Middle East Press on: Jewish, Immigration, Israelis, Hamas, Lebanon, US, UK: New Age Islam's Selection, 15 January 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
15 January 2025
Data On The Rise In ‘Reverse Jewish Immigration’ Shocks Israelis
US, UK Disagreed On How To Deal With Iran’s Nuclear Program, British Documents Reveal
Main Points Of Anticipated Gaza Ceasefire, Prisoner Exchange Deal With Israel, Hamas
Lebanon’s New Dawn
Netanyahu’s Interests Taking Precedence Over Ceasefire Deal
Justice Beginning To Follow Israelis Around The World
------
Data On The Rise In ‘Reverse Jewish Immigration’ Shocks Israelis
By Aziz Mustafa
January 14, 2025
The report by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics at the beginning of the new year, 2025, regarding the reverse immigration of Jews was like fuel poured on the fire of political conflicts in Israel, because the bleak number appearing in the headlines of the Israeli media represented the balance of reverse immigration of Jews outside the Occupation state. 82,000 were removed from the population figure, which was bad news for its political and security circles.
This shocking statistic immediately turned into a new political debate among Israelis, added to their series of endless debates, especially since the available data indicated that this immigration was concentrated on professionals, doctors and technicians due to their despair over the conditions of the state.
While right-wing supporters have exploited these shocking figures to criticise those who are migrating from the state, opponents of the government have used them to attack it. Between the two sides, the phenomenon of reverse migration has turned into another battlefront added to the seven-front war fought by the Occupying state, and evidence that life in it has become unbearable.
While Israelis appear in a hurry to disagree and differ about the accuracy of these figures, and to put the blame on each other, it is impossible to understand what is causing the sharp jump in this reverse migration, given the assertions of the Israelis who are migrating outside the state that they have lost hope in it.
At the same time, this data confirms that experts in the fields of technology, economics, medicine and culture are the main examples of those migrating from the state, because they are no longer able to find a place for themselves in a state that promotes laws limiting their personal freedom, stifle creativity and suppress their private property. It is worth noting that reverse migration of Jews began during the time of the protests that took place against the legal coup, with the Gaza war giving many of them the sense that it was time to leave.
Moreover, the unfair economic policy of the right-wing government, the Haredi’s opposition to compulsory military service, the threats against academic institutions, the attacks on the Supreme Court, the ongoing war in Gaza and the failure to return the kidnapped soldiers, have all restored the fears of Israelis, their lack of confidence in their state, and their fear that they will face more trouble and will not be able to return to it in the future.
Along with the media outlets that have reported the data on reverse Jewish immigration, in recent months, Israeli research centres have noticeably focused on the growing trend of educated young Jews leaving the country, which could harm its economy and social structure. Their motivation behind leaving includes political instability, the economic situation, the cost of living, social tensions and fears of a legal coup.
What truly worries Israel is the age of these immigrants, as 48 per cent of them are between 20 and 45 years old, and 27 per cent are children and adolescents. The vast majority are under 45 years old and are looking for a better quality of life, due to the deteriorating economic situation, the increasing cost of living and the difficulty of obtaining housing and employment, with a greater degree of inability to access good public services.
There is a prevalent belief among Israelis that the repercussions of this reverse migration on Israel will be major, while the right-wing government is content with attacking the phenomenon through “populist” posts on the Internet, without in-depth analysis, and without providing practical solutions. This is because, in practice, these immigrants have a decreased sense of belonging to the state and its culture, and their connection to it has declined, due to the shock of war, the loss of confidence in the leadership and the economic crisis.
The increasing number of Israelis who are reverse migrating from the Occupying state nowadays coincides with the wave of anti-Occupation sentiments and hatred that is raging in the world due to its crimes against the Palestinian people. Given the political and social division that the country is witnessing, the immediate result of this phenomenon is the radical step towards immigrants being separated from the country, family, friends and immediate surroundings and, in some cases, there is no way back.
