Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa
17 April 2013
Benghazi security chief (and veteran Qadhafi-era security official), whom gunmen killed on 21 November 2012, only days after he ordered his men to restrain outlawed armed groups still operating in the city.116
On 3 December 2012, Naji Hamed, a police officer who led the large anti-militia rally in Benghazi in September, escaped an assassination attempt; his brother-in-law was killed instead.117
Then, on 2 January 2013, gunmen abducted the head of Ben-ghazi’s criminal investigation unit, who was in charge of looking into al-Dreisi’s assassination. Explosions and attacks against police stations and the courthouse have rocked the eastern capital since mid-2012, with a peak of deadly violence in mid-December, when six attacks against police stations occurred within a few days.118 Similarly, in Derna, some 300km east of Benghazi, revenge attacks against former members of the security forces have killed at least 30 people since the end of the war.119
This reality has further crippled police authority in these eastern cities.
C. Impunity Overshadowing the security situation has been the lack of accountability for crimes committed by rebel fighters during and after the 2011 conflict.120Rather than being investigated; those suspected of such acts often are hailed as national heroes. The state’s unwillingness or inability to look into the unlawful killing of prisoners of war throughout 2012 has contributed to the fighters’ feeling of operating above the law.
Although this might be a prudent course of action to avoid an open confrontation between government forces and independent armed groups, it inevitably carries the risks of entrenching lawlessness and becoming a trigger of violence.
The NTC in effect gave legal sanction to impunity in May 2012 when it amnestied those who had committed crimes – including murder and forced displacement – during the uprising.121
The broader impression that action taken in defence of the116 On 10 October 2012, al-Dreisi issued an order to the chiefs of police stations in Benghazi stating:
“To the head of departments and national security stations, you are authorised to use force against all outlaws of armed brigades, those who storm your headquarters in order to release detainees, confiscate your weapons, sabotage equipment or damage vehicles. I will take full responsibility for such decisions as an official”. “Benghazi security directorate chief assassinated”, Libya Herald, 21 November 2012 117 Hamed helped organise the “Save Benghazi” rally that took place on 21 September 2012, in the wake of the attack against the U.S. consulate. See “Save Benghazi organiser narrowly escapes assassination attempt, brother-in-law killed”, Libya Herald, 3 December 2012. Tens of thousands took to the streets to protest not only the assault, but also the continued existence e of rebel militias. Later that night, demonstrators stormed the compounds of three Islamist brigades – 17 February, Ansar al-Sharia and Rafallah al-Sahati – with violent clashes occurring at the latter’s base. 118
Eight were killed in six separate attacks against police stations in Benghazi during that week. 119 Crisis Group interviews, member, Dern a local council, Derna, March 2013 120 In March 2012, a UN commission of inquiry concluded that these forces had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity but that no investigation had been carried out. “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya”, Human Rights Council, 2 March 2012, A/HRC/19/ 68 Likewise, Human Rights Watch blamed armed groups for the extrajudicial killings of Muammar Qadhafi and his son Muatasim, as well as 66 other prisoners captured in Sirte. See “Death of a Dictator: Bloody Vengeance in Sirte”, Human Rights Watch, October 2012. 121
Law 38/2012 on “Special Procedures during the Transitional Period” grants immunity from prosecution to “revolutionaries” for “military, security and civilian acts required by the 17 February Revolution” committed with the “purpose of leading the revolution to victory”. The same law grants legal weight to interrogation reports and other information collected by “revolutionaries”, legitimising the seizure, detention and interrogation of detainees outside a legal framework.
New order is de facto legitimate has emboldened armed groups, many of whom justify ongoing illegal activity as necessary to safeguard the “17 February revolution”. Stories abound: for example, of captors of people who have died under torture who request relatives to sign statements affirming that the deceased were plotting subversive activity;122 and of rival armed groups clashing for control over smuggling activity justifying the violence as part of a search for Qadhafi loyalists.123
An armed group member admitted: “If you listen to the security forces, any crime occurring in the country today is the work of some loyalist or another, or part of an operation to hunt down loyalists [of the former regime]. It is all a big lie”.124 Legal immunity awarded to the fighters, their status as heroes of Libya’s liberation, together with the apparent ability of some of them to extort false statements or confessions, has made it extremely difficult to prosecute thuwwar, even for more recent wrong doings. Although the general prosecutor’s spokesman asserted that the state had detained a number of fighters, this is not necessarily evidence of a firm governmental approach.125
Rather, they appear to have been handed over by their militias or relatives in response to retaliatory threats issued by the victims’ family or tribe.126 Even those fighters who fall into government hands seldom face justice: potential witnesses refuse to testify for fear of retribution; 127 prosecutors are reluctant122 Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, November 2012. 123
Crisis Group interviews, security official and local notable involved in mediation efforts among warring armed groups close to the Tunisian border, January 2013. 124 Crisis Group interview, revolutionary fighter, Tripoli, November 2012 An official concurred: “It is easy to accuse the azlam [loyalists] for these actions, but I don’t really think they are responsible for the acts of which they are accused”. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, September 2012. Belief that former regime officials still are actively seeking to subvert the transition and causing security problems remains widespread. The head of a revolutionary brigade claimed it had intercepted a number of telephone calls proving that exiled Qadahfi loyalists “were actively plotting against the new state” and suggested that former regime elements, rather than Islamist militants, might have master-minded the 11 September 2012 attack against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. Former Prime Minister Abdulrahim al-Keeb, in a press conference the morning after the assault, said, “There is no doubt that Qadhafi loyalists are actively trying to undermine the country’s stability”. Crisis Group observations, joint press conference of Prime Minister Abdulrahim al-Keeb and GNC President Mohamed Magarief, prime minister’s office, Tripoli, 12 September 2012.125
Crisis Group interview, Taha Bara, Tripoli, 18 June 2012.126 By July 2012 approximately twenty members of armed groups had been handed over to state prosecutors in Misrata but, according to local residents, all these thuwwar were delivered by the brigades themselves, keen to avoid clashes with other armed groups, or by the fighters’ families, which wanted to prevent a family feud. A Misratan allegedly tortured by members of a brigade, said, “It is impossible for the police to detain a member of katiba here in Misrata. The police cannot even go out and detain a normal person without the backing of a katiba, so how do you think they are going to do it against a member of a revolutionary group?” Following his own abduction, he filed a report with the local prosecutor but said, “I don’t expect the police to be able to do anything.
