Muslim Dilemma in Independent India - Concluding Part

By Naresh Chandra Saxena, New Age Islam

 

One RSS Leader Once Told Me That When They Go To The Villages To Seek Votes, They Always Carry A Video With Them. I Asked, 'Mohan Bhagwat’s?'' He Said, 'No, Owaisi's, In Which He Says He Will Never Chant Bharat Mata Ki Jai Even If A Knife Is Put At His Throat.’ He Added, 'Hindus Then Forget Their Economic Woes and Rush To The Booth To Vote For Us'.

Muslim Demands of Reservation Are Couched in Such a Language Which Invokes Opposition and Suspicion in The Hindu Mind. The Minority Weakens Its Position by Advertising All the Time Its Character as A Minority. Focus On Distributive Justice Invites Hostility from The Majority Community

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Muslim Political Leaders, Or BJP's 'B Team'?

For the last more than 100 years, Muslim political leaders have been demanding an adequate share for Muslims in political power. However, the Indian Constitution does not recognise religion as a category for affirmative action. For this reason, even the Sachar Committee did not recommend formal reservation for minorities. Muslim leadership has been harbouring under the notion that the economic wellbeing of the community is dependent on its achieving due share in political power. Unfortunately, the geographical dispersal of Muslim population renders it impossible for them to convert their cultural identity into a political pressure group. An objective analysis will perhaps show that the Muslim problems (except violence) are not so much the cause of the disturbed Muslim mind as the consequence of that disturbance which is the result of lack of political participation on the terms of their liking (Saxena, 1977).

In a modern society, social and economic power of a group, such as Paarsees and Marwaris, can be quite independent of its numerical strength or political clout. Muslim leadership tends to judge the Indian socio-political scene as a zero-sum game in which gains to Muslim community is perceived to take place only when there is a corresponding loss to the majority community. Muslim demands of reservation are couched in such a language which invokes opposition and suspicion in the Hindu mind. The minority weakens its position by advertising all the time its character as a minority. Focus on distributive justice invites hostility from the majority community.

Leaving aside the Kashmir valley and Lakshadweep, there were only two districts in India in 1971 which had a Muslim majority, Malappuram in Kerala and Murshidabad in West Bengal. Though the number has now increased to 11, due to bifurcation of these districts, migration from Bangladesh and higher fertility rates amongst Muslims, in rest of the 600 and odd districts a Muslim candidate for Lok Sabha has to seek Hindu votes too, and thus cannot afford to be perceived as 'communal'. It is interesting to note that though throughout the period 1967 to 1980 the Muslim community, especially in the north, was highly aggrieved over the issue of loss of the minority character of AMU, none of the Muslim MPs from UP and Bihar dared to raise this issue in the Lok Sabha for fear of losing their Hindu support in the constituency.

It is not just a coincidence that the Muslim majority constituencies of Rampur, Hyderabad, and Kishenganj elected MPs like Azam Khan, Asaduddin Owaisi and Syed Shahabuddin, all known for their extreme popularity among the Muslim masses and equally abhorred by the majority community. Of these Syed Shahabuddin can as well be described as the originator to the brand of identity politics in free India (Ahmed, 2020). He demanded reservation for Muslims both in government and legislative bodies (Ahmed, 2009). He was the tallest Muslim leader post-Independence and his aggressive campaign on Shah Bano and Salman Rushdie forced Rajiv Gandhi first to surrender to his demands, but then he was forced to open the gates of the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi to pacify the Hindu Right, leading to a massive upsurge in BJP's popularity.

One RSS leader once told me that when they go to the villages to seek votes, they always carry a video with them. I asked, 'Mohan Bhagwat’s?'' He said, 'No, Owaisi's, in which he says he will never chant Bharat Mata ki Jai even if a knife is put at his throat.’ He added, 'Hindus then forget their economic woes and rush to the booth to vote for us'.

Muslim politicians have been trying to convince their voters that minorities can become kingmakers if they know how to use their voting strength for political bargaining. To most Muslims, a political party like AIMIM is a legitimate expression of their aspirations, although it survives by increasing a sense of grievance among Muslims and keeps animosity and hatred alive. This has immense social and economic costs in terms of riots and increased discrimination in housing and private jobs. Communal solidarity and communal violence are thus two sides of the same coin. Nissan Syed's observations (2020) are worth quoting, 'Since independence, Muslim communal leadership has been the bane of Indian Muslims. The Muslim predicament is as much a product of obscurantist Muslim leadership as that of the communal politics and bigotry of Hindutva forces. If Indian Muslims organise themselves politically on religious lines, that would only strengthen the majoritarian narrative.'

Mr. Bahuguna, ex-Chief Minister of UP, who was considered to be very close to the Muslim community, in a one-to-one chat with me in 1974 (I was DM Aligarh then) quipped, 'Hindustan Ka Musalman Ek Dedh Taang Ka Admi Hai, Yeh KabhieSeedha Nahin Chal Sakta' (Indian Muslim is a one and a half-legged animal, he can never walk straight).

In colonial India Muslims passionately supported two movements, Khilafat and partition; the former amounted to supporting Turkish imperialism over Arab nationalism while fighting British imperialism at home; and the latter resulted in losing whatever safeguards such as proportional representation that they would have enjoyed in undivided India. The community also got virulently mobilised on the Shah Bano issue, and its negative impact on them has already been discussed.

Though the Shaheen Bagh movement on the CAA issue, which validates religion-based discrimination, reflected the deep, legitimate, and widespread anxiety of the whole Muslim community and was backed by a significant section of non-Muslim intelligentsia too, it was exploited by the BJP to whip up hatred against Muslims and might have helped them electorally.

Muslim Religious Leadership

After Independence, religious leaders and Islamist organisations have had a great influence over Indian Muslims. The Muslim Ulema have practiced a politics of ‘religious difference’ , preoccupied with tokens and empty symbolism. They have been more concerned with the cultivation of Muslims' socio-religious particularism than with their economic uplifting (Jaffrelot and Gayer, 2012). A simple matter of alimony for Shah Bano was projected as an existential threat to the religious and cultural rights of Muslims. It suits them if the Muslim masses suffer from a sense of permanent injury, it will keep their leadership intact. Maulana Abdul Hasan Nadvi, president of the AllIndia Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), described the preservation of the Sharia as 'the most important problem for the Muslims of India'. According to Ali (2019), the Muslim Ulema have not only proved themselves consistently useless in safeguarding the Constitutional rights of the community, but     they have also been complicit in the erosion of these rights. The promotion of religiosity caused havoc for the community, as the religious leadership had no     understanding of how to manoeuvre the community towards prosperity and development. 'The ulema have tried to further their interests, to the detriment of the larger community' (Rahman 2020).  A perceptible and growing shift of the community from Sufi Islam to Salafi or Wahhabi Islam also makes them suspect.

M.R.A. Baig, who was in the Indian Foreign Service traces (1974) the roots of Muslim   stagnation to general orthodoxy which is perpetuated upon the Muslim community because of the hold of religion over them. According to him, 'as a community we are   imprisoned, mentally and morally, within a completely static religious system' (p. 101). Islam preaches submission to authority rather than a critical examination of ideas and institutions. Baig is, therefore, convinced that unless social reform takes place within the community, Muslims will continue to suffer from communal and social degeneration, economic stagnation, and educational backwardness. He is   optimistic that 'Islam not only should but can be reformed' (p. vii).

Reformers such as Hamid Dalwai who had the 'potential to take their community out     of a medievalist ghetto into a full engagement with the modern world' (Guha 2018) were unfortunately unpopular with the Muslim masses. Asghar Ali Engineer and JS Bandukwala who suggested internal reforms were expelled from the community. Maxime Rodinson (1974) in his book ‘Islam and Capitalism’ argues that as an ideology for socio-economic upliftment, Islam is impracticable. Therefore, if a Muslim society   wishes to progress it will have to undergo a profound transformation where old interpretations of Islam will give way to a synthesis of religious and humanist values from which both economy and society will benefit.

[1]OnestatementoftheKhilafatleaderMohammedAlisaysitall,'HoweverpureMr.Gandhi’scharacter maybe,hemustappeartomefromthepointofreligioninferiortoanyMusalman,eventhoughhebe without character'. When questioned later if he really meant it, he reiterated 'Yes, according to myreligion and creed, I do hold an adulterous and a fallen Mussalman to be better than Mr. Gandhi.'(Ambedkar1941)

[1] Sufi Islam has been Indian Muslims' greatest asset, which is now being given up by them. ArshadMadani,aninfluentialDeobandischolarandleaderofJamiatUlema-e-Hind,rejectedSufismandsaid,'SufismisnosectofIslam.ItisnotfoundintheQuranorHadith.SowhatisSufisminitself?Thisisa thingforthosewhodon'tknowQuranand Hadith.'https://indiahome/indianews/article-3501764/Jamiat-chief-Madani-claims-Sufism-brands-World-Sufi-Forum-NDA-bid-divide-Muslims.html

 

These negative judgements have been challenged by several other perceptive scholars of Islam, nevertheless, it is a common observation that Muslim children coming from similar socio-economic backgrounds do rather poorly in schools and colleges as compared to non-Muslims. The fact that they have remained behind other   communities in almost all countries of the world also cannot be a matter of sheer coincidence. This includes even countries where they are in a majority, such as Malaysia, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Egypt.

The condition of the Muslims in countries where they are in a minority is worse. Examples may be given of Thailand, Singapore, Mauritius, Philippines, Russia, and Sri   Lanka where Muslims have done very poorly in modern professions. In India too, it may be recalled that the Muslims remained rulers for about 700 years before the advent of the British. Except for about 60 years from 1820 to 1880 the British policy   was also in their favour.

Individual equality has been guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. How is it that despite having been the rulers, then favoured by the British, and now enjoying equality of opportunity by the Indian Government, Muslims are today far behind non- Muslims? The migration of the elite to Pakistan alone does not explain why their representation in higher education and Government jobs should be poor in the southern states from where little migration took place, and where they are less poor     than the rest.

What Needs to Be Done?

To sum up, the primary responsibility of providing security and a discrimination-free environment to Muslims as individuals lies with the administration, but what can government do if general public prefers 'Sharma Tailors', and ignores 'Habib Tailors'? Most Muslims are self-employed, and their livelihoods are adversely affected due to the rising Hindu bias. Therefore, Muslim leaders too should dispassionately analyse why the Hindus hate them and are easily swayed by the RSS and Bajrang Dal propaganda against them.

As long as bias continues in the Hindu mind, even a 'secular' government would be inhibited in initiating a policy that would be perceived as pro-Muslim. In 2013 the National Advisory Council (NAC) that was set up by the Congress government recommended a new Communal Violence Bill that would have provided adequate protection to religious minorities when communal violence broke out. On a TV debate in 2013, while I strongly defended the Bill, Rajiv Pratap Rudy from the BJP opposed it. After the debate, while having tea, Mr. Rudy requested me, 'Saxena Sahab, we will be very happy if you get this Bill passed. We will sweep the Hindu votes in our favour and win the elections on this plank itself'. The Congress government rejected the NAC's recommendation fearing a Hindu backlash.

  Except perhaps Sudan. Bangladesh though poorer than India has done quite well on social indicators, primarily due to its vibrant civil society and close supervision over development programmes by the external donors.

  In a study of Malaysian society, Parkinson (1967) has argued that the Malays retardation is due to their resisting change and being fatalistic in their approach to life.

 Despite adequate job reservation, the Muslim elite in UP even during the colonial period did not show   much interest in higher education, as best described in Akbar Allahabadi's spoof, 'Kaha majnu se laila         ki….. '

The Muslim ambition of getting declared as a protected minority (akin to the scheduled castes) has boomeranged. It has further alienated them from the majority community and has brought to power a political party that is extremely hostile to them due to ideological and electoral considerations. The path of agitational politics, so effective in a liberal democracy, is not likely to benefit Muslims as long as hatred dominates the Hindu mind. Hindu illiberalism has emerged with a vengeance. BJP's rise has left the community electorally irrelevant (Ali, 2019). After the Ayodhya verdict Syeda Hameed admitted (2020), 'I say with humility to my co-religionists that we have no power, no agency, no spaces left for protest'.

Like other liberals, I too admired the Shaheen Bagh protest that emerged as a non-violent, creative and inspiring movement led by women. One of the most significant aspects of this movement was that women across the country came together to protect the idea of India and to hold the state accountable (Nigam, 2020). However, it was unlikely that the BJP government would have withdrawn the draconian law and Rules on citizenship. It was more likely for the BJP to use the opportunity to further whip up hatred against Muslims. To that extent, long-term gains from the movement are debatable.

To agitate against injustice should be everyone's right. Protest movements empower the marginalised community besides putting pressure on the government. But these also polarise the society and create a kind of us-them feeling.  Some deprived groups such as Dalits (and also women) can easily ignore the cost of polarisation, as benefits from protest far outweigh the cost. Thus, they have gained a great deal in India through agitational politics. Muslim situation is however different in two ways. First, Dalits enjoy Constitutional safeguards in terms of proportional representation in legislatures and administration, which Muslims lost in 1947 due to their own choice of supporting partition. Despite upper -caste Hindus' annoyance to quotas, no political party can dare to even hint at diluting reservations. Second, no political party, not even BJP, can ignore the alienation of Dalits in electoral politics, but on the other hand polarisation and hitting Muslims aggressively is seen by the BJP in their electoral interest. Since BJP does not depend on Muslim votes, it not only ignores their demand but benefits from such agitations, through the consolidation of Hindu votes. This is what I call the Muslim dilemma, as their outburst against injustice consolidates those very forces that oppress them. Our ex-Vice President Hamid Ansari had rightly observed, 'any agitation against discrimination can arouse the very emotions that foster discrimination and is therefore self-defeating' (Noorani, 2004).

Let us not forget that each individual has multiple identities. Muslims should certainly protest as artisans, unemployed youth, or as poor, but not display their religious cards. On the contrary, Muslims in India have started asserting their religious identity. While women displayed their religious fervour by wearing hijabs, men began growing beard and wearing skull caps (Salim, 2017). At the same time, non-communal demands from them are rare. Most weavers in UP are Muslims. In the early 1970s, the price of yarn had shot up, adversely affecting their livelihoods. And yet, in Radiance & Daawat, the so-called Muslim journals, not a single article came out on this issue. These papers remained obsessed with the minority character of AMU, personal law, poor representation in legislatures, etc. In the name of promoting economic growth during the 19th and 20th centuries, mass production through mills was encouraged that threw a large number of Muslim artisans out of employment, it is yet another matter that the then Muslim leadership did not raise their voice at the plight of the artisans.

  The reverse strategy would have been to adopt Hindu names, which Muslim film stars (Dilip Kumar, Madhubala) did in the 1950s to improve their acceptability. It is worth noting that in Thailand and China, the official name of Muslims has to be a native one, and cannot be Islamic.

  Is it because the writers and leaders are Ashrafs, and not concerned with the problems of lower caste Muslims?

If advocacy is on economic issues, such as lack of sanitation in Muslim Bastis, even the BJP government is likely to respond favourably. Religious cleavages have much less legitimacy in India today than those based on language, region, or caste. For instance, improvement in the quality of vocational training schools would certainly benefit Muslims, who are mostly self-employed skilled workers, but one hardly hears such demands from Muslim platforms.

However desirable affirmative action in favour of Muslims may be from the point of view of justice and equity, it is not feasible under the changed circumstances. One must learn to make a distinction between what is desirable and what is feasible, what ought to happen vs what is likely to happen. India under the BJP rule has already become de facto a Hindu nation. All that the Muslims and their sympathisers can do is to prevent its downslide into a Talibani one. When chips are down Muslim strategy should be not how to maximise their gains, but how to minimise their losses. When there are negative returns from protests, the community should introspect what it can do on its own  to improve its lot without inviting the wrath of the majority, and how to promote communal harmony and reduce Hindu bias against them. Any attempt to develop an attitude of total dependence on Government, or agitate for distributive justice, or to place too much emphasis on the difference of their interests from the rest of the population invites hostility which weakens Government initiative, even if the ruling party is 'secular', as these parties too would not risk their popularity if seen as champions of Muslims.

The community suffers from four serious handicaps - Hindu bias, BJP in power, geographical dispersal, and the Indian Constitution which does not recognise religion as a category for group rights. Indian Courts too appear hesitant to strike down unfair laws, such as the CAA and anti-conversion laws recently passed by several BJP states. These states seem to have given informal police powers to the RSS and Bajrang Dal hoodlums to harass and beat up innocent Muslims.

This all leaves little choice for Muslims, except to look within and achieve success on merit. Rather than put pressure on the government which has now become counterproductive, the community must search within and reflect on how it can improve its socio-economic status by pooling its resources, a strategy that would invite admiration rather than animosity from the majority. This needs a new kind of leadership that would kick off a fresh social movement amongst Muslims towards excellence through self-reliance. There have been many such movements amongst the Hindus - Bhramo Samaj in Bengal, Arya Samaj in the north, and Justice Movement & SNDP in the South, and time is ripe now for a similar initiative from the marginalised Muslim community.

Hindu-Muslim unity is certainly desirable for achieving our country's goal towards a cohesive and plural India, but for Muslims, it is a question of life and death. Hence their leaders must ponder in what manner they can contribute to achieving this goal. Hindu parents aspire to send their kids to Christian convent schools, why not to Madrasas? Why not promote English medium Madrasas - at least one in each minority district, and open them to others too? If institutions controlled by Muslims - and this includes Aligarh Muslim University and Jamia Milia - could become world -class, the image of Muslims would certainly improve. The community needs another Sir Syed, not only to increase Muslim share in elite professions but also to improve their image, which would happen if in the next 20 years the best doctors, teachers, and software experts in the country are Muslims. Why should their excellence be confined to music and films only?

Bandukwala suggests, 'What is needed is a total focus on quality education, business and gender respect within Muslim community'. https://www.justicenews.co.in/indian-muslims-have-become-orphans-what-do-we-now-bandukwala/

Muslims have been digging their own grave by allowing themselves to be led by religious and political leaders who promised to get them group privileges. Unfortunately, it remained a mirage, and further deepened Hindu hostility that has been the bane of day-to-day Muslim life. Syed Shahabuddin, the tallest Muslim leader in post-Independence India, shouted effectively against the Indian state’s biased behaviour, but did not direct his energies for internal institutional reforms of the Muslim society. 'This was a great difference from Sir Syed's line of thinking as Sir Syed always emphasized internal reforms and modern education and politics was his later priorities but Shahabuddin Saheb was so much passionate about the politics as if his sole aim was to polarise Indian society and this was the most negative contribution of his political activism in India', observed P. Mohammad (2013) .

Almost 20 years back Naseem Zaidi (2001) reached a similar conclusion:

'Mere repetition of fact/data about the underrepresentation of Muslims in public services, or making it a ground for the demand of reservation quota for Muslims as a community, appears to be a futile exercise and may not solve the problem as has been the case since independence. For correcting the malady, Muslims need a mass movement in which basic thrust should be on the qualitative aspect of education. The movement is to be started from a grassroots level of education.

Is the community showing any signs of such a movement? I wish it did.

It may be worthwhile to recall what Allama Iqbal wrote in Jawab-e-Shikwa, ‘God has not been unjust to the Muslims; they have been unjust to themselves’.

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A career civil servant, Naresh Saxena had worked as Secretary, Planning Commission and Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development in Government of India. On behalf of the Supreme Court, Dr Saxena monitored hunger-based programmes in India from 2001 to 2017. Author of several books and articles, Dr Saxena did his Doctorate in Forestry from the Oxford University in 1992, and was awarded honorary PhD from the University of East Anglia in 2006.

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Part: 1- Muslim Dilemma in Independent India - Part One

URL:  https://newageislam.com/interfaith-dialogue/muslim-dilemma-independent-india-concluding-part/d/131085

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