Bangladesh Crisis in the Mirror of Historical Sociology
By Taj
Hashmi
February 16, 2015
Enough has already been written, discussed and debated
on the ongoing political crisis in Bangladesh, especially with regard to the
usefulness of a meaningful dialogue between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to
resolve the crisis, albeit in the short term. However, all the unsolicited
advice seems to have gone down the Buriganga, which is also as polluted as
Bangladesh politics.
As I have argued through this column, unrestrained
political violence could be a prelude to full-blown terrorism, so has the
International Crisis Group registered similar apprehensions about Bangladesh:
[T]he political crisis is fast approaching the point
of no return and could gravely destabilise Bangladesh unless the sides move
urgently to reduce tensions…. Both parties [AL and BNP] would be best served by
changing course….Violent Islamist factions are already reviving ….While jihadi
forces see both parties as the main hurdle to the establishment of an Islamic
order, the AL and the BNP perceive each other as the main adversary.
AL leaders and senior police and Rab officials in
Bangladesh (the differences between politicians and public servants seem to
have disappeared totally) have publicly stated that the present crisis would be
resolved on the street, not through any dialogue. Senior AL leader Amir Hussain
Amu believes that since the government is in a “strong position,” there is no
need to have any dialogue with the opposition. What other ministers and law
enforcers have already said in public in this regard, better not be reproduced
here. The DIG police of Dhaka Range has not only asked for shooting saboteurs,
but also for “destroying their families”! The irresponsible comments—that
entail “OMG (Oh My God!) Moments”—are abhorrently disturbing.
It's time to appraise the turbulent situation in
Bangladesh in terms of historical sociology. Like Pakistan, Bangladesh came
into being in absolute haste (thanks to the stubbornness of West Pakistani
leaders and military), almost without any plan or preparation on the part of
the would-be founders. The cumulative effects of the unprecedented brutal killing, rape and
torture of tens of thousands of unarmed Bengali civilians by Pakistani troops
and their local collaborators, and the destruction of the administrative,
business, communication, and industrial infrastructure— during the Liberation
War—were simply overpowering for Bangladesh. While thousands of highly educated
and well-trained Bengali civil and military officials were stranded in Pakistan
(up to 1974), the acute shortage of trained manpower in the public and private
sectors in the country further aggravated the situation.
The newly independent country also lacked a powerful
middle class, professionals, teachers and entrepreneurs. Highly ambitious,
corrupt and incompetent political activists and “freedom fighters”—mostly the
pseudo ones, who proliferated after the Liberation—took full advantage of the
situation. Strong patron-client-relationship (prevalent in peasant economies),
nepotism and favouritism soon infected politics, civil administration, and the
nationalised industrial and business sectors. The absence of powerful middle
class—and middle class/urban values—and the proliferation of mass-based rural,
small town culture of the petty/lumpen bourgeois and lumpen proletariat classes
transformed the Bangladesh society into a “Mass Society,” as the late Berkeley
sociologist William Kornhauser (1925-2004) used and elaborated the expression.
During the first decade of independence, the country
went through several rounds of military takeovers, killing of national leaders
and reckless use of political Islam, which simply violated the core principles
of state ideology and literally, the “Spirit of Liberation” (in the academic
and objective sense of the expression). The widening gap between the rich and
the poor, due to the institutionalised corruption through state enterprises,
banks, NGO-business, garment factories, bribery, tax evasion, and extortion has
posed the biggest security threat to the country. On the one hand, people have
become apathetic to politics; and on the other, have accepted corruption as a
way of life. Under-employed and unemployed men have swelled the ranks of “armed
cadres” or political thugs maintained by local patrons, who are again clients
to their patrons at the higher level. The network of the patron-client
hierarchy in the country deserves separate discussions and study.
The “Mass Society” of Bangladesh is more of a
gemeinschaft or rural community than a gesellschaft or urban society, as German
sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) has elaborated the concept. A
gemeinschaft promotes “pre-political” culture of violence, anarchy and
fatalism, where people don't trust and respect each other; they are primarily
factious—only rely on their faction chiefs or patrons—and love to fight members
of rival factions (often their neighbours) on phony issues, rumours, and
conspiracy theories.
No wonder, flimsy issues and problems seem to be more
important than corruption and unaccountability of the ruling elites
(irrespective of which party is in power), and the continued violations of the
Constitution and the state ideology. The unconstitutional removal of
“Secularism” as one of the state-principles without a country-wide referendum;
and the introduction of the bizarre and creepy concept of “state religion”
(Islam as the “state religion”) by the illegitimate government of General
Ershad, may be mentioned in this regard.
As mentioned above, Bangladesh society fits in well
into Kornhauser's “Mass Society”, where “widespread readiness to abandon
constitutional modes of political activity in favour of uncontrolled mass
action” is the norm. Masses are not necessarily working class people, but not
integrated to the state or ruling elites, either. Mass societies emerge in the
wake of revolutionary movements, such as the French and Russian revolutions,
and the fascist/Nazi takeovers of Italy and Germany. Post-revolutionary mass
societies also supplant traditional elites, and are subject to “totalitarian
elite” manipulation at the cost of democracy and pluralism.
Mass societies represent populist views of the
“crowds,” who are “only powerful for destruction;” and defend collective
incompetence of the masses. Mass societies do not evolve out of class
struggles; and are fractured, atomised and bureaucratic. Most importantly, in
mass societies, masses mobilise elites; it is not the other way around.
Sections of intellectuals having soft corner for anti-elitist destructive
crowds promote mass societies. Rapid influx of people in newly developed urban
areas invites mass movements; and sudden rise in the levels of poverty or
prosperity are other contributing factors to mass societies. According to
Kornhauser, a society experiencing youth bulge—when more than half of the
population is in the 18-40 age group—and rise in “religious extremism rather
than political extremism is fully compatible with mass theory.” Followers of
populist mass-based and Islamist parties have more resemblances to members of
mass societies than parties led by slightly more elitist and aristocratic
leaders.
Mostly criminal elements, people with no known source
of income, are the new patrons in the arena of politics. And since winning
elections at any level—local municipalities or the parliament—pays rich
dividends, elections have replaced the share market for investment. The
apathetic and marginalised middle classes hardly take part in elections, either
as voters or as candidates. Thus, half-educated people with dubious character
get elected through manipulation and, literally, buying of votes of urban squatters,
lumpen elements, and rural hoi polloi.
This is, however, not unique to Bangladesh.
Post-colonial states go through cycles of hope, high optimism and euphoria
followed by disappointment and pessimism. Bangladesh's African counterparts
went through similar fluctuating cycles in the 1960s. It is noteworthy that
while post-colonial African states are gradually changing, emerging out of
long-lasting ethno-national conflicts (excepting Mali, Chad, Libya and Nigeria)
of the 1960s-2000s -- Africa is no
longer a place of “forever wars”—unfortunately, Bangladesh is fast going the
“Africa way,” as it was till the recent past. However, the process is still
reversible. Leaders at every level of society must act now.
Taj Hashmi teaches security studies at Austin Peay State University.
Sage has recently published his latest book, Global Jihad and America: The
Hundred-Year War Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-crisis-in-the-mirror-of-historical-sociology-64978
URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-politics/bangladesh-crisis-mirror-historical-sociology/d/101572