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Why Terrorists Do What Extremists Think: New Age Islam's Selection, 31 March 2016

New Age Islam Edit Bureau

31 March 2016

 Why Terrorists Do What Extremists Think

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

 When Is The Next Libya Intervention?

By Richard Seymour

 Female Saudi Book-Lovers The Start Of New Generation

By Yousuf Al-Muhaimeed

 Settling The Status Of Jerusalem

By Laura Wharton

 Terrorism: Globalization of Extremism

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

 Palmyra Is A Major Turning Point In Syria's Civil War

By Ibrahim Al-Marashi

 Preventing another Brussels

By Osama Al Sharif

Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau

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Why Terrorists Do What Extremists Think

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

29 March 2016

It is naïve to accuse writers and commentators of spreading local narratives about Islamist extremism beyond borders and of inciting people against their own religion.

What’s being written and spoken about can be interpreted very easily. The world does not need local translators or writers or inciters to understand what is going on as the tools available for gathering and monitoring information and analyzing them are beyond imagination. More importantly, the truth is clear to everyone: terrorists do what extremists think.

During its period of influence, al-Qaeda released publications urging violence and detailed a manifesto of governance. Its theorists rooted for violence based on their vision. Academic and security apparatuses no longer need to read between the lines or analyze phone calls to decode how extremists think. They need to know what the next target is as the ideology is the same no matter how different these organizations and their names are.

When al-Qaeda emerged, there was controversy over the real motives behind terrorism and questions were asked as to what extremist ideology is behind terrorism. Terrorists are now getting more and more violent. It is now evident that extremism leads to violence and this is no longer a mere theory or conclusion by a researcher who is ignorant of the language and religion.

Are there parties spreading extremist ideology to serve their political aims? Of course, and they are mainly political groups who use extremists to target their local or foreign rivals. This is what is happening in Egypt’s Sinai and in Syria.

The rise of religious extremism has nothing to do with social justice or political injustice. It represents an ideological project that aims to seize control and neutralize others

Are there parties exploiting extremist organizations to serve their own objectives? Of course, there are. Iran is the best example; its regime has managed to use extremist organizations for 30 years in Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and most recently, in Yemen.

Those adopting an extremist ideology, or defending it, do not understand that they are partners of politically violent groups like the ISIS and al-Qaeda. They agree with them on several principles even though they don’t support their political plans. Those propagating extremism in this politically tense atmosphere are tools for the Tehran regime. Extremists serve Iran’s interests because they are putting their countries within the range of the world’s cannons.

For example, rivals accuse each other of being the source of extremist ideology and justify such statements by referring to extremist practices. Let’s not forget that Iran was the party that formulated the political rhetoric that’s currently spread among Islamists and which is about global arrogance and religiously and politically fighting it.

Cascading Effect

Regardless of political exploitations which are usually common in wars, the new threat comes from the complications caused by the spread of extremism, which now threatens us and threatens Muslim communities in the West. Extremist ideology that the terrorists are acting upon is proving to be a major threat to Muslim governments and communities and their relations.

Unless we admit the presence and spread of extremism the situation will continue to worsen and we will find ourselves clashing with other victims. Some theorists try to justify terrorism by putting religion and governments at the forefront. They do this either to protect themselves or to involve them in disputes raised by them. This nothing to do with Muslims in general who end up paying the price of violence taking place in Lahore, ar-Raqqah or Brussels.

Extremists have exhausted the justifications they have used over the years to support terrorists. In the beginning, violence was justified because of the American bases in Saudi Arabia. Then they used Afghanistan to defend al-Qaeda and Taliban. Then they moved on to defending Saddam Hussein in Iraq despite his Baathist regime. After the Americans exited Iraq, those justifying terrorism started using the excuse that Muslims are being persecuted in the West. All that while they ignored acts of terrorism targeting Muslims in Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

The rise of religious extremism has nothing to do with social justice or political injustice. It represents an ideological project that aims to seize control and neutralize others. This is why when an organization commits a crime on the basis of an extremist ideology, the latter must also pay the price and the rest of the Muslims must not be expected to defend it or cover for it.

We must separate the extremists from among us, between extremists and the rest of Muslims and between extremists and Islam. We must reject their statements that the West opposes Islam or Sunnis or Saudis. Truth is that the West opposes them (extremists) and blames them for what is happening and warns against them.

