Sunni Politics In Iraq: A New Elite Seeks To Assert Itself In The Post-ISIS Era
Jeremy Hodge
By Jeremy Hodge and
Anand Gopal
November
16th, 2020
In August
2019, Iraqi Federal Police showed up at the mayor’s office in Fallujah to expel
‘Aissa al-Sayir, the mayor, who had long been a key player in the city’s
politics. Citing voting irregularities, the Anbar Governorate deployed the
police after Sayir refused to give up his post. The event attracted little
notice in the international press, but within Iraq many observers believed that
the ultimate mover in this drama was not the local government at all, but
Muhammad al-Halbusi, the Speaker of the Iraqi parliament, and one of the
wealthiest businessmen in Anbar. The removal of Fallujah’s mayor represented a
changing of the guard in Sunni politics, as a new elite seeks to assert itself
in the post-ISIS era.
US
Secretary Mike Pompeo and Iraqi Speaker Muhammad Halbusi, January 2019. Source:
US State Department/Flickr
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The
discussion of ISIS in Iraq often focuses on Sunni-Shia divides, but this tends
to ignore the crucial role of intra-Sunni dynamics in preserving the peace. In
post-ISIS Iraq, the Sunni elite have split, with one segment allying itself to
Baghdad and reaping enormous benefits—for itself and for cities like
Fallujah—while the other segment has found itself excluded from patronage.
Those, like Halbusi, who prove willing to bridge confessional divides are the
winners in this new Iraq, while the old Sunni elite who cling to pre-war
alignments are the losers. Understanding this divide is crucial to ensuring a
lasting political settlement.
The New Elite: The Rise of Muhammad al-Halbusi
Muhammad
al-Halbusi is one of the most powerful Sunnis in the country, but he derives
this status not from a grassroots base but rather by virtue of his alliance
with the Fatah parliamentary bloc, which is led by figures linked to the
powerful Iran-backed Badr Brigade. Hailing from the town of Garma in Fallujah’s
northeastern outskirts, al-Halbusi belongs to the Halbus clan. Pre-2003, the
Halbus was far less influential than Fallujah’s other tribes, and exerted
little influence on the Ba’athist state. The clan also had few ties to the
Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, which in the late Saddam years was an important actor
in Fallujah. After 2003, marginalised clans like the Halbus did not make up an
important part of the mainstream anti-U.S. resistance; instead, it was jihadi
groups like al-Qa’eda in Iraq that recruited heavily from the ranks of the
Halbus and similar lower-status clans.
In this
environment, Muhammad al-Halbusi, who had a degree in engineering,
distinguished himself from the majority of his compatriots by working openly
with the Americans as early as 2003 on renovation and reconstruction projects.
In June 2004, al-Halbusi’s firm, Steel Company Ltd., was one of many Iraqi
companies sub-contracted to work on a $28.6 million water treatment facility in
Fallujah. The project soon stalled due to the deteriorating security situation
and contractor negligence; by 2005, FluorAMEC, the American firm leading the
project, estimated that it would cost $51.3 million to complete the project. By
2011, this had risen to $107.8 million. By this point, Muhammad al-Halbusi had
become a major player in Fallujah. Three years later, he was elected to
represent the city in parliament.
The Old Elite: The Decline of ‘Aissa al-Sayir
The
political trajectory of Aissa al-Sayir, the ousted Fallujah mayor, was the
mirror opposite of Halbusi’s. Understanding his rise and fall requires
exploring the complex relationship between the Baʿth regime and Islamist movements
before 2003. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s government carried out extensive
repression of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, sentencing many to death. However,
by the 1990s the Iraqi president’s stance towards the group began to shift,
especially as the regime looked to promote an alternative Islamist vision that
could compete with, and be more easily managed than, Saudi-linked Salafism. In
1991, dozens of Brotherhood leaders saw their sentences commuted, and were
eventually released. In Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar, Brotherhood figures
such as Abd al-Razaq al-Sa’adi and Makki Hussein al-Kubaysi, who had been
operating covertly, began to proselytise in the open, often in conjunction with
the Baʿth party’s Faith Campaign. (Al-Kubaysi was an
associate of Baʿthist Faith Campaigner Subhei Samara’i, promoting pro-Ba’athist variant of Brotherhood
