By
Alessandro Bruno
Jan 2, 2021
The much
feared “holy war” connotation that media pundits and government officials too
often attribute to Jihad is deceiving. The term has a far more complex meaning,
which revolves around the concept of “improving oneself.” In specific
situations, Jihad can also signify war or violent struggle. But such situations
are rare and confined by strict legal and religious boundaries.
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Jihad
derives from the Arabic root J h D (? ? ?) and the verb Jahada (??????). It
translates to “strive, making an effort, or applying oneself to achieve a
goal.” Therefore, Jihad is a word related to the idea of self-improvement. The
Islamic philosopher Abdul Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111 AD) described the
Jihad-related term ijtihad’ as the exercise of striving to achieve the outmost
expertise in a given subject. From that interpretation other philosophers of
Islam’s golden age applied the term to jurisprudence. In this sense, ijtihad
represented the effort of legal scholars in mastering fiqh (the study of the
law, or the study of Shari’a). And in Shiite Islam, practitioners of ijtihad,
or mujtahids, are the legal scholars and judges.
Not only is
the idea of aggression missing from Jihad, the term describes noble human
activities, associated with internal struggles to overcome obstacles.
In the
West, apart from a few specialists, most people interpret this beautiful
concept as the fiercest form of religiously mandated violence; Jihad has become
the very synonym for terror. Yet, not only is the idea of aggression missing
from Jihad, the term describes noble human activities, associated with internal
struggles to overcome obstacles, instincts, and self-doubt. Jihad might be best
described as the effort to elevate one’s character or psyche. It’s a concept
that clearly applies to the individual’s journey to believe and to have faith.
Even Jesus Christ might be said to have experienced a Jihad when, after being
baptized, according to religious texts, he spent 40 days and 40 nights fasting
in the desert. During this period, Satan tempted Jesus three times to
compromise his mission.
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Also
Read: What is Jihadi-Salafism?
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The sacred
Islamic texts do distinguish, however, al-Jihad al-Asghar from al-Jihad
al-Akbar – that is “smaller Jihad” from “greater Jihad.” It is the latter, the
great Jihad, or great effort exerted within the believer in pursuit of a higher
plane of faith, that is the most important. The small Jihad implies an external
war to defend the ‘Umma (believing community) from outsiders and “infidels” –
or enemies – and only when responding to acts of aggression. Jihad can be
incited against other Muslims. A Muslim leader, who wants to lead a Jihad
against another Muslim nation, however, must first declare his intended enemies
to be kafir, that is atheists or unbelievers as occurred recently in the case
of the Iran-Iraq war, the war in Syria, the 1990s’ war in Algeria, and in Egypt
starting in the 1970s.
Jihad is an Arabic word related to the idea of self-improvement.
(Creative Commons Photo)
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Those who
perform it for such purposes are mujahidin, such as the Afghan patriots who
fought against the Soviet invaders in the 1980s – or in the case of those who
fought the Crusaders in the 11th and 12th centuries. In recent decades, and
without the due nuances, it is the latter form of Jihad, interpreted as “holy
war,” that has prevailed as a concept in the West, obscuring the other and more
important component. Thus, the most familiar expression of “holy war” related
to the term Jihad is not entirely wrong, but it does mislead. Indeed, it’s
often an image that deceives, evoking fear of an invasion and colonization of
Western lands in the pursuit of a worldwide Islamic theocracy.
More
accurately, the contemporary meaning of Jihad might be better defined as a
challenge to the cultural, economic, and political interference of the West
(and the Communists in the 20th century) in the affairs of the Islamic world.
Jihad in this sense is a defense against external enemies. This interpretation
contrasts sharply with the one that Western media has perpetuated ad nauseam:
Jihad as a synonym for terrorism and a deliberate challenge to “democracy” and
Western lifestyle and values.
Jihad, let
alone the shades of its meanings, were unknown to the general public in the
West until the late 1990s. While the media – and many politicians – have abused
the term, developments in Egypt during the 1980s, marked a period when thinkers
and activists established the philosophical and religious underpinnings of a
revolutionary political project which perpetuated misconceptions around Jihad.
It was an ideological radicalization process that, in practice, resembled
contemporary far-Left and self-determination movements in Europe such as the
Red Brigades in Italy, Action-Directe in France, the Beider-Maanhof in Germany,
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in
Ireland.
Indeed,
even the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928), which advanced
the concept of an Islamic Order that would gradually, and peacefully, permeate
through Egypt’s institutions, shared the visions of some European socialist
thinkers of the 1920s, like Antonio Gramsci.
