Affirming Divine Morality While Challenging Rigid Interpretations
By V.A. Mohamad Ashrof, New Age Islam
10 October 2025
Naseer Ahmed’s article, “Are Rules Moral Because God Ordained Them, or Did God Ordain Rules Because They Are Moral?”, offers a vigorous critique of my views on Quranic interpretation, particularly verse 4:34, and accuses me of veering into interpretive relativism.
The article builds a straw man out of my positions, misrepresents my commitment to moral realism, and clings to a narrow hermeneutic that risks diminishing the Quran's timeless depth. Before diving into the specifics, let me be crystal clear on a point of profound agreement—one that forms the philosophical core of Naseer’s conclusion and has always been the foundation of my own theology.
I fully concur that "rules are not moral because God ordains them; God ordains them because they are moral—eternally aligned with human nature, rational insight, and the balance He built into creation." This is my unwavering position. None of my words, in any of my writings, contradict this. In fact, this principle drives my emphasis on ijtihad (reasoned effort) and the Quran's linguistic richness: divine commands resonate with fitrah (innate human disposition mentioned in Q.30:30), not as arbitrary impositions, but as eternal truths that human reason can unpack and apply. My observation that the Quran "transcends mere human psychology" was never a denial of this alignment; it simply highlights that revelation's wisdom isn't limited to current empirical snapshots but perfects Fitrah in ways that may challenge transient cultural norms. We agree on the ends—moral coherence—but diverge sharply on the means: your rigid literalism versus my principled recognition of polysemy.
Naseer’s critique perplexes me because it expends energy attacking positions I don't hold, while overlooking the linguistic and ethical complexities that demand a more nuanced approach. Naseer frame me as abandoning "reason and logic in favour of interpretive relativism," but this is a caricature. I advocate for hermeneutical rigour, not chaos: meanings are constrained by context, co-text, moral objectives (Maqasid Al-Shariah), and the Prophet's Sunnah. Let's dismantle Naseer’s arguments step by step, starting with your interpretation of 4:34, then moving to your misguided assault on polysemy. I'll reiterate polysemy's validity with five fresh Quranic examples, building on the ones I've discussed elsewhere.
The Straw Man at the Heart of Critique
From the outset, Naseer construct a false dichotomy: either one accepts your "logical" reading of verses like 4:34 as fixed and empirically validated, or one slides into relativism where "all meanings are equally valid." This binary ignores the middle ground I occupy—the Quran's own hermeneutic, where verses are muhkam (clear and decisive) in moral principle but allow linguistic flexibility for application across diverse human contexts. Naseer selectively quote me to suggest I divorce divine wisdom from rationality, but that's a misreading. When I say revelation engages "divine wisdom that may not always align with empirical findings," I mean it refines and elevates empirical reality, not contradicts it. Fitrah isn't raw instinct; it's the ideal human nature, and the deen (way of life) perfects it against imperfections like abuse or inequality.
Naseer’s article dedicates paragraphs to defending a moral realism I already embrace, as if I'm the Euthyphro-style divine command theorist. No—I'm with Naseer: God's ordainments are moral because they embody eternal justice, compassion, and balance. The disagreement lies in methodology. Naseer Ahmed rely on secondary sociological data to prop up a literalist reading, while I insist on holistic exegesis that honours Arabic's nuances. This leads us to your handling of 4:34, which is ethically troubling and exegetically flawed.
A Literalist Trap Masquerading as Moral Realism
Verse 4:34, often translated as addressing men's role as Qawwamun (protectors/maintainers) over women and outlining steps for marital discord—admonish, separate beds, then Wa-Idribuhunna (strike them)—has sparked centuries of debate. Naseer defend a literal "strike" as a "symbolic corrective act," bounded by an escalating framework, non-injurious, and aimed at reconciliation. To bolster this, Naseer cite Michael P. Johnson's distinction between Common Couple Violence (CCV)—minor, reciprocal conflicts—and Patriarchal Terrorism (PT)—systematic abuse. This reference studies like Feld and Straus (1990) showing that minor violence de-escalates in most cases, arguing this aligns with the verse's "moral" outcome: stronger marriages.
