What Stronger Saudi-Russian Ties Signify — and What They Do Not By Faisal J. Abbas: New Age Islam's Selection, 06 October 2017
New Age Islam Edit Bureau
06 October 2017
• What Stronger Saudi-Russian Ties Signify — and What They Do Not
By Faisal J. Abbas
• FGM: A Native Affliction on Every Inhabitable Continent
By John Chua
• How Mosul's Informers Helped In the Fight against Daesh
By Michael Georgy, Ahmed Rasheed & Raya Jalabi
• Russia And Saudi Arabia: Finding Common Ground And Friendship
By Kirill Dmitriev
• Rapprochement with Moscow Opens New Opportunities of Cooperation
By Konstantin Dudarev
• Why Did Qatar Choose Confrontation?
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
• Qatar’s Economy In A Downward Spiral
By Dr. Majid Rafizadeh
• What Corbynism’s Rise Could Mean for GCC-UK Ties
By Dr. Manuel Almeida
• Europe Watches Nervously As Spain Heads for a Split
By Amy Maguire & Georgia Monaghan
Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau
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What Stronger Saudi-Russian Ties Signify — and What They Do Not
By Faisal J. Abbas
6 October 2017
There has been way too much speculation about the ongoing state visit by King Salman to Russia. Understandably, the Syrian dossier has raised the most questions, given that Moscow and Riyadh support opposing sides in the conflict.
Given the high-profile visit and the billions of dollars being invested, the obvious question is whether or not Riyadh — which holds the brutal Assad regime responsible for the catastrophe in Syria — has conceded to Moscow on this front.
However, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir reiterated Riyadh’s commitment to its beliefs, and argued that improved relations with Moscow will help unify the Syrian opposition and get them to become more active in negotiations.
While this is not an immediate remedy for the suffering of the Syrian people, it goes without saying that closer cooperation between two highly influential capitals such as Riyadh and Moscow will definitely help find a solution, as opposed to each side taking its corner and refusing to engage positively.
After all, anyone who does not acknowledge Russia’s significance in the Middle East must have not been paying attention to the shrinking US role. This is a reality today thanks primarily to former President Barack Obama and his ill-advised foreign policy. As such, Riyadh — as a regional powerhouse — must engage with Moscow for the sake of its own interests and those of the region.
Not A Question Of ‘With Us Or Against Us’
More surprising — and uninformed — views about King Salman’s visit came in the form of a Newsweek opinion piece co-written by RAND analysts Becca Wasser and Howard J. Shatz. The two writers argue that the visit seems to want to leave the US “out in the cold.” But this cannot be further from the truth, and echoes former President George W. Bush’s infamous “you’re either with us or against us” approach to foreign policy.
With all due respect to the authors, it goes without saying that the Saudi-US relationship is a long-lasting strategic one. Like any relation it has its ups and downs, but no right-minded analyst can ignore the positive impact that President Donald Trump has had, or the fact that since this year’s Riyadh Summit, Saudi-US relations have reached unprecedented heights.
For an opinion piece in such a prestigious title to argue otherwise — and to do so citing the Kingdom’s decision to diversify its military arsenal and buy arms from Russia as proof — does a disservice to Newsweek readers. Saudi Arabia, surrounded by hostile neighbours and militias, has a right to defend itself. And like any country in the world, it has a right to procure weapons that serve its defence requirements.
The Kingdom is also perfectly capable of maintaining positive relations with different countries, without these relations affecting its strategic and genuine partnerships with major allies such as the US. Last but not least, as significant as King Salman’s visit is, it is only a start and a step forward. There is a way to go, and much to do on both sides, before Saudi-Russian relations can be deemed strategic.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173071
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FGM: A Native Affliction on Every Inhabitable Continent
By John Chua
06 October 2017
Enter the term "FGM" in Google Images and you will find pictures related to female genital mutilation on the African continent. While the origins of FGM are murky, most experts think the practice came from Africa thousands of years ago, was later adopted by some sects of Islam and spread globally through migration.
But the truth is much more complicated. After I spent a good part of a decade travelling to research FGM around the world, I can say unequivocally that it can be found as a native practice on every continent except Antarctica. It is a global phenomenon, emerging in various places at different times, often independently.
People I have met are often surprised that I research FGM as my gender and Chinese ethnicity make me an unlikely investigator. And indeed, when I first heard about the practice in Iraq, it was by chance.
Nearly a decade ago, I started a citizen journalism project. An Iraqi NGO called Wadi invited me to do training for them, and it was then that I met Iraqi Kurds working to expose and end FGM in their country. I worked with them to produce videos that eventually were released in 2013 by the Guardian and BBC as short documentaries.
When those documentaries were released, I thought my job was done. But through Wadi, I also met other anti-FGM activists throughout the Middle East. Initially, I only thought I would make a longer documentary film about FGM in the region, but as I did more research, I realised I had to add Southeast Asian countries to the list. Then India. Then Russia. Then the United States. Eventually, my project grew to become a collection of evidence of FGM practices from around the world.
