Middle East Press on: Anti-Semitic, Iran, Syria, Jews, Turkiye: New Age Islam's Selection, 28 December 2024
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
28 December 2024
Iran's Strategic Setbacks And Rhetoric In Syria
How Türkiye And The US Should Talk About Syria
Pillars Of Türkiye’s Syria Policy
How Is Israel Anti-Semitic And Why Does It Attack Jews?
Letter To A Syrian Rebel (II): 'Your Trauma And Ours Are Different'
Ireland’s Anti-Israel Actions Will Not Go Unanswered
Suing Antony Blinken: The US State Department, Israel And The Leahy Law
Foreign Policy Reboot Strengthens Turkiye’s Hand
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Iran's Strategic Setbacks And Rhetoric In Syria
By Oral Toğa
Dec 28, 2024
The rapid regime change in Syria caused great shock in Iran. Both Iranian media and officials, either explicitly or implicitly, held Türkiye responsible for the process and consistently highlighted Türkiye's role in the movement. During the initial phase of clashes, Iranian authorities and media generally characterized the situation as a "movement of takfiri terrorists" and presented it to the public as such. According to this perspective, these "terrorist groups" were carrying out another front of the struggle against Iran and the "resistance" with Israeli and U.S. support. As such, Türkiye was making a "mistake" by falling into the "trap" of supporting these groups.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a prominent conservative figure and speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, stated: "The movements of new terrorist-takfiri groups are part of America's and the illegitimate Zionist regime's plan. Syria's neighbors must stay alert and not fall for their plans. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the resistance axis will continue supporting the Syrian state and people against a new conspiracy, just as in the past, after defeating the Zionist regime." In short, before Damascus's fall, Iranian officials sought to conduct active diplomacy and explore possible support without directly confronting Türkiye through accusations.
This situation changed after Damascus fell and the new administration in Syria was established. Iranian media began publishing headlines and opinion pieces against Türkiye almost daily. Everything from Turkish TV series to Türkiye's economic activities was scrutinized by Iranian media and somehow linked to Syria. The notion emerged that Türkiye's next move would be directed toward the Caucasus, with articles emphasizing the need to pay attention to Türkiye's future steps and maintain a firm stance on the Zangezur corridor.
Responsibility for defeat
According to Iran, the distance former Syrian regime leader Bashar Assad had been putting between himself and the Iranians also contributed to the situation in Damascus. Assad had noticeably tried to distance himself from Iran and act independently, particularly since May. Three days before Ibrahim Raisi's death, Syria signed a declaration at the 33rd Arab League Summit in Bahrain supporting the United Arab Emirates' sovereignty claims over three islands in the Persian Gulf (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa). This step was met with a reaction in Iran, Syria's longtime ally, and was characterized as "backstabbing" in Iranian media. Similarly, unlike other "resistance group" leaders, Assad did not immediately travel to Tehran to offer condolences after Ibrahim Raisi's death, visiting only about 10 days after the incident. This too became a subject of Iranian criticism.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, making statements after the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas, and Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's military commander, notably omitted Assad's name when listing resistance leaders, essentially ignoring him. Furthermore, according to reports in open sources, Assad's advisor Luna al-Shibl was allegedly discovered conducting espionage activities against Iran, with meeting minutes reportedly leaked to Israel through France. Al-Shibl was reported to have died in a suspicious traffic accident in July 2024. Her brother, Mulhem al-Shibl, had been detained in Damascus a week earlier.
In short, the tension between Iran and the Damascus administration had become public knowledge. Indeed, after Assad's regime ended, Iranian media frequently wrote that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had warned Assad six months earlier, that the warnings were ignored, and that these consequences could have been avoided had the warnings been heeded. The Iranians also criticized Assad for his harsh stance toward his people and lack of flexibility. Information from the field confirms that Assad regime soldiers disliked Iranian militias.
Change of regime
The importance of Syria for Iran has been written about extensively over the past 13 years. The close relations that existed since Hafez Assad's time had reached an even higher level with the Arab Spring. In addition to the IRGC's Quds Force, Iran-affiliated militia groups such as Fatemiyoun, Zeynabiyoun and Hezbollah had actively operated in the field to support the Assad regime. As a result, Assad managed to reestablish his power when he was about to lose it. Thus, through both Hezbollah militias and its presence in Syria, Iran had created a land border with Israel. This was one of the factors strengthening Iran's hand in terms of deterrence.
Moreover, the logistics network along the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon line was vital for Iran. Through these networks, Iran could directly reach Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which had been severely hit by recent attacks, needed logistical support from these lines more than ever. Areas under the PKK Syrian wing YPG's control along these routes also led to the development of close relations between PKK/YPG and Iran. While the PKK/YPG provided Iran with certain facilities through these routes, Iran facilitated PKK militants' border crossings from Türkiye to Iran and into Iraqi territory, particularly in Sulaymaniyah.
With its presence in Lebanon and Syria, Iran was an actor in the Eastern Mediterranean, but this situation has now changed. Additionally, access to the Mediterranean served Iran's efforts to support its allies in the Arab world and reinforce its role as a regional leader. Moreover, reaching the Mediterranean was part of Iran's completion of its "Shiite Crescent" strategy.
After the Oct. 7 attacks, Iran and the so-called resistance axis groups' failure to provide promised support to Gaza against Israel, Hezbollah's desire to avoid direct conflict despite suffering several strategic blows including Nasrallah's death and finally Syria's rapid fall to opposition control, the concept Iran tried to conceptualize as the "Axis of Resistance" was opened to debate in Iran. Years of economic aid to Syria became a particular focus of criticism.
Discussions spread to every platform from newspapers to social media, from television to Parliament. Criticisms that were previously limited to the opposition began to rise from all segments of society. One of the main reasons for these criticisms is that while the country is in such poverty and difficulty and conversely has such an important geographical location and enormous energy resources, it cannot even provide electricity to homes. However, after recent developments, criticisms on this issue began to come even from the conservative segment supporting the regime. This situation shows how deep the crisis of confidence in the Iranian administration has become.
The administration's response was harsh. Khamenei, at every opportunity, called out the criticisms spreading fear and hopelessness among the people by saying that the resistance would not end, that it was a spirit and thought, and called on authorities to initiate legal proceedings against critics. In summary, with all these events, Iran's narrative of "regional leadership" and "resistance" has been damaged. This narrative, one of the sources of regime legitimacy, has weakened.
As a result, with the regime change in Syria, Iran has suffered four major strategic losses: loss of access to the Mediterranean, loss of logistics routes, change in the equation of relations with the PKK and severe damage to the concept it conceptualized as the "Axis of Resistance," largely losing its psychological advantage.
