Is Iran Its Own Worst Enemy In Twitter War With Saudi Arabia?: New Age Islam's Selection, 27 July 2016
New Age
Islam Edit Bureau
27 July 2016
• Is Iran Its Own Worst Enemy In Twitter War With Saudi Arabia?
By Arash Karami
• Turkey’s Stability Is a Must
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
• Undermining Syrian Opposition
By Osama Al Sharif
• Muslim Voters Between Hillary Clinton And A Hard Place
By Khaled A Beydoun
• Ethnic Polarisation: Afghanistan's Emerging Threat
By Davood Moradian
Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau
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Is Iran Its Own Worst Enemy In Twitter War With Saudi Arabia?
By Arash Karami
July 26, 2016
Iranian media outlets have asked authorities to reconsider their nearly seven-year ban on Twitter so that Iranian users can answer in greater force to the millions of Saudi Arabian Twitter users who have begun anti-Iranian hashtags in recent months.
"The issue of Iran's weakness and the small number of Iranians on Twitter and the activity of anti-Iranian forces, especially Saudis on Twitter, in recent days has made the news and has made the topic of removing the block on this media important once again," wrote Pooria Asteraky in Hamshahri newspaper July 25.
Asteraky wrote that since Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen began in 2015, accounts belonging to Saudis would every so often begin an organized campaign of anti-Iranian hashtags, particularly on Fridays. Soon the activities from Saudi users became so common that small protests in Iran or even a fire in a petrochemical plant were being celebrated by Saudis and given their own Arabic hashtag. The article continued that some of the hashtags to trend worldwide, such as blaming Iranian pilgrims for the 2015 hajj stampede that killed 474 Iranians, could easily have been organized by Saudi institutions and are not indicative of individual users.
While Iranian users have responded to these hashtags, their numbers were too small and ultimately unsuccessful, according to Asteraky, who believes in Iran there are approximately 1-1.5 million active users, meaning that they use it at least once a month. Saudi Arabia has nearly 9 million active users, according to a mid-2015 estimate.
A July 14 article on the Tabnak news site, which is linked to secretary of the Expediency Council and former commander in the Iran-Iraq War Mohsen Rezaei, also questioned the block on Twitter: "Saudi's media war against Iran on Twitter has peaked such that Iran, where this site is blocked, has a relatively weak presence, and has not given a firm response to this psychological operation."
The Tabnak article reported that Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in recent months in social media campaigns against Iran, even with ridiculous hashtags such as one blaming Iran for the Nice attack. The article warned that before the Saudis dominate this arena, Iran should become active and urged the authorities to review and reconsider the block on Twitter, which it called "an effective media and an extremely strong loudspeaker at the international level."
Iranians on the whole are relatively new to Twitter. During the 2009 post-election protests, Iranian authorities blocked Twitter, as well as Facebook and YouTube, for fear of protests being organized and aired. Facebook had previously been more popular and had essentially replaced personal blogs as the preferred choice for Iranians. Twitter's rapid rate of publication and limiting characters had yet to catch on for Iranian users.
However, in recent years, as Iranian politicians from the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to President Hassan Rouhani to former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili have joined Twitter, Iranians, too, have circumvented the country's censors, joined the social media website in greater numbers and become more active. Nearly all Iranian news agencies and newspapers now have Twitter accounts, though some remain more active than others. Given that media companies rely heavily on government subsidies, traffic numbers from social media are not a top priority for publishers.
While Iranians have sensed they are being restrained by their own government in this new social media war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it seems unlikely for now that Iran would lift its ban. One of Iran’s main concerns has been that the servers for social media sites are overseas. Kamal Hadianfar, the head of Iran's Cyber Police, recently recommended Iranians not use the messaging service Telegram due to its servers being overseas. Up to 14 million Iranians are currently using Telegram, and today it is perhaps the most popular platform for Iranians.
Source: al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/iran-saudi-arabia-twitter-social-media-psychological-war.html#ixzz4FaZT11Mu
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Turkey’s Stability Is a Must
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
27 July 2016
When Egyptians took to the streets in July 2013 protesting the rule of then President Muhammad Mursi, observers were filled with fear even more than when people had filled Tahrir Square in a similar revolt against his predecessor two years ago.