In my journey across continents, I have observed similar reactions among people whenever I brought up the subject. Everywhere I went, the initial reaction was always disbelief and denial. Some even discouraged me from doing research on the topic, believing that FGM wasn't practised in their community or if it were, only among minorities or immigrants.
In many of these places, FGM is a secret practice. Perhaps this is the reason why FGM has remained hidden for so long to outsiders. While many people involved in the practice or who experienced it would not talk to me, others - to my surprise - agreed to discuss it frankly on video. Perhaps the shock of a Chinese man appearing in their midst, sometimes in isolated communities such as in the Peruvian Amazon or the Russian Caucasus, made them curious and more open.
Different communities also offered different explanations about why they practise female genital cutting. In parts of Iraq, uncut females are deemed "unclean" and are not allowed to serve water. In Pattani, Thailand, female circumcision is believed to prevent diseases, including Aids. In Peru, Shipibo women were convinced uncut girls might become lesbians. In Colombia, Embera mothers would say they cut their babies to stop the clitoris from growing to become a penis.
Some Muslim sects consider the cutting mandatory under Islam, yet there is nothing about this in the Quran and many Muslims from other sects dismiss the hadith purportedly supporting the practice.
But the tendency to justify FGM extends to men of science, as well. In the mid-19th century, some British doctors believed cutting the clitoris could cure sicknesses. Another belief was that a larger clitoris was a sign of sexual depravity and that it was most commonly found among women of colour. The most prominent of the doctors who promoted FGM was Isaac Baker Brown, who in 1866, published On the Curability of Certain Forms of Insanity, Epilepsy, Catalepsy, and Hysteria in Females. In his book, he recommended clitoridectomy for a number of illnesses. Although he and other similar doctors fell out of favour in Britain, their influence was far-ranging.
Their ideas spread across the ocean into the US. For nearly a century starting in the 1860s, some prominent American doctors recommended cutting the clitoris to prevent females from masturbating, which they regarded as a cause of debilitating illnesses.
In the US, I located church and medical documents, from as late as the 1960s, that recommending the cutting. Many survivors were too young to remember the cutting and the number of elderly white FGM survivors alive in America is unknown. But there seems to be a collective societal amnesia about its practise. I found Dr Renee Bergstrom, one such survivor, and persuaded her to go public with her story. She was initially hesitant because even some people close to her were unaware of her situation. Like many other survivors, she was told never to talk about it.
But this happened not just to white American women. In Russia, a Christian sect existed until the 1920s and believed in extreme genital cutting. The Skoptsy sect, numbering possibly 100,000 members in the early 1900s, was known for male castration, but they also sometimes cut female genitals - removing the clitoris and allowing the wounds of the vagina to heal back together. They cited a passage in the New Testament, specifically Matthew 19:12, as the reason for their cutting. In Moscow's Lenin Library, I located documents, drawings and photos attesting to their practice.
FGM still exists in Russia, although it is mostly confined to the Muslim enclaves of the Caucasus. In the Russian Republic of Dagestan, once dubbed the most dangerous place in Europe, I interviewed a gynaecologist who was convinced that the "minor" female genital cutting she performs has health and sanitary benefits.
But Dr Abdulrahim Rouzi, a Saudi gynaecologist I also interviewed, believes that minor FGM could be problematic. After treating hundreds of FGM patients, he has seen that even just cutting the clitoral hood could have negative medical consequences.
Even though FGM is outlawed in many countries, there is no shortage of clinics globally where parents can illegally bring their daughters to get cut.
In my native Singapore, I posed alternatively as a British and American parent wishing to get my non-existent daughter cut and had no problems finding medical personnel willing to perform the procedure.
However, my biggest surprise during this journey was finding out how common FGM was among Singapore's Muslims and its likely detrimental impact on my own friends and extended family - people I have known for most of my life, but who had never previously spoken to me about it.
It inspired me to conduct a survey of 119 Muslim women in Singapore: 86 of them were cut; a quarter said they would continue the practice.
Indeed, FGM is not tied to a specific race or religion. Instead, religion and faulty science are used to justify why the practice is beneficial. In reality, a universal fear of sexuality, especially female sexuality, hides behind these justifications.
To be able to fight against it effectively, we have to recognise that this is a global problem and not limited to one continent or one religion.
Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/fgm-native-affliction-inhabitable-continent-171004091525749.html
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How Mosul's Informers Helped In the Fight against Daesh
By Michael Georgy, Ahmed Rasheed & Raya Jalabi
October 6, 2017
They hid sim cards and phones and provided information on Daesh targets. Without them the fighting would have dragged on
One informer said he hid the sim card from his mobile phone in a water filter to avoid detection by Daesh. Another concealed his in a sack of rice and made calls to his Iraqi handlers from a basement.