Extremists have become more dangerous than terrorists even as terrorism has escalated across the world. ISIS defends itself and sacrifices its fighters while extremists want a suicide attack seeking to target everyone.

Abdulrahman al-Rashed is the former General Manager of Al Arabiya News Channel. A veteran and internationally acclaimed journalist, he is a former editor-in-chief of the London-based leading Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, where he still regularly writes a political column. He has also served as the editor of Asharq al-Awsat’s sister publication, al-Majalla. Throughout his career, Rashed has interviewed several world leaders, with his articles garnering worldwide recognition, and he has successfully led Al Arabiya to the highly regarded, thriving and influential position it is in today.

Source: english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2016/03/29/Why-terrorists-do-what-extremists-think.html

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When Is The Next Libya Intervention?

By Richard Seymour

30 Mar 2016

The British press brings news that SAS fighters have been operating in Libya for several months, alongside Jordanian forces.

This coincides with a growing drumbeat for war in the country, where the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) has found a new territorial foothold in the oil-rich Sirte region. The United States is currently weighing up a bombing campaign to put the '"unity"' government back in power.

How did ISIL find a new home in Libya? The explanation casts doubt on any idea that simple military power will solve the problem.

Five Years on No Change

Recall that, five years ago, when the US bombed Libya, the operation was glorified as a success. The war could be a "model for other efforts". Libyans proclaimed, "Thank you, America!" Sceptics of the war "were proved badly wrong".

Hillary Clinton was jubilant: "We came, we saw, he died," she said of Muammar Gaddafi. After the disgrace of Iraq, The US' moral standing seemed to have been restored.

Five years on, as the country is beset by civil war, the reporting is surprisingly muted on the intervention or its sequels. For example, the Telegraph makes no mention of the intervention and has only a cursory reference to the civil war in its report on the ISIL capture of Sirte.

The New York Times at least acknowledges the intervention, but draws no direct connection between it and the subsequent meltdown. The Guardian acknowledges the intervention, but only to suggest that a new bombing campaign may turn the tide against ISIL, as it changed the tide against Gaddafi. It is as if ISIL came from nowhere.

In fact, ISIL is benefiting from a political dynamic created by the US intervention. In 2011, amid a revolution against the dictator Gaddafi, the Libyan opposition achieved a unified leadership only very briefly and tentatively.

The National Transitional Council (NTC), an alliance of businessmen, lawyers, professionals and ex-regime elements with a broadly pro-US disposition, gained temporary dominance through its ability to form an alliance with NATO.

Whether it is in Iraq, Syria or Libya, the jihadists have benefited from state breakdown, usually where secular dictatorships have lost ground, but a new regime cannot consolidate itself. International and regional military intervention has a record of exacerbating these dynamics.

This alliance piloted them to power, as NATO bombs finally helped to overcome Gaddafi's resistance in the Battle of Sirte. Otherwise, the opposition was extremely fragmented, with a total of 1,700 militias operating.

If the NTC had been as "popular at home" as The Economist claimed it was last year, the new regime it created - with control of the oil resources, a national army and a popularly elected congress - should have been stable and legitimate.

Decomposing Country

Yet, almost as soon as the war was finished, Libya began to decompose. The militias were not federated into an effective authority, and instead operated their own territorial control.

The BBC, in an Orientalist twist, blames this on the opposition having "little understanding of democracy."

But the groups that NATO helped to power were not even representative of the whole opposition, let alone those who had not been convinced to turn against Gaddafi, and they resented the outcome of the vote which empowered the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamists who dominated the elected chamber thus came into conflict with the secular forces supported by the US.

This division was entrenched following a coup launched by the ambitious General Khalifa Haftar in 2014. Haftar was a former CIA asset, and has since become a proxy of the Egyptian General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who backed his coup. He aspires to be the Libyan equivalent of the Egyptian dictator.

In the ensuing descent into civil war, the supposed "unity" government, backed by the UN but ratified by only 18 percent of Libyan voters, was unable to hold the capital and was instead forced to flee to Tobruk.

Haftar has, however, mounted a bloody anti-Islamist campaign as an extension of Sisi's repressive campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. And as the campaign has floundered, Sisi has called for a bombing campaign in Libya, in the hope that it will finally destroy the Libyan wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This is the context in which 1,500 ISIL fighters, in coalition with a local militia known as Ansar al-Sharia, were able to take Sirte. The jihadists have gained support through audacious and brutal attacks on Haftar's troops, whose repressive actions make them despised.

