Middle East Press on Anti-Semitism, Turkey's Militarised Foreign Policy and Hamas: New Age Islam's Selection, 23 September 2020
By
New Age Islam Edit Bureau
23
September 2020
•Redefining
Anti-Semitism On Facebook
By
Neve Gordon
•Turkey's
Foreign Policy Becoming Alarmingly Militarized
By
Metin Gurcan
•Hamas
Members See 'False Unity' With Palestinian Authority
By
Adnan Abu Amer
•It's
Time to Build A New, Peaceful Middle East
By
Mustafa Al Zarooni
------
Redefining
Anti-Semitism On Facebook
By
Neve Gordon
22 Sep 2020
With its
2.7 billion users, Facebook is the world’s largest and arguably most
influential social media platform. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that
right-wing Zionist organisations have identified it as a key platform to
promote their agenda.
Several
years ago, for example, the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs alongside
students from IDC, an Israeli university in Herzliya, helped create ACT.IL, an
“online community that will act to promote a positive influence on the
international public opinion towards the state of Israel via social media
platforms”. ACT.IL established an army of trolls and then developed an app to
make their work more effective by coordinating mass reporting of Facebook posts
critical of Israel.
Soon, it
became clear that no army of trolls can cope with monitoring the massive amount
of content on Facebook. That is why, right-wing Zionist organisations have
recently begun pressuring Facebook to include criticism of Israel as part of
its own definition of hate speech. Their objective, in other words, is to force
Facebook to alter the algorithms it uses to detect hate speech so the company’s
own algorithms will automatically remove any criticism of Israel from the
platform. Algorithms, they realised, are more efficient than trolls.
Working
closely with the Israeli government this past summer, the pro-Israel lobbying
group StopAntisemitism.org launched the new campaign after receiving funding
from right-wing philanthropist Adam Milstein.
In July,
Orit Farkash-Hacohen, Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs, published an
op-ed in Newsweek urging social media companies to root out the anti-Semitic
“virus” by fully adopting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
(IHRA) working definition of antisemitism.
A few weeks
later, on August 7, 120 organisations representing the “who’s who” of Zionist
right-wing groups sent a letter to Facebook’s Board of Directors, calling upon
them to fully adopt the IHRA definition as the “cornerstone of Facebook’s hate
speech policy regarding antisemitism”.
This
definition, which has been endorsed or adopted in some official capacity by
more than 30 countries, includes 11 examples of anti-Semitism, several of which
involve criticism of Israel. This is just the latest concrete manifestation of
how any critique of the Israeli government and its politics now assumes the
taint of anti-Semitism.
There is,
to be sure, some irony here. Historically, the fight against anti-Semitism has
sought to advance the equal rights and emancipation of Jews. Yet, in the IHRA
definition those who speak out against the subjugation of Palestinians are
called anti-Semites.
Thus,
instead of enabling the struggle against those wish to oppress, dominate and
exterminate Jews, this new definition of anti-Semitism comes after those who
wish to take part in the struggle for liberation from colonial rule. In this
way – as Judith Butler has observed – “a passion for justice [is] renamed as
anti-Semitism”.
Yet, the
people behind this campaign are neither interested in irony nor in justice, and
certainly not in justice for Palestinians. As Lara Friedman, the president of
the Foundation for Middle East Peace who wrote an expose on the Facebook
campaign for Jewish Currents, has pointed out, their letter to the Board of
Directors “represents the latest front in the battle to use the IHRA definition
to officially exclude criticism of Israel from the bounds of acceptable
discourse”.
The
campaign seems to have had an immense impact. Four days after receiving the letter
from the Zionist organisations, Guy Rosen, Facebook vice president for
Integrity, announced the organisation had updated its hate speech policy to
take into account certain kinds of implicit hate speech, such as “stereotypes
about Jewish people controlling the world”.
Monika
Bickert, Facebook’s vice president of content policy, sent a letter to the
signatories, noting the company “draws on the spirit – and the text – of the
IHRA”, and that under Facebook’s policy, “Jews and Israelis are treated as
‘protected characteristics'”.