In conclusion, the phenomenon of Jews’ reverse migration from Israel signifies a moral failure of the state, and an explicit declaration of its failure to strengthen the connection of Jews coming from all over the world to an Occupied land that is not their land. This is an expected result of the deepening social division in recent years, the prevalence of divisive and inflammatory rhetoric among them and the state’s permission allowing extremist fascist forces to drag the rest of the Israelis into dangerous internal conflicts that may destroy what remains of the state’s immunity.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250114-data-on-the-rise-in-reverse-jewish-immigration-shocks-israelis/
----
US, UK Disagreed On How To Deal With Iran’s Nuclear Program, British Documents Reveal
By Amer Sultan
January 14, 2025
The UK disagreed with the US on the impact of the Iranian role in Iraq, more than a year after the US-led coalition invaded the country, newly released British documents reveal.
The UK Cabinet Office documents also showed that US policy makers were “impatient” with British insistence on engagement to prevent Iranians from pursuing nuclear ambitions.
In March 2003, the United States led a coalition to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein’s regime, citing later-discredited claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a threat to international peace and security.
Iran refused to support the invasion, fearing the US military presence in neighbouring Iraq would be a serious threat to its interests and national security. But Tehran welcomed the fall of Saddam’s regime, which fought an eight-year-long war against Iran from 1980-1988. Gulf countries were worried that Iran would dominate Iraq after ousting its regime. Kuwait, which had been invaded by the Iraqi military in 1990, politically supported the coalition’s military action.
A few months after the invasion, the US-established Iraqi Governing Council (ICG) was endorsed which signed a Temporary Administrative Law (TAL) in Iraq.
Although Iran was supportive of the ICG and ATL, the US remained “deeply suspicious of the Iranian intentions in Iraq”, particularly Tehran’s alleged support for the insurgence of Shia groups targeting the US occupying forces, the documents show.
The American officials told their British counterparts that they were considering action against the agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) whom they believed were active in Iraq. The documents show that the American-British communications occurred in the lead up to the summit between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the US President George W Bush in the White House in April 2004. Iraq was on the top of the meeting’s agenda.
During his visit to the US, Blair separately met with then-United Nation Secretary General Kofi Anan in New York to discuss a potential future role for the UN in Iraq.
In a briefing report prepared for Blair, his advisors hoped the UK would agree with the US and the UN on a “comprehensive strategy” for the rest of 2004 in Iraq.
Before Blair’s visit, the Bush presidential election campaign was politically struggling due to the difficulties the American occupying forces were facing in Iraq.
Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state, admitted to David Manning, the British ambassador in Washington, that the US administration acknowledged the challenges it faced in Iraq about three months before transition of sovereignty to the Iraqis was to take place on 1 July 2004.
“The truth was that the US was gradually losing on the battlefield,” Armitage confirmed, adding that “there was a lack of a coherent strategy.” In a dispatch about the meeting with the American official, Manning alerted his government that Armitage believed that unless the situation improved rapidly, it was inevitable that Bush would have to authorise additional troops to be deployed in Iraq. This would be “unpopular domestically” and “politically ugly” for the president.
The US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also admitted to Nigel Sheinwald, Blair’s advisor for foreign affairs and defence, that the White House understood that the situation particularly in the centre of Iraq “remained awful” and that the American forces “were in vulnerable positions”.
Blair’s advisors confirmed that the UK agrees with the principle of “tough action” where Iranian officials were found to be involved in “nefarious activity” on Iraqi soil, but emphasised the need for any actions against the Iranians to be “handled sensitively”. The British were concerned that any measures against the Iranians would put their interests at risk. The advisors alerted Blair that the British forces “were in the front line dealing with the Shias in South Iraq”. In addition, they warned him that “retaliation against UK interests in Iran is possible.”
Based on their reports on developments in Iraq after the invasion, Blair was advised that the British overall assessment of the Iranian policy in Iraq “is less negative than the Americans’”. They pointed to the Iranian political support for IGC and TAL, characterising it as “acquiescence” from Iran which the American and the British “have enjoyed”.
