On Takfīrī Extremism: Part 1 - Intellectual tools required to question Takfīrī Fatawas of South Asian Sectarian Ideologues
By Mohammad Ali, New Age Islam
Main points:
·
This essay
is the first in a series of articles discussing the contents of the book, Masla-e-Takfīr
wa Mutakallimīn: Tarīkh, Tahqīq, Tanqīd aur Tajziyya
·
This essay
highlights the historical and theoretical context of the takfīrī
extremism
·
It also
criticizes some of the views discussed in the book.
Fitna-e-takfīr denotes the
reckless and excessive use of the intellectual device of takfir to
anathematize a Muslim or a group of Muslims by an ‘ālim, a
theologian-jurist. Takfir or anathematization is a tool that can be
weaponized to instigate conflict and violence against non-Muslims as well as
Muslims. In theology, the use of takfir is supposed to protect the faith
from what is deemed to be destructive and dangerous ideas and interpretations
that threaten to distort the true meaning of revelation and undermine its
significance. However, in the medieval period, this theoretical tool was
politicized and used against political and religious adversaries, to justify
various actions ranging from social boycotts to violent conflicts against them.
The politicized version of takfir plays a significant role in conflict
within and beyond Muslim societies today. Therefore, to understand the recent and
ongoing conflict in the name of Islam, one needs to unravel the fundamental
theological assumptions first that have been distorted to justify the social
and political violence. The best way to refute the takfīrīextremism is
to depoliticize the concept of takfir by understanding it in its
theoretical and theological framework. In a series of essays (this one is the
first of them), I would like to discuss the principles of takfir
according to the theologians and explore a new discourse based on theological
tolerance in Islamic tradition.
Several events can be recounted that
have been termed fitna-e-takfīr in Muslim history, beginning with the
emergence of Kharijites in the first century of Islam. They deemed Muslims
other than themselves as kāfir. The same events spiraled again during
the time of Ghazali who had to demarcate the boundaries of kufr and īmān:
what meant to be a Muslim or a kāfir, in one of his seminal works,
Faysal al-TafriqabaynalIslāmwa al-Zandaqa. Despite several warnings of
caution against calling a Muslim a kāfir in Islamic scriptures, a number
of Muslim scholars succumbed to their prejudices and negligence and unleashed
this fitna numerous times. Issuing takfir against fellow Muslims
excessively is a tendency that is caused by convincing himself of the
superiority of his own theological opinions to his adversaries' understanding
of the Islamic scriptures. Ghazali viewed people who act out such tendencies as
heretics. Sherman Jackson, while commenting on Ghazali’s arguments offered in Faysal,
writes,
“Heretics are often just as strident
in their judgments, just as swift in calling for sanctions against their
adversaries, and even more convinced of the superiority of their own
theological views.” (On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam, P.4.)
The recent events of fitna-e-takfīr
originated in colonial India during the early nineteenth century and
proliferated after that in the forms of schools of thought (known as maslak,
pl. masālik): Deobandi, Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith. These groups have
doctrinal differences and on the bases of them accuse each other of blasphemy
or/and innovation. A close look at the works of the leaders of these schools
reveals that they fit in the category of what Ghazali termed as ‘heretics.’ No
serious scholarly attention has been paid to understanding the approaches of
these scholars and unearthing their underlying presuppositions. However,
recently, a scholar, Zeeshan Ahmad Misbahi, felt the need to explore Ghazalian
thoughts on the issue and tried to rekindle the discourse on takfīrī
tendency among ‘ulamā and Muslims today, in his book, Masla-e-TakfīrwaMutakallimīn:
Tarīkh, Tahqīq, Tanqīd aur Tajziyya. He wrote this book in Urdu and
examined the principles of engaging with the issue of takfir in
light of the writings of classical Muslim scholars. Even though he is not
expressive in stating what a reader will get from his book, this book intends
to provide its readers with the intellectual tools that can enable him/her to
judge the demand of a maslak that its followers must declare a Muslim
from another maslak a kāfir.
Due to the importance of the book, I
intend to discuss the contents of Misbahi’s book in a series of essays. It will
benefit those who neither read Urdu nor have access to the technicalities of
this complex subject.
With regard to the issue of takfir,
there have been two traditions in Islam, one is followed by mutakallimīn
(plural for mutakallim, who engages in speculative theology), and the
other is followed by fuqaha, jurists. The latter approach is not as
complex as the former one. I will try to discuss these two approaches later in
detail. Misbahi thinks that mutakallimīn are more cautious in issuing a fatwa
of takfīr than the jurists. Therefore, as the word, mutakallimīn,
in the title of the book suggests, he believes that if the approach of mutakallmīn
is employed sectarian bigotry among the Muslim community can be reduced.
In the introduction to the book,
Misbahi outlines the preliminary characteristics of the current takfīrī
tendencies as well as the concerns that motivated him to write the book. The
foremost reason that has been strengthening the takfīrī culture among
Muslims in South Asia is the existence of the modern maslaks. These maslaks
were established in the colonial period and persist today. As pointed out
earlier, each maslak demands complete obedience to the theology
propounded by its leaders, plus imprecation or anathematization of the people
(Muslims) associated with other maslaks. Misbahi thinks that the
existence of these maslaks feeds into the growth of takfīrīextremism.
How did these maslaks survive and become so powerful? Misbahi responds
to this question by arguing that it became possible due to the absence of a
‘grand leadership,’ meaning a global, or at least, national leadership,
possessing the power to censor the heretic views and prevent them from
spreading.
This instance of lamenting for the
socio-political and religious decline of Muslims because of the absence of a
political and religious authority one finds in Misbahi’s book is not rare among
traditional Islamic scholars. I found one such example in Fazl-e-Rasūl
Badauni’s book, Saif al-Jabbār, a polemic, which he wrote around 1853
against Shah Ismail’s interpretations of Islamic creeds. This argument can hold
some value, but it ignores the historical fact, meaning, such takfīrī
extremism have had emerged during the time of the Muslim caliphate and sultans.
It is also premised on the old assumption that the caliphate or a
religiopolitical authority could protect the Muslim world from disintegration.
I believe that the takfīrī extremism is the result of a simple and
atomistic reading of the religious texts and believing that only one
interpretation can be true. It has also resulted from the blind following of
what has been said in theological matters refusing to allow any fresh inquiry
into the interpretations that have already been propounded by maslak
leaders. For example, Barelvis do not allow fresh thinking into some issues
that are fundamental to their maslak and have been interpreted by
Ahmad Raza Khan. The same is true in other South Asian maslaks as
well. In order to counter ideological extremism, one needs to devise an
intellectual response as did Ghazali in his time. Thinking about the need for a
political authority, whether it is a caliphate or some other form of power,
that could repel the heretical tendencies among Muslim societies can have some
serious repercussions. A political authority can sensor some heretical
claims, but investing such power in it in modern times will be tantamount
to allowing the persecution of intellectual freedom.
Misbahi argues that ‘ulamā in
general have become a part of this takfīrī industry. When he says ‘ulamā
in general, I believe, he is talking about the ‘ulamā who are associated
with a maslak and belong to South Asia or the South Asian diaspora in
the world. Because it would be absurd to believe that all ‘ulamā in the
world have been indoctrinated into this extremism. Many ‘ulamā in other
parts of the world do not condone the practice of anathematizing Muslims
without any valid and explicit proof. Misbahi asserts that the maslakī‘ulamā
are unaware of the harm they are doing to the Muslim community. Their takfīrī
extremism and mutual ideological conflicts are not only obscuring the image of
Islam, but they are also making the lives of Muslims difficult. In the presence
of these maslaks, when everyone is anathematizing the other, Misbahi
argues, it becomes impossible to conceptualize an ummah, a global Muslim
faith community.
…..........
Mohammad Ali has been a madrasa student. He has also
participated in a three years program of the "Madrasa Discourses,” a
program for madrasa graduates initiated by the University of Notre Dame, USA.
Currently, he is a PhD Scholar at the Department of Islamic Studies, Jamia
Millia Islamia, New Delhi. His areas of interest include Muslim intellectual
history, Muslim philosophy, Ilm-al-Kalam, Muslim sectarian conflicts, madrasa
discourses.
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