Ties with resistance
In the first days after Nasrallah's assassination, Iran tried to emphasize that "Hezbollah cannot be destroyed despite taking blows" by highlighting the slogan "Hezbollah Lives." After the Syria issue, Khamenei said that Iran was not a proxy force and that resistance was an idea. In fact, Khamenei constantly separates the concepts of proxy force and resistance, thus presenting resistance as an ideology and idea, distancing it from its organic ties with Iran. This way, the defeats experienced do not become Iran's (and its proxies') defeats. Since resistance is already an idea, it doesn't die according to the Iranians. However, it's a fact that there is serious demoralization.
Khamenei also pointed to Syrian youth in two different speeches, saying they would change today's situation. These words are the clearest sign that Iran has not given up on the Syrian field and its objectives. Indeed, after the opposition's victory was confirmed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said they would talk with "legitimate opponents." When these and other Iranian officials' statements are put together, it's seen that Iran wants to keep dialogue channels open with the new Syria. It is probable that in the future, it will seek ways to work with the new government and perhaps try to gain ground by attempting to take an active role in Syria's reconstruction process. Thus, in the medium and long term, Iran will seek a Syria through which it can somehow reach Lebanon, rather than a hostile Syria with which it has no contact.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/irans-strategic-setbacks-and-rhetoric-in-syria
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How Türkiye And The Us Should Talk About Syria
By Ihsan Aktaş
Dec 28, 2024
As the Syrian revolution progresses steadily toward its culmination, one pressing question resonates globally: Who laid the groundwork for this transformative movement?
In seeking answers, it becomes evident that countries aspiring to establish ties with the emerging Syrian state turn increasingly to Türkiye, recognizing its pivotal role and seeking to cultivate stronger relationships with Ankara as a gateway to engagement.
In the past two weeks, Türkiye has actively engaged in diplomatic efforts regarding Syria, hosting visits from several countries. High-profile officials, including U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have visited Ankara. This highlights a growing global trend: European Union member states, Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom and many Gulf countries are seeking to establish relations with Syria through Türkiye.
This is mainly because the Syrian revolution and the fall of Damascus unfolded so rapidly that no state in the world could have anticipated such swift developments.
Three essential pillars
Naturally, Türkiye maintains relations with numerous states and is actively negotiating with them on how to manage this dialogue on Syrian soil. A primary focus is the careful adherence to the following principles:
First, Syria should be governed by its own people. The Syrian population must have the full authority to establish, lead and sustain their own state.
Second, the territorial integrity of Syria must be safeguarded at all costs.
Third, to prevent a return to war and civil unrest, Türkiye strongly advocates for Syria to retain a unitary state structure as a foundation for national unity.
In this context, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's character, approach to events and principled stance are as focused on the future stability of Syria and the well-being of its people as they are on Türkiye and the peace and prosperity of the Turkish people.
Iran has demonstrated a flawed approach by treating the Syrian people as invaders, thereby forfeiting its legitimacy in Syria. In stark contrast, the Republic of Türkiye, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, has earned recognition as Syria's legitimate neighbor through its just, fair and prudent policies.
Türkiye - U.S. discussions
While Türkiye’s diplomatic engagements with all nations hold significance, certain key topics stand out in discussions with the United States.
Foremost among these is the issue of Daesh. As is well known, American public opinion has heavily invested in addressing the threat posed by Daesh. In the minds of U.S. leaders and the public, Daesh continues to be viewed as a violent terrorist organization and a persistent danger in the Middle East.
Although Türkiye and the U.S. approach the issue of Daesh from different perspectives, Türkiye can readily assure the U.S. that it is fully capable of suppressing or dismantling Daesh as a terrorist organization.
The second critical issue is the presence of the PKK/YPG terrorist organization in Syria, which is often misconstrued in the West and elsewhere as a Kurdish issue. It is essential to recognize that approximately 80% of the territories currently controlled by the PKK/YPG are predominantly Arab and Turkmen areas, with Kurds forming a majority in only 20% of these regions. Consequently, the Syrian people's aspiration for national integration has already driven out key actors like Russia, Iran and the Assad regime from substantial parts of their territory. This strong desire for unity is unlikely to tolerate the continued occupation of Syrian land by any terrorist organization.
Türkiye can firmly reiterate that it remains committed to maintaining vigilance against Daesh in a unified, terror-free Syria – without any reliance on the PKK/YPG, if this is the elementary role of the PKK/YPG according to the U.S.
The third issue concerns the protection of Kurdish populations. Türkiye already hosts a Kurdish community comprising approximately 20% of its population. In Türkiye's democratic framework, Kurdish citizens enjoy full political rights, demonstrating the country's inclusive approach toward its diverse communities.
In Syria, Türkiye has already taken a proactive role in granting identity cards to Kurds who had been denied such elemental recognition under Assad's regime. President Erdoğan shares a common understanding with the emerging Syrian government on equal rights for all citizens within a democratic framework.
Terror in center
A likely point of discussion between Türkiye and the U.S. will center on the assertion that the PKK is unnecessary for protecting Kurdish rights. Both the new Syrian government and Türkiye can provide assurances that Kurds will enjoy peace and equality within a unified and inclusive Syrian state.
On the other hand, strategic and economic matters, national interests, and the relations of Syria with Israel, Iran and Iraq are all more open to constructive dialogue in the context of the relationship of Türkiye with these states.
If Türkiye and Trump's America can align on the need to control or eliminate terrorist organizations, they will likely encounter little difficulty in reaching agreements on broader issues concerning Syria.
The contrast is striking between the difficulties of the United States in establishing lasting order in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consistent success of Türkiye in stabilizing the regions it has entered. With the foundation of a new government in Syria, Türkiye has emerged as a cornerstone of regional stability, benefiting the interests of both Western powers and regional players, regardless of alliances or rivalries.
Türkiye's steadfast commitment to Syria's security and territorial integrity highlights its role as a guarantor of peace and a pillar for sustainable stability. A mutual agreement between Türkiye and the U.S. to uphold Syria's unity could pave the way for the country's renewal, and reinforce and redefine the strategic partnership between Türkiye and the U.S.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/how-turkiye-and-the-us-should-talk-about-syria
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Pillars Of Türkiye’s Syria Policy
By Murat Yeşiltaş
Dec 27, 2024
Türkiye is preparing for a paradigmatic shift in its Syria policy after the collapse of the Bashar Assad regime. Before Dec. 8, Türkiye’s approach to Syria centred on the fight against terrorism and the refugee problem. Preserving Syria's territorial integrity through normalization with the Assad regime, weakening the PKK's Syrian wing YPG, facilitating the return of refugees to Syria and a political solution within the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 were the main pillars of Ankara’s Syria policy. In addition, while adjusting its Syria policy with Russia and Iran within the framework of the Astana format, it was also seeking to solve the YPG problem with the U.S.