There was a huge difference between the two events in the same capital. Fears increased due to clashes in and outside the protest area, and for the first time it seemed that Egypt’s January 2011 revolution could go the same way as Libya, Syria and Yemen.
The months following Mursi’s ouster were full of clashes and threats to Egypt’s stability. In Turkey the situation is different. The country is stable with its regime democratically developed over three decades and a huge majority had elected the current government. There are no large movements demanding a change of regime. It is amid this political stability that the coup attempt suddenly took place a week ago.
I do not deny that some are angry at the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However, almost all regional governments and politicians must have been worried that night about possible chaos, given that the wars in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria are bigger than any power’s ability to control them or prevent them spilling over to the neighbouring countries.
People have become used to Syria’s tragedy, and are tired of watching news about it every night. However, the situation there pains the heart. The most recent tragedy there was two days ago, when the regime shelled four hospitals and a blood-donation centre in Aleppo.
We do not know the number of victims, as a few details have emerged. The world was busy with the crime of a German of Iranian descent, who opened fire on civilians in a mall in Munich. Less than two days later, a Syrian migrant killed a woman with a machete.
Who can imagine how the region would have been affected if another big country such as Turkey suffered from a similar situation? It is a very scary prospect for the world. Had the coup succeeded, Turkey would have been doomed to unrest. No one in the region wants the list of stricken countries to grow. No one in Europe wants Turkey to become a gateway for terrorists, immigrants and chaos.
Regardless of disputes between countries, politicians realize the wide-ranging consequences of uncalculated adventures. I think even Iran, which is igniting the region with problems, is afraid of the repercussions of a change in Turkey. The same applies to Russia. Meanwhile, some of the region’s governments are working on major concessions to put out the fires raging in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and to a certain extent in Libya. God alone knows what would have happened to Turkey had the coup succeeded and the country been divided.
Source: arabnews.com/node/960291/columns
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Undermining Syrian Opposition
By Osama Al Sharif
27 July 2016
These are bad times for the political arm of the Syrian opposition. There endemic divisions notwithstanding, now they fear that a US-Russian understanding may derail the one thing that keeps them together: The removal of President Bashar Assad.
The reality is that the Syrian opposition was never taken seriously by the US and Europe. Key figures found a safe haven in Turkey for years but now even Ankara is reviewing its stand on regional issues, including Syria, and may hasten the process of reconciling differences with neighbors following the botched military coup two weeks ago. Turkey’s possible flip-flop on Syria has rattled the Syrian opposition since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the staunchest supporter of their cause.
The diminishing importance of the opposition was detected early in the life of the Syrian crisis. Aside from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a coalition of supposedly secular former officers in the Syrian army, the bulk of the opposition never held sway over a growing number of radical insurgents who had managed to occupy strategic territory in and around Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus countryside and the Golan among others. The radical groups struck a number of military alliances that included Jabhat Al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s proxy in Syria.
In the past two years, the influence of the FSA on the ground receded giving way to radical groups who feel no obligation to be part of any proposed political arrangements for the future of Syria.
Many of these radical groups, such as Jaish Al-Islam whose leader is a key member of the negotiating delegation, have been accused of committing atrocities against civilians and members of other rival groups. In fact only last week a so-called moderate group was accused of beheading a Palestinian child near Aleppo for allegedly fighting with the regime. The US threatened to withhold military aid to this group. But the fact remains that there are hundreds of small rebel factions, some of which are labeled as moderates, who owe no allegiance to the political opposition.
Aside from having no control over the rebel groups, the opposition has witnessed a number of internal divisions. Today there are at least three opposition blocs, with conflicting agendas, and differing ties to Moscow, Ankara, Riyadh, Cairo and even the Damascus regime. The latter has always argued that the exiled opposition lacks legitimacy and has no credentials when talking on behalf of the Syrian people.
But the latest shift is the most worrying for the Syrian opposition. The US and Russia appear to have reached an understanding on the fate of President Assad; one that allows him to stay in power during the transitional period probably with limited authority. It is a fact that Russia carries more sway over Syrian affairs than any other country. Its military intervention last year has altered the dynamics of the Syrian debacle. It has managed to direct attention from the removal of Assad to the war against Daesh and other rebel groups, particularly Al-Nusra Front.
With no clear strategy on Syria, the US slowly gravitated toward the Russian position. It is to become part of a bigger understanding between the two countries over many issues. For now the US priority in Syria has nothing to do with removing Assad or even ensuring the success of the negotiating process. That is why Washington has thrown its weight behind a new player, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is a well-armed Kurdish-led group that Washington hopes will become the spearhead in its effort to take Raqqa from Daesh. Currently the US-led coalition is busy providing air cover to SDF forces in the strategic town of Manbij, close to the Turkish borders.
In return, the US is looking the other way as regime forces complete the encirclement of Aleppo having successfully cut the last route between the besieged city and outside world. Despite repeated warnings that the fall of Aleppo, whose eastern part is controlled by FSA, will come at an enormous civilian cost, the US and its allies have done nothing to stop the daily carnage? Desperate pleas by the Syrian opposition to spare Aleppo have fallen on deaf ears. Syrian regime forces have also made some advances in the Damascus countryside and it is a matter of time before Duma, Daraya and other towns in eastern Ghouta are conquered.
These recent gains and the US-Russian understanding have emboldened Assad and despite a recent agreement by the regime to join political talks, probably in August, there are no signs that anything positive will emerge.
With President Erdogan focusing on a controversial internal purge of his political foes, the Syrian opposition can hardly rely on its Turkish benefactor. It is clear that it has lost the US backing and that with the diminishing role of the FSA it has no influence over what is happening on the ground as well. But what is also clear is that Damascus and Moscow have managed to debunk the myth of the so-called moderate rebel groups. The US-Russian understanding is a game changer and a bad omen for Syria’s opposition forces.
Source: arabnews.com/node/960276/columns
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Muslim Voters between Hillary Clinton and a Hard Place
By Khaled A Beydoun
27 july, 2016
The United States is home to nearly eight million Muslim Americans and Islam today ranks as the fastest growing faith group in the country.
Outpacing it, however, is the proliferation of Islamophobia in the US - or fear and hatemongering of the faith and its followers.
Islamophobia has been at the front and in the centre of the 2016 presidential race. Most vividly and explicitly in the rhetoric of the Republican candidate Donald Trump, who proposed a ban on Muslims entering the US in December of 2015, and as recently as July 13, pushed for an expanded ban on Muslims "from areas of the world with a history of terrorism".
Rhetoric Vs Reality
One measure of Islamophobia is political rhetoric, and the other political track record. Whether he is a demagogue or not, Trump has never held a political office.
But his opponent, Hillary Clinton, has held a number of high-profile political offices, and has long ranked as a central figure in the Democratic Party.
After eight years as First Lady, Clinton served as a New York senator from 2001 to 2009, holding office during the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent crackdown on Muslim American civil liberties.
From 2009 through 2013, Clinton assumed the role of secretary of state, overseeing the continuation of war in Iraq, which she voted for as senator, and pushing for aggressive engagement in Middle East conflicts, most notably in Libya and Syria.
In sum, Clinton's hawkish foreign policy inclinations in the Muslim-majority nations, her unwavering alignment with Israel; and on the domestic front, support of the US PATRIOT Act and emergent counter-radicalisation policing, which links (Muslim) religiosity to presumed involvement with terrorism, looms heavy in the minds of Muslim American voters.
Progressive Muslim American blocs supported Bernie Sanders, often basing that support directly upon critiques of Clinton's past and current platform.
Clinton's hawkish foreign policy inclinations in the Muslim-majority nations, her unwavering alignment with Israel; and on the domestic front, support of the US PATRIOT Act and emergent counter-radicalisation policing, which links (Muslim) religiosity to presumed involvement with terrorism, looms heavy in the minds of Muslim American voters.
After Sanders bowed out of the race, Muslim Americans find themselves interlocked between a candidate that frames much of his campaign on anti-Muslim animus and hysteria, and another whose political track record reveals a hard-line approach to policing Muslims at home and punishing them abroad.