Gramsci
stressed the pursuit and achievement of a cultural and moral domination, or
hegemony, in order to then impose these notions on society with little
resistance, to achieve political power. (In Islamic terms the Gramscian
hegemony approach applied to Islam might be interpreted as a kind of Jihad
al-Akbar).
As a result
of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and
arrest of one of its leaders, Sayyid Qutb – culminating in Qutb’s torture and
execution in 1966; the failed wars against Israel of 1967 and 1973; the
economic crises (bread riots); and the unilateral Camp David peace agreement
with Israel of 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood’s hegemonic project changed
radically.
The
movements that evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood at the end of the 1970s
targeted those who the group believed, by their actions, had renounced Islam.
Just as the
radical leftists in Europe targeted representatives of the state and the
capitalist system for assassination – for instance the Red Brigades kidnapped
and murdered an Italian Prime Minister in 1978 – the movements that evolved
from the Muslim Brotherhood at the end of the 1970s targeted those who the
group believed, by their actions, had renounced Islam. And they challenged
these individuals and institutions with direct violence, adapting Sayyed Qutb’s
later ideas sent out during his time in Tura prison, which advocated a Jihad
against apostasy and ignorance (jahiliyya). The idea was to challenge the
“enemy” within the Muslim world – and those forces that had corrupted the Dar
al-Islam (Muslim world): the West.
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The Muslim
Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna, who was succeeded by Hasan al-Hudaybi,
did not subscribe to Qutb’s ideas. Rather than a Jihad al-Asghar, the
Brotherhood continued to evolve along Gramscian lines, dismantling its armed
wing and pursuing a political approach, which would eventually culminate in
parliamentary representation with independent candidates and alliances with
traditional parties like the Wafd.
Both former
Egyptian Presidents Sadat and Mubarak tolerated the Brotherhood as a stalwart
against the emergence of a strong secular opposition. But many rejected the
political makeover. And the more “action” minded within the faction abandoned
the Brotherhood to join and establish movements, which subscribed to
revolutionary orientation, ready to put Qutb’s ideas into practice such as Takfir
wa Hijra (which led to the killing of one of Sadat’s ministers in 1977) and
al-Jihad, whose militants killed Egyptian President Sadat in October 1981. As
happens when ideologies and movements atomize into separate entities, ideas –
often interpreted more liberally – become distorted.
One
engineer, Muammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, argued that performing an act of Jihad
against an apostate ruler was the sixth pillar of Islam in his “al-Farida
al-Ghaiba” (The Missing Obligation). Not only did Faraj’s pamphlet inspire
the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, it would also continue to serve as
a guide for extremist violence in Egypt throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Some
theologians challenged the new self-declared “authorities” who interpreted the
Qur’an ad-lib, often forcing the interpretation of selected verses to justify
violence. And it is the very weak foundation in Islamic theology and
jurisprudence, which has done so much damage to the idea of Jihad.
It is an
almost universal attribute of all the new and self-taught “philosophers” of
Shari’a that they lack the scholarly authority to pronounce interpretations of
Jihad.
It is an
almost universal attribute of all the new and self-taught “philosophers” of
Shari’a that they lack the scholarly authority, let alone understanding of
nuances, to pronounce interpretations of Jihad and other aspects of the faith.
After all, the violent communist groups of Europe also engaged in the exegesis
of foundational texts (Marx and Lenin for example), often lacking the
philosophical tools.
In fact, it
is very easy for untrained scholars to confuse actions that belong to Jihad
from those that don’t. In that regard, imagine the confusion among Christians
upon reading Luke 22:36, whereupon Jesus asks his followers to procure swords –
a command that contrasts sharply with the usual “turn the other cheek”
exhortations that the vast majority of Christians are asked to follow.
The media’s
often deliberate lack of awareness about the Middle East, its socio-economic
conditions, the involvement of internal and external (Western) actors, and
Islam has allowed the confusion borne out of ignorance to perpetuate. This
speaks volumes about the superficiality with which it approaches subjects
relating to Jihad and Islam. That said, the specific social circumstances,
particularly those in Egypt during the 1970s and 80s, played a significant role
in shaping the West’s understanding – and manipulation – of the concept of
Jihad. Clearly, a better use of appropriate terms and more study of the context
of certain phenomena would ensure greater clarity and promote understanding
between cultures – as opposed to encouraging a clash of civilizations.
Original
Headline: Much Ado About Jihad: Misconceptions and Media Manipulation
Source: The Inside Arabia
URL:
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism