Progressive Muslims Were Leftists Steeped In Islamic Culture By Way Of Mannerisms and Attire
By
Ghazala Wahab
MAR 06,
2021
In the
years after Independence, especially after the passing of the leaders of the
freedom movement, the contours of Muslim politics changed from secular and
nationalistic to largely parochial and conservative. Diverse types of
leadership then emerged.
One (and
this was the minority) was of ‘progressive’ Muslims, fired with Communist
ideology. According to Congress politician, lawyer, and author Salman Khurshid,
‘The “progressive” Muslims were Communists or Leftists. Though steeped in
Islamic culture by way of mannerisms and attire, they were not always
practising Muslims.’ What’s more, they did not see themselves as
representatives of Muslim interests alone. Their politics, though
nationalistic, was aligned with the international Communist movement. A large
number of ‘progressive’ Muslims, especially the litterateurs, identified with
Communist ideology because of its emphasis on social justice. This was because
they found echoes of the Islamic principles of equality and fraternity in the
ideals of Communism. Hence, even though their respective parties may have
viewed them as Muslims, neither they nor their constituents regarded them as
Muslim politicians because they did not conform to what was expected of a
Muslim—as a result, few of them won elections.
Another
type comprised the conformists. For this lot, how their constituents viewed
them mattered greatly because their relevance in politics depended on their
ability to win elections. In their perception, religion was not just a matter
of personal faith, but a qualification for practising politics. Hence, they had
to not only look Muslim but also be more Muslim than others. ‘We have to
conform to the expectations of our constituents,’ admits Khurshid. ‘It helps us
connect with them. Hence, issues like Namaz and Roza become
important because these are the questions politicians like us are asked by our
constituents.’ The dichotomy here is that many of these politicians are
progressive in their outlook but are often forced to take regressive positions.
Instead of inspiring their constituents to become progressive or liberal, they
fuel religious conservatism.
Women
protest at Shaheen Bagh. Photo: PTI
-----
Historically,
Muslims, by and large, from the days of the caliphate onwards have regarded
spiritual and temporal powers as unified. Even in later centuries, when
hereditary dynasties took over the function of governance, the kings maintained
the façade of being guided by divine law. The ulema were part of the court.
When the Mughal Empire fell, the ulema effortlessly moved into the role of
community leaders, as a kind of a bridge between the state and the people.
Subsequently,
when non-religious Muslim politicians emerged in the beginning of the twentieth
century, their focus was the political representation of their class of
Muslims, which was the Shurafa, rather than the uplift of the
downtrodden. To discredit them as representatives of the larger community, the
‘nationalist Muslims’, essentially members of the Indian National Congress,
turned to the ulema, mainly from the Darul Uloom Deoband and its Delhi-based
associated group, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, to steer the Muslim masses towards the
Congress and its politics. Explaining this paradox of supposedly liberal
politicians seeking Muslim support through its least liberal entity, the ulema,
Khurshid says that once the educated class—the AMU crowd and the landed gentry—
drifted towards the Muslim League, thereby according it legitimacy, the
Congress party had to find a new class of grassroots leaders whom the masses
could identify with. In their perception, the ulema had that sort of persuasive
power to steer the masses towards the Congress.
‘There was
no choice but to pick potential leaders from the madrassas,’ says Khurshid. ‘I
had once asked the senior Congress leader Narayan Dutt Tiwari why most of the
Congress leaders were Brahmin. He said that was because Brahmins could mobilize
people at the grassroots level. In a similar manner, the catchment area for
Muslim leadership became the madrassas.’
There was
another reason why the Congress party gravitated towards the ulema of Darul
Uloom Deoband. Between 1913 and 1920, the ulema from Deoband ran an underground
campaign which came to be known as Reshmi Rumaal Tehreek (Silk Scarf
Movement) that sought the support of Afghan and Turkish rulers to overthrow the
British. On the pretext of travelling to Mecca, the Deoband ulema travelled to
Afghanistan and Turkey to garner support. Messages were relayed through silk
handkerchiefs, hence the name. They managed to get some support from both the
Afghans and the Turks. What’s more, they established communication and
collaboration with the Ghadar Party, an underground movement formed by Punjabi
peasants working in the west coast of the United States. Most of them were
former soldiers of the British Indian Army who had migrated to the US after
their military service and worked as labourers in parts of California. The
British eventually caught on after some silk letters were confiscated from
Punjab. The main conspirators, the leading ulema from Deoband, were arrested
and deported to Malta.
Even though
the ulema were trying to wage a jihad against the British, it is not clear what
kind of British-free India they sought—an Islamic India or a multi-religious
and multicultural country. Nevertheless, Reshmi Rumaal Tehreek
established the reputation of the Deoband ulema as nationalists, as opposed to
the Barelvis who had thrown their weight behind the Muslim League. The general
secretary of Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, Maulana Mahmood Madani, says with a measure
of pride, ‘The ulema of Deoband participated in the freedom struggle alongside
Gandhiji.’ In January 2013, President Pranab Mukherjee released a stamp
commemorating the efforts of the ulema involved in the movement.
The ulema
benefitted greatly from this aspect of their historical evolution. So even when
university-educated, professionally-qualified Muslims sought a political
career, they felt compelled to co-opt the ulema. This gave rise to the
perception that to represent Muslims the leader must be, or at least appear to
be, religiously conservative. A Muslim mainstream politician, therefore,
started carrying a twin burden. He (it has rarely been she) would need to
appear to be devout for the benefit of his Muslim constituents and flaunt his
liberal credentials to his party and possible non-Muslim voters, lest he be
considered illiberal or communal. A consequence of this balancing act has been
that Muslim politicians are reluctant to raise issues that genuinely affect the
community and call for changes in government policy or even the accountability
of law-enforcement agencies. For instance, prejudice in government employment,
harassment in the name of security, the blatantly partisan behaviour of state
police forces, and, most importantly, the bogey of terrorism—all of which are
frequently invoked to harass Muslim youth are issues that mainstream Muslim
politicians rarely take up. Instead, they dabble in the same issues that the
ulema do, such as the protection of Islam, Urdu language, Muslim Personal Law
and so on.
***
Interestingly,
a small section of these Muslim conformists has also aligned itself with the
Hindu right wing. The BJP has always had a few token Muslim politicians in its
ranks—these politicians are projected to seem bigger than the influence they
really wield, both within the party and amongst the voters. However, these
representatives of inclusiveness are so powerless that they are unable to
register even a token protest when their fellow right-wing hardliners victimize
Muslims.
Despite the
necessity for minority representation in a democracy, the truth is that Muslim
politicians essentially cannot do much to better the lot of the Muslim masses.
Their position and power within mainstream political parties is limited to
getting a few votes. Their own self-interest, insecurity, and likely inability to
connect with the Muslim masses (because of their repeated failure to deliver)
have rendered most of them irrelevant within their own parties.
This leads
to a few questions. Who do the Muslim politicians represent? What is it that
they do which non-Muslim politicians cannot do? Are there issues that pertain
to Muslims alone, which only a Muslim politician can address, or would a
non-Muslim be more effective in doing so? Why can’t a Muslim politician be
regarded as a regular mainstream politician, shorn of his Islamic identity?
***
Another
kind of Muslim political leader wields influence from behind the scenes. These
strongmen usually belong to organizations that have consolidated influence at
the grassroots level. Leading the pack is the All-India Muslim Personal Law
Board. It came into being, unsurprisingly, to protect Islam which was facing
multifarious threats, both from dissenting Muslims like reformer Hamid Dalwai
as well as non-Muslims.
In March
1970, Dalwai established the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal (Muslim Truth-Seeking
Society) in Pune to work towards reforming Muslim Personal Law. Two years
later, in December 1972, ulema of various hues got together to establish the
AIMPLB to (among other issues):
Take
effective steps to protect the Muslim Personal Law in India and for the
retention, and implementation of the Shariat Act;
Strive for
the annulment of all such laws, passed by or on the anvil in any State
Legislature or Parliament, and such judgments by courts of Law which may
directly or indirectly amount to interference in or run parallel to the Muslim
Personal Law or, in the alternative, to see that the Muslims are exempted from
the ambit of such legislations;
Set up an
‘Action Committee’ as and when needed, for safeguarding the Muslim Personal Law
through which [an] organized countrywide campaign is taken up in order to
implement decisions of the Board;
Constantly
keep watch, through a committee of Ulama and legists, over the state or Central
legislations and Bills; or Rules framed and circulars issued by the government
and semi-government bodies, to see if these, in any manner, affect the Muslim
Personal Law.
Although in
conversation with me, the AIMPLB’s spokesperson, Kamal Farooqui, listed social
reforms as one of the objectives of his organization, the reforms that he spoke
of were similar to the ones pursued by religious sects like Deoband, i.e.
removing extraneous influences from Islam and ridding the Muslims of social
evils like dowry, ostentatious weddings, and un-Islamic rituals. The AIMPLB
came into its own when it spearheaded the campaign against the Supreme Court
verdict in 1985 on Shah Bano’s case. This forced Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s
government to overrule the court, and instead pass the Muslim Women (Protection
of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986.
------
The
above is an extract from the chapter ‘Minority Politics’ in Ghazala Wahab’s new
book Born a Muslim: Some Truths About Islam in India (Aleph Book Company).
Ghazala
Wahab is executive editor of FORCE magazine.
Original
Headline: Minority Politics: Notes on
How Muslims Have Been Political in India
Source: The Wire
URL: https://newageislam.com/books-documents/progressive-muslims-were-leftists-steeped/d/124505