Rhetoric versus reality, tempered by the always-looming fear that Trump's rhetoric may very well make for an even more ominous reality if he is elected come November.
This fear of Trump making good on his rhetoric is what's driving many Muslim Americans to line behind Clinton.
Islamophobic Presidential Race?
While Muslim voters are exhausted with Clinton's posture towards Muslims at home and abroad, and Sanders defects and independents are unwilling to resign to the "anything but Trump" plea, this sizable segment of Muslim-Americans finds itself permanently stuck between Hillary and a harder place.
In many regards, the 2016 presidential race manifests the flat understanding of Islamophobia today in the US.
Trump's bellicose rhetoric against Muslims and his explicit segregation of Islam from his perception of American identity have branded him the "Islamophobic candidate" among and beyond Muslim-Americans.
Campaigning with manifestations of racism and blatant Islamophobia may be Islamophobia's most apparent form. But it is hardly its only one.
Clinton's rhetoric towards Muslims rings with tolerance. But it is frequently flanked with qualifiers such as "terror-hating", "peace-loving" or the seemingly benign, yet divisive "moderate Muslim" tag.
Underneath this conceptual approach and framing - masterfully deployed by President Barack Obama - is a full-fledged commitment to expand localised anti-terror programmes that link religiosity to radicalisation, seed informants in community mosques and cultural centres, and enhance the surveillance of urban, Muslim-American enclaves across the country.
The counter-radicalisation policing scheme was piloted in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis in 2014 as surveillance of Muslim-Americans has been expanding under the Obama administration.
Clinton's support of the PATRIOT ACT, championing of counter-radicalisation programming in the Middle East as secretary of state, and strategic invocations of "good versus bad" Muslims stateside foreshadows even further expansion of the surveillance state.
For the Muslim-American population targeted by bigots on the ground and the suspicious eye of the state - particularly after the Orlando Massacre - these developments spell heightened fear and increased encroachment on free exercise of religion, political expression, and other core civil liberties.
Lesser Of Two Evils?
The blatant Islamophobia embodied by Trump is, indeed, countered by a structural Islamophobia wielded by Clinton, making the 2016 presidential options more of a "lesser of two evils" ultimatum.
The evil looming on the right is louder and clearer with his Islamophobia, while the dangers associated with a Clinton presidency spell broader surveillance of Muslim Americans stateside, continuing the legacy of Obama - but a far more hawkish posture in Muslim-majority states in the Middle East.
For Muslim-Americans, to vote for Trump is to do the unthinkable.
On the other hand, casting a vote for Clinton means assuming the risks and perils of an expanded "war on terror" at home and abroad.
And registering a third-party option or abstaining from voting would functionally push Muslim-Americans further down the political margins.
Nobody ever said voting, or not voting, was easy. Especially for a community already viewed as outsiders, wrestling with the unshakable narrative that being Muslim and American are clashing identities.
Khaled A Beydoun is an Associate Law Professor with the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. He is Affiliated Faculty at UC-Berkeley, and a native of Detroit.
Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/07/muslim-voters-hillary-clinton-hard-place-160725094634857.html
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Ethnic Polarisation: Afghanistan's Emerging Threat
By Davood Moradian
27 july, 2016
In Afghanistan's "theme park of challenges", ethnic politics is becoming a key contested debate, alongside the usual and known issues.
The Saturday terrorist attack that targeted predominantly the Hazara community has heightened political tension.
From harsh exchanges among growing Afghan social media users (PDF) to the controversy over how to name universities, the disputed 2014 presidential election to the stalled electoral reforms, ethnic politics is polarising political elites and the state bureaucracy.
While most Afghan political actors engage in one way or other in ethnic politics, they are hesitant to publicly and openly articulate their ethnic views - particularly to their external interlocutors.
Such a polarisation and, more importantly, its collective denial, could take the country into unchartered territory.
The Land Of A Thousand Cities
Afghanistan is a wonderfully diverse nation. The ancient Bactria - in today's northern Afghanistan - was known as the "land of a thousand cities" in 4th century BC.