But at least I did not stay quiet”. Crisis Group interview, Amin al-Sahli, Misrata, 30 June 2012 Members of local branches of the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission, to whom local residents can reach out to seek redress for past and current grievances, admit to being unable to look into crimes committed after the end of the 2011 war. “If the state cannot provide strong security forces we will not be able to address the crimes that took place after the liberation ... so it is likely that events that took place after the liberation will be the last issues that the Commission will deal with”, said the head of the Sabratha branch. Crisis Group interview, Ali Bashir al-Shibani, Sabratha, 14 January 2013.127
People who witnessed the abduction of an injured Mashasha fighter being transported by ambulance to a Tripoli hospital in June 2012 and subsequently killed illustrate this point. At a checkpoint along the Tripoli airport road, members of a Zintani brigade stopped the ambulance. According to proceed for similar reasons; 128and detaining officers, afraid of being attacked, often release them or hand them over to another armed group. 129In a rare case that reached trial, fellow members of the suspect’s armed group ambushed the judicial police vehicle transporting him to court and set him free.130
An international human rights activist summed up the difficulties in carrying out justice against thuwwar:
Efforts by lawyers and judges to bring to justice revolutionaries alleged to have committed acts of torture and ill-treatment have either been blocked by the office of the general prosecutor, prompted retaliatory violence, like the bombing of the court house in Benghazi, or led to death threats against lawyers, victims and in some cases their families. This has made many lawyers too fearful to bring cases forward, particularly those alleging acts of torture at the hands of the SSC, certain powerful militia groups or military councils.131
Feeling immune, many brigade members openly boast that they are on a quest to hunt down individuals who hunted them in the past. A Derna fighter vowed to kill a former security officer from Tripoli who, years earlier, purportedly had called him “a useless pig from the east” in front of his entire family. “What justice”, he asked, “can the state deliver? At best, a judge might sentence a person to a few years in jail and that is it”.132 He laughed at the suggestion that he might be held accountable for his intended action.
The November 2012 formation of Ali Zeidan’s government and appointment of the new interior minister, Ashur Shwayl – himself a police officer – appear to have reinvigorated official determination to cu rb the armed groups’ authority. Shwayl listed the SSC’s integration into the police force as a priority, stating he no longer would tolerate illegitimate armed groups or condone abductions, kidnappings and storming of homes without a proper warrant from the prosecutor’s office.133
The prime minister echoed this stance in several broadcast addresses.134 Should concrete steps follow, tensions with armed groups are certain to rise; several people with ties to the brigades expressed concern that Shwayl could become a target in what they testimony by the ambulance driver and recorded on film, when the armed men at the checkpoint learned that the injured person was a Mashasha fighter, they forced the driver and another passenger at gunpoint to leave him and drive off. The wounded man was found shot dead the following day. His family brought the case before the military prosecutor, as the relevant brigade fell under the defence ministry’s authority. As of April 2013, however, the two witnesses had refused to pro-vide witness statements, fearing that brigade members would seek revenge. Crisis Group interview, judge familiar with the case, Tripoli, November 2012 128
Crisis Group interview, member of an armed group, Tripoli, November 2012.129 Crisis Group interview, Abdullah Banun, lawyer and head of a Sufi community, Tripoli, 22 No-vember 2013. 130 Crisis Group interview, Salah Abeid Allah, head of Bani Walid’s Court of First Instance, Bani Walid, 24 November 2012. 131Crisis Group interview, Libya representative, OMCT, Tripoli, 13 March 2013 A law criminalising torture and forced disappearances, which the GNC passed on 9 April 2013, arguably could embolden lawyers to take on cases against brigade members. The law imposes a minimum jail sentence of five years for the infliction of mental or physical pain to a detainee and life imprisonment in the event of a detainee’s death. Omar Hemidan, GNC spokesperson, press conference, Tripoli, 8 April 2013. Like all Libyan laws, it is not retroactive and therefore its provisions only apply to future cases. 132
Crisis Group interview, Derna fighter, Tripoli, November 2012.133 Crisis Group interview, adviser to the prime minister’s office, 18 December 2012. See also Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, press conference, Tripoli, 7 January 2012. 134 Ibid; publicly broadcast cabinet session, Tripoli, 10 January 2013.
Described as a de facto “open war” between police and revolutionary brigades. One such Tripoli resident said:
Shwayl is a good guy. He is the only one who has spoken out against the attacks against Benghazi police stations. All the others stayed silent. He is smart, but he has entered a very dangerous game. He and perhaps even some other ministers risk being killed or kidnapped if they continue like this.135
Armed groups continue to detain thousands accused of links to the former regime. Some were released after preliminary investigation, but many are being held without due process and without having seen a judge. Of the roughly 7,000 still in detention, some 3,000 are said to be in facilities officially run by the state.136
The rest remain in makeshift prisons under the control of armed groups, mainly in Tripoli and Mis-rata.137In May 2012, the NTC gave the interior and defence ministries a two-month deadline to refer to proper judicial authorities detainees “against whom there is sufficient evidence attesting that they have committed acts considered crimes under the law or otherwise set them free”.138 However, details were not fleshed out and, so far, it appears that local judicial districts have decided on their own how to proceed, forming screening committees in consultation with local authorities and armed groups.139
Ultimately, the deadline passed without any significant number of releases; only in early August did these committees begin sending an initial group of detainees home. The process ran into serious problems in Misrata; 140 and in a Tripoli prison, 135 Crisis Group interview, Tripoli resident with family ties to the SSC, Tripoli, December 2012. Tellingly, on 31 March 2013, members of an armed group kidnapped and detained Mohamed al-Ghattous, an adviser to the prime minister, as he was driving through the outskirts of Tripoli. He was released after ten days. Reuters, 9 April 2013. 136 Some facilities the justice ministry considers under state control do not necessarily fit that description; in at least one detention centre visited by Crisis Group, only a small wing housing a dozen detainees was managed by the judicial police. The rest of the facility, with 400 detainees, as well as the outer perimeter were under the local SSC force’s authority. Crisis Group observations, Mager prison, Zliten, 20 September 2012.137
As noted above, there is some controversy over numbers. International human rights groups, the UN and some local organisations have called on the state to carry out a screening process in order to try those who committed crimes and set free those against whom there is no evidence. In his briefing to the UN Security Council, Special Representative Tarek Mitri said, “while there has been some progress in the screening and processing of conflict-related detainees, this has remained limited in scope. UNSMIL continues to urge the Libyan authorities to accelerate the screening of these detainees, the release of those against whom there is insufficient evidence, and the transfer of detainees to state-controlled facilities”. “Security Council briefing”, op. cit., 29 January 2013 138