Sheryl
Sandberg, Facebook’s chief operating officer, even wrote a personal note to
Milstein, who financed the campaign. She assured him that the IHRA definition
has been “invaluable – both in informing our own approach, and as a point of
entry for candid policy discussions with organizations like yours”.
Yet, the
company still seems to be reluctant to adopt the parts of the definition that
relate to Israel, and it is not coincidental that in Facebook’s responses they
mention only hate speech towards Jews.
Friedman
from the Foundation for Middle East Peace cites senior Facebook official Peter
Stern who three months before the campaign was launched asserted that: “We
don’t allow people to make certain types of hateful statements against
individuals. If the focus turns to a country, an institution, a philosophy,
then we allow people to express themselves more freely, because we think that’s
an important part of political dialogue … and that there’s an important
legitimate component to that. So we allow people to criticize the state of
Israel, as well as the United States and other countries.”
Unsurprisingly,
Facebook’s new hate speech policy has not satisfied the pro-Israel lobby, and
in the August 7 letter, part of the ire was directed towards Stern, claiming
that he had “admitted that Facebook does not embrace the full adoption of the
IHRA working definition because the definition recognizes that modern
manifestations of antisemitism relate to Israel”.
In a tweet
responding to Sandberg’s letter, Milstein made it clear the campaign will
continue: “We look forward to working with @Facebook to ensure #antisemitism is
eradicated from the platform and the #IHRA working definition of antisemitism
is fully adopted by your organization.”
On the other
side of the political spectrum, a group of scholars (myself included)
specialising in anti-Semitism, Jewish and Holocaust history, and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict wrote to Facebook about the dangers of adopting
the IHRA definition.
While
urging Mark Zuckerberg to “fight all forms of hate speech on Facebook”, we
called on him to refrain from “adopting and applying a politicized definition
of antisemitism, which has been weaponized to undermine free speech, in order
to shield the Israeli government and to silence Palestinian voices and their
supporters”.
If Facebook
does eventually bow down and include the full IHRA definition in its
algorithms, free speech on Israel/Palestine, which is already under immense
pressure, will receive a lethal blow. It is up to Facebook users to voice their
concern by notifying Zuckerberg and Sandberg that they will abandon the
platform the moment the media giant decides to adopt the IHRA definition.
Ultimately, we, the users, do hold the power.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/9/22/redefining-anti-semitism-on-facebook/
----
Turkey's
Foreign Policy Becoming Alarmingly Militarized
By
Metin Gurcan
Sep 22,
2020
As recently
as early September, Turkish media was beating the war drums as tensions
escalated with Greece over territorial and gas exploration rows in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The pro-government media, in particular, was abuzz with
commentaries on how Turkey’s military power was superior to that of Greece and
how Turkey would easily win a potential war with its neighbour. The same
pro-government commentators and retired generals are now lauding the merits of
diplomacy and dialogue while accusing those who fail to change tune of
promoting tensions and war.
Such abrupt
turns on key matters of national interest have become alarmingly frequent in
Turkey since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed super executive powers in
2018, showing that Ankara’s foreign policy has fallen into the trap of
short-termism and become increasingly unpredictable.
Moreover,
almost everyone in Ankara feels entitled to speak on foreign policy matters.
The president’s spokesperson and communications chief as well as the ministers
of Defense, Economy, Energy and even the Interior have come to readily pass a
comment. Ranting against Turkey’s adversaries is today a highly popular thing
in Ankara. Foreign policy bluster has seemingly become an easy way for members
of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to raise their profiles and
advance their political careers. It is usually riskless and with high populist
returns.
Amid these
frequent about-turns and the cacophony of messages, foreign policy in Ankara
today is a realm of inconsistency and confusion.
In the past
two years, Erdogan has claimed credit for any bold foreign policy move, including
Turkey’s military operation in northeast Syria in October 2019, its maritime
deal with Libya the following month, and efforts to assert itself in Africa and
the Eastern Mediterranean. But when it comes to less illustrious events such as
Washington’s retaliation for Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defense systems,
President Donald Trump’s brash letter to Erdogan over Syria, the killing of 36
Turkish soldiers in a strike in Idlib or Greece’s militarization of Aegean
islands near Turkey’s shores, no one is around to be accountable to the public.