However, after the fall of the Assad regime on Dec. 8, Türkiye revised its policy in Syria and created a new strategic framework in line with the realities of the new era. While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration had a compartmentalized approach to Syria before Assad, it is now building a holistic Syria strategy. The main goal of Ankara’s holistic Syria strategy is to stabilize all of Syria.
Türkiye’s strategic advantages
Türkiye sees post-Assad Syria as an opportunity for regional stabilization. Caution, balance and a pragmatic approach are the key elements shaping Ankara’s new Syria strategy.
Many opportunities can be seen as Türkiye’s strategic advantages in Syria in the new era. First and foremost, among these is the fall of the Assad regime. Türkiye does not have to continue with a strategy that must take into account Assad and the Baath regime to stabilize Syria. This allows Türkiye to develop a more flexible approach and creates a ground where it can directly contribute to Syria’s political future. On the other hand, Ankara has long been working in coordination with opposition forces on maintaining the de-escalation environment in Syria, preventing the Assad regime's attacks on Idlib, operating local governance mechanisms in Idlib, limiting the movement of refugees and fighting against radical terrorist elements. This allows Ankara to exert a certain influence on Syria in the transitional period.
In the new Syria, Iran’s distancing from the Syrian stage also stands out as one of Ankara’s important advantages. Iran no longer maintains militias in Syria and lacks political and ideological influence over the Damascus government. Therefore, Iran does not have the power it once had at the new Syrian table. A similar situation seems to apply to Russia. Russia’s priority is the ongoing war in Ukraine, which forces Moscow to shift its attention from Syria to Ukraine.
The current strategic landscape is also one of Türkiye’s strategic advantages. Between 2016 and 2020, Türkiye had to develop its policy in a highly competitive security environment due to Syria and was engaged in fierce competition with its regional rivals. After 2020, Ankara, which had been at odds with Arab countries holding direct and indirect interests in Syria, eased its foreign policy tensions by dismantling the anti-Türkiye bloc through a strategy of regional normalization.
Türkiye’s critical role in post-Assad Syria unfolds in a new strategic environment where the Iranian axis is weakening and the Turkish-Arab alliance is strengthening. This gives Türkiye an advantage in stabilizing Syria, where it can count on the support of Arab countries and work in coordination with them.
Trump’s likely Syria policy and strong signals to cut ties with the PKK/YPG are also among Türkiye’s most important advantages. The possibility of a coordinated and planned U.S. withdrawal from Syria in coordination with Ankara and Damascus allows Türkiye to approach the YPG problem from a Damascus-centered perspective. The new relationship model between Türkiye and Europe, based on new dynamics, also provides an opportunity for Ankara to use international diplomacy more flexibly during Syria's transition period.
New paradigm, new tools
In reshaping its Syria policy, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's administration has built a proactive policy. One of the most important pillars of the proactive policy is the establishment of centralized authority to ensure security and stability. For this reason, Türkiye is working closely with the new Damascus administration to build an inclusive government, guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, secure religious and ethnic minorities, fight against all terrorist elements and create a facilitative ground for refugees to return to Syria.
The second pillar of Ankara’s strategic priorities is building a united Syria. To achieve this goal, Ankara argues that a territorially unified Syria, whose borders are protected by a single authority, is the only solution. To this end, Ankara supports the formation of a unified Syrian army, consolidating security and defense under a single command, and establishing a democratic system where political sovereignty resides with a central government. This goal has emerged as a red line for the new Damascus administration and enjoys strong support from Ankara.
The third pillar of Türkiye’s proactive policy is effective regional diplomacy. Ankara is working in close coordination with all Arab countries to reconstruct the political, economic and security of the new Syria. Developing bilateral and multilateral diplomacy models for this purpose, Ankara acts together for Syria's territorial integrity and stability with Arab countries that have direct and indirect interests in Syria. Ankara has been in intensive diplomatic contact with the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Organization and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to urge them to support the new government in Damascus.
Activating multilateral international diplomacy to refocus the international community on Syria is also an important pillar of Ankara’s Syria policy. Although Security Council Resolution 2254 is one of the main sources of reference, Ankara argues that it should be adapted to the new field conditions. In this sense, 2254 is seen as a document that sheds light on the transition process and the roadmap for Syria’s reconstruction. At the same time, Ankara calls on the international community to engage diplomatically with the new Damascus administration and to lift the U.N. embargo on Syria.
Threat of PKK/YPG
Türkiye recognizes the need to manage geopolitical balances in the emerging Syria by adopting a balanced and pragmatic approach. Fully aware of the risks, Ankara is prioritizing its foreign policy efforts in Syria in the coming months to mitigate the challenges.
Foremost among these risks is the potential for armed conflict stemming from disagreements within and between military factions. Therefore, achieving de-conflict between military factions is among Türkiye’s top priorities. Although Ankara sees the YPG issue as an important security threat, it believes that this issue is the responsibility of the new Damascus administration in the post-Assad period. Indeed, the new Damascus administration calls on all armed groups to lay down their arms and contribute as political actors in the transition period.
The meaning of this is quite clear for the YPG: In the new Syria, the YPG no longer has the tools it had before. It lacks the demographic weight to control northeastern Syria, it lacks sufficient military power, and it is powerless against the Arabs who want to hold the new Syria together. More importantly, the Trump administration realizes that the new Damascus government will continue the fight against Daesh unabated and wants to withdraw from Syria. However, this does not mean that the YPG problem will be solved quickly. For this reason, Ankara is closely monitoring Syria's internal dynamics, the potential stances of regional countries and the positions of international actors regarding the YPG issue.
Threat of Israel
One of the most critical issues in Syria is Israel’s policy over the Golan Heights. Israel considers it a strategic victory to weaken Iran in Syria. It will shape its strategy in the new period according to the goal of consolidating this strategic success and will try to legitimize its policy by securitizing Iran.
The new Damascus administration, Türkiye and the Arab countries want Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights occupied after Dec. 8. Therefore, Ankara must work closely with Arab countries by directing regional diplomacy towards the goal of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. The new Damascus administration’s declaration that Syria will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, that it will protect border security, and that there will be no attacks from Syria against neighboring countries is expected to cause Israel to change its policy.
Nevertheless, if Israel continues with its aggressive security policy, Türkiye and Israel may come face to face in Syria. This poses the risk of a new, unprecedented conflict and increases the likelihood that Syria will once again descend into internal conflict. To prevent the Iran-Türkiye rivalry in Syria from turning into a Türkiye-Israel rivalry, Israel’s adoption of a position that supports rather than destabilizes stability in Syria could positively affect Ankara-Israel relations in the new period.
Ankara recognizes that Iran’s influence in Syria has diminished but views Tehran’s diplomatic support as valuable in shaping a new Syria. However, this approach does not imply that Iran will retain the same level of influence as it did in the past. Meanwhile, Russia continues to be an important actor for Ankara.
