Are We Muslims Prisoners of Historical Narratives?
By Mushtaq Ul Haq Ahmad Sikander, New Age Islam
17 March 2026
Prisoners of Sacred History
An examination of how historical narratives, especially in Islamic tradition, trap Muslims in sectarian divides through sacralized events and selective hadith.
Main Points:
· Allure of history shapes identities, loves, and hatreds via triumphs and tragedies.
· Rigorous yet flawed hadith compilation by Bukhari and Muslim led to contradictions and selective canonization influenced by politics.
· Sacralization of early disputes like Saqifah, Siffin, and Karbala birthed irreconcilable Sunni-Shia sects.
· Umayyad tyrants like Muawiya and Yazid contrasted with reformer Umar bin Abdul Aziz, fueling biases.
· Path to unity is Desacralize history, prioritize Quran, embrace mutual respect over fatwas.
History is quite alluring as it offers lessons and also documents about what happened in the past. Its magnetic pull lies in the way it weaves tales of triumphs, tragedies, and turning points that seem to echo into our present lives, shaping not just our understanding of the world but also our deepest emotions. Based on history we come to love or hate anyone, forging allegiances to long gone figures whose actions, real or interpreted, become the bedrock of our identities and animosities. In no sphere is this more evident than in Islamic history, precisely Muslim history, which is the history developed over time, where we have contested claims particularly related to various reports of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). These reports, transmitted through generations, form the core of our religious practice, yet they are fraught with debates that have persisted for centuries.
The hadith collectors applied various strict measures to attribute anything to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Scholars like Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim sifted through hundreds of thousands of narrations, employing rigorous criteria such as the integrity of the chain of transmitters (isnad), their memory, piety, and precision. They discarded vast numbers deemed weak or fabricated, yet even in the most authentic collections, various contradictory sayings found way in the hadith books. For instance, reports on minor details of prayer timings or inheritance shares sometimes clash, reflecting the human element in oral transmission across diverse regions and eras. The acceptance of few books of hadith compiled while leaving other ones was due to variegated reasons—political influences under certain caliphs, regional scholarly preferences, or theological alignments. This selective canonization played a pivotal role in how communities interpreted Islam, laying the groundwork for deeper fractures.
Hence the sects got formed due to the elevation of events of history to sanctity and sacredness. This sanctity ushered in a halo of sacred resulted in formation of sects whose unity seems irreconcilable. Early disputes, such as the succession after the Prophet's passing, were initially political: a group gathered at Saqifah to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr, while others awaited Ali's involvement. Over time, these events were imbued with divine significance, transforming pragmatic choices into eternal truths. The Battle of Jamal, Siffin, and Karbala were no longer mere conflicts but sacred watersheds, their narratives etched into liturgy, poetry, and ritual. What began as disagreements over governance evolved into Sunni and Shia identities, each viewing the other's heroes with suspicion.
Few personalities are controversial and their crimes are evident like the kings of Banu Umayyah starting from Mawiya except for the Umar bin Abdul Aziz (RA). Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, founder of the Umayyad dynasty, challenged Ali's caliphate, leading to the Battle of Siffin where arbitration was demanded, a move some saw as cunning delay tactics. His reign introduced hereditary rule, shifting from elective caliphate to monarchy, and he appointed his son Yazid as successor, flouting consultative traditions. Yazid's forces massacred Husayn and his family at Karbala in 680 CE, an event that Shias commemorate annually as Ashura, symbolizing tyranny's triumph over righteousness. Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, under Abdul Malik, suppressed revolts with ruthless efficiency, his sack of Mecca leaving the Kaaba scarred by catapult fire. Marwan ibn al-Hakam consolidated power through intrigue, his policies favouring Arab supremacy over non-Arabs (mawali). These rulers expanded the empire to Spain and India, yet their methods—torture, nepotism, cursing Ali from pulpits, stained their legacies. In stark contrast, Umar bin Abdul Aziz (RA), the eighth Umayyad caliph, reversed these trends. He abolished the cursing of Ali, redistributed wealth equitably, revoked unjust taxes, and promoted merit over tribalism, earning praise as the "fifth rightly-guided caliph" from both Sunni and Shia scholars. His brief rule (717-720 CE) demonstrated that reform was possible even within a flawed dynasty.
The tussle between the contesting narratives of Caliphate and Imamate also resulted in unsurmountable divide that was later solidified by the different compilations of hadith books by both Shia and Sunnis. Sunnis uphold the Rashidun caliphs—Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali—as exemplars chosen by consensus, their leadership a model of shura (consultation). Shias, emphasizing divine designation, point to events like Ghadir Khumm where the Prophet declared Ali as mawla (master), interpreting it as appointment to Imamate, a spiritual and political authority passed infallibly through his progeny. This divergence manifested early: at Ali's caliphate, opposition from Aisha (RA) and Muawiya led to civil strife; post-Karbala, Imams like Zayn al-Abidin preserved the lineage amid persecution. By the 9th-10th centuries, Sunni hadith scholars like Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Tirmidhi, Abu Dawood, Nasa'i, and Ibn Majah compiled the Sihah Sitta, prioritizing narrations from the Prophet's companions broadly. Shia counterparts, facing Umayyad and Abbasid hostility, relied on narrators from Ahl al-Bayt, producing Kutub al-Arba'a—Al-Kafi by Kulayni (d. 941), Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih by Saduq (d. 991), Tahdhib al-Ahkam and Al-Istibsar by Tusi (d. 1067). These corpora, while overlapping on core rituals, diverge sharply on leadership, companions' status, and jurisprudence, Sunnis accept most sahaba as just, Shias deem some as treacherous.
To overcome this divide, some scholars came to reject hadith completely and calling themselves as Ahle Quran that were strongly objected by the scholars, who deem Quran and hadith both essential to understand and follow Islam, although Quran is the unifying work, while hadith remains divisive. The Quranist movement, or Ahle Quran, emerged prominently in the 19th-20th centuries, figures like Abdullah Chakralawi in India arguing that the Quran's completeness (6:38, 16:89) negates need for supplementary texts prone to fabrication. They practice prayer solely from Quranic descriptions, rejecting hadith-derived details like exact rak'ah counts. Orthodox ulama, from Deoband to Najaf, condemned this as bid'ah, insisting hadith elucidates Quran—e.g., explaining zakat rates or hajj rites. Yet, even those who call themselves Ahli Hadith, only accept those hadith that support their point of view and discard others that contradict their sectarianism. So those like Ahle Quran, Ahle Hadith too are flawed and biased in their approach. Ahl al-Hadith, a 19th-century reformist strain in India and Arabia, claims to follow hadith literally without taqlid (blind imitation), yet critics note their Salafi leanings favour anti-Shia narrations, sidelining those praising Ali excessively. For example, they uphold Bukhari's reports on Abu Bakr's virtues while questioning Shia-favoured ones. This cherry-picking mirrors Quranists' rejectionism, revealing selective rationality across the spectrum.
Hadith and historical documents have amalgamated with each other. So the heroes of Sunnis are villains of Shias, and the Shia bias against companions of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is very evident from their books and statements. Abu Bakr's caliphate is Sunni gold standard for piety; Shias see it as usurpation delaying Ali's right. Umar's conquests built the empire; some Shia texts portray his policies as harsh toward Fatima's claim. Uthman's nepotism is acknowledged by Sunnis as flaw, but Shias amplify it as corruption. Ali unites somewhat, yet his battles divide sympathies. However, the praise of kings and tyrants like Mawiya, Yazeed, Hajjaj and Marwan by few groups of Sunnis has reinforced the Shia bias that Sunnis are enemies of Ahle Bayt. Certain Salafi or pro-Umayyad fringes glorify Muawiya as a companion and conqueror, Yazid as caliph despite Karbala (dismissing it as political), ignoring massacres at Harra (Medina 683 CE) or Husayn's beheading. This praise, found in some medieval chronicles like al-Tabari selectively interpreted, clashes with hadiths cursing tyrants. This bias has further been reinforced by polemical literature written as rebuttal among both sects by Shias and Sunnis. Shia works like "Al-Muraja'at" by Sharaf al-Din debate Sunni positions aggressively; Sunni tomes like "Minhaj al-Sunnah" by Ibn Taymiyyah vilify Shia Imams as innovators. So the fire of sectarianism is not getting doused even after centuries have passed. From Abbasid-era disputations to modern satellite TV fatwas, rhetoric escalates, turning mosques into battlegrounds over 7th-century grudges.