In short,
foreign affairs have become a tool to furbish Erdogan’s image, the result of
which is a highly personalized foreign policy.
On Sept.
17, for instance, presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin framed Ankara’s
decision to pull a research ship out of disputed waters in the Mediterranean
Sea as Erdogan’s personal gesture to Greece. “Our president has given a chance
to diplomacy again. Hopefully, the Greek side will use this as an opportunity
to advance the talks,” he said.
A grave
repercussion of Erdogan’s foreign policy posture, which has come to mirror his
short-tempered and polarizing style in domestic politics, is the erosion of
institutional decision-making and execution on foreign policy matters. The
Foreign Ministry’s institutional capacity has been seriously damaged and overly
politicized, including through nepotistic appointments and promotions.
Since 2018,
the gap between Ankara’s dreams or desires and the reality on the ground or the
realpolitik has widened as well. Ankara has come to pursue dreams of “spoiling
games” by others rather than a foreign policy based on its economic and
military capacity. The defensive, status quoist leaning of Turkey’s foreign
policy in the past was hardly the best example, but its current offensive,
revisionist brand is devoid both of a grand strategy and a capacity matching
ambitions, which makes it extremely risky. Because of its failure to develop a
realistic, rational and strategic framework, Turkey has grown increasingly
isolated, trying to compensate for its risky loneliness with revisionist
military activism.
Until the
2010s, Ankara used only limited military force to manage a complex,
multi-threat environment. Its main priority was the four-decade domestic
conflict with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Diplomacy and
deterrence were used to freeze rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the
Cyprus conflict. This began to change in the summer of 2018 when Erdogan
assumed sweeping powers under a new executive presidency system.
Turkey’s
embrace of muscular methods is rooted in profound transformations in its
external environment and domestic dynamics.
Externally,
Ankara’s threat perceptions have shifted east and south, owing to growing
security risks in the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, North Africa and Syria, and
to strategic competition with Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates and other regional powers. Ankara was particularly unnerved by NATO’s
passivity on its southern flank during the Syria crisis, which contributed to a
security vacuum there. In relying on the People’s Protection Units — the PKK’s
Syrian franchise — to counter the Islamic State, Western powers ignored or
dismissed Turkey’s well-known concerns. Also, there is a pervasive and enduring
sense among the Turkish ruling elite that the Western security block failed to
adequately support Ankara during and after the coup attempt of July 2016.
A number of
domestic factors have also driven the militarization of foreign policy. First,
foreign policy has become a crucial plank of Ankara’s political agenda since
the executive presidency system took effect. Military actions abroad enjoy
strong popular support and help sustain Erdogan’s popularity. In particular,
his embrace of a more nationalist discourse at home has helped consolidate his
de facto coalition with the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party.
Second,
military deployment abroad is popular with the armed forces themselves. It
boosts morale and motivation through extra pay and promotion opportunities and
provides valuable experience in joint force operations.
A third
domestic driver of Turkey’s more militaristic approach is its role in
harmonizing ties between the military and civilian leadership, who agree on the
need to enhance Turkey’s military capabilities and defense industry. The
military is more concerned with the technical dimensions of this consensus as
part of a transformation and restructuring process called Vision 2033. Politicians,
meanwhile, are keen to use this new capacity and energy in domestic and foreign
policy. They also hope that keeping the army busy abroad will make civilian
control of the military easier as the generals focus on external rather than
domestic affairs. Finally, the boom in the Turkish defense industry allows
Ankara to pursue a more independent strategy and display its defense systems
for the purpose of international marketing.
Foreign
policy is increasingly becoming a tool of daily politics at home, shaped by a
populist approach that prioritizes domestic consumption and thus glues foreign
policy to the government’s domestic political agenda.
The foreign
affairs field has become intertwined with political career planning as AKP
politicians are now easily appointed as ambassadors or to other foreign posts.
The
decision-making process is often devoid of comprehensive consultations and
transparency, leading to uncertainty, arbitrariness and unpredictability in
foreign policy decisions.