They thrive in battle with secular authoritarians such as Bashar al-Assad, Nouri Maliki and now Haftar. Such fights dramatise their notion of an "oppressive Tawaghit", delivering them recruits and allies.

Real Beneficiaries

If the US does decide to bomb Libya again, it will be doing so effectively in alliance with Egyptian foreign policy, once again backing an unrepresentative minority in Libya.

This time, however, it will be difficult to pretend that they are "popular". Worse still, it will combine all the dynamics upon which ISIL thrives.

Whether it is in Iraq, Syria or Libya, the jihadists have benefited from state breakdown, usually where secular dictatorships have lost ground, but a new regime cannot consolidate itself. International and regional military intervention has a record of exacerbating these dynamics.

And if the main line of struggle in Libya, which was once between dictatorship and democracy, becomes one between Islamists and secular authoritarians, the beneficiaries will be the most reactionary elements on both sides.

Richard Seymour is an author and broadcaster based in London. He has written for The Guardian, the London Review of Books and many other publications.

Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/libya-intervention-160330083039560.html

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Female Saudi Book-Lovers The Start Of New Generation

By Yousuf Al-Muhaimeed

Mar 30, 2016

DESPITE the huge turnout at the recent Riyadh International Book Fair, on an average Arabs read only a quarter of page per year, according to the latest UN figures.

The figures reveal an acute reading crisis across the region, with the average person failing to read even one full page of text in a year.

At the same time, sales of books at the Riyadh Fair totaled millions of riyals. Attendance at the book fair is a temporary phenomenon, covering only ten days each year and it means we don’t look at books on a daily basis. How do the sales of books at major bookstores compare with sales of other stationary items and electronics?

We have to make up this shortfall by establishing permanent book exhibitions and special souks at prime venues with associated services, such as galleries, contemporary art institutes, coffee shops, in a similar way as it is Al-Bujairi district in Al-Diriyah in Riyadh.

We can also explore establishing a permanent souk for second-hand books, so that books can circulate more and people can take advantage of them in a similar pattern as the Southbank Book Market in London and similar markets in other European capitals.

In the Muslim world there are examples, as in the mural paintings of Uzbekistan that illustrate the content of old books that are out of print, and in Baghdad books are available at cheaper price in Al-Mutanabbi street.

Of course, there are second-hand book stores in various districts of Riyadh. If these books are collectively stored and displayed at Al-Bujairi district, together with new editions of well-known books in both Arabic and English, it would create an appropriate cultural environment for book lovers, and enable them to have easy access to books throughout the year.

People in most advanced countries in the world consider books as part and parcel of their daily lives, just like food. But even in these countries, both the authorities and publishers are concerned about falling rates of reading, and so they use all possible ways and means to foster reading habits among their populations.

At the same time, we have not made any major headway in our reading habit over the last several decades, and this is clearly evident in the UN report. This is the case not only with regards to the span of time we set aside for reading, but also the number of books printed, published, or translated. We are satisfied with allotting ten days for books a year, and then we altogether forget about reading for the rest of the year.

The most fascinating element of the Riyadh Book Fair was the long queue of female visitors at the fair. Social media celebrated the pictures of these queues of book-lovers. It made us feel special that we have somehow contributed to a new generation of readers. When a mother becomes a reader, subsequently her children will be introduced to bookstalls to buy books, and will eventually lead to the emergence of a whole new generation of readers over the coming decades.

I am not sure whether these women attend book fairs simply out of their passion for reading or if they are in search of something that gives them satisfaction while facing the tough moments in their daily lives. Renowned Arab poet, Gibran Khalil Gibran, once pointed out that nobody can win over a woman who finds real enjoyment in reading a book or poem or song or in making a cup of coffee.

In short, whatever may be the objective of a woman with her reading, it is a good and exemplary example for her children, and that will eventually lead to the creation of a new generation of readers.

Source: saudigazette.com.sa/opinion/local-viewpoint/female-saudi-book-lovers-start-new-generation/

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Settling the Status of Jerusalem

By Laura Wharton

30 March 2016

Jerusalem is not one city, but two. Nearly 50 years after Israel captured East Jerusalem; the city remains as divided as ever. As its neighborhoods suffer from a new wave of violence, acknowledging this reality is becoming increasingly urgent. Settling the status of Jerusalem — as two cities, one for Israelis and one for Palestinians — must be made a priority if peace between the two sides is ever to be achieved.

The 1947 United Nations Partition Plan called for the division of British-controlled Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, but it set aside Jerusalem as an independent enclave under international administration. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, however, the city was divided. West Jerusalem fell under Israeli control, and East Jerusalem — including the ancient Old City — was occupied by the Kingdom of Jordan.

The division endured until the Six-Day War in 1967, when Israel rebuffed an attack by Jordan on the headquarters of the UN observers in West Jerusalem, and then invaded the rest of the city, along with the entire West Bank. After the war, Israel declared united Jerusalem as its capital, annexing more than 30 Arab villages to the municipality.

Both halves of the city have since remained under Israeli control, but neither has been internationally recognized as being legally part of the Jewish state. And no country acknowledges Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Not a single embassy sits within the city limits; even the US maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.

Similarly, no matter how loudly Israel proclaims that the city is united, it is anything but so. With the exception of the Old City, Israelis, even city residents, rarely venture into East Jerusalem, where most of the signs are in Arabic. The Palestinian half of the city suffers from a lack of infrastructure, including roads, sewage and schools. Nearly 85 percent of its children live below the poverty line. Fewer than 2 percent of East Jerusalem’s residents vote in municipal elections, as most believe that participating would lend legitimacy to the Israeli occupation. Thus although Palestinians comprise 37 percent of Jerusalem’s population, not a single Palestinian sits on the city council.

Meanwhile, approximately 3,000 Israeli extremists have bought houses in East Jerusalem, where security forces protect them and have their children transported to school in armoured vehicles — part of services provided to the settlers that cost the Israeli government more than 100 million shekels ($25 million) in 2014. The settlers’ presence, usually marked by giant Israeli flags, is viewed by most Palestinians as a provocation and is a source of constant tension.

The two sides of the city are united only in mutual economic dependence — the result of a policy that encouraged bringing Palestinian workers into Israel in the hope that jobs — and the fear of losing them — would make them reluctant to rebel. Decades later, the dependence has become mutual. Some 3,500 of the 5,500 employees in Jerusalem’s hotel industry are Palestinians, as are approximately half of public bus drivers (a short strike be Arab drivers in November wreaked havoc on the city’s transportation network).

Jerusalem’s contested status has implications for the entire region, and has been one of the main obstacles in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. While early proposals for a settlement called for Jerusalem to be made independent, as per the UN Partition Plan, more recently a consensus on the broad outlines of a peace agreement has emerged.

Most proposals for Jerusalem (including the so-called Clinton Parameters in 2000, which the Israeli government approved) share many common features. The most important is the principle that Palestinian neighbourhoods (in which 99 percent of the Palestinian population lives) will be under Palestinian control, and Israeli neighbourhoods (in which 99 percent of the Israeli population lives) will remain under Israeli control. Responsibility for the city’s holy places will remain unchanged, with the Church of the Holy Sepulchre under Christian management, the Islamic Waqf administering the Temple Mount, and a rabbi in charge of the Western Wall.

And yet efforts to finalize an agreement have been repeatedly postponed. Details regarding the management of the Old City, the administration of Jerusalem as a whole, and the relocation of settlers have been considered too sensitive to tackle, and would-be peacemakers have thought it better first to build trust by starting with easier topics.

That approach has proved to be a failure, and in the intervening years the city’s divide has continued to fester. A new approach is needed. The pretence that Jerusalem is united can no longer be used to mask discrimination. Palestinians must be given control over their lives, so that the safety of all of Jerusalem’s residents, both in their homes and in public spaces, can be guaranteed.

Israel’s immediate neighbours and other regional powers should make settling the status of Jerusalem a priority, before security in the city deteriorates further. This is important not only for the sake of Jerusalem’s residents; settlement of the city’s status would also provide momentum for addressing other issues. Indeed, anyone interested in bringing calm to the region should focus on Jerusalem.

Only by separating the two Jerusalems now, before things get any bloodier, will we maintain the possibility of one day reuniting it once again — as the international beacon of peace it was meant to be.

Source: arabnews.com/columns/news/902721

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Terrorism: Globalization of Extremism

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

30 March 2016

It is naïve to accuse writers and commentators of spreading local narratives about extremism beyond borders and of inciting people against their own religion.

What is being written and spoken about can be interpreted very easily. The world does not need local translators or writers or inciters to understand what is going on as the tools available for gathering and monitoring information and analyzing them are beyond imagination. More importantly, the truth is clear to everyone: Terrorists do what extremists think.