The sacralization of history has made it impossible for Muslims to unite as we want to resolve the tussle happened centuries ago with today’s logic and unless we do not aim to respect each other’s point of view without issuing Fatwas of being anti Muslim till then we cannot dream of any permanent unity. Today's ummah, 1.9 billion strong, faces colonialism's scars, Zionism, Islamophobia yet internal rifts hobble collective action. Iraq-Syria wars pit sects against each other; Yemen's tragedy mirrors Karbala proxy fights. We project 680 CE onto 2026 geopolitics, fatwa-ing brothers as kaffirs for historical dissent. Imagine if companions resolved Saqifah without sacralising it, mere politics, not theology. Quran warns against division (3:103, 6:159), urging unity on its rope alone.
To elaborate, consider the human psychology at play. History's allure stems from narrative's power; we crave heroes and villains for identity. In Islam, early fitnah (strife) was cautioned against narrating by the Prophet himself— "Leave my caliphs to Allah," akin to hadiths urging silence on companions' disputes. Yet chroniclers like Ibn Ishaq, al-Waqidi amplified tales, blending fact with flair. Umayyads patronized pro-Muawiya scribes; Abbasids favoured anti-Umayyad spins. This historiography sacralised politics: Karbala's elegies became Shia doctrine, Sunni madrasas teach companions' infallibility nearly.
Sectarianism's cost is staggering. Think Ottoman-Safavid wars killing millions over Sunni-Shia lines; colonial divide-and-rule exploiting it, modern Wahhabi-Shia clashes in Pakistan killing thousands yearly. Ahle Quran arose from such fatigue—Ghulam Ahmed Pervez in Pakistan argued hadith fuelled nationalism. Ahl Hadith, via Shah Waliullah's heirs, sought purification but veered literalist, banning Sufi practices as shirk.
Yet hope glimmers. Umar bin Abdul Aziz's model, he consulted scholars across divides, revived Prophetic simplicity. Modern thinkers like Muhammad Iqbal urged transcending taqlid; Allama Tabatabai's Shia-Sunni dialogues emphasized Quran. Saudi-Iran détente hints at realpolitik overriding history. Practically, unity requires desacralizing history: teach it as lessons, not liturgy. Madrasas could prioritize shared fiqh—prayer, fasting over caliphal debates. Inter-sect fatwa councils, like post-9/11 Amman Message, deem each other Muslim. Sunnis honour Husayn's stand sans cursing Yazid, Shias revere Abu Bakr's sacrifices sans usurpation charge. No fatwas for disagreement, Quran allows ijtihad differences (73:1-4). Globally, youth via social media question inherited biases, seeking Quran centric Islam. Permanent unity demands this, historicize history, sanctify only revelation. Else, we remain prisoners, chains forged in 7th-century sands binding 21st-century souls.
Elaborating further, the hadith conundrum merits deep dive. Collectors' measures, jarh wa ta'dil (narrator critique), were scientific for era, yet fabrications via political paymasters infiltrated. Shia chains avoid sahaba suspected of Nasibism (Muawiya partisans); Sunnis scrutinize Rafidism (extreme pro-Ali), resulting in parallel universes. Quran only appeals for its 6000+ verses suffice practice; hadith adds 500,000 variants.
Ibn Hazm's anti-Shia barbs, Allamah Hilli's retorts. Modern Zakir Naik vs. Shia debaters online. Fire undoused because stakes are salvation, your history defines your deen.
cognitive dissonance demands to admit Muawiya's flaws? Although it threatens Sunni edifice. Question Imamate infallibility? It undermines Shia anchor. So the solution is to follow prophetic model, focus on mercy, justice, not dynasties.
The path forward is epistemological humility. All err, but Quran is perfect. Ultimately, it will free the prisoners of historical narratives, as it will shatter narrative chains, embrace Quranic ummah. Unity will not be a dream, and it will be our destiny, if we choose.
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M. H. A. Sikander is Writer-Activist based in Srinagar, Kashmir.
URL: https://newageislam.com/islamic-ideology/are-we-muslims-prisoners-historical-narratives/d/139288
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