The British perspective assessed that this Iranian behaviour “can help achieve our objectives”. While the briefing report advised Blair to reassure Bush that a “beady eye” will be on intelligence activity of Iran, it recommended looking for ways in which Iran can be offered a “buy-in”. For example, Blair’s aides advised “taking up an Iranian offer to supply 200MW of electricity” to the south of Iraq where there were popular fears of an electricity shortfall in the summer of 2004.
The UK prepared a strategy to strengthen security protection for civilians working on vital reconstruction projects such as power stations. Increasing import of electricity from abroad including Iran, “which could supply 200 MW at short notice”, was a part of this strategy. In addition, the British expected such a deal with Tehran would “underpin the Iranian support for the political process” in Iraq.
At that time, improving the quality of service provision to the Iraqi people was one of the crucial problems faced by the coalition forces under growing security threats. The British advisors warned that major power shortages “could lead to popular unrest if urgent remedial action does not continue unhindered”. They feared the deteriorating security conditions could threaten the efforts to produce more electricity.
The documents also reveal a divergence between the US and UK on the most effective way to address Iran’s nuclear programme.
The briefing report shows that the British government reviewed the UK policy on the issue ‘in light of concerns that a gap was opening up with the US on how to handle Iran in the medium term.” The government considered “selling the UK thinking on how to handle the nuclear issue” a priority for the talks between Bush and Blair. The US believed that the Iranians had nuclear ambitions and the pressure needed to be maintained to deter them and, while the British didn’t disagree with this view, they saw “the benefits of conditional engagement drawing Iran into the IAEA web”.
The UK, along with France and Germany, were involved in an initiative for talking to Iran. But some US policy makers were “impatient” with this initiative and “would prefer a more aggressive approach” starting with referring Iran to the UN Security Council. The Americans explained to their British counterparts that such a step “would create a climate of pressure and threat aimed at forcing Iran into a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear ambitions”. However, the British officials doubted it was possible to secure a referral of Iran to the UNSC at that time. In addition, they didn’t expect anything would be achieved by such a referral. They insisted that there should be “further serious failures (from Iran) coming into light” in order to secure such a step.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250114-us-uk-disagreed-on-how-to-deal-with-irans-nuclear-program-british-documents-reveal/
---
Main Points Of Anticipated Gaza Ceasefire, Prisoner Exchange Deal With Israel, Hamas
By Anadolu Agency
January 14, 2025
The world awaits the announcement of a landmark Gaza ceasefire and prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas to end over 466 days of Tel Aviv’s genocidal war on the Palestinian enclave.
The anticipated deal outlines detailed steps for phased implementation and long-term arrangements for Gaza.
Israeli government approval process
The draft agreement will be presented to Israel’s Security Cabinet, the broader government and possibly the Knesset (parliament) for approval.
If approved, Israel’s Justice Ministry and prison authorities will release the names of Palestinian prisoners eligible for freedom under the agreement.
Objections may be raised with Israel’s Supreme Court, although such appeals have historically been denied.
Israeli President, Isaac Herzog, will then pardon Palestinian prisoners serving life or long-term sentences as required by the agreement.
However, not all prisoners included in the deal will be released simultaneously, as the exchange is structured in stages.
Phases of the agreement
The deal will unfold in three phases, each lasting 42 days. However, Israel is reportedly negotiating to limit the agreement to two phases, according to a draft obtained by Anadolu.
Phase 1: Humanitarian measures
This phase will last 42 days and focus on releasing 33 Israeli captives held by Hamas, both alive and deceased, including women, the elderly and the ill.
The Israeli military, meanwhile, will withdraw from several areas in Gaza under its control.
The first release of Israeli prisoners will occur seven days after the ceasefire begins.
For each female Israeli soldier released, 50 Palestinian detainees will be freed, including 30 serving life sentences and 20 with long-term sentences.
For every civilian captive, 30 Palestinian detainees will be freed, including minors, women and those with medical conditions.
