Saudi-Iranian Competition for Regional Hegemony Is Not Sunni-Shia Rivalry
By
Mustafa Menshawy and Simon Mabon
13 Mar 2021
The
outbreak of the Arab Spring triggered a number of conflicts and regional
tensions in the Middle East, which over the past 10 years, have acquired an
increasingly sectarian tinge. At the forefront of what some analysts have
identified as “Sunni-Shia conflict” have been Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud is greeted at
Mehrabad Airport in Tehran by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami on December 8,
1997 [AP/Enric Marti]
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Emboldened
by the fragmentation of states across the region, Riyadh and Tehran have sensed
an opportunity to increase their own standing in the Middle East and have
entered a fierce competition for regional influence. The frequent use of
religious rhetoric and loyalties in proxy conflicts has led some observers to
conclude that this competition is mainly sectarian in nature and stems from a
historical Sunni-Shia struggle.
But a
closer examination of recent history demonstrates that this is by far not the
case. In this article, we challenge the “ancient hatreds” thesis and contend
that the present sectarian tensions are predominantly a political construct
serving the domestic and regional agendas of the two countries.
Tensions
between Sunni and Shia groups and countries have often been portrayed as deeply
ingrained and a consequence of historical and theological antagonism.
The roots
of today’s “Sunni-Shia conflict” are often sought in the disagreements over the
succession of Prophet Muhammad as the leader of the Muslim community (whether
it should have been kept within his family or not). The subsequent killing of
his grandson, Hussein ibn Ali, at the hands of forces loyal to the Umayyad
caliph Yazid in the Battle of Karbala of 680AD is seen as having solidified the
split between the Shia and the Sunni.
The Shia
are said to perceive the Sunni as supporters of power usurpation by the
Umayyads and responsible for the death of a succession of Prophet Muhammad’s
true heirs, while the Sunni perceive the Shia as “apostates”, deviating from
“true Islam”.
In the 16th
and 17th centuries, the Safavid dynasty gradually transformed Sunni Iran into a
bastion of Shia Islam. Then, in the 18th century, the House of Saud embraced
the ultraconservative Sunni Wahabiyya doctrine. These two developments are
considered by some to mark the onset of sectarian Saudi-Iranian rivalry.
In recent
years, both Tehran and Riyadh have actively used religious language in their
hostile rhetoric towards each other. They have also sought to channel their
influence through proxies, seemingly along sectarian lines, prompting some to
talk about a “rebirth of the Shia-Sunni divide”.
But to look
at the tensions between the two countries solely through the prism of
sectarianism would yield flawed conclusions. The line between Sunni and Shia
Islam has been historically and theologically blurred at times and has not always
been such a divisive element. Furthermore, historical events and developments
of the past 60 years demonstrate that religious sentiments are by far not the
main factor in decision-making in Riyadh and Tehran.
The main
considerations on both sides of the Gulf have been regional influence and
internal stability. Both countries have had the resources and ambition to seek
regional security and hegemony and both have had a weak spot – a
religious/ethnic minority based in their oil-rich provinces.
And whenever
their interests have not clashed directly, there have been quite a few moments
of positive engagement and collaboration between the two countries.
With the
onset of the Cold War, the United States looked to regional powers in the
Middle East to establish a solid front against the expansion of Soviet
influence and secure the export of oil from the Gulf region. As a result, Iran
– under the Pahlavi dynasty – and Saudi Arabia became part of the United
States’ “twin pillar” to provide regional security. In the 1960s and 70s, the
two countries collaborated closely and enjoyed good relations.
The
Egyptian army’s intervention in the Yemen War (1962-70) to back the coup led by
Arab nationalist officers also brought Riyadh and Tehran together, as they
backed the forces fighting to preserve the rule of the Zaidi King-Imam. Some
fighters loyal to the imamate travelled from Saudi Arabia to Iran to receive
training.
Sharing
long borders and historical and tribal ties with Saudi Arabia, Yemen
represented a “red line” for the Saudis. The Iranians, for their part, feared
the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism, which was
stirring anti-Shah sentiment in Iran’s Arab-populated oil-rich province of
Khuzestan.
The Iranian
revolution of 1978-79 shook the region and soured Iran’s relations with the
House of Saud. Supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini directly called for the
overthrow of American-backed Arab rulers and sought to export revolutionary
activity under the banner of an “uprising of all Muslims” guided by his
leadership.
Of
particular concern for Saudi Arabia was the outbreak of protests in its Eastern
Province, home to the majority of its Shia population and its oil reserves.
Riyadh launched a bloody crackdown to end the upheaval, which resulted in the
death of dozens of civilians. Meanwhile, the clerical establishment issued a
flurry of anti-Shia publications portraying the protests not as Muslim but as a
Shia conspiracy in an attempt to blunt the revolutionary appeal of the Iranian
Revolution.
Meanwhile,
Iran itself faced ethnoreligious upheaval, as Arab communities in Khuzestan
province – where 80 percent of the country’s onshore oil reserves are located –
rose up to demand autonomy and an end to their marginalisation. The Arab
uprising was violently suppressed by the security forces, with more than 100
people killed.
After the
death of Khomeini in 1989, relations between the two countries began to
improve. In January 1990, when a devastating earthquake in the Iranian city of
Manjil took the lives of tens of thousands, Riyadh rushed in to send aid to the
ravaged areas. In 1991, the two countries resumed their diplomatic relations,
just as the United States launched the First Gulf War against Iraq, whose
Baathist regime was a nemesis to both the House of Saud and the Islamic
Republic.
In May
1997, Iran’s newly elected reformist President Mohammed Khatami undertook a
tour of Arab countries and paid a visit to the Saudi port city of Jeddah, where
he met King Fahd. At the end of the meeting, they issued a joint communique in
which they pledged “non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, respect
for national sovereignty and independence and peaceful coexistence derived from
the ties of religion and heritage which bind the states of the region”.
In December
1997, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah travelled to Iran to attend a summit of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference and was greeted by Khatami, who
symbolically kissed him on both cheeks. The Saudis made it clear that “if the
two governments have the political will, there are no limits to cooperation
with Iran”.
Under the
leadership of the more hawkish President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was elected
in 2005, Iran was quick to use its extensive links to the anti-Baathist
opposition – part of which it had long hosted – to establish a strong foothold
in weakened and fragmented Iraq. Reeling under heavy US and UN sanctions, the
Islamic Republic sought to curb US presence and influence on its western border
and become the main player shaping Iraqi affairs. Over the next few years,
Tehran managed to establish extensive influence over the security sector and
various political forces (both Shia and non-Shia) in Iraq.
Elsewhere
in the Arab world, it sought to gain the support of ordinary Arabs by
emphasising its commitment to the Palestinian cause and opposition to Western
imperialism. As one Shia scholar put it, at the time the Iranian foreign policy
was “Sunni”.
In Saudi
Arabia, however, Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was perceived as a major
threat. Saudi officials repeatedly urged the US to stay engaged in the region
and even asked Washington to launch military strikes on the Iranian nuclear
programme to “cut off the head of the snake”.
A few years
later, the outbreak of the Arab Spring pushed the hostility between Saudi
Arabia and Iran to a new level. Each of them sought to shape the outcomes of
the Arab uprisings to favour their interests, and in doing so adopted seemingly
contradictory policies.
They backed
some uprisings while opposed others. Iran supported the protests in Bahrain in
the name of respecting the “will of the people”, but was quick to send military
support and personnel to Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as he tried to crush
nationwide protests against his regime.
Saudi
Arabia did the opposite. It dispatched its army to help the Bahraini monarchy
regain control of the streets, but in Syria, it backed the armed opposition,
providing it with generous military and financial assistance.
In pursuing
these goals, Saudi Arabia and Iran embraced the use of sectarian rhetoric and
allegiances, to complement the deployment of military force in Bahrain, Syria
and Yemen. While the conflicts in these three countries easily lend themselves
to a Sunni-Shia rivalry interpretation, the reality in all three is much
complicated.
The example
of Yemen perfectly illustrates the fallacy of the sectarian argument. Just as
in the 1960s, “Wahhabi Riyadh” and “secular Tehran” backed the pro-imamate
Zaidi Shia forces out of political considerations rather than religious ones,
after 2011, they supported various political players depending on their current
interests.
After
supporting Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (himself a member of the Zaidi
sect) for years, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries brokered a deal for him to step down in 2011. By 2014, Saleh had made
a comeback to Yemen and allied with the Houthis, a Zaidi armed group, who he
had previously tried to obliterate, only to betray them as an opportunity to
reconcile with Riyadh emerged.
And even
though Saudi Arabia launched a war against the Houthis in 2015, declaring them
an Iranian proxy, it did engage with the group in the months after Saleh’s
overthrow, as it tried to shape the outcome of Yemen’s political transition.
Iran, for its part, approached leftist forces and separatists in the south,
trying to expand its influence in Yemen.
The Arab
Spring and the Iranian-Saudi escalation of tensions have also inevitably
spilled over onto the domestic scene in both countries. In Saudi Arabia’s
Eastern Province, protests broke out inspired by the Arab uprisings. The
monarchy felt threatened and again launched a bloody crackdown, claiming the
protesters were “terrorists”, “Iranian agents” and “fifth column”.
Iran has
also witnessed similar disturbances by ethnic minorities in Khuzestan and
Sistan-Baluchestan provinces and by disaffected youth and ordinary citizens in
Tehran and other big cities. The Iranian government has repeatedly accused
Saudi Arabia of agitating unrest among its Arab population and sponsoring
violence, such as the 2018 attack on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’
parade in Ahvaz.
Since the
dynamics of Iranian-Saudi relations have been highly influenced by the
intervention of third parties, mostly the US, it is possible that the new
administration in Washington could have a positive effect and alleviate
tensions.
Indeed,
Washington might realise that some form of collaboration between Iran and Saudi
Arabia might be beneficial to its regional interests.
President
Joe Biden has already signalled that he is looking into rejoining the Iran
nuclear deal, which his predecessor pulled out of. This has provoked a mixed
reaction in Tehran and alerted some US allies in the region, including Saudi
Arabia.
However, a
nuclear deal could be an opportunity to get both countries on the negotiating
table. There are already proposals to include Riyadh in any future talks with
Tehran.
Finding a
way of balancing the competing interests – and fears – of Riyadh, Tehran and
Washington is not an easy task but understanding the ways in which the rivalry
plays out is essential. One thing is certain, while religion has a role to
play, this rivalry is more about politics and regional security than “ancient
hatreds”. That is why, peace – or at least some degree of normalised relations
– is quite possible.
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Dr
Mustafa Menshawy is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of
Lancaster’s SEPAD, the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization Project.
He authored two books and several articles, including Leaving the Muslim
Brotherhood: Self, Society and the State (Palgrave 2020) and ‘Constructing
State, Territory, and Sovereignty in the Syrian Conflict’ (Politics journal
2018).
Professor
Simon Mabon is Chair in International Relations at Lancaster University where
he is also Director of the Richardson Institute. He is Director of SEPAD, the
Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization Project.
Original
Headline: Saudi Arabia and Iran have not
always been foes
Source: The Al-Jazeera
URL: https://newageislam.com/the-war-within-islam/saudi-iranian-competition-regional-hegemony/d/124540