They were among several hundred Mosul residents who provided information on Daesh targets during the victorious nine-month battle for Iraq's second biggest city, Iraqi military and Kurdish intelligence officials said.
They included taxi drivers, Iraqi soldiers and defectors from Daesh. Without their help, officials say, the fighting would have dragged on longer, snared in Mosul's narrow alleys.
"I was really afraid the whole time. Because you paid with blood, you paid with your life if you were caught," said one of the informers, 30-year-old former army sergeant Alaa Abdullah, who remained in Mosul after its capture by Daesh in 2014.
"My mother used to say, you're still young. But I'd tell her, every time I see a Daesh fighter, I get a grey hair," he said. "And you can see all my greys now. From all that hatred and fear."
The city, which was home to about two million people before the war, was liberated in July. Daesh's reversal seemed improbable in June 2014 when its fighters swept into Mosul. The militants were welcomed by many fellow Sunnis, the majority of the city's population, who complained of injustices at the hands of Iraq's government. The Iraqi army capitulated and fled, leaving its weapons behind.
Mosul was Daesh's most significant conquest in Iraq, part of what it called a "caliphate" that stretched into neighbouring Syria. In Mosul's Great Mosque, Daesh leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi declared himself head of the world's Muslims in July 2014.
Yet, by the time Iraqi forces launched a massive ground assault to retake Mosul in October 2016, backed by Kurdish fighters, Shia militias and US air power, many residents had turned against the group, which exerted brutal control. Its opponents were beheaded or shot. Acts such as smoking a cigarette were punishable by 40 lashes, residents said.
Nine Iraqi and Kurdish military officials, informers and their relatives detailed how their battle for Mosul unfolded. As Iraqi army commanders and US advisers were preparing the ground offensive, intelligence officers were recruiting informers, building alliances with the region's Sunni tribes and infiltrating Baghdadi's inner circle. Iraqi intelligence had tested using informers in the successful operation to retake another Daesh stronghold, Falluja, in June 2016. Now it was time to apply the tactic on a bigger scale in Mosul.
"We were working hard to penetrate networks and establish connections that would be beneficial once the military phase began, and it paid off," a senior Kurdish counter-terrorism official, Lahur Talabany, told Reuters. "We were able to connect to people close enough to aid us in our efforts."
Many people became informers because "they truly believed in the cause of eradicating Daesh," Talabany said. A few were motivated by money to put food on the table. Daesh fighters defected from the militant group when they saw its downfall was "inevitable and imminent."
From early 2016, Iraqi military intelligence began reaching out to possible informants and allies through intermediaries, Iraqi officials said.
Intelligence officers first turned to the Sunni tribes that had been instrumental in driving out Daesh's precursor, Al Qaida, in 2006-2007. But fear of Daesh was holding the tribes back, said Lieutenant Colonel Salah Al Kinani, an army intelligence officer. One tribesman, for instance, wanted a guarantee that the group would not burn him alive if he was caught. Then, in August 2016, there was a breakthrough.
Kinani and his men made contact with a close aide to Baghda Ali Al Jabouri, also known as Abu Omar Al Jabouri, a former officer in Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard who had joined Daesh when it overran Mosul in 2014.
An Iraqi intelligence officer began negotiating with Jabouri through members of his Jabouri tribe, Kinani said. After initially hesitating, Jabouri agreed to lead 60 men in a revolt against Daesh to coincide with the start of the army's ground assault in October 2016. But the plot failed. Daesh became suspicious of a fighter loyal to Jabouri, according to Kinani, and seized his mobile phone, which revealed details of the plan to deliver arms and ammunition to houses inside Mosul. Under torture, the fighter told all.
While Iraqi intelligence officials were talking to Jabouri, they also began seeking out civilians in Mosul whose relatives had been killed by militants. They calculated that desire for revenge might make them willing recruits. Mahmoud, a cab driver, was one such informer. He said that Daesh had jailed his brother and cousin in July 2014 for giving the Iraqi army information on its movements in Mosul. He never saw them again, he said.
He eavesdropped on militants' conversations in his cab. Dialling in from the basement of his home to an Iraqi security officer, he provided intelligence on buildings occupied by the militants, the location of car bombs and explosives factories. "I used to take the sim card from my phone and hide it in the sugar jar or a sack of rice," Mahmoud said.
The army sergeant turned informer, Alaa Abdullah, said he went into hiding when Daesh took control of Mosul in 2014, rarely sleeping in the same place twice. As a former translator for US troops during the US occupation, he believed he was a target for the militants. He had also spent time training cadets in the Shia south and feared the Sunni hardliners would brand him an infidel.
Abdullah hid his telephone in a water filter. His brother, like Mahmoud, drove a taxi to make a living and was a rich source of information.
"Daesh fighters would ride in his cab and he would tell me what he heard," said Abdullah.
Abdullah worked with a police intelligence officer, Ayad Jassim, to put together a network of 30 informants in towns and villages near Mosul. Jassim, who was based in the town of Qayara, south of Mosul, confirmed the account. He said the informants provided details about militants' movements, their vehicle licence plates and where they met. As a result, Jassim said, airstrikes by the US-led coalition killed as many as 50 militants in some weeks.
"The success of the informers created an atmosphere of mistrust in Daesh. Militants were suspicious of each other," added Jassim, who said he lost 27 members of his family to Daesh.
A US official said Daseh was "better at making enemies than they were at grabbing territory."
Recognising the threat from informers, it made an example of captured spies.
When the group caught Ibrahim and Idrees Nasir breaking a ban on using cellphones, they discovered the men were in contact with Iraqi security forces by dialing the last number they had called, their cousin Nawfal Youssef said. They were killed with a bullet to the head.
"They hung them by telephone polls on a main street for ten days. They stuck paper signs on their chests which said: 'This man is a traitor. You will suffer the same fate if you cooperate with the infidel Iraqi security forces'," Youssef said.
Some Iraqi officials concede questions remain over the ability of the main Iraqi army to retain control of territory it has gained with the help of US air power. Compared with US trained soldiers in Iraq's highly capable counter-terrorism service, the bulk of the army is ill-equipped and lacks discipline.
The US is afraid a fragmentation of Iraq could further destabilise the Middle East. For some people in Mosul, Iraq's wrecked economy and rampant corruption are the most pressing problems.
Abu Hassan, a former soldier and informant, is also frustrated. He used his work as a cab driver to gather intelligence for the Iraqi military. He says his handlers promised that he could have his old army job and $1,000 a month salary back when Mosul was freed. But when he went to Baghdad to reclaim his job, he was sent packing, he said. These days, Abu Hassan is bitter. He's barely making $7 a day driving his cab. Iraq's defence ministry dismissed his complaints.
"He should have done this to help his country and not for a job. This is the difference between real soldiers and mercenaries," said Lieutenant Colonel Mahdi Ameer.
Source: khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/how-mosuls-informers-helped-in-the-fight-against-daesh-
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Russia and Saudi Arabia: Finding Common Ground and Friendship
By Kirill Dmitriev
5 October 2017
In 1926, it was the Soviet Union that first officially recognized the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. This laid the foundations for enduring good relations between the two nations. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first official state visit to the Kingdom. This time, King Salman is visiting Russia, the first ever state visit by a ruling Saudi monarch to the country.
This historic event gives additional impetus to the relationship already established by the two governments in the search for joint policies, as well as energy and investment projects. This also comes at a time of growing economic collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Russia, with a number of binding agreements expected to be signed during the visit.
Following many years of constructive dialogue and successful agreements between the world’s two leading oil producers, today Russia and Saudi Arabia are aligned in their approach to a series of key global political and economic challenges. Similarly, there is significant potential for cooperation in energy and culture.
In 2015, as a result of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Russia and his meeting with Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) established a partnership with the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), which committed to invest $10 billion in Russian projects — to date the largest investment commitment for projects in Russia.
Under this agreement, both countries focus on joint investment in agriculture, medicine, retail, logistics and real estate, with projects spanning a four-to-five-year period. Investments made by the PIF and RDIF to date have outperformed the major indices, and there are a number of promising new joint projects in the pipeline. At least seven deals have already been finalized, valued at close to $1 billion.
The RDIF is Russia’s champion in developing the business partnership with Saudi Arabia, and this partnership is crucial for the future prosperity of our two countries. Energy and oil are a natural fit for Russia and Saudi Arabia, both at the state and company levels.
The two countries, together providing about a quarter of global oil output, were the driving force behind the unprecedented production agreement between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC oil producers, which stabilized global energy markets, benefitting both suppliers and consumers.
This level of cooperation is being mirrored, and we see various ventures in these sectors, ranging from production projects to developing technology — a sure sign that governmental cooperation on energy policies is being replicated at a corporate level.
The $1 billion Russian-Saudi energy investment fund, focused on identifying attractive investment opportunities in Russian oil and gas production, will be a good example of how we can work together and further stimulate corporate alliances.
Russia is also working with key Saudi corporations. Supported by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), the RDIF is identifying attractive investment opportunities in the Kingdom and other Gulf countries. Agreements of this nature are providing Russian companies with the opportunity to develop home-grown operations and gain a foothold in new markets.
The RDIF-SAGIA relationship is continuing to progress. They recently announced the Russian Saudi Investment Forum to be held in Moscow on Oct. 5, to which more than 200 companies have been invited to participate, including the PIF, Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, Aeroflot, Sibur and SABIC. Since its inception, the RDIF has been committed to working with global sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to jointly invest in projects domestically and abroad.
The close Saudi-Russian relationship has ensured that these collaborations have received broad political and economic support, and is already extremely beneficial for both countries. SWFs from the Gulf, especially from Saudi Arabia, have been an essential force in the success of the RDIF’s mission to attract long-term foreign direct investment into Russia’s economy.
The RDIF’s unique co-investment model means merging both the equity and local expertise of our international partners, simultaneously boosting Russian economic development and creating value for the partners. Throughout these years, our partnership with the PIF has come a long way. Together, we have executed deals in transport infrastructure, manufacturing, logistics and other sectors, and are actively considering more than 25 other projects.
We observe how increasingly new business and investment ties between the two SWFs are being forged. We are fully aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 for the PIF to become the largest and leading SWF globally. Sharing similar views with our Saudi partners, we are interested in adding value to both countries’ economies by delivering high returns via our cooperation in a wide range of sectors in Saudi Arabia and Russia.
As such, Russia is enthusiastic about working with the Kingdom to improve industry and manufacturing in line with Vision 2030. We are open to strategic partnerships advancing the trade and export capabilities of both countries. The RDIF is already committed to deepening these relationships and employing best practices.
Diverse and long-term projects are essential to further cultivating this relationship and maintaining these strategic partnerships between the two countries. King Salman’s visit is yet another reason for optimism, and marks a turning point in strengthening ties between Russia, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries for many years to come. Russia and Saudi Arabia share many values and cultural interests, and we look forward to continuing to develop new business and investment ties between our nations.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1172756/columns
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Rapprochement with Moscow Opens New Opportunities of Cooperation
By Konstantin Dudarev
6 October 2017
King Salman's visit to Russia, his first, is a significant and historic event. After the Soviet Union became one of the world’s first powers to recognize Saudi Arabia in 1926, bilateral relations saw both ups and long periods of alienation during the Cold War and from 2011 to 2015.
The first step toward rapprochement was made in September 2003 during the visit of then-Crown Prince Abdullah to Moscow. It was marked by the signing of a number of bilateral agreements. One of the most important was on cooperation in the oil and gas sector. It brought two big Russian companies, Lukoil and Stroytransgaz, to the Saudi market.
Despite all the difficulties of entering a new market, both companies achieved success. Lukoil discovered gas-condensate deposits, and Stroytransgaz completed construction of the Shaybah-Abqaiq oil pipeline, receiving the highest appraisal from its client Saudi Aramco.
The positive development of bilateral relations that followed was halted by the conflict in Syria in 2011, in which our countries took opposing positions. But the arrival to power of King Salman in January 2015, and the meeting of his son Mohammed bin Salman with President Vladimir Putin in May that year, ended the four-year period of no relations.
The achieved deals were perceived as the Kingdom’s positive response to numerous Russian calls to develop economic and investment cooperation despite foreign policy disagreements. During the same meeting in 2015, Putin sent an invitation to King Salman, which he accepted.
But after this visit the dates were shifted several times, probably due to lack of trust and the absence of a favourable environment due to the conflict in Syria. Apparently, there were expectations that one of the parties would make concessions to receive material gains. Nevertheless, thanks to the political will of Putin and King Salman, efforts to find mutual understanding on political and economic issues did not stop.
What made the current visit possible? In the same way as in 2003, the rapprochement is determined by the need to cooperate in the oil sector, on which both countries still greatly depend. Having suffered serious losses during the period of low crude oil prices on the international market, Russia and Saudi Arabia understood that the best way to compete is to cooperate.
After overcoming their differences, both sides reached an agreement on cooperation in 2016 to stabilize the oil market and establish so-called “fair” oil prices that are acceptable to both producers and consumers.
Market stability and acceptable prices are vital to overcoming the economic challenges that the two countries face. Russia has to withstand Western sanctions, while the Kingdom chose the path of reforms to get rid of dependence on oil and to diversify its economy. The strategy of economic, social and cultural transformation is declared in Vision 2030.
Mutual understanding enabled constructive dialogue between the heads of energy institutions, Alexander Novak and Khalid Al-Falikh, who agreed to do “everything possible” to stabilize oil prices. Common ground was also reached by heads of oil giants: Igor Sechin from Rosneft and Amin Naser from Saudi Aramco.
As a result, they managed to reach an unprecedented agreement on cooperation in the markets of Asian counties such as India, Indonesia and others. Experts claim that Russian companies may be invited to realize mega-projects in Saudi Arabia, and that Saudi Aramco may take part in Arctic projects in Russia.
But oil and gas is not the only domain of bilateral cooperation. Vision 2030 creates prospects for foreign companies, and both countries believe that nuclear energy, where Russia is the world’s leader, can become the largest field of cooperation.
Another hi-tech domain is space exploration. Here, the parties can develop an existing partnership, as Russian rockets have already launched several satellites constructed in Saudi Arabia.
Military production offers great prospects in the hi-tech sphere as well. Russia is widely recognized as a producer of the most modern military equipment, and the Kingdom — the world’s biggest weapons importer — has decided to create its own arms production industry with the participation of foreign companies. On Thursday, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to buy S-400 air defence systems and receive “cutting edge technologies” from Russia.
Unlimited opportunities for cooperation can be found in Russian agriculture, mining and processing of minerals — domains that are in line with Vision 2030, and where Russia has vast experience. Wood processing, car and furniture production, civilian infrastructure, medicine, drinking water supplies and many other spheres have potential for cooperation.
Both countries’ institutions and private companies should determine the main directions for cooperation that are starting to open up thanks to Vision 2030, and formalize these directions in a separate document.
It appears that the most important political factor behind King Salman’s visit to Moscow is the interest in a strategic partnership to stabilize the Middle East and Syria in particular, as both Moscow and Riyadh wish to preserve the country’s sovereignty and territorial unity.
The convergence of the Russian and Saudi positions — not only on Syria, but also on Iraq, Yemen and Libya — was recently confirmed by the foreign ministers of both countries. According to UN statistics, Moscow and Riyadh hold similar positions on 90 percent of issues.
Russia’s decisive contribution to the fight against Daesh has perceptibly changed Moscow’s standing in the region, including in Saudi Arabia. Rapprochement with Moscow strengthens the Kingdom’s regional positions, and opens new opportunities of cooperation in order to re-establish stability in the Middle East.
Partnership with Riyadh, Russia’s military might and its good relations with most of the region’s countries can together lead to positive processes. The high-level meeting in Moscow is destined to provide a new impetus to a multidimensional development of bilateral relations, in the interests of the people of both countries, as well as regional and global stability.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173051
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Why Did Qatar Choose Confrontation?
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
6 October 2017
After the decision of the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ) — comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain — to boycott Qatar, the latter deployed all efforts to thwart the alliance’s plan and push it toward reconciliation. Doha got closer to Tehran, reestablished relations with Hezbollah, and financed Houthi militias in Yemen and other radical Islamist groups that are against the ATQ.
Qatar also supports the US Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), which aims to criminalize Saudi Arabia for the 9/11 attacks. It is pushing for the Kingdom to be held accountable in front of the US Congress for its military activity in Yemen, despite the fact that Qatar was part of the Saudi-led alliance there. Doha is also providing support to anyone who is ready to attack the ATQ member states.
We condemn what Qatar is doing, but we are not surprised by its actions. It used to do the same thing behind the scenes; now it is openly targeting these countries. Doha’s aggression and confrontation are not its only options. Since the outbreak of the dispute with the ATQ, Qatar had three options.
The first was to accept the quartet’s conditions and recalibrate relations in accordance with guaranteed reconciliation. This would end the problem, and we would all live in stability, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s affairs. The second option for Qatar was to boycott the four countries and manage its affairs without them.
Doha chose the third and most difficult option: Waging war against the ATQ members via international organizations and governments, building new alliances, making military deals against the quartet, financing the enemies of its members and waging incitement campaigns against them whenever possible. Qatar has been doing this for the past 20 years. It believes it can impose its will on anyone. In doing so, it is taking a huge financial gamble.
Doha’s provocations against the ATQ members may force them to take action or support many ambitious people in Qatar. No one wants to impose change by force, unlike what Doha claims. Toppling regimes and orchestrating coups would ruin the reputation of the perpetrators.
Moreover, had the ATQ members intended to organize a coup or invade Qatar, they would not have spoken explicitly about their resentment or boycotted Qatar, because this put its security services on maximum alert. The quartet could have remained quiet and planned to take over Doha within two hours.
We can see how Qatar’s royal family is terrified like never before, bearing in mind how Doha has over the past two decades plotted to topple and frighten regimes, including those of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar’s fear of retaliation made it seek help from other countries and spend enormous amounts of money. Nevertheless, it will eventually bow and agree to the ATQ’s demands, even if behind closed doors.
Doha’s irresponsible attacks against the ATQ will eventually lead to Qatar’s bankruptcy and lack of respect, and its ongoing provocations could push its adversaries to do what might be even more dangerous for the emirate.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173061
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Qatar’s Economy in a Downward Spiral
By Dr. Majid Rafizadeh
6 October 2017
Qatar attempts to paint a picture of a national economy unaffected by the diplomatic dispute with its neighbours Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Yet the latest economic data and financial statistics reveal a very different story.
Qatar’s economic sectors, industries and major financial institutions have been considerably impacted by the boycott of Doha over its alleged support of terror groups.
First of all, Qatar’s gross domestic product (GDP), which was expected to grow by 3.1 percent before the crisis, will grow by just 2.5 percent in 2017, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg in August. Doha’s fiscal deficit for 2017 is currently expected to increase to 5.1 percent of GDP, up from 4.6 percent, the economists forecast.
Fitch Ratings in August downgraded Qatar’s sovereign credit rating, while other ratings agencies including Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s have also revised their positions in the fallout of the diplomatic crisis.
In July, Moody’s reduced its outlook on Qatar to negative from stable, and downgraded the forecast for three major institutions including Qatar Petroleum (QP).