During its period of influence, Al-Qaeda released publications urging violence and detailed a manifesto of governance. Its theorists called for violence based on their vision. Academic and security apparatuses no longer need to read between the lines or analyze phone calls to decode how extremists think. They need to know what the next target is as the ideology is the same no matter how different these organizations and their names are.

When Al-Qaeda emerged, there was controversy over the real motives behind terrorism and questions were asked as to what extremist ideology is behind terrorism. Terrorists are now getting more and more violent. It is now evident that extremism leads to violence and this is no longer a mere theory or conclusion by a researcher who is ignorant of the language and religion.

Are there parties spreading extremist ideology to serve their political aims? Of course, and they are mainly political groups who use extremists to target their local or foreign rivals. This is what is happening in Egypt’s Sinai and in Syria.

Are there parties exploiting extremist organizations to serve their own objectives? Of course, there are. Iran is the best example; its regime has managed to use extremist organizations for 30 years in Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and most recently, in Yemen.

Those adopting an extremist ideology, or defending it, do not understand that they are partners of politically violent groups like the Daesh and Al-Qaeda. They agree with them on several principles even though they don’t support their political plans. Those propagating extremism in this politically tense atmosphere are tools for the Tehran regime. Extremists serve Iran’s interests because they are putting their countries within the range of the world’s cannons.

For example, rivals accuse each other of being the source of extremist ideology and justify such statements by referring to extremist practices. Let us not forget that Iran was the party that formulated the political rhetoric that is currently spread among Islamists and which is about global arrogance and religiously and politically fighting it.

Regardless of political exploitations, which are usually common in wars, the new threat comes from the complications caused by the spread of extremism, which now threatens us and threatens Muslim communities in the West. Extremist ideology that the terrorists are acting upon is proving to be a major threat to Muslim governments and communities and their relations.

Unless we admit the presence and spread of extremism the situation will continue to worsen and we will find ourselves clashing with other victims. Some theorists try to justify terrorism by putting religion and governments at the forefront. They do this either to protect themselves or to involve them in disputes raised by them. This has nothing to do with Muslims in general who end up paying the price of violence taking place in Lahore, Raqqah or Brussels.

Extremists have exhausted the justifications they have used over the years to support terrorists. In the beginning, violence was justified because of the American bases in Saudi Arabia. Then they used Afghanistan to defend Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Then they moved on to defending Saddam Hussein in Iraq despite his Baathist regime.

After the Americans exited Iraq, those justifying terrorism started using the excuse that Muslims are being persecuted in the West. All that while they ignored acts of terrorism targeting Muslims in Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

The rise of religious extremism has nothing to do with social justice or political injustice. It represents an ideological project that aims to seize control and neutralize others. This is why when an organization commits a crime on the basis of an extremist ideology, the latter must also pay the price and the rest of the Muslims must not be expected to defend it or provide cover for it.

We must separate the extremists from among us, between extremists and the rest of Muslims and between extremists and Islam. We must reject their statements that the West opposes Islam or Sunnis or Saudis. Truth is that the West opposes them (extremists) and blames them for what is happening and warns against them.

Extremists have become more dangerous than terrorists even as terrorism has escalated across the world. Daesh defends itself and sacrifices its fighters while extremists want a suicide attack seeking to target everyone.

Source: arabnews.com/columns/news/902736

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Palmyra Is A Major Turning Point In Syria's Civil War

By Ibrahim Al-Marashi

29 Mar 2016

Bashar al-Assad had said for years to both Syrians and the international community that only his regime could prevent the spectre of ISIL taking over Syria.

For the first time he has acted to deal with this threat. Damascus finally invested in amassing enough military forces to defeat ISIL in a battle for territory. Also, even with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the war, Moscow's residual airpower in Syria can still sustain the Assad regime's momentum on the battlefield.

The Syrian state's recent victory against ISIL in Palmyra represents a major shift not only in the war against ISIL, but also in the trajectory of the nation's five-year civil war.

Fluctuating Syrian And Iraqi Frontlines

Syria's victory in Palmyra comes just three months after Iraq recovered Ramadi from ISIL.

Both Ramadi and Palmyra had fallen during ISIL's May 2015 offensive, proving then that ISIL could wage two simultaneous military campaigns across distant frontlines. The battles for Ramadi and Palmyra have nullified ISIL's gains.

