Pakistan: No Consensus on Terrorism, Though Army Chief Admits Existential Threat Is Internal, Not External

By Najam Sethi

21-27 December, 2012

The recent attack on Peshawar airport by TTP terrorists has raised several important questions regarding national security, civil-military relations and media perceptions. Unfortunately, the fact is that on a core concern of national security - the army chief has admitted that the existential threat to Pakistan is internal and not external - the key players are not on the same page for one reason or other. Consider.

The TTP is relentlessly targeting the military that has lost over 3000 soldiers in the war to date. Some terrorist attacks, as on the GHQ in Pindi and Mehran Naval Base in Karachi, etc, have been downright audacious. Yet, apart from the Swat operation 2007-08, there has been no focused attempt to uproot the TTP from its hideouts in Waziristan. The military is constrained by four factors.

First, it doesn't want to create the public impression that it is "going into Waziristan" only because the Americans have said it must "do more". Earlier this year, it determined the time was right, but Leon Panetta, the US Defense Secretary, announced that a "joint operation" in Waziristan was on the cards, prompting the Pakistanis to issue a swift denial and call off the operation.

Second, the military leadership is wary of taking additional casualties. COAS General Ashfaq Kayani has been internally sapped by a string of developments - an unprecedented three years extension in service that hasn't gone down well with the rank and file, the Raymond Davis affair, the US Navy Seal raid to kill and extract Osama Bin Laden, the botched-up Memogate witch-hunt, mishandling of the NATO supply routes blockade, and aspersions on the business conduct of his brothers - and is therefore hesitant to take the brunt of decisions that could rebound on him.

Third, the civilians, both in government and opposition, have shown no inclination to bail the military out. The PPP government has been dragging its feet on the anti-terrorism law proposed by the military, both to facilitate nabbing, holding and prosecuting terrorists but also to avoid charges of violating human rights that could have an adverse impact on military and financial assistance from the US because of strict Congressional oversight of such violations. It has also absolved itself of such decision-making after being stung by the military on the Kerry-Lugar Bill and Memogate. Understandably, it is reluctant to shoulder the burden of ordering the military into Waziristan when the media, mullahs and opposition parties - in particular Imran Khan who represents the populist third force that is threatening both mainstream parties in the forthcoming general elections - are poised to condemn it for "pursuing an American agenda". It doesn't help when the military leadership is loath to openly admit that "this is our war".

Fourth, the military's Afghanistan end-game strategy for Afghanistan is still wobbly. It wants to protect its Mulla Umar - Haqqani network assets and help them get a key position in Kabul after the Americans leave but it doesn't have the will or ability to break the nexus between its assets and liabilities - the TTP is a liability but it is inextricably networking with the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Fifth, the military is also keen to remain on the right side of the vernacular media and mullahs that remain part of the problem rather than the solution. Many journalists and religious leaders are still prisoners of misplaced religious nationalism. They say the TTP is an Israeli-India-American conspiracy against Pakistan because "Muslims cannot possibly kill Muslims", or variations of the theme. For example, a section of the media has made a big issue of a tattoo (of a painting by a Peruvian artist given to erotica, sorcery and fantasy) on the back of an Uzbek terrorist, claiming it as proof of the non-Muslim identity of the foreign devils because "mutilation of the body is forbidden in Islam". Evidence suggesting the opposite is blithely ignored. Many Taliban fighters in Afghanistan have been found with tattoos because they were "inspired" by foreign jihadis from Muslims countries worldwide where tattoos are part of the local culture - especially in the countries of Central Asia where it is a growing art form - after they made Afghanistan their base area in the 1980s. Indeed, Abu Musab al Zarqavi, the tattooed Al-Qaeda terrorist from Jordan who served time in Afghanistan and wrought havoc in Iraq until he was killed by a drone strike in 2006, was the one man who symbolized the new Al-Qaeda culture imported into Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Zarqavi introduced beheadings, suicide bombings, kidnapping for ransom, hostage taking and attacks on the Shia as new elements in Al-Qaeda 's strategic armoury.

A national consensus against terrorism is lacking because there is no clear demarcation of civil-military rights, responsibilities and power on the one hand and the place of religion in Pakistani nationalism on the other. Unfortunately, there is no party or leader on the Pakistani horizon who is ready to shake us out of this hopeless situation.

Najam Sethi is the editor of The Friday Times

Source: The Friday Times

URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-terrorism-jihad/pakistan-no-consensus-terrorism,-though/d/9770