The new Syria has emerged as one of Ankara’s most pressing foreign policy priorities. Thirteen years of experience and lessons learned underscore the need for a pragmatic approach. Recent diplomatic efforts have demonstrated that Ankara has embraced this pragmatism.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/pillars-of-turkiyes-syria-policy
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How Is Israel Anti-Semitic And Why Does It Attack Jews?
27 December 2024
The story of the antisemitic basis of Zionism has been told time and again, and it is one that I have written about multiple times in this publication.
This includes the ideological affinity of the foundational Zionist ideas with antisemitism, whereby both believe that European Jews are not European but a separate Oriental people.
They both also hold that Jews should not live among European Christians, that they are indeed a separate race and a separate nation, or as the antisemitic Protestant fundamentalist and Zionist British foreign minister Arthur Balfour described them, "a people apart".
The alliances that the Zionist movement brokered since its inception with antisemitic European politicians and regimes to advance its claims are an inseparable part of the history of the movement.
This legacy of the Zionist movement, however, did not end with the establishment of Israel in 1948.
On the contrary, the new Zionist settler colony institutionalised the antisemitic basis of the movement and insisted that those who oppose Zionism and Israeli antisemitism, whether Jews or gentiles, are the actual antisemites - something that was more difficult to do before 1948, as the majority of Jews were at the time anti-Zionist or non-Zionist.
'Jewish' state
First, the Zionists decided to name their new settler-colony "Israel".
As "Israel" has referred in the biblical and Judaic tradition to the descendants of Jacob, or the Jewish people, naming the country "Israel" sought to conflate all Jews with the state of Israel.
In doing so, anyone who deigned to criticise Israel would be accused of attacking and criticising all Jews, in their entirety, and not the Israeli government and its racist institutions.
Second, the refusal of Israel to issue a "Declaration of Independence" officially in 1948, even though its propagandists would refer to its official "Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel" casually as a "Declaration of Independence", was yet another indication.
The "Declaration of the Establishment of the Jewish State" was named as such after proposals to name it a "Declaration of Independence" were turned down by the Zionist leadership.
The Zionist Palestine Communist Party delegate Meir Wilner proposed that the state be declared "sovereign and independent", but his amendment was turned down.
These proposals were rejected outright in favour of declaring the state "Jewish" and nothing more.
This vehement rejection had to do with the main purpose of Zionism, namely that the state it sought would represent "Jewish people" worldwide and not only the Jewish colonists of Palestine.
Declaring the state "independent" would have implied that it was independent of world Jewry and, therefore, that it was an "Israeli" rather than a "Jewish" state.
Since Israel's leaders insisted that the Zionist movement must continue its settler-colonial activities even after Israel had been established, as the majority of Jews continued to live outside Israel as they still do today, declaring the country's "independence" might have precluded it from doing so.
Such reasons would be made explicit in subsequent debates about the refusal to officially call the state "independent".
Third, Israel insisted in the Declaration and subsequently that its very establishment of the state was not on behalf of the goals of the Zionist movement, which large numbers of Jews had always opposed, but rather that the creation of a Jewish state was "the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State".
Here again, Israel implicates all Jews whom it does not represent in the establishment of its settler colony on the land of the Palestinians. Thus, if one were to oppose this alleged "natural right of the Jewish people", such a person would be nothing less than a virulent antisemite.
In this manner, Israel arrogated to itself the right to represent world Jewry, who had not granted it such a mandate ever.
All the European powers and the US, which refused to allow Jews fleeing the Nazis to escape to their countries, recognised the Israeli state's new claim to represent all Jews. This step absolved them from the responsibility of taking in the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees after World War Two.
Diaspora Jews
The claim to speak for and represent all Jews outraged non-Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews, and even some pro-Zionist Jews in Europe and the US, who insisted that the Zionist movement and Israel were giving ammunition to the antisemites who accused Jews of dual loyalty as a result of this Israeli claim.
American Jewish leaders were very concerned precisely about this dangerous antisemitic claim on the part of Israel.
In 1950, Jacob Blaustein, the president of the American Jewish Committee, signed an agreement with Israel's Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to clarify the nature of the relationship between Israel and American Jews.
In the agreement, Blaustein declared that the US was not "exile" but rather a "diaspora" and insisted that the state of Israel did not formally represent Diaspora Jews to the rest of the world.
Blaustein added that Israel could never be a refuge for American Jews. He emphasised that even if the US were to cease to be democratic and American Jews were to "live in a world in which it would be possible to be driven by persecution from America", such a world, he insisted, contrary to Israeli claims, "would not be a safe world for Israel either".
Under pressure by American Jewish leaders, Ben-Gurion, on his part, declared that American Jews were full citizens of the US and must only be loyal to it: "They owe no political allegiance to Israel."
The agreement between Israel and the American Jewish Committee stipulated that "Israel, for its part, recognised the allegiance of American Jews to the United States. It, too, would not meddle in the internal affairs of diaspora Jewry. Individuals who chose to make aliyah were needed and would be warmly welcomed, but those remaining in America would not be disparaged as 'exiles.' Neither American nor Israeli Jews would speak on behalf of the other."
'Self-hating' accusations
The Israelis would not maintain Ben-Gurion's position for long.
Following the June 1967 war and Israel's conquest and occupation of territories from three neighbouring Arab countries, Israel began to demand that all world Jewry support its policies and that they ought to do so uncritically.
If they failed to follow its instructions, it was because they were not proper Jews - a position that was most clearly articulated by Israel's famed South Africa-born foreign minister, Abba Eban.
At a 1972 annual conference in Israel sponsored by the American Jewish Congress, Eban laid out the new strategy: "Let there be no mistake: The New Left is the author and the progenitor of the new antisemitism…the distinction between antisemitism and anti-Zionism is not a distinction at all. Anti-Zionism is merely the new antisemitism."
It would take a few decades before this formula crafted by Eban would become official policy not only in Israel but across the western world.
If gentile critics were castigated as antisemites, at the 1972 conference, Eban described two US Jewish critics of Israel, namely Noam Chomsky and IF Stone, as suffering from a complex of "guilt about Jewish survival".
Their values and ideology, by which he meant their anti-colonialism and anti-racism, "are in conflict and collision with our own world of Jewish values".
Eban's identification of Israeli colonial and racist policies with Jewish tradition and values was part and parcel of Zionism's implication of all Jews in Israel's actions and ideals.
But even Eban's horrifying ex-communication of Chomsky and Stone from the Jewish tradition seems mild today compared to how aggressive Israeli officialdom and its supporters in the West have become since then in declaring Jewish critics of Israel, let alone anti-Zionist or non-Zionist Jews, as "self-hating Jews" or as antisemites.
One notable example is the targeting of Jewish students and educators over the last two decades for derision and exclusion on college campuses by supporters of Israel, both Jewish and non-Jewish, as "self-hating Jews" or Jews who "are abetting the antisemites" because they have been critical of Israel or supportive of Palestinian rights.