See NTC Law 38/2012, Article 1.139 In Misrata, members of the local city council and of the military and civilian prosecution, as well as representatives of the brigades who guarded the detention facility, formed the screening commit-tees under SSC supervision. They were to determine whether detainees should fall under the military prosecutor’s or general prosecutor’s jurisdiction or be released. After the initial screening, judicial review procedures also differed. In a Tripoli prison, the military prosecution (al-niaba al-askari-ya), reviewed the case of detainees under its jurisdiction, while the criminal investigations unit (al-baath al-jinai) or the unit for the prevention of crime (mukafahat al-jarima) screened those who fell under the general prosecutor’s authority. Crisis Group interviews, international rule of law adviser, Tripoli, 4 December 2012; former detainee, Tripoli, 28 November 2012 140
The SSC released a few dozen people in Zliten and about 100 in Misrata. By late June 2012, the Misrata prosecutor had received several detainee files from the SSC but none from brigades’ con- where a first batch of a dozen detainees had been sent to the criminal investigations unit for screening, only three were let out before the armed group in charge of their detention halted further releases.141
Releases were hindered by three factors: fear that freed detainees would carry out revenge attacks against former jailers, as happened in Misrata; threats by Libyans harbouring grievances toward detainees to kill them upon their release and retaliate against their jailers and screening officials; and objections voiced by some jailers.142
As a result, people familiar with the screening process contend that the small number of actual releases came about due to personal connections with the jailer rather than proper investigations or evidence gathering.143 Problems have been most acute in the case of detainees under the general prosecutor’s jurisdiction. Those screenings took place outside detention facilities, either in prosecutors’ offices or in the offices of various branches of the security forces. This fuelled distrust between jailers – whether judicial police or independent armed groups – and screeners. In contrast, in the case of military prosecutions, interviews occurred inside the facilities themselves, creating what military prosecutors described as “a more positive, trusting atmosphere”.144 trolling detention facilities. Crisis Group interview, Abdellatif Baju, chief prosecutor, Misrata, 31 June 2012 The screening process in Misrata came to an abrupt halt within a few days, when armed groups objected to certain releases, and a jailor allegedly was shot by a released detainee. 141
According to a former detainee in the old Tajura prison – a facility officially under state custody since April 2012 yet where the judicial police consist of a former armed group with only minimal respect for ministerial directives – sixteen detainees were transferred to the criminal investigation unit in early August. Investigators from that unit released three detainees on the spot for lack of evidence. As soon as guards from the detention facility found out, they reasserted custody of the thirteen awaiting review and set out to look for the three who had been let go. Two of the latter fled the country, one was recaptured. According to the former detainee who was released in late October 2012, for the following two months no further screening of the 200 detainees who fell under the general prosecutor’s jurisdiction took place. Screenings slowly resumed in 2013. Crisis Group inter-view, former detainee, Tripoli, 28 November 2012 and 21 March 2013 142
Crisis Group interviews, human rights activists, security officers, Tripoli, Benghazi, August-October 2012. The judicial police on guard in a number of state-controlled facilities often are civilian brigades lacking training in prison management and unwilling to conform to state standards. According to a human rights activist, even state officials have been prevented from visiting certain state-controlled prisons, “because the head of the prison did not want to allow a prosecutor to interview a detainee”. Crisis Group interview, Libya representative, OMCT, Tripoli, 13 March 2013.143 Crisis Group interview, justice ministry official, Tripoli, January 2013. 144
A military prosecutor involved in the screening process at several facilities on the outskirts of Tripoli said, “We worked inside the prison, day after day; the guards got to know us, and that made them trust us. We work independently. Some members of the kataib (armed groups) tried to pres-sure us, but we didn’t care. We managed to free those we concluded were not guilty according to the law. Those who were just fighting and were captured on the front line, we cannot accuse them of anything, and so we released them”. Crisis Group interview, military prosecutor, Tripoli, 23 December 2012 Colonel Rahmouna, chief military prosecutor at the time, confirmed that their screening process was more successful than their civil counterparts’. By the end of August, military prosecutors had received some 1,000 detainee files, which they processed within two months; “many of them are being freed”, he said. Even so, Rahmouna saw limitations, in particular that he had neither capacity nor mandate to compel the brigades to allow the screening. “Many Thuwwar refuse, so we can only screen those in detention facilities whose guards agree to the screening process”. Ibid.
In the old prison of Tajura, five military prosecutors flanked by two military police interviewed some 200 detainees; unlike their civilian counterparts, who were prevented from completing the screening of a similar number, military prosecutors succeeded in releasing more than half. Those deemed by prosecutors to require a trial were transferred to a military facility in the interim.
Crisis Overall, problems surrounding the screening process have added to tensions between armed groups and government authorities whom the thuwwar accuse of seeking to free former regime loyalists and who typically expected the process merely to validate their claims – regardless of whether there was sufficient evidence to war-rant a trial.145
Group interview, former detainee, Tripoli, 28 November 2012; military prosecutor, Tripoli, 23 December 2012 145 Crisis Group interview, SSC commander, Zliten, September 2012. In early 2013 the government appears to have won the support of a few brigades from Misrata that agreed to transfer detainees from the city’s three main makeshift prisons to a former air force base being refurbished as a detention centre. The government also decided to transfer to Misrata some twenty prosecutors in order to expedite the screening process. Whether these measures will succeed has yet to be seen; the transfer is scheduled for late May 2013. Justice ministry decree 219/2013, 18 February 2013.
IV. In Court
With most post-conflict detainees awaiting judicial review and with scant public trust in the judicial system, Libya’s new rulers have been under pressure to show armed groups and the general public that they are moving toward bringing former regime loyalists to justice. After some delays, due largely to chaos in state institutions, including the judiciary, the first trials against Qadhafi-era officials occurred in mid-2012, in either ordinary criminal courts or their military counterparts. The few cases to have reached trial in both types of courts illustrate – in different ways – the challenges the judiciary faces.
