or willingness — to ensure that its commitments translate into observable outcomes. If assurances are perceived as rhetorical rather than operational, their deterrent value diminishes rapidly.
More broadly, the continued erosion of ceasefire norms has systemic implications. Each violation, however limited, contributes to a cumulative destabilization that makes future agreements harder to negotiate and even harder to sustain. In a region already defined by overlapping conflicts, the margin for miscalculation is dangerously thin.
None of this suggests that Israel’s security concerns are fabricated. The threat environment along its northern border is real, shaped by Hezbollah’s capabilities and its integration into a wider Iranian strategy. But security cannot be sustainably achieved through the perpetual expansion of operational space at the expense of neighboring states’ sovereignty. Such an approach may yield short-term tactical advantages, but it entrenches long-term instability.
Lebanon, for its part, remains the weakest link in this equation — not by choice but by circumstance. Its fragility makes it both a battleground and a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical contest. This is why adherence to ceasefire terms is not a procedural detail, it is a necessity.
The current trajectory suggests that the ceasefire is less a binding agreement than a temporary pause within an ongoing conflict cycle. Unless there is a shift — either through enforceable mechanisms or a recalibration of strategic priorities — the pattern will persist: negotiation, violation, normalization and repetition.
In the end, the issue is not whether ceasefires are declared. It is whether they are meant to hold.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2640840
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A ‘Slow Killing Ends: Finding My Father in the Dust of Khan Yunis
April 23, 2026
By Shaimaa Eid
The call was a devastating shock, the kind that ends years of agonizing uncertainty with a single, brutal question: “Your father is missing; do you have any details that could help identify him?” For Gaza journalist Mohammed al-Haddad, those words marked the end of an 814-day search for his father, Ismail.
The memory of their final meeting remains vivid. On January 15, 2024, amidst heavy shelling near Nasser Hospital, Ismail visited his son one last time.
“The last time I saw my father was on January 15, just eight days before he went missing,” Mohammed told the Palestine Chronicle, adding: “He came to see me at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis and held my hand tightly, urging me to take good care of myself. He was overwhelmed with fear, as shells were falling heavily around our home near the hospital.”
Eight days later, Ismail disappeared. “My father disappeared on January 23, 2024. He was in the Al-Mawasi area near what is known as ‘Well 22’ with our family, but he could no longer bear the anxiety as the strikes intensified around our home.”
He set out, risking his life, to warn Mohammed’s brother and convince him to leave. He never arrived. Somewhere along that stretch of road, Ismail simply vanished.
“We lost contact with him and found ourselves trapped in a maze of uncertainty,” Mohammed told us, his heart heavy with the pain of loss.
“ There was no information, no signs, and no way to reach him,” he added.
The family began an exhausting search, contacting human rights organizations and the Red Cross, but the bombardment was at its peak, and they were told at the time that Ismail’s name was not listed anywhere.
“For 814 days, we stayed in constant contact with those organizations, holding on to the hope that he might be alive in an Israeli prison, but the response was always the same: his name was not there.”
Mohammed describes that period as a “slow killing” of the family, explaining that the lack of information led to deep anguish and overwhelming grief.
Despite this, they never stopped searching for even the smallest glimmer of hope.
“The family lived through extremely harsh moments,” Mohammed went on to say.
“I have brothers and sisters outside the Gaza Strip who would ask me every day: Is there any news about our father? Has anyone seen him in the prisons? With every prisoner exchange deal, we would rush to check the names and ask those who were released, hoping one of them had heard of him.”
Speaking about the moment that changed everything, Mohammed recalls one of the most painful experiences of his life: when his father’s remains were finally found.
The silence was finally broken by a stranger. In the western area near the Abu Alaa roundabout, a man was digging the ground to set up a tent when he uncovered a small Nokia phone, some clothes, and human bones. Though the phone was broken, the SIM card survived. When authorities placed it in another device, the first name that appeared was Mohammed’s brother.
Mohammed paused briefly, then continued, “When they called us and asked for a description of his clothes and shoes, I realized in that moment that we had found my father’s body.”
“My heart started pounding uncontrollably, and a terrifying certainty took hold of me. I went straight to the forensic department at Nasser Hospital, and when I saw the shoes and his personal belongings, I knew the remains were my father’s. I told them there was a modern phone and an ID card in the pocket of his jacket, and indeed, they found them there. They belonged to my father.”
Mohammed confirms that the waiting was unbearably exhausting. He says, “The questions kept circling in our minds every single day: Is he alive? Is he dead? Is he being tortured in captivity? Today, the questions have gone quiet, and the noise of the wait has faded, but the pain has settled in our hearts forever.”
“My father died while trying to save his son. The hero is gone, leaving behind a legacy of love and a story of grief that will be told for as long as we live,” he told us.
From that moment, a new story of grief began for Mohammed. “How will I tell my siblings abroad, who have been living on the hope of seeing him again?” he wondered.