All senior
figures in Ankara feel free to go into the realm of foreign policy, which often
results in a muddle of messages. For foreign actors, especially those in the
West, this could create confusion as to who is their interlocutor on the
Turkish side and fuel a perception of a deepening governance and management
crisis in Ankara.
What will
the mood in Turkey be next week on the rows in the Eastern Mediterranean? Will
it remain in favour of dialogue or reverse to warmongering? Such questions are
becoming increasingly hard to answer as seven days is now too long a period in
Turkish foreign policy.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/09/turkey-libya-syria-six-problems-aggressive-foreign-policy.html
-----
Hamas
Members See 'False Unity' With Palestinian Authority
By Adnan
Abu Amer
Sep 22,
2020
Despite the
meetings and steps undertaken by Hamas’ and Fatah’s leaders to present a united
front following Israel's normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Bahrain, Hamas’ middle leadership level and popular organizational
bases do not place great trust in what they called “false unity,” arguing that
Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have shown a lack of credibility when
it comes to reconciliation with Hamas in the past.
For them,
Fatah and the PA efforts are not patriotic but rather tactical, strategic,
temporary and stem from their own interests. They claim the PA and Fatah did
not change their security services’ approach toward Hamas in the West Bank, as
they continue to arrest and summon Hamas cadres despite the positive meetings
in front of the cameras and under the pretext that they fear Hamas will take
control of the West Bank as it did in the Gaza Strip in 2007.
The
Committee of Families of Political Prisoners in the West Bank, a nongovernmental
institution concerned with the affairs of Hamas members imprisoned by the PA,
said in its monthly report issued Sept. 10 that the PA continues its
violations, arresting 30 political activists, summoning 33 people, and raiding
nine homes and workplaces. The violations, according to the report, targeted 24
former prisoners, 24 released political prisoners, university students,
journalists, teachers and university lecturers, most of whom are Hamas cadres.
The most violations were recorded in the West Bank city of Hebron, followed by
Jenin and Nablus.
Nayef
Rajoub, former minister of endowments in the Hamas-run government and a Hamas
leader in the West Bank, told Al-Monitor, “The movement welcomes any step to
end the division and bless any effort in this direction. Yet our experience
with the PA has been bitter. Numerous agreements were signed with the PA in the
presence of regional and international witnesses. Every time, the PA would
circumvent what was agreed upon. Based on that, we need to see how it is going
to act on the ground in order for the Palestinian street to be reassured and
see that it is being serious in overcoming differences and divide.”
"Based
on that," Rajoub added, "the PA needs to implement what is being said
on the ground without contenting itself with media remarks and meetings. This
is because it is a shame that the arrests, summons and harassment of Hamas in
the West Bank continue.”
“I fear
that the [rapprochement] steps taken toward Hamas may be tactical and stemming
from the PA’s own interests after it reached a dead end, and that it wants to
use [the Hamas] card in front of Israel and the Americans,” Rajoub continued.
Since the
outbreak of the coronavirus in the West Bank in February, the PA has summoned
and arrested Hamas activists across the territory and investigated with some
into their social media posts. That has prompted Shaker Amara, a prominent
Hamas leader in the West Bank, to describe such a policy as an act of sabotage
of national efforts and a consolidation of the divide.
However,
Ehud Hamo, a correspondent for Israeli Channel 12 in the West Bank, revealed in
a Sept. 16 report that the PA leadership issued instructions to its security
forces in the past days following the signing of the Arab normalization deals
with Israel in Washington not to arrest any Hamas member unless it is an
extreme, sensitive case.
Yahya
Moussa, a Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who also chairs the Human Rights and
Oversight Committee at the Palestinian Legislative Council, told Al-Monitor,
“Since its inception, the PA has taken the path of negotiations with Israel. It
is unwilling to change this course because its interests are correlated with
Israel, despite the rupture today. We are in a position that will neither lead
us to a national reconciliation nor to resist the occupation. I am not
optimistic about any upcoming steps, because the PA is not serious about that
and it does not want to have a competitor or any other program in the political
arena. It even views the green Hamas flag as an existential threat. Abu Mazen
(Mahmoud Abbas) no longer has a political presence; no one raises the phone to
speak to him and everyone is waiting for the end [of his term]. It is strange
how all of a sudden Hamas steps in to save him with the courteous remarks.”
