By Zeeshan Shaikh
November 23,
2020
Pakistan’s
hard-talking, expletive-spouting Islamist cleric Khadim Rizvi died on Friday.
His meteoric rise in Pakistan’s military-dominated political landscape and his
power to bring governments to their knees, all in the span of less than a
decade until his sudden death, are unique even by the standards of how much the
country’s history has been shaped by radical Islam under the benign and
enabling gaze of its army.
Rizvi’s
abrupt death has created confusion and speculation about its cause, although
indications are that it was likely a case of Covid-19. Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP),
his movement and later a political party, has grown so much and proved itself
useful so many times that Pakistan’s permanent power wielders are unlikely to
let it wither away.
What Made Him Different
The sheer
street power that Rizvi commanded made him different from the other extremists
who have risen to prominence in Pakistan over the last three decades. He was
not a Deobandi like the Taliban, nor an Ahle Hadees like Lashkar-e-Toiba’s
Hafiz Saeed. Rizvi was a Barelvi. Most Barelvis are viewed as
middle-of-the-road, moderate Sunni Muslims. Half of Pakistan identify as
Barelvi, whose practice of Islam is suffused more with Sufi traditions
prevalent across South Asia, than with the Saudi Wahhabism that reigns over
jihadi Tanzeems.
But
Barelvis, like every other sect of Muslims, also have strong views about
perceived blasphemy. Rizvi channelised the common belief among a majority of
Pakistanis that there is no forgiveness for blasphemy, weaponised it for his
political ends, and turned it into raw street power. He did not have to indulge
in terrorist violence, yet was more successful than any other extremist group
in getting his way with those in power too.
At the very
least, he forced successive governments to perish the thought of reforming the
draconian blasphemy laws. And he was repeatedly able to target and undermine
civilian governments.
In this
way, he was a counterpoint to Saeed and other jihadists who had been tagged as
global terrorists by the international community. Their work was secretive and
across borders. Rizvi, on the other hand, was out there, harnessing religion
across the country without setting off large-scale violence. Plus he had no
links with militant Islamists in Afghanistan or with IS or al-Qaeda. More
importantly, he was a populist who knew the pulse of the average conservative
Sunni Pakistani.
Khadim Hussain Rizvi gestures
to his supporters during a campaign rally ahead of general election in Karachi,
Pakistan July 1, 2018. (Reuters Photo: Akhtar Soomro, File)
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But like
the others, he was also a natural ally of the Pakistan military which uses
religious extremism for its own agenda. For a week immediately preceding his
death, Khadim had summoned his followers to march on Islamabad in protest
against French President Emmanuel Macron’s stand in favour of free speech and
the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed. In his speeches at the protests, Rizvi also
launched scathing attacks against former PM Nawaz Sharif who had accused Army
chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa of conspiring with the judiciary to oust him. Rizvi
accused Sharif of working to the agenda of outsiders.
Rise From Nowhere
Rizvi
literally came out of the blue. His Launchpad was the 2011 assassination of
Salman Taseer, the Pakistani politician who was then Governor of Punjab
province, by his bodyguard. Rizvi was then an unknown government-employed
cleric in Lahore. He took up the cause of Taseer’s assassin Mumtaz Qadri,
lauding him for killing a man who had come out in support of Asia Bibi, the
jailed Christian woman accused of blasphemy. The government served Rizvi
several warnings over his utterances before finally sacking him. After this, he
threw himself into a campaign in support of blasphemy laws and for the release
of Qadri. The PPP government was then considering a repeal or reform of the
draconian laws, but had to shelve this.
After Qadri
was hanged in February 2016, Rizvi and his supporters swarmed Islamabad and sat
on a Dharna on the day of his Chehlum, the 40th day after death. There was
teargassing and rioting. Three people died. The protestors demanded the
recognition of Mumtaz Qadri as a martyr, the conversion of his Adiala Jail cell
into a national heritage site, the execution of Aasia Bibi, the removal of
Ahmadis and other non-Muslims in key posts, and the assurance that the
blasphemy laws would not be diluted. The protests were held under the banner of
Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah (TLYRA).
A widely
circulated video of Rizvi weeping at the funeral, and putting his turban at the
feet of Qadri for not being able to save him, cemented his leadership of the
movement, whose declared aim was to safeguard the blasphemy laws. He left
Islamabad with a warning to Sharif that he would return, which he did in
November 2017, when he and thousands of his followers sat-in on an arterial
road between Islamabad and Rawalpindi, paralysing life in both cities for
nearly a month.
The trigger
for the protest was an attempt to reform the election laws, which Rizvi alleged
was aimed at diluting the anti-Ahmadi provisions. Finally the Pakistani Army,
which had refused to use force to evict the protestors, brokered a deal that
was effectively a total surrender by the government. Not only was the amendment
rolled back, the Law Minister also resigned after issuing an apology. A senior
military officer was seen distributing money to the protesters, which was
explained away as ticket money for going home. ?? Follow Express Explained on
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Khadim Hussein Rizvi leads an
anti-France rally in Karachi, Pakistan. (AP Photo: Fareed Khan, File)
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When the
TLP contested the 2018 general elections, it positioned itself as the guardian
of Hurmat-e-Rasool (Prophet Muhammad’s honour) and the custodian of blasphemy
laws. It polled 4.21% of the votes countrywide and emerged the fifth largest
party, better than the performance of LeT chief Hafiz Saeed’s party. It also
won three seats in the Sindh Provincial Assembly.
After that,
the TLP carried out periodic protests, paralysing the government in November
2018 with a huge sit-in in Islamabad demanding the execution of Aasia Bibi
after she was acquitted by the Supreme Court. The government signed an
agreement with the TLP that she would not be allowed to leave the country as it
was believed she would do after the acquittal.
What Now
After
Rizvi’s death, his son Saad Rizvi has been appointed as the head of the TLP.
The leaders of other parties, such as the Sunni Tehreek Pakistan, or the Jamiat
Ulema e Pakistan, are also likely to see an opportunity – either to revive
their own outfits to ride the current wave of Barelvi religious extremism and
political activism, or to try and take over the leadership of the movement that
Rizvi has left behind. Either way, they will need powerful benefactors.
Original Headline: Rise of a cleric: how did
Khadim Rizvi become so influential in Pakistan?
Source: The Indian Express
URl: https://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-jihad/strange-metamorphosis-how-small-time/d/123564