“As journalists, we have tasted the bitterness of losing colleagues, but losing a father who was also our companion and friend is a wound that cannot be mended,” he concluded.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/a-slow-killing-ends-finding-my-father-in-the-dust-of-khan-yunis/
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‘Art of the Deal’ Reversed: How Netanyahu Exploited Trump, Accelerated American Decline
April 22, 2026
By Ramzy Baroud
Though reading—even nonsensical material—has value, allowing us to broaden our intellectual horizons and prepare ourselves to understand all arguments, one must not elevate such “reading material” beyond its deserved scope.
Trump, born into a very wealthy family, was not shaped by the harsh realities that define genuine negotiation. His trajectory was cushioned by inherited capital, access, and a system designed to reward spectacle and excess. He did not emerge from struggle, but from insulation. This distinction is not incidental—it is foundational.
Even in his own mythology, Trump admits to the performative nature of his approach. In The Art of the Deal, he famously writes: “I play to people’s fantasies… I call it truthful hyperbole.”
This is not strategy in any classical sense—it is manipulation elevated to doctrine.
Trump does not fully understand how real deals in the world of politics are made. Even his deals as a developer and tradesman are highly specific to his environment. His success—or failure—is largely dependent on his ability to manipulate markets, dominate competitors, inflate brand perception, and weaponize media attention.
This is profoundly area-specific: New York, Florida, or anywhere else within the United States.
In these environments, rules are elastic, institutions are predictable, and the system ultimately protects capital. But in the realm of international politics, these assumptions collapse.
And yet, in American politics, the same tactics worked.
Americans, conditioned by spectacle, reward performance. Trump understood this instinctively. He is, fundamentally, a showman—a political impresario. He can sell brands—whether knives, steaks, ties, or lofty promises of “making America great again.” His success did not stem from wisdom or intellectual depth, but from his precise ability to exploit weakness: to lie convincingly, to mirror the anxieties of desperate voters, to recycle slogans like “drain the swamp,” and, above all, to entertain.
Unfortunately, in American politics—where political charlatans, backed by armies of lawyers, media figures, and professional entertainers, dominate the stage—such hollow performance often prevails. Ronald Reagan is often cited as a prototype of this phenomenon, but he was hardly alone.
Trump, however, made a critical miscalculation: he assumed that what worked in selling illusions to American consumers and voters would translate seamlessly into international politics.
For him, everything is about leverage.
And since the United States possesses, in his view, overwhelming force, he believed that military superiority could function as the ultimate negotiating tool. This belief has been repeated throughout his rhetoric, often framing the US as possessing “the most powerful military” in the world.
In his logic, power is not managed—it is displayed, exaggerated, and weaponized.
Thus, he invested heavily in militarization, rhetorically and politically, promoting a worldview where dominance replaces diplomacy. His political circle reflected this posture: figures selected not for strategic depth, but for performative aggression—individuals embodying a culture of intimidation rather than negotiation.
Even before escalating tariffs, Trump consistently invoked military strength as a bargaining chip—threatening invasions, casually proposing the acquisition of foreign territories, and even suggesting the renaming of geographical realities as though sovereignty itself were negotiable branding.
But intimidation failed.
The world did not respond as expected. States did not capitulate under theatrical displays of force. And so Trump turned—predictably—to tariffs.
He repeatedly framed tariffs not as economic instruments, but as ideological weapons, famously declaring that “tariffs are the most beautiful word… in the dictionary.”
This was not economic policy—it was branding masquerading as strategy. That tactic—using monopolistic leverage to pressure competitors—may function within Trump’s provincial business universe, where regulatory systems often favor corporations and their legal machinery over smaller actors.
Internationally, however, the system is far more complex.
Following World War II, the United States commanded roughly half of global economic output. Today, that dominance has significantly eroded, replaced by a multipolar system in which economic power is distributed, contested, and interdependent.
Even the remaining US share of the global economy does not operate independently. It is governed by interconnected realities: supply chains that span continents, energy dependencies that constrain policy, maritime routes that must remain secure, volatile markets, and access to raw materials controlled by other powers.
Trump either misunderstood—or ignored—this.
He began imposing tariffs aggressively, only to repeatedly reverse or delay them under pressure from markets, allies, and internal contradictions. His economic strategy mirrored his broader political method: escalation, spectacle, retreat—then repetition.
This pattern exposed the limits of his approach.
The attack on Venezuela was a continuation of this logic—a desperate attempt to manufacture leverage where none existed, to project strength amid mounting policy failures, and to revive the illusion of decisive leadership.
Trump needed a spectacle.
He needed Maduro captured, humiliated, displayed. He needed a short, decisive operation with immediate economic and political returns. He needed, above all, a performance—one that would validate his worldview.
This was framed as the ultimate manifestation of his promises: overwhelming military force, immediate economic gain, controlled chaos followed by stability, and the inevitable media spectacle—the image of victory carefully staged.
But Trump was not as strategic as he believed. He exists within an echo chamber—surrounded by loyalists, advisors, and media figures who constantly reinforce the myth of his genius. This insulation deepens the very flaw that defines him: an inability to distinguish between performance and reality.
The Venezuelan episode was not enough. He needed more—to reverse the trajectory of failure that defined both his first administration and the early stages of his second.