In line with its commitment to affect a clean break from the past and ban special courts, the state referred non-military former regime officials in its custody to the ordinary criminal justice system. The decision, hailed as “very courageous” by a human rights activist at the time, appeared promising.146 Defendants were given access to a lawyer;147 proceedings were open to the public; and most sessions were broadcast on state television. Defence witnesses answered questions without apparent coercion, and defendants, seated behind metal bars, were allowed to question them.148
In the newly refurbished high-security facility on the outskirts of Tripoli where detainees were both tried and incarcerated, authorities also provided access to medical facili-ties.149 On several occasions, courts agreed to postpone hearings to allow the defence146 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist Salah al-Marghani, Tripoli, 10 August 2012. He was appointed justice minister in November 2012. 147 Crisis Group observations, public hearings of trials against Qadhafi-era officials in the court-room of the adjoining Correction and Rehabilitation Centre in Tripoli’s Hadba neighbourhood, July-December 2012. According to Libyan law, once a case reaches the trial stage, a defendant is obliged to have a lawyer, private or assigned by the court (Article 161, 1953Code of Criminal Procedure, CCP).
The law also states that, “in any other case other than flagrante delicto, and in the case of haste or fear of evidence loss, investigators may not interrogate any accused or confront him with other accused persons or witnesses except after summoning his lawyer to appear, if any” (Article 106). The lawyer of Abu Zeid Dorda claims that he was not present when prosecutors interrogated his client, but he has had no problem accessing him since the trial started. The reason for the lack of access during the interrogations could be explained by the fact that, despite being a trial in an ordinary court, until December 2012 prosecutors continued to follow procedures of the People’s Courts, which bar the presence of a lawyer during interrogations. However, human rights organisations complained that even after it became obligatory to follow ordinary criminal procedures, authorities had prevented detainees from seeing their lawyers.
Former Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, also incarcerated there, complained to UN officials that he was not given adequate access to his Libyan lawyers. Crisis Group interview, Daw al-Mansuri Aoun, defence attorney representing Abu Zeid Dorda, Tripoli, 29 July 2011; “United Nations visits al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi in prison”, press release, UNSMIL, 28 February 2013; Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, March 2013. 148
Authorities authorised the broadcast of the first hearings, which consisted primarily of the confirmation of charges, but did not authorise broadcast of the subsequent hearings when witness statements were made. Crisis Group observations of the trial against Abd al-Ati al-Obeidi and Muham-mad Zwai, 7 January 2013, when the defence was allowed to question witnesses.149 A doctor and ambulance were stationed outside the courtroom during the trials. The doctor stated that the physical conditions of the detainees in the Correction and Rehabilitation Centre at Hadba in Tripoli, where most high-level former regime officials are kept, are checked daily and that specialists were on call. He dismissed accusations that had circulated in foreign media in June 2012 regarding the alleged torture of former Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, who had been extradited from Tunisia. Similar allegations of torture emerged in February 2013 but were refuted by the government and by UNSMIL, which visited the former premier and asserted that he had “unequivocally” denied allegations of torture.
Crisis Group interview, doctor in charge of medical more time to study the prosecutors’ submissions, a stark contrast to the hurried sentencing of past political tribunals.150The main problem emerging from these prosecutions is that they are too few and – from the perspective of many armed group members – too slow. These complaints feed into the already widespread feeling that the state is unable to carry out justice.
That these delays and referrals might be a healthy sign of commitment to due pro-cess often is ignored.151Similarly, rather than being praised as a positive development ensuring respect for civil liberties, the December 2012 Supreme Court order that criminal courts follow proper procedures often is viewed as evidence of the judiciary’s ongoing collusion in de fence of Qadhafi-era officials.152Many fighters as well as ordinary citizens insist on quick retribution against these officials, even if they were not directly implicated in repressing the uprising, viewing them as guilty for standing by Qadhafi.153 For others, swift justice for political opponents is simply the only type of justice they know.154 Even military courts – which currently enjoy ample jurisdiction over civilians and consequently, according to prosecutors, could handle up to half of the detainees facilities at the prison and court at the Hadba complex, Hisham al-Atri, Tripoli, 26 June 2012; “United Nations visits al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi in prison”, op. cit. 150
The defence attorney for a former regime official said, “that is good. Justice needs time. It can-not be rushed”. Crisis Group interview, Daw al-Mansuri Aoun, Tripoli, 29 July 2012 151 Even ordinary Libyans, with no links to revolutionary armed groups but actively engaged during the uprising against Qadhafi, expressed concern that the delays in the trials undermine trust in the state and urged the government to “do something” in order to “show the people what these close associates of Qadhafi did”. “Some of these people have been imprisoned for almost two years, but we don’t know what is happening to them .... When Qadhafi came to power, he immediately put on trial the members of the previous regime. They were shown on television, and the charges were broadcast for everyone to see; and even later we would often see confessions on television. That served the purpose of showing the public what these men were guilty of. I am not saying that we should do the same now, but you must realise that that is what Libyans are used to, and they are wondering what is happening with these prisoners now. We need to interview them, get them on television, hear about the crimes of the Qadhafi-era so that those who still want the Qadhafis to come back can hear and learn about what they did”. Crisis Group interview, Libyan writer, Tripoli, 22 December 2012.152
See Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, ruling 59/25, 23 December 2012. A café owner with ties to a Tripoli brigade watched state television broadcast footage from the trial of former Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi and said, “I really cannot understand what all these delays are about. Why is it so difficult to reach a verdict for these guys? They supported the regime during the 17 February revolution, and that is in itself a crime. And why are months going by without bringing Saif [Qadhafi’s son] to court? I bet it is just a way to buy time in order to bring them back in the system”. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, 14 January 2013 153According to international justice sector advisers, Misrata prosecutors and members of the city’s committee in charge of screening detainees have urged prosecution of low-ranking support staff serving Qadhafi-era security officials, including drivers, cooks and accountants. Libyans with ties to Misrata detainees likewise claim that their relatives played no role in the violence during the 2011 war. Crisis Group interviews, international justice sector advisers, Tripoli, December 2012; family members of detainees, Tripoli, October and December 2012
A lawyer said, “Some armed groups understand the procedures and the way our justice system works; indeed some of these groups are in charge of state detention centres and have the responsibility of bringing accused Qadhafi-era officials to court. But others just don’t get it. They are convinced that the state is plotting against them when officials say that ordinary criminal trials require time. They are used to thinking that justice is the swift and arbitrary justice they witnessed under Qadhafi”. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, November 2012
