By
Alain Gabon
22 August
2020
In his
preface to the English edition of Francois Burgat’s Understanding Political
Islam, author Pascal Menoret tells us the book is “the work of a trespasser. It
sums up the breakthroughs of a French scholar who escaped the snug - and often
smug - Western enclave to research one of the least understood political
movements: Islamic activism.”
Members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood stand trial in Cairo in 2015 (AFP)
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Understanding
Political Islam, initially published in 2016, is also the work of a passeur -
one whose unique, lifelong experiences of travelling, living, working and
conducting research across the Middle East and North Africa region enables
westerners to understand the world through the subjectivity of the “Islamic
Other” (whom Burgat reminds us is not as different from us as we often
fantasise Arabs and other Muslims to be).
We are
reminded that 'Islamism' is by no means the scary, violent, anti-democratic and
dangerous monolith it has for years become in western media and political
discourse
One of the
many benefits of the book is to offer us an analysis of political Islam that is
not tainted or distorted by western prejudices, ideologies, abstractions and
Orientalist fantasies that structure the analyses of other Islamologists.
The depth
of Burgat’s familiarity with these countries, cultures and peoples stands in
sharp contrast to the often abstract or theoretical takes by other
Islamologists.
Burgat’s
Islamic/Islamist “Other” is situated, historicised and humanised, as opposed to
the vilified caricatures we have been served for decades by virtually all
western media and politicians as the new enemy - the “Green Threat” that
replaced the Communist Red Scare after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Written in
elegant prose that is as rich, dense and intelligent as it is clear and
accessible, Understanding Political Islam is part autobiography, part travel
memoir and part scholarship, where Burgat both synthesises and revisits his
prior works on the subject, but also updates them, especially with respect to
the Arab Spring and its aftermath.
A true
page-turner where the warm, charismatic, personable and generous author is
present with us on every page, each chapter takes us on a geographical and
analytical journey to one of the various countries where Burgat has worked or
studied. The book is a synthesis of a lifetime of thinking, researching and
writing on Islamist activism around the world.
Without generalising,
Burgat effortlessly explains both the diversity and the specificity of the
various Islamist movements around the world, France included, as well as their
shared commonalities.
We are
reminded that “Islamism” is by no means the scary, violent, anti-democratic and
dangerous monolith it has for years become in western media and political
discourse, where it is now systematically - and wrongly - associated with
“fundamentalism” and religious “extremism” at best, and more often terroristic
“jihadism”.
In reality,
these groups, movements and parties are often radically different from one
another. The spectrum of political Islam comprises both ultra-violent terrorist
groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), but also Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood under the country’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed
Morsi, and other pacifist parties, such as Tunisia’s Ennahda, which has exerted
a profoundly democratising and pacifying influence on the political life of
that country.
None of
those movements are static or immune to change. Far from it: they usually
evolve over time, often radically, and sometimes in surprising ways.
In the
somewhat simplistic typology of mainstream French media, Francois Burgat has
been cast as “the third man”, usually after the much better-known political
scientists Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy.
While much
has been written on the theoretical rivalry between Kepel’s thesis on the
“radicalisation of Islam” versus Roy’s reverse theory on the “Islamisation of
radicalism” - with other analysts claiming the two are not incompatible, but
complementary - Burgat, the third major figure of French scholarship on Islam
(third in terms of the level of media attention he receives, but second to none
in terms of analytical power) has rejected both.
Instead,
Burgat champions a qualitatively different explanation of Islamism and
jihadism. Its starting point is western imperialism, the legacy of colonialism
and neocolonialism, and the continuing racism and discrimination of European societies.
In France,
the media attention given to Islamologists is primarily determined by whether
they fit within the group-think and dominant narrative about “Islamism” - in
other words, whether they contribute to that “green scare”. Kepel does, while
Burgat does not.
If Kepel
and his many disciples highlight the religious, scriptural-theological and
ideological dimensions of “religious extremism” (including the non-violent
type), and if Roy and others emphasise its psychological and even psychiatric
aspects, Burgat re-contextualises, re-historicises, and above all
re-politicises Islamism and jihadism, without assuming that the former leads
naturally to the latter in “conveyor belt theory” fashion.
For Burgat,
both Kepel, who “ascribes a decisive role to the influence of religious
doctrine on society”, and Roy, who tries to explain Islamism and jihadism
through paradigms such as nihilism, the “death drive” or jihadis as “small-time
crooks”, confuse the symptoms for the causes.
Their
theories are like “trees that hide the political forest” and misleadingly
replace the fundamentally political root causes with religious, ideological,
psychological or psychosocial ones.
It is
crucial that we stop misunderstanding the phenomenon of the rise and spread of
Islamism - so that one day, hopefully, the West can finally develop more
rational, mutually beneficial relations with Islam
By
excluding the colonial and neocolonial political and historical backgrounds of
these phenomena, including western domination of the Muslim “other” through
violence far greater than jihadism itself; and by refusing to take into account
the enormous responsibilities of non-Muslim actors, such as western
governments, and their usually despotic Arab allies in the making of jihadist
violence; such disingenuous explanations are also, for Burgat, complicit with
French or US nationalist and imperialist neoconservatism.
Analytically
and politically, they obfuscate the real drivers, along with the fundamentally
political, reactive and oppositional nature of Islamism and jihadism.
For Burgat,
Islamism and jihadism do not signal a “return of religion” or a “revenge of
God”, but a return to centre stage of the (still-dominated) Global South in the
international geopolitical arena, but also at the domestic level.
Far from
the psychosocial or religious and doctrinal “spasms” described by Kepel, Roy or
Abdelwahab Meddeb in his equally ubiquitous Malady of Islam, Islamism and
jihadism are foremost mass protests by self-conscious political, often
revolutionary actors.
