New Game on West Asian Chessboard
By Chinmaya
R. Gharekhan
February
20, 2012
For India,
whose stakes are high not just in Syria but the entire region, the time has
come to demonstrate a new form of non-alignment, between Saudi Arabia and Iran
In an
article published in The Hindu titled “Syria, slow descent into chaos,”
(November 19, 2011), I wrote about the danger of Syria being slowly engulfed in
a civil war. By now, the civil war is well set.
Two facts
are evident in the situation in Syria. The “international community” is
determined to topple Bashar Al Assad's regime, and there is heavy and
undisguised involvement of external forces, with active encouragement and
assistance including financing and arming of anti-regime elements. There are reports
of Libyan fighters having been brought to join the dissidents in Syria. The Al
Assad regime — the father and the son — has been a thorn in the side of some
countries, especially Israel — and hence America — because of its alliance with
Iran and resultant backing of the Hezbollah, its alleged role in the
assassination of pro-West Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri in 2005, its
initial alleged support of the Baathists in Iraq, as well as its continuing
alliance with Russia. (Did the Cold War never really end or has it revived?)
Saudi Arabia, which has never been comfortable with Syria because of its
tendency to follow an “independent” line, was particularly upset with Bashar
following the murder of Hariri, who was a protégé of the Saudi ruling family.
Given Saudi domination in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), it is logical for
this group also to be opposed to Syria.
The
Turkey factor
When the
United States, major European countries and nearly all Arab states, the largest
repositories of crude oil, combine against him, what chance does Bashar have?
How long can he hold out? The Russians and Chinese can perhaps help in
preventing sanctions being imposed on Syria in the Security Council, and Russia
can give Assad more weapons because they have their own interests in the Middle
East, not least being the Syrian port of Tartous on the Mediterranean. But once
the dissidents in Syria manage to seize control over some territory anywhere in
the country, the external involvement will become decisive in tilting the
scales against Bashar, as happened in Libya. In addition to acquiring a
foothold in some parts of Syria, the opposition would also need to put together
a coalition of their own so that foreign aid can be channelled to them — again
on the lines of what happened in Libya. Once the objective of getting rid of
the regime is achieved, the opposition can go back to squabbling among
themselves, once again like in Libya.
What we are
witnessing in relation to Syria is a manifestation of the great game in the
Middle East, namely the Shia-Sunni hostility which translates largely into
Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, but in some respects it transcends that. Turkey, for
example, cannot be on the side of Saudi Arabia in so far as the competition for
dominance in the region is concerned because Turkey has its own ambitions in
this regard. Turkey has joined — in fact it is the major regional power in the
anti-Assad coalition — because of several reasons, the anti-Shia campaign, the
Syrian support for PKK, the banned Kurdish party in Turkey and Syria's lack of
gratitude for Turkey's good offices for hosting the negotiations with Israel.
It may be
recalled that a few years ago, the U.S. had encouraged the formation of a
coalition of moderate Sunni states in confrontation with Iran. There are
reports of the Sunnis in Iraq readying themselves to go to the aid of their
fellow Sunnis in Syria. Al-Qaeda is waiting in the wings to acquire one more
base in the region which ought to give considerable discomfort to the monarchy
in Jordan.
Support
for Assad
There are a
few factors working for Bashar Al Assad also. He continues to enjoy popular
support in the country. Forty per cent of Syria's population consists of
minorities of different kinds, all of whom are united in not wanting a hard-line
Sunni establishment taking over power in the country. The army, which is
largely Sunni though the officer corps consists mainly of Alawites, is by and
large, still loyal to the regime. The number of defectors is most likely
exaggerated in the western media. And then there is diplomatic and limited
military support from Russia. He can also count on the strong support of Iran
which itself has a huge stake in Bashar's survival, but it is not clear how
helpful Iran's support means in practical terms. He can also perhaps enlist the
Hezbollah on his side to make life a bit difficult for Israel, but the same may
not be true of Hamas whose leadership is making its own calculations on the
advisability of continuing to put all its eggs in the Assad basket. Bashar also
presumably continues to have enough leverage to destabilise Lebanon, and not
only through the Hezbollah. On the whole, however, the odds are stacked against
Bashar. His capacity to fight the combined onslaught is not unlimited; his
finances are dwindling just as those of his opponents are increasing and will
increase even more, and his diplomatic supporters might not stand by his side
for too long depending on what other pieces come into play on the international
chess board,
One more
fact is certain. Bashar Al Assad is not going to give up, because the stake for
him is nothing short of his life. Bashar could hold out for much longer than
expected. Once again the analogy of Libya comes to mind. This means prolonged
civil conflict which will take the lives of thousands. That region is not
unfamiliar to civil war, Lebanon having endured 14 years of a bloodbath among
its various confessions. If he concludes that the army will always remain with
him, he will decide to fight it out, but that cannot last too long because of
diminishing coffers, etc. Will he then seek refuge abroad?
Russia's
last ditch effort to bring all Syrians parties together around a negotiating
table reminds one of the desperate attempt to stall the first Gulf War in 1991
when Primakov, a former Prime Minister and the best Soviet expert on Arab
affairs and a friend of Saddam, tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Saddam
Hussein to make some compromise gesture. The present effort also is not likely
to succeed, first because the opposition is divided and second because the
opposition has much more to gain by not cooperating with Russia and remaining
on the side of the U.S. and the rich Gulf states. What can Russia offer to the
dissidents? The other side can offer a great deal. Further, Bashar has made it
difficult for those who might wish to help him for their own reasons by failing
to carry out reforms which he has had ample time to implement since succeeding
his father a decade ago. Since the principal though indirect target of the
anti-Assad movement is Iran, there is almost no chance of the Russian effort
succeeding. Similarly, the difficulty with the Arab League idea of a U.N.
peacekeeping operation is that it presupposes existence of peace or ceasefire
which peacekeepers can keep or maintain. However unpalatable and deplorable,
there may be no alternative to the civil conflict playing itself out until the
bitter end.
The Arab
Spring
The brief
history of the phenomenon which goes by the dubious name of “Arab Spring” has
established a clear trend. Every successive country involved in this
development has witnessed increasing levels of violence. Tunisia's was the
least violent revolution. Egypt has suffered many more casualties than Tunisia.
In Libya, hundreds and possibly thousands have died, in Yemen even more. The
Syrian revolution, if it can be called that, has cost thousands of lives on
both sides — it is essential to emphasise this point, the number of dead on the
government side is not much smaller than on the opposition side — and will surely
claim thousands more.
Muslim
Brotherhood is the only party, besides the official Ba'ath party, with a
reasonable base in Syria and will almost certainly be the largest beneficiary
should the Assad government fall at some time. It is reported to be receiving
large-scale help from some affluent Sunni governments. This ought to be a cause
for concern for Israel, Jordan, Iraq and the West in general. However, for
Israel, the highest priority is to isolate and weaken Iran; Muslim Brotherhood
and the Salafists can be dealt with later. It should be stated that Israel has
every justification for its total hostility towards Iran, given some of the
anti-Israeli statements of its leadership.
For India,
the stakes are high, not so much in Syria by itself but in the whole region,
especially the sub-region of the Gulf. As was mentioned by this writer in an
article entitled: “The new great game” (The Hindu, April 28, 2011), India might
have to practise a new form of non-alignment or dual alignment between Saudi
Arabia and Iran. The time for this has come. Continued instability in Syria
might make the region unstable, affecting the production and export of oil,
and, most importantly, the situation of the six-million Indian diaspora working
in the region. India's vote in favour of the resolution which was vetoed by
Russia and China on February 4 should not be seen as “no longer sitting on the
fence”; rather, it was, one likes to think, a demonstration of our readiness to
adapt our positions to changed circumstances. Consistency is not a virtue in
international relations. It is quite possible that future challenges might
produce yet different responses.
The writer
served as India's special envoy for the Middle East and is a former U.N. Under
Secretary General.
Source: The Hindu, New Delhi