Pro-Israel claims
Supporters of Israel have relentlessly attacked Jewish professors who criticise Israel as "self-hating".
Some are appalled that there is "an even larger quantity of self-hating Jews" among those whom they accuse of antisemitism because they support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement.
Zionist rabbis critical of Israeli policies have not been immune either and are labelled "self-hating", as have senior White House aides who are strong supporters of Israel but whom Israel's own prime minister described as "self-hating" when they called on Israel to "freeze" building colonial settlements in the occupied territories.
Yet, supporters of Israel, like American academic Daniel J Elazar, argue that Israel "was founded to rest upon Jewish values", a claim that equates the colonial principles of the Israeli state with Judaism and Jewish identity - an outright antisemitic equation.
The identification of Israel's values and policies as "Jewish", or the belief that its policies are enacted in defence of the Jewish people, extends beyond its American Jewish supporters. Many American Christian fundamentalists support Israel precisely because it is "Jewish".
These Israeli and pro-Israel claims have now been adopted wholesale by the American political establishment as outright truths, which is what allowed US President Donald Trump in December 2018 to tell American Jews at a White House Hanukkah party that his vice president had great affection for "your country".
Israel did not object, nor did its government object to Trump telling another group of US Jews in April 2019 that Netanyahu is "your prime minister".
Trump is not alone.
President Joe Biden's strategy to combat antisemitism includes the American "unshakeable commitment to the State of Israel's right to exist, its legitimacy, and its security. In addition, we recognise and celebrate the deep historical, religious, cultural, and other ties many American Jews and other Americans have to Israel".
Statements like these generalise about all American Jews by ignoring those who do not possess "deep" or even shallow ties to Israel - or whose ties compel them not to support Israel's claims about Jews or its policies towards Palestinians.
Rather than combating antisemitism, such a coupling of American Jews with Israel reiterates Zionist, Israeli and US Christian and evangelical views of Jews, to which many American Jews object.
The allegations that all American Jews support Israel uncritically and that such support is intrinsic to Jewish identity are nothing less than staple antisemitic generalisations.
Jewish identity, like all identities, is plural and varies both religiously and ethnically, let alone geographically, culturally and economically.
Anti-Semitic formula
Today, an increasing number of American Jews are separating themselves from Israel, its Jewish supremacist regime and its colonial crimes.
They are targeted for their political positions by pro-Israel lobbies and smeared as "self-hating".
It is not the Jewish or gentile critics of Israel, however, who fail to distinguish between Judaism and Zionism. On the contrary, they insist on that separation vigorously.
Indeed, those leading the right-wing pro-Israel campaign on US and European campuses have set one main goal, shared by the Israeli government, for their continuing witch hunt: to do away with any distinction between Judaism, the Jewish people, Zionism and the Israeli government.
It is the very same goal that the founders of Israel insisted on and planned for when they named their settler colony "Israel".
The historical movement from Ben-Gurion's forced acknowledgement in 1950 that American Jews do not owe Israel any loyalty to the post-1967 Israeli official consensus and the Netanyahu regime's anti-Semitic insistence that "anti-Zionism is antisemitism" is now complete.
This anti-Semitic formula has now been adopted by the US (including in Congress and by Trump), along with British and European officials. The current goal is to force universities, the student movement, cultural institutions and the media, in sum, everyone, to subscribe to this anti-Semitic formula - or else.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/how-israel-antisemitic-why-attack-jews
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Letter To A Syrian Rebel (Ii): 'Your Trauma And Ours Are Different'
By Amotz Asa-El
December 27, 2024
Your revolt was still young when this column last wrote you (“Letter to a Syrian rebel,” January 6, 2012), catching you “at the crack of dawn… gauging what the next day may have in store” just before mothers across your bleeding land will “pray the grocery will have today the flour, sugar, and eggs it didn’t have yesterday” and fathers will “decide whether to navigate between rifle barrels en route to the gallon of kerosene without which the family will shiver at night” and “the grocer will demand cash, and the black marketeer dollars, and the doctor baksheesh, and the preacher repentance, and the garbage truck will just not come.”
Thirteen years and more than a million dead and wounded later it is clear that this forecast, grim though it was, foresaw hardly a fraction of what your people have endured. No one in his right mind predicted your country’s leaders would kill half a million Syrians and displace every second Syrian, including thousands who would prefer a ramshackle boat’s voyage across an angry sea over life in an even angrier land.
That letter did, however, anticipate your victory, and also its disillusioning results. “Chances are high,” it suggested, “that your Syria, while undoing the alliance with Iran, will become the proxy Turkey now wants to make of you.”
Though hoping you “prove resolute enough to reclaim your honor rather than replace one regional patron with another,” it asserted that “for now, Middle Israelis will have to assume post-Assad Syria will not be progressive,” and thus brace “for a new Syria that will uphold its dictatorial predecessors’ hostility to Israel.”
Recent events have given Middle Israelis no solid reason to change these somber expectations. That is why this letter is not about your relationship with us. Rather, it’s about your relationship with the country you must now lead, because what it will demand you to address, above anything else, is something about which we Jews know a great deal: trauma.
YOUR TRAUMA and ours are, to be sure, different.
Your people were not the victims of any racial theory, the attack on them was not designed to annihilate them, and they were not targeted by a propaganda machine programmed to assassinate their character and let their blood. Not to mention the magnitude: Hitler killed more than 30% of the Jewish people; Assad killed less than 5% of the Syrian people.
Even so, your people were slaughtered en masse: families were shelled in their living rooms, torched in their basements, and gassed on their streets; thousands lost limbs and millions lost parents, children, siblings, spouses, neighbors, friends, and livelihoods, not to mention their self-respect and hopes.
For a population smaller than Florida’s, it all adds up to one big holocaust, and that is how it will remain etched in their minds, no matter what their leaders will do.
Take it from us Jews: your people will be carrying the trauma for generations. It will take years until your people fully understand what they have been through. In our case, it took more than three decades until one groundbreaking book, journalist Helen Epstein’s Children of the Holocaust (1979), showed that the survivors’ post-trauma was passed down to their offspring: the boys and girls who were named after Holocaust victims, the kids whose parents’ friends were mostly other survivors, and the teenagers whose dreams included nightmares about being hounded by barking German shepherds and chased by gun-toting Nazis in helmets and boots.
Is there any doubt that some version of this syndrome now awaits your own people?
It takes no Sigmund Freud to tell you that the population you will be leading is haunted; a people whose young adults lost their education, whose teenagers lost their childhoods, and whose children will for years have nightmares about their starving parents sifting for food in garbage heaps while fleeing tanks, gunships, jets, and mustachioed spooks.
The question you face, therefore, is what to do in the face of all this, and the answer is that you have a choice – the same choice that our parents faced back when they proceeded from their murderers’ gallows to the remainder of their days.