thinking; ‘Abd al-Razaq al-Sa’adi meanwhile, brother of Brotherhood leader ‘Abd
al-Malik al-Sa’adi, was close with ‘Abd al-Latif al-Humaym, another
pro-Ba’athist cleric who was among the richest families in Anbar.) Many of
these figures became key leaders in the post-2003 insurgency; Makki al-Kubaysi,
for example, became one of the founders of the Association of Muslim Scholars,
a body that funnelled funds to Brotherhood-linked insurgent groups such as the
1920 Revolutionaries Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq.
One of the
leaders who emerged from this milieu was ‘Aissa al-Sayir. Having graduated with
the rank of Lieutenant from Iraq’s Police Academy in 1993, al-Sayir had solid
Baʿthist
credentials. At the same time, his tribe, the Albu ‘Aissa, had contributed more
members to the ranks of Fallujah’s Muslim Brotherhood than any other tribe.
After 2003, ‘Aissa himself became a high-ranking member of the Brotherhood’s
political front, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Many prominent IIP-affiliated
figures who dominated Sunni politics after 2003, such as Rafa al-‘Aissawi and
Khamis Khanjar, were similarly Albu ‘Aissa tribesmen from Fallujah. Following
the US invasion, IIP chapters throughout Anbar seized control of city councils,
police departments, and the Anbar provincial council, liaising with the
Americans while simultaneously funding the 1920’s Revolutionary Brigades, the Islamic
Army of Iraq, and other insurgent groups.
In 2007,
the IIP in Fallujah formed a new armed faction, Hamas Iraq, which joined the
US-backed Sahwa—“Awakening”—movement against al-Qa’eda. Al-Sayir, who was
officially serving as an “aide” to the police chief, moonlighted as the
commander of Hamas Iraq. Hamas Iraq is widely believed to have exploited the
cover provided by the Sahwa to lead a campaign of arrests and executions
against the IIP’s political enemies. For a brief period in 2011 and 2012,
al-Sayir spent time in jail following a government crackdown on the IIP and
other Sunni politicians such as Rafi al-‘Aissawi and former Iraqi Vice
President Tariq al-Hashemi.
However,
following the re-emergence of al-Qa’eda in Iraq as ISIS in 2013, a
rapprochement occurred between the IIP and the Iraqi government, which sought
an Islamist ally to thwart the appeal of ISIS among Sunnis. In provincial
elections that April, the IIP catapulted back to power throughout Anbar,
regaining influence over the governorship, provincial council, and numerous
other bodies. In 2015, al-Sayir was appointed mayor of Fallujah.
The Birth of a New Era
Though the
rise of ISIS proved useful for the IIP, it paid far greater dividends for the
Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a massive umbrella body comprised of mostly
Shi’a militias that operated in partnership with—but not under the purview
of—regular Iraqi army forces. Even the PMF’s critics acknowledged its
indispensable role in defeating ISIS, a legacy that granted the group political
capital during the May 2018 parliamentary elections. The factions closest to
Iran united as the Fatah Alliance. Muhammad al-Halbusi was by now a rival of
the IIP, who sought to monopolise resource distribution and exclude those
outside their patronage network, especially with an independent power base like
al-Halbusi. So he took the unusual step of throwing his lot in with Fatah, a
pro-Iran party. The gamble paid off, as Halbusi was elected Iraq’s Speaker of
Parliament, despite the fact that his party, Al-Hal Alliance, had won few
votes.
“We
supported Muhammad al-Halbusi to become speaker of Iraq’s parliament,” said
Hadi al-Ameri, Chairman of the Fatah Alliance and the Badr Brigades. “He’s a
man of his word.” Throughout 2020, Fatah MPs have publicly defended al-Halbusi
from attempts by IIP-affiliated officials to submit a vote of no-confidence and
have him impeached. Al-Halbusi’s Al-Hal Alliance used such support to supplant
the IIP as the new power broker in Anbar province. It has also benefited from
independent revenue streams, such as that of Jamal al-Karbuli, a wealthy Sunni
businessman from Masyab, a mixed-sect city in southern Iraq where the Badr
Brigades maintain a strong presence. Both the Governor of Anbar that ordered
Aissa al-Sayir’s removal, Ali Farhan al-Dulayimi, and al-Sayir’s replacement,
Muwayyed Farhan al-Dulaymi, are members of the Al-Hal Alliance and owe their
status to deals made by al-Halbusi in parliament.