Phase 2: Broader negotiations
Beginning on day 16, this phase will focus on discussions for a comprehensive deal involving the release of all remaining Israeli hostages, including soldiers and civilians.
Negotiations must conclude before the end of the fifth week of the first phase.
Phase 3: Reconstruction and stability
This phase will centre on long-term arrangements, including rebuilding Gaza’s infrastructure and establishing sustained peace.
Ceasefire in Gaza
The ceasefire will begin on the first day of the agreement, with Israel withdrawing its forces from Palestinian residential areas and halting warplane operations 10 hours daily and 12 hours during prisoner exchanges.
A gradual withdrawal from Gaza will follow, including key areas such as the Netzarim Corridor, which divides northern Gaza from the south, and the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border.
In the second phase, a declaration of sustained calm will mark the cessation of military operations, a full withdrawal of Israeli forces and the reopening of crossings for the movement of goods and people.
Prisoner swap
In the first phase, for every Israeli civilian released, 30 Palestinian prisoners will be freed.
For each Israeli soldier released, 50 Palestinian detainees will be freed, including 30 serving life sentences and 20 with high sentences.
The agreement includes the release of 47 Palestinian prisoners who were rearrested after being freed in the 2011 prisoner exchange deal.
Israel has stipulated that prisoners serving life sentences cannot return to the West Bank, similar to conditions in the 2011 deal when such prisoners were sent to Gaza or abroad.
Negotiations will follow to determine the number of Palestinian detainees to be released in exchange for Israeli soldiers in the second phase of the agreement.
Palestinian detainees released under the agreement will not face re-arrest for the same charges.
Israeli hostages
The agreement includes the release of all 98 Israeli captives held by Hamas.
The first phase will focus on 33 humanitarian cases, including women, children under 19, the elderly over 50 and civilians with medical conditions.
Soldiers will be released in subsequent phases, and the return of remains will be addressed in the third phase.
Israel currently holds more than 10,300 Palestinian prisoners, while it is estimated that 98 Israelis are detained in Gaza. Hamas said that many Israeli captives have been killed in indiscriminate Israeli air strikes.
Humanitarian aid to Gaza
From the first day of the agreement, humanitarian aid will be delivered to Gaza at a rate of 600 trucks daily, including 50 fuel trucks. Half of these supplies will go to northern Gaza.
The UN and other international organisations will oversee the distribution of aid throughout all phases of the agreement.
Return of displaced Palestinians, reconstruction
Displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza will be allowed to return to their homes in northern Gaza from the first day of the agreement.
Reconstruction efforts will focus on repairing infrastructure, including electricity, water, sanitation, communications and roads.
Temporary housing will include 60,000 mobile homes and 200,000 tents for displaced families.
The rebuilding process will also cover homes, civilian buildings and other essential infrastructure.
Guarantors of the agreement
Qatar, Egypt and the US will act as guarantors of the deal, following weeks of intensive negotiations to finalise its terms.
The Israeli army has continued a genocidal war on Gaza that has killed over 46,600 people, most of them women and children, since 7 October, 2023, despite a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire.
The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in November last year for Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his former Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
Israel also faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice for its war on the enclave.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250114-main-points-of-anticipated-gaza-ceasefire-prisoner-exchange-deal-with-israel-hamas/
---
Lebanon’s New Dawn
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
January 14, 2025
After Damascus, Beirut now celebrates a new era with the election of a president, a position that Hezbollah had obstructed, leaving the post vacant since October 2022. This new phase in Lebanon concludes 50 years of regional exploitation of this small country, the second-smallest Arab state in terms of area.
For decades, Lebanon has been a hub for regional conflicts involving Nasserism, Saddamism, the Assad regime and Iranian influence. It was forced to be the sole front with Israel after the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian fronts were closed. The situation is now returning to balance after Iran’s influence was eliminated and the Assad regime removed.
Thus, international demands have finally been met, paving the way for political and commercial dealings with Beirut. Local battles among Lebanese factions will persist, but as long as they remain without gunfire they will not be the concern of other countries and will be left to internal settlements within Lebanon’s complex governance framework.
Following the successful resolution of the presidency, a series of changes is anticipated. Joseph Aoun was elected president through a successful “cesarean” process, facilitated by Arab and international forces. The Americans threatened to halt economic support from any source and Israeli drones continued to circle overhead, leveraging the context of war and political vacuum.
During the deliberations, an Iranian diplomat’s luggage was searched at Beirut Airport and the prohibited contents were confiscated and publicly exposed. On the land border, Lebanese security handed over dozens of wanted Syrian officers to the new regime in Damascus. Inside parliament, it is no longer possible or permissible to coerce MPs into voting against their will, as Hezbollah and the Assad regime once did.
Regardless, Iran is now part of the past. While Hezbollah remains, efforts to dismantle much of its arsenal will continue under the ceasefire agreement with Israel.
The latest war will be the last conflict with Israel conducted via Lebanon. Amid the evolving circumstances, we will witness further developments and new hopes. Lebanon’s commercial activity, disrupted by the Syrian war and constrained by Hezbollah and Bashar Assad’s drug-smuggling operations, will find open markets once again.
The country will also be able to activate the energy production agreement relating to its maritime border with Israel and bring an end to the remaining land border disputes fabricated by the Assad regime after Israel’s withdrawal from the south in 2000. This was used to justify the “Iranian-Syrian resistance” under the pretext of liberating the “occupied Shebaa Farms.” Sovereign states in the region have realized that ending the state of war with Israel serves their national security interests.
Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords, closing the Egyptian front, followed by King Hussein of Jordan with the Wadi Araba agreement. Even Hafez Assad preceded them by signing the Disengagement Agreement in 1974, which effectively became a peace treaty lasting 50 years.
Some Lebanese argue for the need for something beyond a ceasefire — an internationally guaranteed permanent agreement to prevent the return of war in the name of resistance. In his inaugural speech, the new president hinted: “We will discuss a comprehensive defense strategy on the diplomatic, economic and military levels.”
Lebanon may not yet have recovered sufficiently to take such a bold step and end its use as a battleground for Syria, Palestinian organizations or Iran. However, Lebanon can build on the Naqoura Agreement it signed with Israel in 1949. Based on this, both countries recognized each other’s borders and agreed to abstain from military actions by “regular and irregular forces.” In reality, peace agreements protect Arab states, not Israel, which is always militarily superior to them.
These agreements also safeguard Arab states’ rights to their lands and resources amid the shifting dynamics of conflict with Israel and other regional powers. This matter is best left to the Lebanese at the appropriate time. It is likely that the last war convinced even the remaining factions — such as Hezbollah’s popular base, which bore the greatest cost — that ending the wars is in their best interest.
What do others want from Lebanon? In his inaugural speech, President Aoun stated that Lebanon would not rely on external forces and would export only its best products and focus on its economy.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2586381
-----
Netanyahu’s Interests Taking Precedence Over Ceasefire Deal
Yossi Mekelberg
January 14, 2025
For both the people of Gaza and the families of the Israeli hostages, there is something that is even crueler than the failure to reach a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas — and that is to repeatedly raise their hopes that such an agreement is close, only to dash them with yet another set of unconvincing excuses. In the meantime, more people are killed in Gaza every single day and more hostages are confirmed to have died in captivity. Only last week, the bodies of father and son Youssef and Hamza Alziadana, who were kidnapped on Oct. 7, 2023, were recovered in Gaza by the Israeli army.
For more than a year, since the fighting was briefly halted in November 2023 to allow a phased exchange of hostages taken by Hamas for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, no substantial progress has been made on a ceasefire deal, leaving those who are directly impacted by the war hanging between hope and despair. One could be forgiven for being left with the impression that there is more of a facade of negotiations than any deep commitment to reaching a deal. These are talks for the sake of talks, mainly to appease the international community or in response to domestic pressure, but with neither the political will nor the courage to make the necessary compromises to finalize an agreement.