Our parents’ choice was simple and sharp: Build or sink.
That gave the young an advantage. Survivors who were 40 and older when catastrophe caught them often remained wrecks for the rest of their lives. Younger survivors fared better because biology allowed them to look to the future rather than to the past.
That’s what happened on the individual level. On the collective level, the survivors were given, here in the Jewish state, the opportunity to do the building that their traumatized souls demanded.
True, Israel was mostly built by people who did not survive the Holocaust, including nearly 1 million who came from Arab lands. The Holocaust’s survivors, by contrast, numbered hardly 250,000. However, most of them arrived in Israel and became part of a massive creation, helping build here, over a mere 13 years, 21 new cities and thousands of new farms, factories, hospitals, schools, banks, universities, seaports, airports, highways, and whatnot.
That, in a nutshell, is how the Jews overcame their trauma, and that is how the Syrian people can overcome theirs: by turning their devastated land into a massive construction site. It is a choice they, under your leadership, can make now, and the sooner the better, while the massive foreign capital it demands can still be raised.
You can, of course, choose the alternative path; the path most here expect you to choose: the path of oppression, robbery, vitriol, deceit, hatred, and wrath. It would be the sorry path of the man you unseated, and such will also be its results.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-835036
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Ireland’s Anti-Israel Actions Will Not Go Unanswered
By David Ben-Basat
December 27, 2024
Relations between Israel and Ireland have been marked over the years by ongoing tension, harsh criticism from Dublin, and a growing sense of alienation. This has culminated in the recent decision of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to shutter Israel’s embassy in Ireland – a rare move that underscores a deep crisis in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.
This decision does not stand in a vacuum. It stems from Ireland’s longstanding antisemitic and anti-Israel policies, which include legislation supporting the Palestinian struggle and harsh statements against Israel by Irish politicians.
The roots of Ireland’s anti-Jewish policies can be traced back to World War II. After Hitler’s suicide, when Europe breathed a sigh of relief, Irish prime minister Éamon de Valera snuck away under cover of night to console the Nazi ambassador over Hitler’s death. De Valera also strongly objected to the death sentences imposed on Nazis during the Nuremberg Trials.
Furthermore, Palestinian terrorist organizations trained members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in refugee camps in Lebanon. Ireland’s ideology aligns closely with the national and ideological narrative of the Palestinians. Dublin views the Palestinian struggle for “liberation” as similar to Ireland’s historical fight for independence from British rule.
This solidarity with the Palestinians has become a central driver of Ireland’s policies toward Israel, leading to the adoption of one-sided stances against the Jewish state.
Ireland sees itself as a “justice warrior” and a leader in the field of human rights. It uses this position to support the Palestinians while harshly criticizing Israel. This is evident in parliamentary resolutions, speeches on the international stage, and specific legislation targeting Israel.
In 2018, the Irish parliament advanced legislation banning the import and sale of products from Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria (West Bank). This law was seen as a precedent in Europe, aimed at pressuring Israel over what was described as the “illegal occupation.” Though the law was not implemented, due to opposition from the European Union, its advancement infuriated Jerusalem and was perceived as biased.
Ireland has also stood out as a leading supporter of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, which seeks to economically and diplomatically isolate Israel. BDS has received public support from Irish politicians, parliamentarians, and government ministers who openly endorse its objectives.
During military operations such as Operation Protective Edge and Guardian of the Walls, Ireland was one of the first European countries to accuse Israel of war crimes. Irish parliamentarians’ accusation against Israel of operating an “apartheid regime” and calls for imposing sanctions on Israel gained wide support from within the Irish government and with the public.
Silence on Hamas's crimes
AFTER THE Hamas-perpetrated massacre on October 7, in which over 1,000 Israeli civilians were murdered and many others kidnapped, the Irish government condemned the violence and “expressed deep concern over the escalation in the region.” Irish prime minister Leo Varadkar and Foreign Minister Micheal Martin issued statements expressing sorrow over the loss of life and calling for a halt to the violence. However, their condemnation was focused on demands for a ceasefire and humanitarian concerns in Gaza, without explicitly and directly condemning Hamas’s actions or recognizing them as acts of terror.
This stance from Ireland drew criticism from Israeli officials, who expected an unequivocal condemnation of Hamas’s atrocities.
Ireland has consistently voted in favor of anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations. These include condemnations of Israel’s military actions, calls for the establishment of international investigative committees, and denunciations of settlement policies.
Over the years, Irish politicians have used particularly harsh language toward Israel, exacerbating the rift between the countries.
Notable examples include speeches by Ireland’s current and past presidents and senior officials. Former Irish president Mary Robinson, for example, has been a vocal critic of Israel’s policies. She has spoken in favor of the Palestinians while condemning Israel’s “occupation policies.”
Ironically, five years ago, Robinson received the US Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor, from former president Barack Obama.
Irish Trade Minister Simon Coveney has stated that “Israel’s actions in Gaza and Judea and Samaria (West Bank) harm the chances for peace and violate the human rights of Palestinians.”
Irish parliamentarians frequently compare Israel to colonial regimes that practice racial discrimination and have even called for a complete boycott of Israel. MP Richard Boyd Barrett described Israel as an “apartheid state” and called for prosecuting it for war crimes.
Closure of embassy
ISRAEL’S DECISION to close its embassy in Dublin results from a combination of budgetary and strategic considerations. While the Foreign Ministry claims that the move is related to resource allocation among embassies, it is clear that it also stems from the lack of diplomatic benefit in maintaining relations with Ireland.
Recently, Ireland joined a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, accusing Israel of war crimes and genocide, and sought to expand the definition of genocide to apply to Israel. Foreign Minister Sa’ar called this a double standard and an example of antisemitism based on the dehumanization and delegitimization of Israel.
Foreign Minister Sa’ar must summon the EU ambassador to Israel, Dimiter Tzantchev, and the Irish ambassador to Israel, Sonya McGuinness, to determine whether this constitutes a blatant violation of the European Parliament’s educational standards, which Ireland is bound to uphold.
Dana Ehrlich, Israel’s ambassador to Ireland, has herself been a victim of a systematic campaign of delegitimization. She reported that protesters displayed posters directed against her at demonstrations, calling for the expulsion of “the terrorist.” Images of her with blood on her face were circulated, none of which were condemned by the Irish government.
“I have many colleagues in difficult and critical countries, but Ireland’s obsessive hostility has crossed all red lines,” Ehrlich said.
Since October 7, Ehrlich has faced threats and calls for her expulsion from Ireland. In March, the Israeli embassy in Ireland received a threatening letter containing white powder, photos of victims from October 7, and a picture of Ehrlich with the caption: “You’re next,” according to a report in the Irish Times.
“In the past year, there has been a systematic delegitimization of any cooperation with Israel,” Ehrlich said. “A targeted incitement campaign against me personally, a reduction in bilateral activity, and attempts to advance anti-Israel measures within the European Union. At the UN, Ireland distinguishes itself negatively even more than other countries.”
The hatred toward Israel is evident not only in public opinion, the economy, and politics but also in the education system.
Irish education
A REPORT published last month revealed that Ireland’s education system teaches hatred toward Jews and Israel through official textbooks. The research, conducted by the Impact-se institute, uncovered blatant antisemitic content in Irish teaching materials.
“Judaism believes in violence and war,” one textbook states, while Islam is described as a “religion of peace.” Jews are presented as Christ-killers. Irish students are taught about “aggressive Israel” and “poor Palestinians,” with no mention of Israeli peace proposals.
“Jewish children are afraid to speak about their identity,” warned Irish Chief Rabbi Yoni Wider in an interview with the BeChadrei Charedim website. “Students are being forced to change schools to escape the hatred.”
The Irish Education Ministry ignores these issues. Instead of addressing the problem, officials claim that “the materials are balanced” and refuse to meet with representatives of the Jewish community.
“The inflammatory rhetoric of Irish politicians against Israel over the past year has fueled hatred,” Rabbi Wider said. “The anti-Israel narrative is so distorted that it creates fertile ground for antisemitism.”
Among the disturbing assignments in textbooks: students are asked to imagine a future where Palestinian children “join militant groups” or “get good jobs,” as though terrorism were a legitimate career path.
IRISH SCHOOLBOOKS are filled with lies and historical distortions about the Holocaust, referring to Nazi concentration camps as “transit camps.” For example, one history book includes an illustration of the Third Reich’s railroad system leading to Auschwitz, described as a “prisoner-of-war camp.”
The incitement extends to academic institutions. Several weeks ago, there were reports of a physical assault on a Jewish student in Ireland, solely because of his Jewish identity.
The overt hostility of the Irish government toward Israel is trickling down to the general public, resulting in antisemitism and threats against Ireland’s Jewish community.
Ireland’s government officially recognizes a “Palestinian state” but shows no compassion for the Israeli hostages suffering under Hamas captivity. It does not demand their release alongside calls for a ceasefire in Gaza.
The false statement by Irish President Michael Higgins, claiming that Israel plans to establish settlements in Egypt, reflects ignorance at best or, at worst, a deliberate attempt to harm Israel’s peace agreement with Egypt.
Closing the embassy is a firm and appropriate response to Ireland’s anti-Israel policies. Israel is sending a clear message: it will not tolerate one-sided condemnations, and Ireland’s anti-Israel actions will not go unanswered.
Closing the embassy does not mean severing diplomatic ties with Ireland, but it serves as a warning signal to other nations.
Faced with two options: continuing to endure hostility and harm to our national dignity, or recalling Israel’s ambassador from Dublin, Foreign Minister Sa’ar made the right choice by choosing the latter.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-835059
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Suing Antony Blinken: The Us State Department, Israel And The Leahy Law
By Dr Binoy Kampmark
December 27, 2024
On 17 December, a number of Palestinians filed a federal lawsuit pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, alleging human rights violations by Israel in Gaza and the West Bank. Their contention: that the US State Department has failed to implement the strictures of the Leahy Law. The law, comprising one segment covering the State Department and another for the Department of Defence, prohibits the use of US assistance to the units of foreign security forces suspected of committing gross violations of human rights (GVHRs). The proviso for restoring that assistance can only take place if the offending entity in question takes adequate steps to address the violations.
Examples of such violations include torture, extrajudicial killing, prolonged detention without charge and trial, enforced disappearance, rape and, as broadly noted in the Leahy Law’s own definition “other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, or the security of the person.”
The action, supported by Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief based on Blinken’s “de facto refusal to implement the statute prohibiting US assistance to Israeli security force units about which there is credible information that they have committed gross violations of human rights.”
Blinken’s record when applying the Leahy Law to Israeli units is disturbingly scrappy. In May, for instance, he explained to Congress that the punishments meted out to soldiers and officers in four cases prior to 7 October 2023, were adequate. One example deserves attention, involving an officer in the Shahar Search and Rescue Battalion of the Israeli occupation forces.
The soldier in question shot and killed Ahmed Manasra, an unarmed Palestinian, in March 2019. A plea deal reached between the military prosecutor and the soldier, subsequently approved by a panel of military judges, proved exceedingly generous to the soldier as it was degrading to Manasra: a three-month term of community service, and a three-month suspended sentence. Blinken accordingly found, as outlined in his memorandum of justification, that the Israeli government “is taking effective steps to bring to justice the responsible member of the Shahar Battalion.” It was a decision perplexing to Tim Rieser, a longtime aide to the chief author of the relevant statute, Sen. Patrick Leahy. Blinken’s justification was inconsistent “with how the law is written and how it was intended to be applied.”
Former State Department officials linked to the original Leahy Law have been less than impressed by the lethargic actions of their former employer. Former Department member Stephen Rickard, who was also a former senior staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, confirms the favourable prejudice within the department towards Israeli units, adopting what he calls a “‘see no evil, hear no evil’ policy”.
“If the State Department will not comply with the law, then it is time for the courts to vindicate the rule of law and order it to do so,” Rickard said.
Former State Department staffer Josh Paul was also candid, saying: “I sat as part of the Israel Leahy Vetting Forum [ILVF] and saw repeatedly cases of gross violations of human rights being brought forward and senior officials being unwilling to act upon them because of fear of political consequences.”
The forum has been more active of late, signalling, according to ProPublica, a marked departure “after years of deferential treatment of Israel”. That said, the lawsuit contends that the ILVF’s vetting operations are, for the most part, “unique, complex, lengthy, high-level”, not to mention “arbitrary and capricious, and is not rationally related to advancing the purpose of the Leahy Law.” This complexity is pure bureaucratic pantomime, intended to mask what is, at heart, a simple policy goal: exempting the conduct of Israeli forces from the level of scrutiny reserved for their international counterparts.
As the lawsuit contends, the State Department “annually vets hundreds of thousands of non-Israeli foreign security force units for compliance with the Leahy Law and ultimately suspends and deems thousands of them ineligible for US assistance.” Since the law’s enactment in 1997, the department had failed to suspend or deem ineligible “a single Israeli unit despite overwhelming information of widespread GVHRs committed by Israel.”
In 2019, Congress amended the Leahy Law to require the secretary of state to provide foreign governments a list of ineligible units under the law and receive assurances that those governments would comply with the Leahy prohibition and block US assistance to such units before transferring assistance in cases of “untraceable assistance”. Despite this amendment, the IVLF failed to identify a single ineligible Israeli Unit responsible for gross human rights violations.