These victories are significant given that before it was only the sub-state militias that defeated ISIL. Before it captured Ramadi, ISIL had lost Tikrit in a battle with Iraq's Shia militias.

Forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar al-Assad walk with their weapons in Palmyra city after they recaptured it [Reuters]

In the summer of 2015, it was the militia of Syrian Kurds which expelled ISIL from Tel Abyad, on the border with Turkey, followed by its victory in Sinjar, Iraq, in November.

In both Iraq and Syria, it was these militias, benefiting from US air support, which defeated ISIL in battle.

However, the victory in Ramadi, followed by Palmyra, represents the recent rise of the state military in Iraq and Syria respectively. Both militaries, as national institutions, have defeated ISIL, thus allowing each state to claim victory on behalf of the people.

The ability of the state to claim victory is paramount given how both sides of this conflict have sustained myths about their fighting prowess.

ISIL's victories in Ramadi and Palmyra in May 2015 perpetuated the myth of its military invincibility, essential to recruiting fighters from Iraq, Syria, the greater Middle East, and the West.

ISIL's victories in Ramadi and Palmyra in May 2015 perpetuated the myth of its military invincibility, essential to recruiting fighters from Iraq, Syria, the greater Middle East, and the West.

As of 2016, the Iraqi and Syrian states have reversed ISIL's gains on the battlefield, undermining its aura of invincibility. Both states have gone on to leverage these victories to perpetuate their own myths, promising their citizens that the military will return a modicum of security to their respective nations.

In the case of Ramadi, the Iraqi state went to great efforts to highlight the role of the official armed forces in the liberation of the city. In reality, the Shia militias still played a supporting role by containing ISIL's expansion from Ramadi in May 2015, and the US provided significant air support in the final campaign to recapture it.

Nonetheless, the Iraqi government could claim that it was a national victory since it was the Iraqi security forces, a national institution, and not the Shia militias, that dealt the final blow to ISIL on the streets of Ramadi. 

In the case of Palmyra, the Syrian government has ostensibly claimed its first national victory against ISIL, even if the victory was achieved with the aid of non-Syrian actors, including Russia, Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iraqi and Afghan Shia foreign fighters.

By finally taking on ISIL in Palmyra, Assad can bolster whatever remains of his legitimacy among his own citizens, and can communicate to the international community that he is the only viable bulwark against this terrorist threat, at a time when Europe is still reeling from the attacks in Brussels.  

Breaking The Syrian Stalemate

The Syrian state's ability to recover Palmyra at the end of March 2016 is also significant in that it has demonstrated just how fluid the battlefields in the civil war have become over the past couple of months.

During most of the Syrian civil war, rebel factions could seize territory, but the Syrian state maintained a monopoly on airpower, tanks and heavy artillery, creating a bloody stalemate.

Residents stand near a picture of Syria's president Bashar al-Assad in Wafideen Camp, in Damascus [Reuters]

In April 2015, the stalemate was overcome when a good number of the rebel factions cooperated for the first time, and also received anti-tank missiles from foreign sponsors, which contributed to their rapid success in Idlib and Jisr al-Shughur in northern Syria.

For the first time, Bashar al-Assad admitted publicly that the military had suffered setbacks after losing Idlib to the rebels.

After the rebels' success, the rates of desertion among the Syrian armed forces increased, combined with the military's lack of morale, as the state grew ever more reliant on Hezbollah and Iran.

Then Palmyra fell to ISIL in May 2015. With those rebel victories, questions emerged as to whether the Syrian regime would even survive.

Marwan Bishara, senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, asked: "Is it truly the beginning of the end for Assad and his decades-old regime?"

The headline of an article in The Guardian asked, "Amid the ruins of Syria, Is Bashar al-Assad now finally facing the end?"

It was a question that Russia most likely pondered around the same time, and which, in hindsight, explains its robust intervention on behalf of the Syrian state.

The US thought Russia's intervention in Syria would be like its experience in Afghanistan. In fact, it broke the stalemate of the civil war in favour of the Syrian state.

Not even a year has passed since the question of Bashar al-Assad's survival was raised. Now, his survival is no longer in doubt.

However, this recent victory occurred because the cessation of hostilities with other Syrian rebels freed up enough manpower for the Syrian state to recapture Palmyra. The Syrian state still does not have enough military resources to score an outright victory against both ISIL and the other Syrian rebels in the near term, even with the residual Russian forces remaining.