In recent weeks, the Donald Trump factor has also entered the conversation, mainly due to the US president-elect’s repeated demand for this issue to be resolved before he enters the White House and his threat that “all hell will break out” if the hostages are not released. It is hard to tell what the new administration may be planning to unleash against Hamas if it does not accede to Trump’s demands or what could be more hellish than the situation that already exists in Gaza. However, those demands might also be a message to Israel to play its part in advancing a deal.
A disconcerting aspect of the negotiations is the constant leaks, with claims that the vast majority of the outstanding issues have been resolved. Be that as it may, some key aspects still need to be bridged. In practice, this is almost meaningless because, until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.
On the face of it, the chief obstacle since the collapse of the November 2023 deal has been Hamas’ demand that any hostage deal must include a broader agreement to end the war in Gaza. With all the justified anger at what Hamas perpetrated on Oct. 7 and its ongoing cruel treatment of the hostages, at this point, when more than 47,000 Palestinians have been killed by Israel, with no care for the lives of civilians and the widespread destruction inflicted on this tiny territory, ending the war will serve everyone’s interests, even if not their respective leaderships.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is insisting on a partial deal and refuses to end the fighting, while still trumpeting his hollow commitment to a total victory. Netanyahu has tied himself, and the Israeli army, into intractable knots by aiming to completely eradicate Hamas and claiming that only military pressure will lead to the release of the hostages. But not only is Hamas still fighting, but 98 hostages are still in captivity and, tragically, as time goes by they become less likely to remain alive.
At this point, there is not a shred of evidence to show that Netanyahu gives a fig for the fate of the hostages or for the consequences of the war on his own society. As long as his right-wing partners in the Cabinet threaten to leave the coalition should he agree to a ceasefire that includes the end of the war and the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners, his priority will continue to be the well-being of his coalition and not that of the people he was elected to protect.
As for the far-right Religious Zionist party, its Kahanist interpretation of both Judaism and Zionism is beyond contempt. For its leaders, the goal has already switched from defeating Hamas to occupying Gaza and building settlements there. Itamar Ben-Gvir, who holds the position of national security minister, was the only security Cabinet member to vote against the temporary truce of November 2023 that saw the release of 105 civilian hostages out of the 251. It is clear that, despite growing evidence of what the hostages are going through in captivity, he will continue to oppose an end to the war, while Netanyahu, in his weakness and deviousness, is unwilling to oppose this dangerous vision.
Moreover, to expect anyone in the current Israeli government to show any sympathy for the living hell of the Palestinians in Gaza would be naive. As much as Netanyahu would like to turn the debate over a ceasefire deal into a verdict on the character of Hamas and to portray those who support a ceasefire deal, including the families of the hostages, as Hamas apologists, he is well aware that, militarily, he is taking Israel into a long guerrilla war that will cost lives on both sides with no political gain.
This loss of life, and the divisive impact on Israel’s society of the hostages remaining in captivity, immensely outweighs any downside of agreeing to a ceasefire, as costly as that might be. After all, should Hamas violate the terms of the agreement, Israel will be within its rights to respond militarily. If it adheres to the deal, then the hostages are back home and Israel can come to terms with its longest war since that of 1948 and embark on healing its society, its politics and its economy.
However, this scenario is precisely what does not serve Netanyahu’s personal interests or those of his coalition. And the international community, especially the Biden administration, has let those interests prevail. For the current prime minister, disruptions that create an element of controlled chaos, along with a constant external threat, are the ingredients that allow him, against the odds and despite what Israelis consistently favor in the opinion polls, to remain in office and in defiance of every objective criterion of good governance and accountability.
It has become a pattern of Netanyahu’s behaviour in the negotiations that every time a deal seems to be close, all of a sudden new conditions pop up. With a general election not due until the end of next year and the opposition generally leading in the polls by a considerable margin, the chances of an early election are slim. In other words, the country and the conflict are trapped with a government that is recklessly ignoring the suffering of its own people and that of its neighbours for as long as it takes to keep it in power. It remains to be seen whether the inauguration of America’s new president on Jan. 20 can change this and, if so, how quickly.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2586372
-----
Justice Beginning To Follow Israelis Around The World
Chris Doyle
January 14, 2025
A Brazilian judge this month ordered the police to mount an investigation into an Israeli soldier who was on holiday in the country. This followed a legal application from the Hind Rajab Foundation, a group named after a five-year-old Palestinian girl killed in Gaza.
