
By Stephen Schwartz
October 21, 2014
Recently, some media
commentators have argued that, rather than the product of a simple
confrontation between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Syria and Iraq, the rise of the
so-called "Islamic State" should be perceived as an eruption into
those countries of Wahhabism, the only interpretation of Islam recognized as
official in Saudi Arabia.
David Gardner of the
Financial Times, for instance, blamed Saudi Arabia indirectly for the growth of
ISIS, writing, "Jihadi extremism does present a threat to the kingdom. But
in doctrinal terms it is hard to see in what way it 'deviates' from Wahhabi
orthodoxy." Others have implied or alleged that Saudi Arabia helps finance
ISIS.
On September 30,
Financial Times writers Heba Saleh in Cairo and Simeon Kerr in Dubai asserted,
"in contrast to the tacit official encouragement of more liberal voices
after 9/11, any debate within Saudi Arabia over the role of [Wahhabism] in
fostering [ISIS] extremism has been timid and largely confined to social
media."
Yet in analyzing
radical Islam, we should make distinctions, not confuse them. Looking back at
Saudi Arabia's reaction to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, we would find
little public dialogue over the role of Wahhabism in the origins of al Qaeda.
The Saudi monarchy and their representatives denied a linkage and discouraged
investigation of it. After the U.S.-led Iraq intervention in 2003, Saudi media
and websites were replete with praise for Saudi citizens who had died as
terrorist combatants north of the kingdom's border. The Saudis created an
ineffective anti-terrorist "rehabilitation" program before
"deporting" al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to Yemen. Later,
however, the Saudis declined to support the Wahhabi Nour party that emerged in
Egypt after the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011.
Saudi Arabia had begun
to change in 2005 with the death of King Fahd Abd Al-Aziz and ascent to the
throne of his half brother, the currently-ruling King Abdullah. Abdullah
commenced a series of reforms that while small, nonetheless marked a new
direction for the desert realm. In 2007, the so-called "religious
police" or "morals patrols," titled officially the Commission
for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), and known among the
populace as the Mutawiyin (volunteers) or Haia (commission), came under
official scrutiny.
Previously, the
"morals patrols" had roamed the streets of Saudi cities, carrying
leather-covered sticks with which they beat women whose all-covering garment,
the abaya, slipped an inch and revealed an ankle, pushing ordinary people
toward mosques at prayer times, raiding houses where they suspected alcohol was
present, monitoring the highways to prevent women from driving and unrelated
couples from riding together, harassing members of the Shia minority, including
a rape victim who was punished by lashing, detaining hajj pilgrims who engaged
in metaphysical rituals prohibited by the Wahhabis, and killing people in
especially-brutal incidents. Thanks to King Abdullah, the morals patrols were
subjected to court authority for the first time.
In 2009, King Abdullah
established a ministry for women's education and dismissed the then-head of the
morals patrols, Ibrahim Al-Ghaith. Two years later, Saudi women were granted
limited electoral rights, to become effective in 2015. Further, King Abdullah
announced in 2011 the foundation of the world's largest university for women,
named for his aunt, Princess Nora Bint Abdulrahman, and located near the
capital, Riyadh.
The director of the
"morals patrols" was again replaced in 2012, by Abdul Latif Abdul
Aziz Al-Sheikh, who is a descendant of the 18th-century founder of the Wahhabi
sect, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, but supports greater female participation in
society. After his appointment, Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh cautioned the
"morals patrols" against harassment of the public, and forbade them
from arresting, interrogating or searching people or residences without a
warrant from a local governor.
Saudi Arabia in 2013
criminalized domestic violence and appointed 30 women to the unelected national
legislature or "shura council," which was previously restricted to
men. The same year, Saudi Arabia nominated its first motion picture directed by
a woman, Wadjda, about a young girl who wants to buy a bicycle and the
obstacles she faces, for an Academy Award.
Regarding the horrors
in Syria, although Saudis like other Sunni Muslims are outraged at the
massacres of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, Saudi authorities earlier this year
banned involvement in jihad abroad, with prison sentences of three to thirty
years for Saudis who fight outside the country, enlist in terrorist groups,
provide them with material assistance, or incite others to join them.
Wahhabi fanatics have
pushed back against these adaptations to modern reality. In the latest
manifestation of Wahhabi intransigence, a court judge in Riyadh, according to
BBC News, sentenced Shia cleric Nimr Al-Nimr to death by beheading and
crucifixion for activism in 2011, in Shia protests in the Saudi Eastern
Province, where many Shia Muslims live. Iran is widely accused of involvement
in the Saudi Shia turmoil, and both Tehran and the Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen
defended Al-Nimr and condemned the Saudis aggressively in the case.
A slow but undeniable
transition is underway in Saudi Arabia. Notwithstanding its Wahhabi legacy and
the emulation of Wahhabism by ISIS, raids by the Royal Saudi Air Force against
ISIS, and a pledge by Riyadh to train the non-sectarian Syrian Free Army, may
demonstrate that Saudi Arabia has taken a positive stand against the
metastasized Wahhabism of ISIS.
Certainly, none of the
measures instituted by King Abdullah would be imaginable under the domination
of ISIS. Saudi journalist Bader Al-Rashed declared in the Middle East news
portal Al-Monitor of September 29, 2014, "Today . . . because of [ISIS],
there are discussions on the connection between Sunni jihadist extremism and
Wahhabism inside and outside Saudi Arabia. This might eventually change the way
Saudis see themselves. . . . The kingdom's participation in the first
airstrikes against IS in Syria on Sept. 23 demonstrates its seriousness in
combating the radicals."
Commitment to the
battle against ISIS may therefore drive Saudi Arabia further away from its
Wahhabi past.
Source:
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/2421/saudi-wahhabism-and-isis-wahhabism-the-difference
URL: https://newageislam.com/islamic-ideology/saudi-wahhabism-isis-wahhabism-difference/d/99666