awaiting trial – have their share of problems.155 Conceived of as battlefield courts, they lack independence,156 and two of the three judges that compose this type of court are not required to have any legal training.157Although some military prosecutors are aware of international standards governing the trial of enemy combatants (and notably that guilt cannot simply follow from standing by the former regime) and have ordered acquittals on that basis, that is far from the norm. In the absence of quick remedial steps, these tribunals could render the expedited form of justice for which many armed groups call.158 Worrying examples abound, from the questionable conviction of foreigners accused of working for Qadhafi159 to the charges levelled against former NTC chief Mustafa Abdel Jalil.160
155Crisis Group interview, lawyers, military prosecutors, Tripoli, December 2012. 156 According to international legal experts, military courts lack independence from the government because two of the three officers on them fall under the defence minister’s authority, as do military prosecutors. Crisis Group interview, international legal expert, Tripoli, June 2012.157 Crisis Group interview, lawyers, military prosecutors, Tripoli, December 2012. 158A military prosecutor in Tripoli said, “the [International Committee of the] Red Cross gave us training. We know that we cannot consider soldiers guilty of a crime simply because they stood by the regime. In Tripoli, we are releasing these types of people. But what other prosecutors in other cities across the country are doing, I really don’t know”. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, December 2012. Human rights activists from Misrata noted that some prosecutors in that city, which has the highest number of detainees still awaiting trial, are considering trying former combatants for “taking arms against Libya” (Article 165 of the Penal Code, which carries the death penalty). Crisis Group interview, international rule of law adviser, Tripoli, December 2012 Tripoli’s military prosecutor called this “a total misinterpretation and misuse of the law”. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, December 2013 He added: “This article  is intended for those who fought for a foreign country against Libya; but these detained men were actually fighting for Libya, because the Qadhafi regime was – legally speaking – Libya”.159
A June 2012 military trial against a group of nineteen Ukrainians, three Bielorussians and a Russian accused of working as mercenaries for Qadhafi’s regime was concluded in four quick hearings. According to diplomats familiar with the case, proceedings were deeply flawed, and evidence suggesting they were in Libya as oil workers was ignored. Crisis Group observations of military court trial 1/2012, Tripoli mujamma al-mahakim court house, 4 June 2012; Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Tripoli, July 2012. As of April 2013, the group was being held in a makeshift prison run by Liwa Qaaqa, awaiting their appeal scheduled to begin on 1 May. Crisis Group observation, Liwa Qaaqa headquarters, Tripoli, January 2013. A diplomat said, “In the current climate, where military officers are under pressure to demonstrate their allegiance to the revolution and to distance them-selves from the former regime, how can you expect a brigadier to acquit these people?” Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, July 2012.160 In December 2012, a military judge charged Jalil for his alleged responsibility in the July 2011 killing of Abdel Fatah Younis, who had defected in February 2011 and became the rebel forces ‘commander.
Jalil said the proceedings “were totally outside of the law” and accused eastern tribal leaders of forcing the military prosecutor’s hands. Abdel Jalil, on Libya Wataniya radio, 19 December 2012 Benghazi’s military court eventually withdrew its jurisdiction over the case.
V. Creeping Lawlessness
Due to shortcomings in the state’s prosecutorial capacity and legal impunity enjoyed by armed groups, individuals and brigades who emerged victorious after the 2011 war too often consider themselves above the law. As noted, this has translated into kidnappings, revenge killings and attacks against religious minorities, foreign representatives, activists and lawmakers; 161 moreover, several small skirmishes have opposed rival armed groups. For their part, security forces have proved unable, at times even unwilling, to curb these incidents, generating a widespread perception among ordinary citizens of creeping lawlessness.
Speaking in March 2013, a Tripoli resident said, “Under Qadhafi we were afraid of being arrested. Now, we fear being killed”.162 A cycle of violence followed by retaliation has given rise to fears of a dangerous pattern of score settling, often based on little more than presumptions and suppositions. A human rights activist noted: “Even those killed have sons, brothers, cousins, who similarly vow to retaliate against the killer of their lost one”.163 Tellingly, the words “the killer must be killed” (al-qatil yuqtal) have begun to appear, spray-painted, in a number of eastern cities.164
In response, the government has appeared largely unable to intervene, at times lacking the means, at others the authority to act. This impotence extends to the protection of sites belonging to the country’s cultural and historical heritage but that some hard-line religious groups consider idolatrous. After Islamists (or criminals posing as such) ransacked his zawiya(religious school) in the Tripoli medina, a Sufi leader lamented: “[Prime Minister] Zeidan called me to say he was sorry for what had happened. But what am I going to do with his apologies?”165
With no substantial investigations having taken place following any of the attacks against Sufi shrines, these sites continue to be targeted.166 In turn; the erosion of state authority has further emboldened armed groups, some of which appear to be aligned with specific political factions.167
On at least two161 A series of attacks against Sufi mosques and shrines in Misrata, Zliten, Tripoli, Derna and on the outskirts of Benghazi occurred in mid-2012 and have continued sporadically ever since. In October 2012, during the attack on Bani Walid, unidentified assailants demolished a section of the town’s main Sufi shrine and the adjoining school in its entirety. Since late 2012, a number of attacks also have targeted Christians (see above). Aside from the 11 September 2012 assault in Benghazi that killed the U.S. ambassador and three others, violence against foreign targets include shots fired on 12 January 2013 at the Italian consul and occasional attacks against UN and UK embassy vehicles as well as Red Cross offices and staff members.162 Crisis Group interview, Tripoli resident, Tripoli, 14 March 2013. 163
Crisis Group interview, activist, Derna, March 2013.164 Crisis Group observations, graffiti, Derna and Benghazi, March 2013. 165 Crisis Group interviews, Abdullah Banun, former NTC member and Sufi leader, Tripoli, 22 November 2013 Approximately 70 people broke into the religious school, stole books, old manuscripts, some objects and the community’s antique banners. A few days after a member of the Sufi community reported the incident to the local police station, a bomb exploded in his car. According to Banun, a respected lawyer, community members said they recognised the culprit and brought him to the station; the police allegedly transferred him to an SSC-affiliated brigade, which soon released him.166
As recently as 28 March 2013, unknown assailants used grenade launchers to demolish the 500-year-old Sidi Mohamed al-Andalusi shrine in Tajura, on the outskirts of Tripoli. Crisis Group ob-servations, Tajura, 30 March 2013.167 Examples of linkages between politicians and armed groups abound. Othman Mleghta, the head of the Tripoli-based Liwa Qaaqa armed group, is the brother of a leader of Jibril’s National Forces occasions in early March 2013,brigades or armed protesters have taken aim at the GNC itself, raising questions about its ability to function.168
Similar attacks occurred intermittently against the prime minister’s office and the justice ministry.169Some brigades have battled over control of strategic oil terminals or fields in an apparent attempt to grasp the lucrative rights to secure the facilities.170 Taken together, such developments have compounded both domestic and international concerns regard-ing prospects for economic and political normalisation.