While Assad has achieved a string of tactical victories, breaking the military stalemate outside Aleppo against the Syrian rebels and in Palmyra against ISIL, breaking the political stalemate between the state and the opposition seems an ever more formidable challenge in the year to come.

Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/palmyra-major-turning-point-syria-civil-war-160329073835831.html

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Preventing another Brussels

By Osama Al Sharif

30 March 2016

Europe is in shock following last week’s double suicide attacks in Brussels; the capital of the European Union and NATO’s headquarters. Daesh has claimed responsibility but the attackers were all second- generation Belgians, most with criminal records and some on terror watch list. The attacks were linked to last November’s Paris carnage, which also emanated from Belgium and in particular the notorious Molenbeek suburb of Brussels.

Europe is bracing itself for further attacks and security has been tightened in all major cities. There has been talk about catastrophic intelligence failure as the hunt for culprits and other cells intensified. But Europe’s problem with its own Muslim radicals transcends intelligence gathering mechanisms and security cooperation. It is time for European countries to address the root cause of the radicalization of second-generation immigrants.

The challenge for Europe differs from what the Arab and Muslim worlds are facing. The question of why Muslims in Europe have failed to integrate or assimilate must be confronted as the continent ponders what do next. The potential threat by disgruntled, often unemployed and poorly educated European Muslims has nothing to do with the rise of jihadist movements in the Arab and Muslim world in the past few decades. The attacks in London, Madrid, Paris and Brussels, carried out entirely by European Muslims, will continue to haunt the old continent for years to come, even after Daesh is finally defeated as a militant group.

Europe must face the reality that more than 6,000 of its own citizens have made their way to Daesh’s self-proclaimed state in Syria and Iraq over the past few years. Foreign jihadists have proved to be the most radical and the least compromising among the militants in that group. While they represent a small percentage of the millions of Muslims now living in Europe; the vast majority of which are peaceful and moderate, the fact that they were radicalized to such an extent will continue to raise questions about Europe’s “Islamist” dilemma.

Daesh’s emergence and its appeal are not difficult to understand. US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the alienation of Sunnis by Iran-backed governments have contributed directly to the creation of a perfect environment for a radical ideology that has nothing to do with mainstream Islam. Daesh is an extension of Al- Qaeda, another militant group that believes in a clash of civilizations and seeks to create an imaginary utopian state. Their ideology is a product of this region’s complex and tumultuous history, foreign intervention, decades of social, economic and political injustice and the gross failure by regimes to build open and democratic societies.

While Daesh is on the retreat, both in Syria and Iraq, it is its ideology that constitutes the bigger danger. Military efforts and political compromises will eventually eradicate the group from both countries. But defeating its extremist dogma; the takfiri, nihilistic and rejectionist beliefs, will take time. This is the challenge for this region as it battles extremism not only through force but by presenting a counter argument coupled with much needed political, economic and social reforms.

For Europe it is a different challenge, and a more diverse approach. The backlash from the latest attacks will translate into the rise of right-wing nationalist parties that feast on people’s fears and xenophobia. Europe’s universal values will come into question. The depth and breadth of Europe’s existential goals will be tested. The challenge that most European countries face with their own Muslim communities will deepen. Away from the direct global threat of Daesh, Europe must look for answers within itself and it must look hard.

Those young men and women who were born and raised in closed European suburbs lacking a unifying identity and feeling detached from society at large found a refuge and a cause in extremist groups. Why they chose to go and join what they believed to be an ideal society in the self-proclaimed caliphate is a question that European leaders must face. How were they recruited and why they came back to blow themselves up in the heart of Europe is an intellectual exercise that will require boldness and courage.

The deadly attacks in Paris and Brussels have changed Europe’s priorities and may alter its course. The flow of refugees from Syria has exacerbated the problem. But it is vital to consider that in essence Europe’s dilemma today is home grown. It is in the ghettos of some European capitals that disenfranchised young Muslims have come to embrace extremist ideologies. This has nothing to do with refugees or conflicts in far-away countries.

While we in the Arab and Muslim worlds must face and deal with the challenge of religious extremism in our own way, the test for Europe requires a different path altogether. For long the question has been asked: Why have European Muslims failed to integrate or assimilate? Even more important is to ask why the majority feel marginalized and left out. Europe’s war against terror must go beyond security measures and it must locate and deal with the root cause at home.

Source: arabnews.com/columns/news/902731

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URL: https://newageislam.com/middle-east-press/terrorists-extremists-think-new-age/d/106815


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