Qatar’s stock market has also been hit. The index on Wednesday sank to a five-year low, bringing total losses, since four other Arab states broke off ties with Doha on June 5, to nearly 18 percent.
Qatari industries to have been significantly impacted include tourism and transport. According to a Fitch report in August, the number of passengers carried by Qatar’s national airline had dropped by 10 percent since the start of the diplomatic row.
Although Qatari leaders have attempted to show that other countries such as Turkey and Iran are providing Doha with the required imports, food and beverage prices climbed 4.5 percent from a year earlier in July, their fastest increase since at least 2014. This is due to the fact that other countries cannot offer as competitive prices as other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members do.
Qatar has approximately $340 billion in reserves to address the negative impacts on its economy, but this will not resolve the underlying issue. Furthermore, given the gloomy outlook, Qatar will increasingly find it difficult to attract foreign investment. According to Qatar Central Bank data from late July, net foreign reserves dropped by $10.4 billion in June.
Qatar has been forced to deposit billions of dollars into its banks. But this is unlikely to resolve the underlying problem as foreign reserves continue to decline, and more cash is leaving Qatar’s local and commercial banks.
In a nutshell, the negative economic trend in Qatar cannot continue for long. Use of Doha’s reserves and new deals with other countries will not address the major financial problems at play. Qatar’s economic outlook will continue to decline if the Gulf crisis persists.
It is therefore in Qatar’s long-term interests to change its policies in order to restore ties with other GCC members. Otherwise, sooner or later, the downward financial trend will lead to major domestic discontent and resistance, endangering the Qatari leaders’ hold on power.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173066
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What Corbynism’s Rise Could Mean for GCC-UK Ties
By Dr. Manuel Almeida
6 October 2017
The uncertainties and quarrels afflicting the Conservatives in the UK were again on display this week during the party’s conference, as the party continues to struggle to define a consistent position on Brexit and convince its European counterparts that it is ready for meaningful negotiations.
The Conservatives’ struggle with Brexit, the most consequential affair in the country’s recent history and one of their own making, could have a significant impact on Britain’s longstanding ties with its Arab allies in the Gulf.
In fact, the instability surrounding the government and its besieged Prime Minister Theresa May is gradually paving the way for Jeremy Corbyn, the once highly contested Labour leader now increasingly seen as prime minister in-waiting.
Although the next general election is only scheduled for 2022, the current exceptional circumstances could well lead to an earlier vote. In June’s snap election, called by May with the intention of reinforcing her position in government and toward Brexit negotiations, the Tories lost their majority.
If the last general election is anything to go by, Corbyn stands a good chance of putting an end to Labour’s longstanding absence from Downing Street. Labour is just seven seats away from the Tories to have a go at a ruling coalition, and 64 seats from a majority. And Corbyn has put to rest any remnants of former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s pragmatic and pro-business New Labour, instead presiding over a significant left-turn of the party.
An entire career as Labour backbencher, often voting against his own party, leaves some doubts about what kind of foreign policy agenda Corbyn would pursue while in office. Yet the opposition leader has consistently held dogmatic, often radical and deeply ideological positions on issues as diverse as the special relationship with the US, Britain’s nuclear deterrent, terrorism, and the UK’s relations with Iran and the Arab Gulf states.
Of late, for example in his speech on foreign policy in May, Corbyn has tried to build a more moderate image. Nevertheless, his extensive record points to a radical, leftist firebrand struggling to disguise his longstanding instincts.
During a parliamentary meeting in 2009, he called Hezbollah and Hamas “friends,” later expressing regret over his choice of words to MPs investigating accusations of antisemitism in the Labour party. The US assassination of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was, in Corbyn’s own words, a “tragedy.” His sympathies for the Irish Republican Army, and his relationship with Sinn Fein, are well known.
The Labour leader’s empathy toward the “progressive” Iranian regime, reflected among other things in a handful of appearances on Iran’s Press TV, stands in sharp contrast with his contempt for the Gulf monarchies.
He is also an admirer of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a supporter of Cuba’s revolution, and an apologist for the indefensible North Korean regime. In the 2003 book “Anti-Imperialism: A Guide for the Movement,” Corbyn argues that the Soviet Union posed no real threat, and he opposes sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear weapons program.
All these positions are indicative enough of the kind of difficulties the Arab Gulf states could come to face in dealing with a possible — many would say probable — Corbyn-led Labour government.
The unrealistic plan of leading Brexiteers has been to take advantage of the withdrawal from the EU to forge a “truly global Britain,” whereby trade ties with traditional allies and partners would become more relevant than ever. While May’s government has made it a priority to reach out to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, as attested by the first GCC-UK Summit held late last year, expanding bilateral trade ties could suffer under a Corbyn government.
Corbynism poses another potential, even if more indirect, challenge to the interests of the Arab Gulf states. The longstanding confidence the GCC states have had in Britain’s economy as a destination for major investments would certainly be put to the test by a radical economic program of nationalization and out-of-control public spending.