Alliance (NFA). Similarly, Anwar Magarief, whose brother is Mohamed Magarief, GNC president and head of the National Front party, leads a brigade based in the eastern city of Ajdabiya but known to be occasionally active in Tripoli. Crisis Group interview, security officer, Benghazi, March 2013.168 On 3 March 2013, members of an armed group officially integrated into the armed forces slipped into the GNC hall and opened fire on security forces, wounding three and damaging the hall. They were reacting to reports that the GNC was planning to remove protesters who had occupied the hall for over a month, demanding financial compensation for wounds suffered during the war. GNC members moved their next session to Tripoli’s Kremia meteorological centre; there another group of protesters, this time demanding that the GNC approve a draft political exclusion law, stormed the hall and pressured legislators to pass the law at gunpoint. After a twelve-hour siege, legislators were allowed to leave, but shots were fired at the vehicle carrying President Mohamed Magarief.
The GNC suspended its activities for a week while legislators considered relocating to another town. Finally, on 13 March, Hasan al-Amin, a member from Misrata who headed the GNC’s human rights committee and had spoken out against illegal detentions, announced his resignation following threats directed against him by armed groups from Misrata. Libya TV channel, 13 March 2013. 169 SSC-affiliated armed men attacked the justice ministry on 31 March 2013 to protest the minister’s intention to close the detention centre in Tripoli’s Mtiga airport, considered an unofficial prison under the authority of the SSC. See Associated Press, 25 March 2013.170 In early March two armed groups, allegedly from Zintan and nearby Zwara, exchanged heavy gunfire around ENI’s Mellitah natural gas complex, 60km west of Tripoli, forcing the operation to close for several days. The Zwara brigade reportedly challenged Zintan’s authority to guard the site. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Tripoli, 22 March 2013
As part of its challenging transition process, Libya will need to break the cycle of violence and lawlessness to which the rebellion and its aftermath, a history of distrust towards the justice sector and present delays in reactivating the courts have all contributed. The perceived disarray of the judiciary has led individuals and armed groups – many of whom needed little encouragement – to step in, round up thou-sands of suspects accused of being pro-Qadhafi loyalists and detain them in total disregard of official procedures. Considering themselves above the law, some brigades and individuals have carried out targeted assassinations and torture, while engaging in criminal activities. This has prompted a pattern of abuse and violence that in turn has fuelled resentment and grievances, further eroding confidence in the state’s ability to deliver justice. Breaking this cycle requires simultaneous efforts on inter-dependent fronts:
Judicial reform and accountability. Victims of Qadhafi-era officials rightfully demand accountability for past crimes and removal from office of perpetrators; armed groups in particular understandably express frustration at the slow pace of this pro-cess and at the unreformed character of a distrusted judiciary, and such frustration at times can assume violent forms. This should serve as impetus to get the judicial system as well as a proper vetting process up and running.
Judicial reform – including, inter alia, amending legislation inherited from the past, building an independent and capable police force and enhancing the capacity of prosecutors – inevitably will take time. Yet, some shorter-term steps can help restore public confidence. A first measure would be to send clear signs that judicial personnel found to be either corrupt or guilty of unlawful behaviour, notably condoning torture, will be dismissed after undergoing a vetting process. This would best be undertaken by an independent committee, rather than through the direct exclusion of judges who manned Qadhafi’s “special” courts, as the draft law on political exclusion presently proposes.
More broadly, Libya needs a comprehensive transitional justice strategy encompassing criminal trials but also appropriate vetting mechanisms and truth commissions. The Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission and its local sub-committees should begin operating alongside the ordinary criminal justice system, tackling both past and ongoing abuses. Alongside these steps, the government should reach out to the general public – suspicious of an apparatus seen as a carry-over from the former regime – and explain features of the justice system and transitional justice approach, highlighting changes carried out since Qadhafi’s fall.
Reining in armed groups. None of this should serve as an excuse for authorities to condone – or turn a blind eye toward – what at times is tantamount to an over-broad, arbitrary punishment of entire communities and broad segments of society or to the seemingly indiscriminate use of force against alleged regime loyalists in disregard of minimal due process. The complacent attitude toward brigades’ treatment of Tawergha and Bani Walid residents is a case in point.
Prime Minister Zeidan’s commitment to disband illegal brigades and his justice minister’s attempts to end arbitrary detentions are welcome steps in this regard. They will have to tread carefully, of course, lest they alienate those well-armed groups that enjoy genuine popular credentials born of their participation in the uprising.
Fighting them has proven dangerous s; likewise, insisting that they integrate the police or army (still considered by many as Qadhafi-era vestiges) or that they immediately hand over detainees to state authorities – particularly in the absence of evidence that security forces and the judiciary have been reformed and can be trusted – would be a high risk exercise. Conversely, agreeing to the integration of armed groups into state bodies without proper screening for crimes could well institutionalise lawlessness.
Ultimately, little of this will mean anything unless a basic sense of security is restored. Members of the judiciary or of various fact-finding committees should be afforded adequate protection. They cannot be expected to risk their lives or well-being in order to hold individuals accountable. In all this, members of the international community can play an important sup-porting role. The UN support mission (UNSMIL) has a mandate to support rule of law and transitional justice; already, it is providing advice on prosecutorial strategies, transitional justice programs and detention policy. It should continue doing so, while enhancing technical assistance to the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Com-mission and its local branches. Numerous states and non-governmental organisations are engaged in efforts to promote the rule of law and disseminate information on transitional justice; this too should be continued, although their work ought to be better coordinated and not circumscribed to Tripoli alone.