It was at this moment that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu entered the equation—armed not only with plans, but with a deep understanding of Trump’s psychology.
Netanyahu understood what many had already learned: Trump is not driven by ideology, strategy, or long-term geopolitical thinking. He is driven by praise, by spectacle, by the illusion of victory.
This is why Netanyahu consistently shielded Trump from criticism, reacting aggressively to even mild dissent within Israeli political circles. He understood that Trump’s loyalty is transactional—but his ego is absolute.
The objective was clear: draw Trump into a prolonged confrontation with Iran, particularly in strategically volatile arenas like the Strait of Hormuz. Not necessarily to win decisively, but to entangle.
For Netanyahu, all outcomes carried benefit: a weakened Iran, a destabilized region, and an opportunity for Israel to reassert dominance after the profound political and moral damage inflicted by the war on Gaza, the genocide, and the resilience of Palestinian and regional resistance movements.
The result, however, was catastrophic. What followed will likely be remembered as one of the most disastrous periods in modern US foreign policy—one that accelerated the erosion of American influence in the Middle East and exposed the limits of its global power.
Now, there can be no “art of the deal” for Trump—because there is no leverage left.
His choices are stark: withdraw from a confrontation with an Iran that has emerged more resilient and strategically entrenched, or sink deeper into a protracted conflict that will further weaken the United States and destabilize the region.
The choice should be obvious.
The real question is whether the United States possesses the political will—and institutional courage—to restrain Trump before he drags his country, and much of the world, further into the abyss.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/art-of-the-deal-reversed-how-netanyahu-exploited-trump-and-accelerated-american-decline/
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UK Universities Paid Intelligence Firm to Monitor Pro-Palestine Students
April 22, 2026
‘Trawled Through Social Media’ and Secret Assessments
At least 12 British universities paid a private intelligence firm run by former military officials to monitor student activists and academics — particularly those expressing solidarity with Palestine — according to a joint investigation by Liberty Investigates and Al Jazeera.
The firm, Horus Security Consultancy Limited, “trawled through student social media feeds and conducted secret counter-terror threat assessments” on behalf of some of the UK’s most prominent institutions, including Oxford, University College London, King’s College London, and Imperial College.
Internal documents reveal that universities were not passive recipients of information, but actively directed monitoring efforts. In October 2024, for example, the University of Bristol provided Horus with a list of student protest groups it wanted alerts about, explicitly including pro-Palestinian activists.
The firm has been paid at least £443,943 between 2022 and 2025 to provide intelligence briefings compiled through a system designed to “harvest a vast range of sources on the internet,” including thousands of social media posts.
These reports were then circulated internally. One briefing sent to the London School of Economics included a student’s post stating:
“We may have been evicted, but we are more powerful and organised as a collective than we have ever been!” — one of many posts compiled into daily “encampment updates” sold to universities for £900 per month.
Students were largely unaware they were being monitored. One Ph.D. student said: “We knew surveillance was happening by the university but it is shocking to see how systematised it is,” adding that it is “deeply scary” how much universities are “willing to invest” in such surveillance.
The monitoring also extended to academic activity. Palestinian-American scholar Rabab Abdulhadi was subjected to a secret counter-terror “threat assessment” ahead of a lecture in 2023, despite no evidence of wrongdoing.
Reflecting on the experience, she said: “You’re supposed to be innocent until proven guilty (…) but they actually made an assumption of guilt and started investigating me because of my scholarship.”
‘State of Terror’ and Institutional Crackdown
The investigation has raised serious legal and ethical concerns, particularly regarding the use of artificial intelligence to collect and analyze student data at scale.
Gina Romero, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, reportedly warned that “the use of AI to harvest and analyse student data under the guise of open source intelligence raises profound legal concerns,” explaining that it enables “disproportionate amounts of data on students to be collected” and used in ways they cannot anticipate or challenge.
Critics argue that these practices are part of a broader pattern of repression targeting pro-Palestine activism on UK campuses. A report by the European Legal Support Centre found that students and academics were more likely to face disciplinary action for pro-Palestine views than for any other political position.
Romero described the impact on students as severe, warning that such surveillance contributes to a “state of terror,” in which many activists experience “psychological trauma, mental exhaustion, and burnout,” with some abandoning activism altogether.
Trade unions have also condemned the practice. The head of the University and College Union described it as “shameful” that institutions had “wasted hundreds of thousands of pounds spying on their own students.”
Despite the backlash, several universities defended their actions, claiming the monitoring relied on publicly available data and was intended to assess “potential security risks.” Others refused to disclose details of the intelligence briefings, citing commercial confidentiality — even though the information was derived from public sources.
The investigation also highlights the role of Horus itself, a company founded by former military intelligence officials and led by figures who have publicly linked pro-Palestine protests to foreign influence campaigns and called for the deportation of non-British demonstrators.
Taken together, the findings point to a growing convergence between security frameworks, counter-terror legislation, and university governance — one that increasingly treats political activism, particularly in support of Palestine, as a matter of surveillance and control rather than protected expression.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/state-of-terror-uk-universities-paid-intelligence-firm-to-monitor-pro-palestine-students/
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