They have
everything to do with “post-colonial suffering, youth identification with the
Palestinian cause, rejection of western intervention in the Middle East, or
exclusion from a racist and Islamophobic France, relations of domination
endured by the Muslim component of the population …and the policies of our
governments.”
Jihadism
thus constitutes a “counter-violence” - a logical outcome of the fact that all
“the most ordinary political conditions for extreme violence have been brought
together”, mostly by western states and Arab regimes.
There is
therefore no need to invoke as root causes a “contamination of Islam”, an
alleged malady of Salafism, or other religious, theological, psychosocial or
even sexual pathologies. With or without those, the toxic political and
geostrategic terrain upon which groups such as al-Qaeda and IS have emerged
remains bound to generate reactions of a similar, sometimes violent nature.
To take an
obvious example, Iraq under US military occupation did not need to get “Islamised”
for armed resistance to inevitably occur. Yet, the ideological function of
abstract theories, such as those of Kepel and Roy, is to deny or “conjure away
the various effects of the persistence of North/South domination, to discredit
the protests of the dominated”, and to maintain the illusion that “their bombs
have nothing to do with ours”.
In sharp
contrast, Burgat has tirelessly repeated politically incorrect truths that no
one wants to hear, including “that the precondition of the long-awaited democratic
transitions is not excluding Islamists from the political sphere. Much less is
it hoping that they disappear. The solution is integrating them in the
political sphere.”
He notes
that the “Islamic reference point” of these movements is in no way “a dogmatic,
intangible dead-end divorced from history or impervious to change”, and that
there will be no end to terrorism until western states and societies recognise
and address their own fundamental responsibilities in the creation of such
Frankenstein monsters as al-Qaeda and IS.
They must
start by ending their “unwavering support for regimes like that of [President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi] in Egypt; for anti-religious elites marginalised in their
own societies; or even for our Israeli ally”. Such indefensible policies, he
notes, serve only to “exacerbate the radical, reactive threat these policies
are precisely supposed to preserve us from”.
Burgat
insists that far more than theoretical disagreements are at stake in the proper
understanding of political Islam. The question is which representation of the
“Muslim Other” will dominate the public sphere, which affects how we relate to
other countries and domestic Muslim populations.
That is why
it is crucial that we stop misunderstanding the phenomenon of the rise and
spread of Islamism - so that one day, hopefully, the West can finally develop
more rational, mutually beneficial relations with Islam and its more than 1.5
billion believers.
So far, it
has been unable to do so. Instead, it has opted for hostility towards, and even
eradication of, anything labelled “Islamist” - a toxic and counterproductive
policy that is not so much due to the alleged “threat to peace and freedom”,
but to the fact that Islamism is a powerful, transnational political movement
that for decades has openly challenged western imperialist and neo-imperialist
hegemony and the sacred cow of “secularism”.
So, what
exactly is “Islamism”? In Burgat’s analysis, and again contrary to group-think,
it “is less the result of an ideology than the production of new political
identities from one’s own ground”. Similarly, the Global South is “a region
whose specificity is less its religion or culture than its position right
outside the West’s bloody borders”.
Islamism
seeks to organise the resistance to both the ongoing western push for hegemony,
and to corrupt, co-opted native and national elites
Islamism is
the adoption of an “Islamic religious lexicon against colonial oppression and
post-colonial modernism”, by which newly independent countries sought to
modernise along European lines.
It signals
a fundamentally political (as opposed to ideological or religious) and
anti-colonialist “turn towards speaking Muslim” - an effort to forge an
“indigenous” and “authentic” social and political vocabulary that would be
imposed neither from the outside by former colonial powers, nor from the inside
by post-independence westernised regimes, nor from above by elites and puppet
regimes serving the West.
Islamism
seeks to organise the resistance to both the ongoing western push for hegemony,
and to corrupt, co-opted native and national elites.
A
fundamentally reactive and oppositional political movement - and furthermore a
major one that Burgat correctly predicted would not disappear, but rather
remain an essential and major part of the political cultures of these countries
- Islamism is essentially a continuation of the long historical fight for
independence from western domination. It is “the extension of the dynamic that
successfully fought for independence”.
Islamism,
in all its variants, is indeed “the new voice of the South” - one that is not
so much produced by “Islam” as by the history suffered by Muslims at the hands
of both foreign colonial states and authoritarian Arab states. In Burgat’s
reading, it historically represents the third stage of decolonisation, pursuing
the anti-imperialist struggle for independence of now-discredited and ossified
nationalist movements, such as Algeria’s National Liberation Front.
In addition
to pursuing political and economic independence, or at least distancing from
the West, Islamism is now also “starting to reconquer, often successfully, the
ideological territory once lost to the North”.
At its
core, and regardless of the various forms it takes - whether admirably
democratic like Ennahda, or violently terroristic like al-Qaeda - Islamism is
the continuation of the South’s long process of self-emancipation from the
North. As such, it threatens western imperialist domination, influence and
control over these countries, peoples and cultures.
It is
therefore not surprising that the West vilifies and seeks to eradicate even the
most perfectly democratic and peaceful expressions of Islamism, given that
they, too, announce the end of the era of unchallenged European and American
hegemony.
----
Dr. Alain Gabon is Associate Professor of French
Studies and Chair of the Department of Foreign Languages & Literatures at
Virginia Wesleyan University in Virginia Beach, USA. He has written and
lectured widely in the US, Europe and beyond on contemporary French culture,
politics, literature and the arts and more recently on Islam and Muslims.
Original
Headline: Why the West seeks to vilify political Islam
Source: The Middle East Eye
URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-west/is-islamism-often-portrayed-threat/d/122702