Since
al-Halbusi’s appointment, Fallujah has witnessed a massive reconstruction boom.
Hundreds of new residential units have popped up. Officials are paving the
city’s main thoroughfares, rebuilding the important al-Muwazafin bridge, and
are working on the city’s water treatment facility. (This latter project is
being paid for with a $285 million loan from the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency in 2015.)
The rivalry
between al-Halbusi and the IIP in Fallujah, rooted in old socio-economic
cleavages, is now oriented around seeking to benefit from such lucrative
contracts. Shortly before his dismissal, Aissa al-Sayir was rumored to have met
with Khamis Khanjar, a fellow Albu ‘Aissa tribesman with historical links to
the IIP and who, like al-Halbusi, has used his riches to influence national
politics, making the two bitter enemies. Khanjar’s own party, “the Arab
Project,” includes in its ranks IIP figures such as Rafa al-Aissawi and Tariq
al-Hashimi, targets of the government’s crackdown on Sunni politicians in
2011-2012. Prior to his removal, opponents accused al-Sayir of stalling reconstruction
projects in Fallujah in order to ensure that the city’s IIP elite won the
contracts. However, since al-Sayir’s departure, al-Halbusi has become something
of a “city boss” in Fallujah, with companies linked to him and his Al-Hal
Alliance monopolising funds pouring into the city.
Social
media gives a sense of the reach of al-Halbusi’s patronage network. Fallujah’s
mayor, for example, recently tweeted using the hashtag
#Fallujah_in_the_eyes_of_Halbusi’s_men a video of two supporters standing on
the city’s renovated main thoroughfare, praising their benefactor:
“We want to say thank you, Anbar’s number one
hero of reconstruction, the architectural engineer, Muhammad al-Halbusi! And
who else? Fallujah’s mayor, Sir Muwayyed Farhan al-Dualimi. Your positive touch
[on the city] is clear!”.
@moaedfarhan77
Rebuilding
Fallujah has brought tremendous benefits for the city. That such efforts are
linked to a political force rooted in a cross-sect alliance is a cause for
optimism. Al-Halbusi himself has promoted his alliance with Fatah using just
such a narrative, declaring that following after the horrors of ISIS, Iraqis
are ready to move past confessional divides.
Yet in
allying with the Badr Brigades and in marginalising the old Sunni elite,
Halbusi and the new elite risk stoking resentment in Anbar—potentially creating
fault lines that ISIS-like groups can exploit in the future. The mass graves
dotting the surroundings of Fallujah, left behind by Iran-backed militias,
remain unaccounted for. (Recently, for example, al-Halbusi refused to point
fingers at the militias when a few dozen bodies turned up in al-Babil
governorate, where many Sunnis had been abducted and killed). Tens of thousands
who have lost their family members due to these militias remain without
justice, or a truth and reconciliation process. Through such partnerships,
Halbusi has added to the sense in Fallujah that these militias are able to
operate with impunity. Meanwhile, the IIP continues to exert an influence. Its
members proliferate the ranks of Anbar’s Sunni middle class, and occupy many
bureaucratic posts in local government and in key industries. The best hope for
a stable Iraq is a lasting political settlement, which will depend on the
country’s resources—in terms of reconstruction funds and access to
justice—being shared equitably across its society.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the
author, not the position of the Conflict Research Programme, the London School
of Economics and Political Science, nor the UK Government.
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Jeremy Hodge is a Lead Research Coordinator for
the Zomia Center for the Study of Non-State Spaces. He is also an investigative
reporter covering the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as collusive
state-business relations and the petroleum/defense sectors in the broader
Middle East. Jeremy’s articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Nation,
The Daily Beast, Le Monde Diplomatique, Al-Jazeera and other outlets and have
been nominated for awards by the Overseas Press Club.
Anand Gopal is a 2019/2020 Fellow on the
Conflict Research Programme. His research project is titled: Iraq after ISIS:
Political Settlement, Reconciliation and Countering Drivers of Conflict. He is
an Assistant Research Professor at the Center for the Study of Religion and
Conflict and the Center on the Future of War at Arizona State University, and a
Fellow at Type Media.
Original Headline: The Rise of the New Sunni
Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah
Source: The LSE Middle East Centre
URL: https://newageislam.com/the-war-within-islam/sunni-politics-iraq-new-elite/d/123490
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