The diversity is visible in every corner of the country. Apart from traditional Islam as the religion of the majority of the country and Dari/Persian as the lingua franca of the nation, Afghanistan is a nation of minorities with overlapping, duplicating and parallel interactions.
The nation-state of Afghanistan is a hybrid polity, partly historical-natural and partly colonial and elite-constructed.
Since its consolidation in the late 19th century, it has struggled to settle its territorial space, build institutions and define its national identity.
Despite Afghans' proven records in ethnic harmony, the growing ethnic polarisation among the elites and state machinery can easily spread to other sectors of society.
The struggle over national identity has been between "civic nationalism" and "tribal nationalism".
One perspective construes Afghanistan as the land of the Pashtuns and hence Pashtuns' political mastery.
Their opponent discourse describes the country as the heartland of ancient Khorasan and ensuing political-cultural prominence of non-Pashtuns.
However, the majority of Afghans believe in the pluralistic nature of Afghan society and the need for an inclusive and representative state.
Furthermore, in the absence of any national census, the claim and counter-claim of being the largest ethnic group remain political, rather than factual.
Elites' ethnic politics has been a key driver of Afghan state weakness and its decades-old hybrid conflict.
This includes the controversy over the Durand Line, the collapse of the Afghan constitutional monarchy in the mid-1970s, the disintegration of leftist and Islamist parties, the inter-factional wars of the 1990s and the post-2001 elite factionalism.
Moreover, the absence of any separatist movement, organised or widespread sectarian violence, communal violence, and Afghans' legendary determination for national independence show the resilience and strength of their national unity.
Post-2001 And Lost Opportunities
The collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 heralded Afghanistan's third democratisation endeavour and laying the foundation of a functioning democratic state.
The process of drafting a new constitution and the eventual outcome became once again a struggle between competing visions and constituencies, including the century-old tribal nationalism versus civic nationalism.
While it had successfully codified some impressive civic and political rights, gender equality and participatory politics, the new Afghan constitution has unfortunately also institutionalised tribal nationalism and ethnic hierarchy.
It adopted a strong presidential system to be accompanied by two symbolic vice presidents and almost no role for political parties.
The drafters' assumption and ensuing implementation was the allocation of presidency to a Pashtun and two slots of vice presidency to be given to the remaining ethnic groups - Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and others. Such a strong presidential distribution of power has become a "winner-takes-all system".
The main advocates of a strong presidential system were expat technocrats, while the Mujahedeen groups were mainly in favour of a parliamentary system.
The former's choice became aligned with Washington's preference to deal with a strongman and London's historical ethnic prejudice and its Pakistan-oriented policy.
The concentration of power in Kabul had further widened the gap between the centre and remote provinces, particularly in Taliban-infested areas.
The controversial 2014 presidential election has significantly exacerbated and deepened ethnic politics; an election that was characterised by the European Union observers as "a North Korea situation".
The arrangement in the aftermath with the formation of the National Unity Government brokered by the United States Secretary of State John Kerry helped a peaceful transfer of power, but not a legal and constitutional one.
President Ashraf Ghani's refusal to implement political and electoral reforms, and growing accusation against his ethnic and exclusionary politics have exacerbated the 2014 disputed presidential election.
The Way Forward
Ethnic identity and occasional ethnic tension are the features of every multi-ethnic society - involving power, interest, identity, grievances, fear, envy and hatred.
However, the failure to manage ethnic politics is one of the drivers of socioeconomic underdevelopment, ethnic and civil wars, state collapse, ethnic cleansing and even genocide.
Despite Afghans' proven records in ethnic harmony, the growing ethnic polarisation among the elites and state machinery can easily spread to other sectors of society.
There are vivid and recent examples that show no country is immune from the poisonous politics of hatred and division.
A transparent, rational, emancipatory, ethical and political intra-Afghan dialogue is the way forward in transforming tribal nationalism into a fully rooted civic nationalism, with ensuing institutional and constitutional reforms.
Davood Moradian is the director-general of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, former chief of programmes in President Hamid Karzai's office and chief policy adviser to Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/07/ethnic-polarisation-afghanistan-emerging-threat-160725120143630.html
URL: https://newageislam.com/middle-east-press/is-iran-its-own-worst/d/108087