The failure to apply the law, the plaintiffs continue to argue, was “particularly shocking in the face of the unprecedented escalation of Israeli GVHRs since the Gaza War erupted on October 7, 2023.” The provisional orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) directing Israel to cease depriving Palestinians of essential items for their survival, and heeding the UN Genocide Convention, along with arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, underlined that point.
This legal action is taking place in the footsteps of previous efforts launched in US courts. In November 2023, a lawsuit was filed in the US District Court for the Northern District of California by the Centre for Constitutional Rights, acting for a number of Palestinian human rights organisations, along with Palestinians in Gaza and the United States. It sought an order from the court “requiring that the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense adhere to their duty to prevent, and not further, the unfolding genocide of Palestinian people in Gaza.”
The relevant duty arose by virtue of the UN Genocide Convention being “judicially enforceable as a peremptory norm of customary international law.” The complaint further argued that the genocidal conditions in Gaza had been “made possible because of unconditional support given [to Israel] by” President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin.
The applicants failed to convince the judge that they had jurisdictional grounds to sue the officials in question, despite the judge declaring that there had been plausible grounds that Israel was contributing to genocidal conditions. This was subsequently affirmed on appeal by a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, primarily on the political question doctrine. The principle holds that courts are not to review instances where allegations of international law violations have taken place if there are substantial questions of foreign policy involved. An expansive reading of this is arguably unwarranted, given that US obligations at international law would presumably fall within the bounds of curial assessment. The litigants remain undeterred and plan to challenge this further.
The litigation being steered by DAWN is likely to face similar arguments about jurisdiction: that assistance to foreign security units is a matter for the executive and therefore beyond a court’s assessment. But, trite as it is, courts are there to guard the appropriate application of statutes. The Leahy Law, as evidence of Congressional instruction to the State Department, is unequivocal in its purpose and scope regarding gross human rights violations. The time, it would seem, has come for those instructions to be applied to Israel without deferential favour.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241227-suing-antony-blinken-the-us-state-department-israel-and-the-leahy-law/
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Foreign Policy Reboot Strengthens Turkiye’s Hand
Sinem Cengiz
December 27, 2024
Turkish foreign policy has been marked by major geopolitical shifts in the past year. Reading Turkish foreign policy is no simple task; it requires a nuanced understanding of the country’s diplomatic maneuvers, as well as its regional and global positioning.
In 2024, Turkiye scored three important goals in its foreign policy, while also facing challenges as it heads into 2025. The overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, the normalization of relations with the Arab world, and successful mediation efforts between African nations were the three main foreign policy victories for Ankara.
The collapse of the Assad regime strengthened Ankara’s leverage in its foreign policy amid declining Russian and Iranian influence in the region. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s historic visit to Cairo, the first such visit in over a decade, not only signaled the restoration of ties with Egypt, but also was pivotal for Turkiye’s reintegration into the Arab world. Egypt, with its central role in the Arab League, helped facilitate Ankara’s renewed acceptance in the region.
At the end of 2024, Erdogan brokered a peace agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia, resolving a year-long maritime dispute over access to the Red Sea. This deal signaled Turkiye’s growing influence in Africa, with Ankara positioning itself as a neutral mediator capable of defusing tensions with diverse actors. Following the agreement, Erdogan announced plans to visit Ethiopia and Somalia in early 2025, showing his continuing commitment to deepening Turkiye’s footprint in Africa through economic investment, security cooperation, and humanitarian aid.
Ankara’s relations with the Gulf states also showed significant progress in the past year. Regional cooperation and connectivity, driven by economic imperatives, have been the defining features of Turkiye’s recent policy toward the Gulf. In 2024, Turkish-Gulf relations entered a new phase, underpinned by three key developments: Ankara and the Gulf Cooperation Council agreed to begin formal negotiations for a free trade agreement, and also to resume talks on strategic dialogue — Turkiye was designated as a strategic dialogue partner by the GCC in 2008. Meanwhile, a four-way preliminary agreement was signed for joint collaboration on a “Development Road” involving Iraq, Turkiye, Qatar, and the UAE. Turkiye’s political and defense cooperation with individual Gulf states also was strengthened through visits by their leaders, which paved the way for the signing of several key agreements.
Beside these successes, Turkiye’s relations with the West remain troubled, especially in light of Israel’s war in Gaza and Ankara’s close ties with Moscow. As the US prepares for a second Trump administration in 2025, Turkiye appears to be positioning itself for a more critical international role, while maintaining a cautious “wait-and-see” approach. Ankara is likely to shape its policies toward Donald Trump’s second administration based on Washington’s actions and priorities in the region. The future of Turkiye-US relations will likely depend on the new administration’s handling of its relations with the Kurdish YPG/PYD in Syria, which has been a long-standing point of disagreement between Ankara and Washington.
Turkiye’s prominent role during and in the aftermath of the downfall of Assad’s regime in Syria has dramatically increased its influence in regional geopolitics, with both Washington and regional actors now recognizing its outsized role. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has indicated that Ankara is willing to act as a mediator between the US and Syria’s future authorities. He also said that Ankara “is coordinating actions on the situation in Syria with Saudi Arabia at the highest level.”
As 2024 draws to a close, Turkiye is actively seeking regional support for its Syria policy. Turkish policymakers have visited Cairo and the Gulf capitals to discuss the future of Syria’s transitional government. They also have signaled that Turkiye’s new foreign policy in the region can achieve success only with strong regional support.
Additionally, throughout the past year, Turkiye has maintained a delicate balancing act in its approach to Russia’s war in Ukraine. While strengthening ties with Ukraine, Ankara has also continued its pragmatic relations with Moscow. There is an existing divergence between Turkiye and the West, particularly the US, in their perceptions toward the great power rivalry. Ankara views multipolarity positively, which offers Turkish policymakers flexibility when dealing with the West. Yet, in 2025, the effectiveness of Turkiye’s strategy will depend largely on the incoming Trump administration’s handling of the Ukraine war, its approach to the YPG/SDF in Syria, and its strategy in navigating relations with Ankara.
Although the region faces uncertainty related to the post-Assad Syria, Iran-Israel tensions, and the Gaza war, Turkiye is entering 2025 in a relatively strong regional position. It has normalized ties with former regional foes, and also elevated its role as a crucial Western partner, thanks to its efforts to mediate the Ukraine war. Ankara has also taken positive steps in its relations with the EU since the elections held in Turkiye in May 2024. This led to a reconfiguration of Turkish foreign policy, which was redefined by de-escalation.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent visit to Turkiye is a promise of a closer future between Brussels and Ankara. According to von der Leyen, “Turkiye has an essential role to play in stabilizing the Middle East.” This statement is significant, particularly as the West now looks to Turkiye for guidance on Syria’s future after Assad.
Looking ahead, Turkiye’s ability to leverage its foreign policy successes and navigate the region’s complexities in the coming year remains to be seen.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2584474
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