Coupled with the economic impact of Brexit, this radical and backward economic program could wreak havoc. Plus, the idea that a Labour government will necessarily reverse Brexit is challenged by the fact that at the helm of Britain’s most pro-EU party is a deep Eurosceptic, if not Europhobe. Corbyn’s ambiguous position in the run-up to the referendum was one of the crucial factors undermining the “remain” campaign’s chances.
The Arab Gulf states have plenty of reasons to worry about the growing prospects of a Corbyn premiership. The relative hope, if this possibility comes to fruition, is that institutions and the inevitable need for moderation when in power would curb Corbynism’s most radical and populist inclinations.
Source: arabnews.com/node/1173046#
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Europe Watches Nervously As Spain Heads for a Split
By Amy Maguire & Georgia Monaghan
October 5, 2017
Catalonia's claim to independence is historical. It has always considered itself a distinct entity.
More than two million Catalans have voted in a referendum for independence from Spain. Sunday's vote was a milestone in the century-long struggle for self-determination in Catalonia.
Catalonia's claim to independence is historical. It has always considered itself a distinct entity. While Catalonia has co-existed with Spain for centuries, the 1979 Statute of Autonomy under the 1978 Spanish Constitution permitted Catalonia some autonomy, with self-government of education, health care and welfare.
Catalonia has also maintained a culture and language distinct from its Spanish neighbours. For Catalans, strong national identity has been demonstrated through resistance of repressive expressions of Spanish influence - notably the Franco dictatorship's attempts to suppress Catalan culture and language.
As one of the strongest and most productive economic regions in Spain, the perception among Catalans is that they give more in tax than they receive in state benefits. In 2015, 20 per cent of Spain's total GDP came from Catalonia, while the state budget for Catalonia received a 6.5 per cent decrease from 2003.
The current Catalan claim for independence has been energised by the perceived economic and political repression of the region by the central government in recent years. Many Catalans believe Catalonia would be more successful if it could self-rule.
Parallel to inequitable economic treatment, the Spanish government has also moved recently to constrain Catalan autonomy. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court struck down an expanded version of the Statute of Autonomy that granted Catalonia the title of a "nation". In March 2017, former Catalan leader Artur Mas was banned from holding public office after being found guilty of disobeying the Constitutional Court by holding a symbolic referendum in 2014. Such aggressive responses by Spain to the idea of secession have driven increasing numbers of Catalonians toward the independence movement.
Catalonian President Carles Puigdemont argues his people's sovereignty lies with the Catalan parliament, and that no other court or political power could ban or suspend the vote. The referendum's legality is certainly contentious, notably because it did not adhere to democratic conventions like the requirement for a minimum threshold of votes. Regardless, Puigdemont is looking to make a declaration of independence on Monday.
While Catalans claim independence, Madrid refuses to recognise the referendum's legitimacy. Spanish President Mariano Rajoy has labelled the referendum as a "constitutional and democratic atrocity" and slammed the Catalan leaders for creating "serious damage to co-existence".
In line with the 2010 Constitutional Court decision, the Spanish government opposes Catalan independence on the grounds of constitutional invalidity. The 1978 Spanish Constitution denied the independence of Catalonia, declaring the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation".
Madrid argues there is no provision in the Spanish Constitution for self-determination, and that a unilateral vote of independence is at odds with Article 155's requirement for democratic participation of all Spaniards. On these grounds, the Constitutional Court banned the referendum - which nevertheless proceeded on Sunday.
The UN has criticised Madrid for its disproportionate and violent response to a peaceful attempt at self-determination. Human Rights Watch has condemned the Spanish government for violating Catalans' civil right to peaceful assembly and free expression. In contrast, the EU regards the vote as illegal but has called for unity and peaceful relations between Spain and Catalonia.
Catalonia, on the other hand, is effectively asserting the right of its people to self-determination. This is a collective human right, enshrined in common Article 1(1) of the twin human rights covenants - the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
In voting at a referendum and preparing for a declaration of independence, Catalonia is following a similar contested path to the emerging state of Kosovo. In 2010, the International Court of Justice found that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law. Spain is the only country in Western Europe to refuse recognition to Kosovo as an independent country. Spain's insistence that unilateral secession cannot be permitted for Kosovo is intertwined with its determination not to lose Catalonia.
Self-determination can be realised in a range of ways, including through forms of autonomy within a nation-state. It may be that a negotiated arrangement that would preserve Spain's sovereignty over Catalonia would still be possible. However, by meeting Sunday's assertion of self-determination with repression, Spain has undoubtedly fuelled Catalonia's determination to establish an independent state. Other EU member nations, including the UK, will be watching with concern that Catalonia may inspire separatist movements in Scotland, Bavaria and Flanders.
Source: .khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/europe-watches-nervously-as-spain-heads-for-a-split
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/middle-east-press/stronger-saudi-russian-ties-signify/d/112781