The Israeli authorities were compelled to help this Israeli soldier flee Brazil. The grounds for investigation were that the soldier appeared to have videoed himself destroying a shelter for displaced Palestinians in Gaza.
All of this is because of the war crimes, even genocide, Israel has been perpetrating in Gaza. In the future, could it be that Israelis who have served in the Israeli army have fewer and fewer locations to travel to and may face judicial action abroad?
The Israeli military has now ordered all those ranked colonel and below to ensure that their names and faces do not appear in any form of media. Will this be enforced?
Yet, this is rather late in the day. Who has not seen any of the torrent of TikTok videos of Israeli soldiers posing arrogantly in Gaza, perhaps wearing female lingerie or defiling a mosque? Such actions do not appear to have been met with any official sanction.
Human rights groups will have a wealth of data on Israelis who have fought in Gaza. Going forward, Israeli officers may be more careful, but it may already be too late. One wonders whether the Brazil example will be a one-off or part of a strategic effort to go after possible Israeli war criminals.
Could this act as a deterrent? Might it in any way puncture the arrogant, “we can do anything we like in Gaza” attitude that has permitted this genocide to be prosecuted? Who knows what is the limit to Israel’s actions?
But securing the arrest and indictment of Israelis in other states will not be easy.
Firstly, you need a state that is willing to stand up for international law and also take the ensuing flak from both Israel and the US. The US House of Representatives last week passed a bill that could lead to sanctions against the International Criminal Court. Many American politicians have threatened military action if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or ex-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are arrested. The Israeli Knesset is considering similar legislation to authorize the government to “use of all means to extract Israeli nationals apprehended” in connection with the International Criminal Court. It would even make it illegal to have direct or indirect contact with the court.
However, there may be some willing states. South Africa could be one, but as it has accused Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice, it is not a favoured destination for Israelis. A few countries in Europe, like Spain, Norway and Ireland, might have the courage.
Secondly, there is the issue of securing evidence against an individual. This might not be so easy. For example, the Israeli state policy of starvation is a clear crime against humanity. But a court would need to see significant evidence against an individual Israeli.
Thirdly, those who wish to execute this would have to know the travel plans of a specific Israeli to go after. It is hard but not impossible. A businessman who had served in Gaza may be at a conference, for example, but the opportunities may be slim.
Action could be brought against young army soldiers who had fought in Gaza, perhaps when they go on a six-month post-army holiday in southeast Asia. Israeli reservists, who tend to be older, may go more to Europe for weekends or skiing trips.
Dual-citizens are also potentially vulnerable. For example, an Israeli Gaza veteran with an EU passport could be liable to prosecution in a European court.
But the more likely scenario is going after those higher up the chain of command. Israeli generals and commanders are well-known individuals with command responsibility. Many already do not travel to a host of states for fear of criminal proceedings. Back in 2009, an arrest warrant was issued in the UK against then-Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni over her role in that year’s war on Gaza. She was compelled to cancel a planned visit.
The International Criminal Court may be the most effective route. Arrest warrants have already been issued against two Israeli leaders, but the chief prosecutor was clear that more could be coming. The court should be prosecuting those involved in the Israeli settlement industry. Here, there is no dispute of fact — they exist — or legality. They are illegal and a violation of the Rome Statute.
Universal jurisdiction is a powerful tool to prevent and deter war crimes. Just as it mattered that Syrian regime war criminals were pursued in European and other courts, so too Israeli figures who may have committed war crimes should be investigated. European and American leaders may have lost whatever moral compass they had, but judicial bodies can play a huge role in terms of justice and deterrence.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2586358
-----
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism