By Taimoor Ashraf
Mar 7, 2012
A resolution demanding
self- determination for the people of Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province,
tabled by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher in the halls of Capitol Hill, has
stirred frenzy in Pakistan. Alarm bells have started to ring, forcing many to
think whether Uncle Sam is up to his usual antics! An insecure country, which
has had to endure the humiliation of dismemberment in 1971, cannot help but
think whether the US has actual designs of further cutting Pakistan into
pieces. The Foreign Office has dubbed the move as a violation of international
laws. Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon has called it “...the West’s ongoing
movement against the Muslim world”. This is not so. The Americans may have
violated Pakistani sensibilities. However, they are perfectly under the ambit
of international law for discussing the matter. Furthermore, a closer look at
the principle of self-determination is required, since the law as it stands
today does not help either the Baloch separatists or their international
‘friends’.
The law as it has
developed ever since the landmark Lotus Case (1927) PCIJ Ser. A No. 10,
stipulates that every nation-state has the right to legislate on any matter, be
it within its borders or outside. A country under prescriptive jurisdiction of
law may pass legislation on any international event, territory, property,
person, wherever they may be present. This, however, does not mean that the
country, in pursuance of its law(s) may invade and occupy the other country on
the pretext of enforcing its law(s). The same Lotus Case, which empowers a
sovereign state to legislate on matters outside of its territorial boundaries,
also restricts the enforcement of such law outside of its boundaries. “The
first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is
that — failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary — it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state,” read a few
lines from the judgment in the Lotus Case.
Therefore, while the
US and its supreme legislative body is empowered under international law to
discuss, debate, and even pass legislation in favour of demanding the right of
self-determination for the people of Balochistan, it is nonetheless restrained
from invading and occupying Balochistan to enforce any such legislation.
The passing of the UN
General Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories
and Peoples in 1960 developed the principle of self-determination as a legal
right rather then a political philosophy. It is a post-Colonialism, post-World
War II development, which has essentially become one of the most fundamental
principles of customary international law today. The International Court of
Justice in Portugal v Australia 1995 ICJ Rep 90, declared the principle of
self-determination as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law’. Furthermore, in another case, the Court in its advisory
jurisdiction stated that ‘the right of the peoples to self-determination is
today a right erga omnes’ (Palestinian Wall Advisory Opinion 2004 ICJ
Rep para. 88). Therefore, even if Congressman Rohrabacher had not raised the
issue, the principle stood regardless, upholding one of the most fundamental
legal rights. But this is not what makes us fidgety; it’s the fact that the
right of self-determination often leads to independence! Notwithstanding that,
this understanding too needs close scrutiny.
In the Western Sahara
Case 1975 ICJ Rep 12, the Court defined the principle by stating that
self-determination “requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the
peoples concerned”. The judgment naturally begs the question: which ‘peoples’
are entitled to exercise such a right? The jurisprudence on the issue is,
however, still unsettled, and as a result two distinct schools of thought have
emerged.
The traditionalists,
since the principle developed out of the womb of Western colonialism, are of
the view that only those who were/are occupied by a foreign state may exercise
this right. Palestinians and their right to self-determination is one ripe
example. This school of thought does not foresee a distinct ethnic group,
existing within an independent state, exercising the right of
self-determination. If the law develops along these lines in future, it
certainly would help the cause of the Baloch separatists and their
international advocates. Nevertheless, there is another school of thought.
The opposite view is
that any ethnic group, living either under a colonial power or in an
independent state, may exercise this legal right. The EC Arbitration Commission
on Yugoslavia has bolstered their case. The Commission is of the view that
people living in an independent state may exercise this right given that they
achieve the factual prerequisites (e.g. permanent population, defined
territory, government, capacity to enter into legal relations, etc) for
statehood as listed in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States
1933. This essentially implies secession. However, to assuage the fears of
federal states, the Commission has made “factual independence” a prerequisite
to exercising the right of self-determination. The Commission, furthermore,
does not disallow a federal state from preventing secession lawfully (some
would suggest even forcefully). Case Concerning Certain Questions Relating to
Secession of Quebec from Canada 161 DLR (4th) 385 is a relevant case in point.
The Supreme Court of Canada was approached on Quebec’s independence from Canada
and its validity under both Canadian and international law(s). The Court was of
the opinion that a political sub-unit of an independent state does not enjoy
secession as a right under international law. However, the Court emphasised
that the government of the independent state must respect the ethnic group’s
culture, language, etc. In short, for our purposes it is comforting to conclude
that the existing international law does not support the Baloch separatists’
right to independence.
What the resolution
has however done is that it has put the ball back in our court. If the Baloch
have genuine grievances (they certainly do), they must be addressed. The powers
that be simply cannot brush their genuine demands aside by labelling them as
treasonous. Callousness is one luxury we cannot afford in Balochistan, at least
not anymore. The onus is on the political leadership to stand up and be
counted. In a perverse way we should be thankful to those who tabled this
resolution for waking us up from our slumber.
Americans like
Congressman Rohrabacher must not be able to ruffle our feathers but we must
heed the advice of another American who in 1858 had said: “A house divided
against itself cannot stand.”
The writer is an advocate of the high court
Source: The Daily Times, Lahore
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