This approach is punchy in its empiricism but crumbles under scrutiny. First, it's an empirical fallacy: tying divine morality to sociological data makes revelation hostage to revisionist science. Johnson's CCV/PT model, drawn from U.S. datasets, is culturally specific and contested—critics note it overlooks emotional abuse or long-term trauma. What if new research (e.g., post-2020 studies on domestic violence during pandemics) shows even "minor" strikes erode trust? Does 4:34's morality flip? No—divine rules aren't validated by polls or papers; they're inherently moral, as Naseer himself argue. Naseer’s method contradicts this by outsourcing ethics to "empirical findings," reducing the Quran from transcendent guide to behavioural manual.
Naseer’s reliance on Johnson’s CCV is particularly problematic. Johnson's 1995 paper differentiates CCV (situational, gender-symmetric) from PT (control-based, male-dominated), claiming CCV doesn't escalate. But meta-analyses (e.g., Archer 2000) show symmetry is artifactual—women suffer more injury. Empirical validation fails when data evolves; e.g., WHO reports any physical intimacy violence increases depression risk 2-3x. Tying Quran to this is theologically risky—revelation isn't falsifiable by stats.
Moreover, classical tafsir: Ibn Abbas saw "strike" as non-harmful (miswak), but later scholars like Shafi'i limited it. Reformers like Abduh favoured metaphorical. Naseer’s "bounded" view ignores how "symbolic" acts in power-imbalanced societies become coercive. False binary again: non-physical doesn't mean "nothing"—it means wisdom, counselling, space.
On advisory nature: if non-binding, why imperative language? It's guidance with moral force, but ijtihad adapts. Your conditional qawwam ignores verse's universality—roles evolve, morals don't.
Second, your reading strips the verse of its moral weight. The Quran doesn't sanction the "lowest common denominator" of human conflict; it elevates us. Labelling "strike" as "symbolic" and "restorative" is itself a euphemism—Naseer accuse me of "self-congratulation" for alternatives like "separate" or "withdraw," but your softening (a "tap" akin to a Miswak, per classical views) does the same to dodge cruelty. The Prophet (PBUH) never struck a woman, declaring: "The best of you are those best to their wives" (Tirmidhi 3895). His Sunnah is the living Tafsir (exegesis); it points to non-violence as the highest standard. Why defend physicality when arbitration (4:35) follows, emphasizing reconciliation without force?
Third, Naseer create false binaries. He claims replacing "strike" with "nothing" pushes marriages to divorce, but that's not my position. The escalating steps—counsel, emotional distance—are therapeutic, moral processes. Wa-Idribuhunna's polysemy allows "strike out" (as in travel, per other usages) or "cite examples," preserving dignity. His conditional framing—that the verse applies only if the husband is Qawwam—renders it irrelevant in egalitarian societies, limiting its eternity. Yet the Quran speaks universally: its moral trajectory favours kindness (Ma’ruf, 4:19), forbidding harm (La Darar Wa La Dirar). If "strike" tensions with this, hermeneutics demands resolution via Maqasid—justice, mercy—not empirical patches.
Fourth, Naseer’s "non-binding advisory" label neuters the verse. If husbands can divorce arbitrarily, why the meticulous structure? It's a moral directive, capping responses at ethical limits. Historical scholars (e.g., Tabari, Razi) limited or nullified physicality based on Sunnah; modern ones (e.g., Wadud, Engineer) reinterpret for equity. Naseer’s defence risks enabling abusers: in patriarchal contexts, "symbolic" strikes blur into PT. Global data shows physical correction correlates with cycles of violence—contradicting Fitrah's call for tranquillity (Sakinah, Q.30:21).
In sum, Naseer Ahmed’s 4:34 reading is well-intentioned but flawed: it conflates description with prescription, empirics with ethics, and literalism with logic. It overlooks Arabic's complexities, where Idrib means more than "hit" (e.g., "set forth" in parables, 14:24). This segues to polysemy—your biggest misunderstanding.
Challenging Dismissal of Polysemy: Re-Iterating Its Essential Role
Naseer conflate polysemy with "pluralism" or "relativism," accusing me of confusing "multiplicity of human opinion with divinely sanctioned ambiguity." Wrong. Polysemy is a linguistic fact: words carry multiple related meanings, activated by context. It's not indeterminacy—meanings are bounded by grammar, co-text, intertextuality, and maqasid. The Quran, revealed in eloquent Arabic, exploits this for economy and depth. Verse 3:7 distinguishes muhkam (clear) from mutashabih (allegorical/multi-layered); clarity lies in moral principle, not lexical fixation.
In 4:34, polysemy offers moral flexibility: "strike" for ancient contexts, "separate" for modern, preserving harmony.
Nasser’s critique of my Quru' example (2:228)—meaning "menstrual periods" or "purity periods"—admits polysemy but insists on one "logical" fit. That's my point: context decides, enabling ijtihad for moral validity (e.g., confirming non-pregnancy). Denying this flattens the text. Polysemy is Quranic design. Arabic roots branch meanings; denying this is like reading poetry as prose. Naseer’s Quru' concession proves it—why resist elsewhere? Polysemy isn't relativism; it's divine wisdom accommodating human diversity while upholding constants like justice.
To challenge Naseer’s view and re-iterate polysemy, here are five more Quranic examples (beyond Salat, Sawm, Zakat, Jihad, Hijab, Kalalah, Sayyi'at, Yad, Wahy, Zina, Hikma, Ruh, Nur, Daraba, Qawwam, Riba, Jizya, Taqwa, Amanah, Deen, Qadar, Ummah—drawing from the tradition's richness):
1. Fitnah (فتنة): In 8:28, It Means "Trial" Or "Test" (Wealth/Children As Fitnah). In 2:191, "persecution" (expel from fitnah). In 29:10, "temptation" to apostasy. Context shifts from personal ordeal to social oppression to spiritual seduction—all valid, resolved by moral logic: fitnah tests faith, demanding perseverance. Fitnah's polysemy allows nuanced ethics—personal trials build resilience, persecution justifies defence (2:193), temptation warns against shirk. Moral constant: endurance in truth.
2. Dhikr (ذكر): In 2:152, "remembrance of God." In 15:9, the Quran itself ("We sent down the Dhikr"). In 38:8, "admonition" or historical warning. Polysemy allows personal devotion, scriptural reference, or communal lesson—unified by maqasid: guiding humanity to mindfulness. Dhikr's layers—remembrance prevents heedlessness (62:10), Quran as dhikr is protected (15:9), warnings deter sin. Ijtihad selects, aligning with rational insight.
3. Aman (أمن): In 2:125, "Security/Safety" (Mecca As Sanctuary). In 24:55, "peace" from fear. In 106:4, "protection" in trade. Meanings range from physical safety to spiritual tranquillity—context dictates, but all align with Fitrah’s need for security. Aman fosters holistic security—physical (sanctuaries), emotional (faith), societal (justice). In creation's balance, it counters fear with trust.
4. Sabil (سبيل): In 2:154, "Way/Path" (Of God). In 4:94, "journey" or "struggle." In 9:60, "cause" (zakat recipients). Polysemy encompasses literal roads, metaphorical paths, or efforts—resolved by intent, promoting moral navigation. Sabil guides action—path to God (spiritual), journey (physical), cause (social). Polysemy enables comprehensive Deen.
5. Barakah (بركة): In 7:96, "Blessing/Abundance." In 11:48, "increase/growth." In 34:18, "prosperity" in lands. Shifts from divine favour to material plenty to spiritual enrichment—context activates, underscoring God's balanced creation. Barakah's abundance is divine economy—blessing multiplies efforts, growth sustains, prosperity rewards. Context reveals, reason applies.
Toward a Unified Hermeneutic of Compassion and Reason
Naseer, our shared commitment to moral realism—rules moral because inherently so—should bridge us. Naseer’s 4:34 defence, reliant on contested empirics and literalism, risks harm; my polysemy approach preserves dignity, adaptability, and Fitrah. The Quran calls us to reflect (47:24), not rigidify. Let's honour its depth: morally constant, linguistically rich, eternally relevant.
Naseer’s approach risks cultural stasis; mine ensures relevance. Empirical sociology aids, but doesn't dictate—revelation refines it. On fitrah: innate aversion to violence supports non-physical readings. Prophet's example is paramount—never struck, emphasized gentleness. We agree God ordains moral rules; let's interpret accordingly, with humility and reason.
V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence. He is dedicated to creating pathways for meaningful social change and intellectual growth through his scholarship.
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