There is no quick fix to Libya’s security problems. But taking immediate measures to restore confidence in the judiciary and enhance its capacity to deal with abuses, both past and present, would be a first, significant step forward. Tripoli/Brussels, 17 April 2013
Appendix A: Map of Libya
Based on UN map no. 3787 Rev. 7 (February 2012). The town of Tawergha has been added.
Appendix B: Glossary of Acronyms
CCP Code of Criminal Procedure
GNC General National Congress, Libya’s elected legislature since August 2012 GPC General People’s Congress, Libya’s national legislature from 1977 to 2011 HRW Human Rights Watch ICC International Criminal Court ICPS International Centre for Prison Studies LLFJ Libyan Lawyers for Justice LSF Libya Shield Forces, coalition of armed groups operating under the chief of staff NFA National Force Alliance, political coalition led by Mahmud Jibril NTC National Transitional Council, interim legislative body representing anti-Qadhafi forces from February 2011 to July 2012 OMCT World Organisation Against Torture RCC Revolutionary Command Council, Libya’s governing body from 1969 to 1977
SJC Supreme Judicial Council, managing body of Libya’s judiciary SSC Supreme Security Committee, parallel police force composed mainly of civilian brigades STDS Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, colonial-era special court Thuwwar litt. revolutionary; commonly used word to describe members of civilian armed groups that took part in the 2011 uprising against Qadhafi UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission to Libya Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya Crisis Group Middle East/North AfricaReport N°140, 17 April 2013 Page 43
Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 150 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes Crisis Watch, a twelve-page month-ly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the Interna-tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujumbura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ne-pal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela.
Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, institutional foundations, and private sources. The following governmental departments and agencies have provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for International Development, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development Research Centre, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union Instrument for Stability, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af-fairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Development, U.S.
Agency for International Development.: The following institutional and private foundations have provided funding in recent years: Adessium Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Elders Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Henry Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Oak Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Ploughshares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Stanley Foundation, The Charitable Foundation, Tinker Foundation Incorporated. April 2013
Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on the Middle East and North Africa since 2010
Israel/Palestine Tipping Point? Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy, Middle East Report N°95, 26
April 2010 (also available in Arabic and He-brew) Drums of War: Israel and the “Axis of Resistance” Middle East Report N°97, 2 August 2010 (also available in Hebrew and Arabic). Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation, Middle East Report N°98, 7 September 2010 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew)
Gaza: The Next Israeli-Palestinian War? Middle East Briefing N°30, 24 March 2011 (also available in Hebrew and Arabic).Radical Islam in Gaza, Middle East/North Africa Briefing N°104, 29 March 2011 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew).
Palestinian Reconciliation: Plus Ça Change ..., Middle East Report N°110, 20 July 2011 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew). Curb Your Enthusiasm: Israel and Palestine af-ter the UN, Middle East Report N°112, 12 September 2011 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew). Back to Basics: Israel’s Arab Minority and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East Report N°119, 14 March 2012 (also available in Arabic).
The Emperor Has No Clothes: Palestinians and the End of the Peace Process, Middle East Report N°122, 7 May 2012 (also available in Arabic). Light at the End of their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab Uprisings, Middle East Report N°129, 14 August 201 (also available in Arabic). Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East, Middle East Report N°133, 22 November 2012 (also available in Arabic). Extreme Makeover? (I): Israel’s Politics of Land and Faith in East Jerusalem, Middle East Re-port N°134, 20 December 2012 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew).
Extreme Makeover? (II): The Withering of Arab Jerusalem, Middle East Report N°135, 20 December 2012 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew).
Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current, Middle East Report N°96, 26 May 2010 (also available in Arabic). New Crisis, Old Demons in Lebanon: The For-gotten Lessons of Bab-Tebbaneh/Jabal Mohsen, Middle East Briefing N°29, 14 October 2010 (only available in French and Arabic).
Trial by Fire: The Politics of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Middle East Report N°100, 2 December 2010. Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious?, Middle East/North Africa Report N°101, 24 February 2011 (also available in Arabic). Uncharted Waters: Thinking Through Syria’s Dynamics, Middle East Briefing N°31, 24 November 2011 (also available in Arabic). Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow-motion Revolution, Middle East Report N°108, 6 July 2011 (also available in Arabic).
Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide, Middle East Report N°109, 13 July 2011 (also available in Arabic).
Lebanon’s Palestinian Dilemma:
The Struggle Over Nahr al-Bared, Middle East Report N°117, 1 March 2012 (also available in Arabic).
Now or Never: A Negotiated Transition for Syria, Middle East Briefing N°32, 5 March 2012 (also available in Arabic and Russian). Syria’s Phase of Radicalisation, Middle East Briefing N°33, 10 April 2012 (also available in Arabic) Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt’s SCAF, Middle East/North Africa Re-port N°121, 24 April 2012 (also available in Arabic) Syria’s Mutating Conflict, Middle East Report N°128, 1 August 2012 (also available in Arabic)
Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, Middle East Report N°131, 12 October 2012 (also available in Arabic). A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict, Middle East Report N°132, 22 November 2012 (also available in Arabic). Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, Middle East Report N°136, 22 January 2013 (also available in Arabic).
Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way, Middle East/North Africa Report N°106, 28 April 2011 (also avail-able in French). Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya, Middle East/North Africa Report N°107, 6 June 2011 (also available in Arabic). Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after Qadhafi, Middle East/North Africa
N°115, 14 December 2011 (also available in Arabic) Tunisia: Combating Impunity, Restoring Security, Middle East/North Africa Report N°123, 9 May 2012 (only available in French). Tunisia: Confronting Social and Economic Challenges, Middle East/North Africa Report N°124, 6 June 2012 (only available in French).
Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts, Middle East/North Africa Report N°130, 14 September 2012 (also available in Arabic). Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi challenge, Middle East/North Africa Report N°137, 13 February 2013. Iraq/Iran/Gulf Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond, Middle East Report N°94, 25 February 2010 (also available in Arabic).
Loose Ends: Iraq’s Security Forces between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal, Middle East Report N°99, 26 October 2010 (also available in Arabic). Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (II): Yemen between Reform and Revolution, Middle East Report N°102, 10 March 2011(also available in Arabic). Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears, Middle East Report N°103, 28 March 2011 (also available in Arabic and Kurdish).
Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, Middle East Report N°105, 4 April 2011(also available in Arabic). Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform, Middle East Report N°111, 28 July 2011 (also available in Arabic). Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011 (also available in Arabic) Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question, Middle East Report N°114, 20 October 2011 (also available in Arabic) In Heavy Waters: Iran’s Nuclear Program, the Risk of War and Lessons from Turkey, Middle East Report N°116, 23 February 2012 (also available in Arabic and Turkish). Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan, Middle East Report N°118, 12 March 2012 (also available in Arabic).
Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit, Middle East Report N°120, 19 April 2012 (also available in Arabic). The P5+1,Iran and the Perils of Nuclear Brinkmanship, Middle East Briefing N°34, 15 June 2012 (also available in Arabic). Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition, Middle East Report N°125, 3 July 2012 (also available in Arabic). Déjà Vu All Over Again: Iraq’s Escalating Political Crisis, Middle East Report N°126, 30 July 2012 (also available in Arabic). Iraq’s Secular Opposition: The Rise and Decline of Al-Iraqiya, Middle East Report N°127, 31 July 2012 (also available in Arabic).
Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, Middle East Report N°138, 25 February 2013. Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?, Middle East Report N°139, 4 April 2013.
Appendix E: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees
Thomas R Pickering
Former U.S. Undersecretary of State; Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria
President & CEO
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Ayo Obe Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria Ghassan Salamé Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po
Morton Abramowitz Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey Cheryl Carolus Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC Maria Livanos Cattaui Former Secretary-General of the International Chamber of Commerce Yoichi Funabashi Chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative; Former Editor-in-Chief, The Asahi ShimbunFrank Giustra President & CEO, Fiore Financial Corporation Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Moisés Naím Senior Associate, International Economics Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy George Soros Chairman, Open Society Institute Pär Stenbäck Former Foreign Minister of Finland
Other Board Members
Kofi Annan Former Secretary-General of the United Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001) Nahum Barnea Chief Columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel Samuel Berger Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former U.S. National Security Adviser Emma Bonino Vice President of the Italian Senate; Former Minister of International Trade and European Affairs of Italy and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Micheline Calmy-Rey Former President of the Swiss Confederation and Foreign Affairs Minister Wesley Clark Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Sheila Coronel Toni Stabile Professor of Practice in Investigative Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Centre for Investigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S. Mark Eyskens Former Prime Minister of Belgium Nabil Fahmy Former Ambassador of Egypt to the U.S. and Japan; Founding Dean, School of Public Affairs, American University in Cairo Joschka Fischer Former Foreign Minister of Germany Lykke Friis Former Climate & Energy Minister and Minister of Gender Equality of Denmark; Former Prorector at the University of Copenhagen Jean-Marie Guéhenno Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University;
Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Carla Hills Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative Lena Hjelm-Wallén Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden Mo Ibrahim Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International Igor Ivanov Former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Asma Jahangir President of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief Wadah Khanfar Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; Former Director General, Al Jazeera Network Wim Kok Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Ricardo Lagos Former President of Chile Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Former International Secretary of PEN International; Novelist and journalist, U.S. Lalit Mansingh Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK Benjamin Mkapa Former President of Tanzania Laurence Parisot President, French Business Confederation (MEDEF)
Karim Raslan Founder, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of KRA Group Paul Reynolds President & Chief Executive Officer, Canaccord Financial Inc. Javier Solana Former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary General and Foreign Minister of Spain Liv Monica Stubholt Senior Vice President for Strategy and Communication, Kvaerner ASA; Former State Secretary for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lawrence H. Summers Former Director of the U.S. National Economic Council and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; President Emeritus of Harvard University Wang Jisi Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University; Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Wu Jianmin Executive Vice Chairman, China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy; Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry; Former Ambassador of China to the UN (Geneva) and France Lionel Zinsou CEO, PAI Partners
Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission.
Anonymous (3) Dow Chemical Mala Gaonkar Frank Holmes Investec Asset Management Steve Killelea McKinsey & Company Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton Harry Pokrandt Shearman & Sterling LLP Ian Telfer White & Case LLP Neil Woodyer
International Advisory Council
Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Anonymous Anglo American PLC APCO Worldwide Inc.
Ryan Beedie Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman BP Chevron Neil & Sandra DeFeo Family Foundation Equinox Partners Neemat Frem FTI Consulting Seth & Jane Ginns Alan Griffiths Rita E. Hauser George Kellner Faisel Khan Zelmira Koch Polk Elliott ulick David Levy Leslie Lishon Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Näringslivets Inter-nationella Råd (NIR) – International Council of Swedish Industry Griff Norquist Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey R. Hoguet Kerry Propper PTT Public Company Limited Michael L. Riordan Shell Nina Solarz Horst Sporer Statoil Talisman Energy Kevin Torudag YapıMerkezi Construction and Industry Inc. Stelios S. Zavvos
Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).
Martti Ahtisaari Chairman Emeritus George Mitchell Chairman Emeritus Gareth Evans President Emeritus Kenneth Adelman Adnan Abu Odeh HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Hushang Ansary Óscar Arias Ersin Arıoğlu Richard Armitage Diego Arria Zainab angura Shlomo Ben-Ami Christoph Bertram Alan Blinken Lakhdar Brahimi Zbigniew Brzezinski Kim Campbell Jorge Castañeda Naresh Chandra Eugene Chien Joaquim Alberto Chissano Victor Chu Mong Joon Chung Pat Cox Gianfranco Dell’Alba Jacques Delors Alain Destexhe Mou-Shih Ding Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Gernot Erler Marika ahlén Stanley Fischer Malcolm Fraser Swanee Hunt Max Jakobson James V. Kimsey Aleksander Kwasniewski Todung Mulya Lubis Allan J. MacEachen Graça Machel Jessica T. Mathews Nobuo Matsunaga Barbara McDougall Matthew McHugh Miklós Németh Christine Ockrent Timothy Ong Olara Otunnu Lord (Christopher) Patten Shimon Peres Victor Pinchuk Surin Pitsuwan Cyril Ramaphosa Fidel V. Ramos George Robertson Michel Rocard Volker Rühe Güler Sabancı
Mohamed Sahnoun Salim A. Salim Douglas Schoen Christian Schwarz-Schilling Michael Sohlman Thorvald Stoltenberg Leo Tindemans Ed van Thijn Simone Veil Shirley Williams Grigory Yavlinski Uta Zapf Ernesto Zedillo