Although
pessimism prevails over Hamas’ middle leadership about the rapprochement with
Fatah, Hossam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau who is in charge of
the national relations’ file, said in a televised statement on Sept. 15, “Hamas
seeks to stand by Fatah and all Palestinians in the liberation battle if there
is an agreement on the popular resistance and there are contacts to solve the
internal Palestinian situation.”
Meanwhile,
some PA circles believe that Jibril Rajoub, secretary-general of the movement’s
Central Committee who is leading the efforts to communicate with Hamas, is not
backed by all of Fatah. They believe he is seeking rapprochement with Hamas for
his own personal gains among Palestinians and not to achieve Palestinian reconciliation.
Sari Arabi,
an expert on Islamic movements and an author for Arabi21, told Al-Monitor,
“Hamas believes that a rapprochement with the PA is better than a rupture, even
though it does not lead to a serious reconciliation, a real unity or a shift in
the PA policy.”
He said,
“Hamas cannot refuse to communicate with the PA, even in the media, in order to
counter the annexation and normalization plans, although the PA benefits from
Hamas’ propaganda among the Palestinians. Yet the problem resides in some of
the Hamas leaders’ exaggeration when it comes to unity with Fatah. That is why
they need to listen more to the middle leadership level whose vision is
realistic when it comes to the PA. The true reconciliation and serious popular
resistance imply a confrontation with the Israeli occupation, which the PA’s
ruling class rejects.”
Commenting
on rapprochement, sceptics within Hamas believe the PA has not given leeway for
any serious popular resistance and has not led any effective resistance since
the United States declared Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced the
Mideast peace plan.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/09/palestinian-fatah-hamas-reconciliation-talks-no-trust.html
-----
It's
Time to Build A New, Peaceful Middle East
By
Mustafa Al Zarooni
September
22, 2020
Peaceful
coexistence is a hallmark of developed nations and regions. The ability to
resolve conflicts by peaceful means can empower nations, allowing them to focus
on more important aspects of a nation, such as building trust and social
cohesion, education, healthcare, etc.
Yet,
countries in the Middle East have been embroiled in conflicts for years.
Ideological differences, wars have consumed much of our attention. A few
countries have made progress in the region, which should inspire others to
follow their footsteps. But the Arab world is still beset with dilemmas on how
to move on and make policy choices that keep the best interests of people in
mind.
Some
countries continue to play a populist role, keeping up an image of struggle and
resistance. They are stalling the progress of their country and are unwilling
to build relations with neighbours. Building secret relations with enemies does
little to bridge the trust deficit created over the years. Despite being a part
of the region, they are not contributing to its progress in any meaningful way.
Take, for
example, some major developments of the past few years, including annexing the
Golan Heights and moving of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. There was no
real opposition against these steps, not even a word when Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced annexation of 30 per cent of the West
Bank. Did any country stand up to Israel and suggest ways to stop annexation
from happening and open doors for discussions and negotiations?
The UAE
took the lead and the leadership saw reason in extending a hand of friendship
to Israel. By establishing diplomatic ties with Israel, it has brought the
issue of two-state solution to the forefront. Bahrain is supporting the UAE,
and now it remains to be seen when will more Arab countries follow suit,
establish relations with Israel and demand recognition for Palestine.
Peace
between states, political dialogue and negotiation have always been fundamental
pillars of successful diplomacy that can help settle complex issues afflicting
the region.
The UAE
firmly believes that extending bridges of communication is the fastest way to
security and stability. This explains the country's bold step to sign a peace
treaty with Israel.
Israel now
must highlight its true intentions towards Arabs. The Palestinians, meanwhile,
must reassess their plans. The government is still living under an illusion of
demands that have left no room for compromise.
Perhaps, it
is the time for them to have a more youthful and open-minded government that
can fathom what does "peace for peace" truly mean.
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/its-time-to-build-a-new-peaceful-middle-east
-----
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