Islamist Ulema’s Ideological Interpretation of Religion Will Pave the Way for the Political Success of Hefazat-e-Islam and Islamism in Bangladesh
By
Smruti S. Pattanaik
December
11, 2020
After the
death of Allama Shah Ahmed Shafi, the Amir of Hefazat-e-Islami (HeI), on
September 18, 2020, the new leadership of Juniad Babunagori and other hardline
Islamists dominate the Shura of HeI. Shafi, a firebrand Islamist, had brought
the Awami League (AL) government to its knees by demonstrating his
organisation’s street power in 2013. However, he unhesitatingly cooperated with
the government after that, till his death. What does Ahmed Shafi’s death mean
for ulema politics in Bangladesh? Will Juniad Babunagori, who succeeded Shafi
after a major power tussle to take over the Hathazari madarassa, continue with
his legacy?
Ulema Politics
HeI mostly
consisted of erstwhile ulema political parties whose political visibility
reduced after the AL assumed power. This was especially so in the context of
the weakening of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the main ally of the
ulema political parties, and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the dominant religious
political party committed to Sharia rule. This was after the BNP-led alliance
lost the 2008 election. The dominant ulema group, the Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ),
left the BNP-led four-party alliance in 2012. The HeI emerged in 2010 and made
its mark as a united front of the ulemas in Bangladesh. 1
Ulema
politics in the country largely remained confined to regulation of madrassas,
shaping the attitude of the government towards religion and preservation of
Islam. Though the Anjuman-i-Ulama-i-Bangala was one of the first platforms that
brought together the ulemas in the United Bengal province, it lost its lustre
after partition. Even though the Jamaat-ul-Islam Pakistan (JuIP) dabbled in
politics and later some ulemas joined with other political parties to demand
implementation of Nizam-e-Mustafa, ulema politics has always remained
fragmented.
Post-liberation
of Bangladesh in 1971, religious political parties were banned. General Zia ur
Rahman lifted the ban and brought substantial changes to the constitution
through the Fifth Amendment after he took over power as Chief Martial Law
Administrator and President in 1977. The JeI participated in the 1979 elections
as part of Islamic Democratic League and won six seats. The 1979 Iranian
Islamic revolution also inspired the Bangladeshi ulemas.2 However, ulema-led
political parties were not able to muster much electoral support, compared to
the well-knit and well-resourced JeI. The declaration of Islam as state religion
activated some ulemas under the Islami Shasonotantra Anadolan.
After
Bangladesh re-entered into democratic politics military rule in 1990, the
ulemas became active but still could not succeed electorally. The IoJ, for
instance, managed to get two seats in 2001. Organisations formed and led by the
ulema though have been at the forefront of the Islamisation drive in
Bangladesh, both in the social and political sphere. They control the country’s
vast Quawmi madrassas that do not follow the government-approved syllabus
taught in the government-run Aliya madrassas. Rather, the students of these
madrassas focus on the conservative Dars Nizami that deals with Islamic
jurisprudence.
The ulemas
in Bangladesh have always gathered under the leadership of those who control
big madrassas. Mufti Fazlul Haq Amini, a faction of IOJ, for instance,
controlled the Lal Bagh and Boro Katra madrassas in Dhaka. The Islami
Shasonotantra Andolon Ameer, Syed Mohammad Fazlul Karim, popularly known as
Charmonia Pir, who was also part of the IoJ, controls a large madrassa in
Charmonia, Barishal. Sheikh Azizul Haque controlled the Jamia Rahmania Arabia
madrassa in Mohammadpur, Dhaka. Since many of these ulemas have since died,
there was a void in ulema politics. Some of the ulemas earlier associated with
IOJ, are now part of HeI.3
Politics
of Hefazat-e-Islam
While Hefazat
claims it is apolitical, as they do not participate in electoral politics, they
are at the forefront of accumulating religious capital and have emerged as
important players in Bangladeshi politics. HeI, which literally means
‘protector of Islam’, was established in 2010 as a reaction to the Draft
National Women’s Development Policy Bill, proposed by the military-backed
caretaker government in 2008. The women’s bill was finally passed by the Awami
League government in 2011, providing equal rights to women in property ‘through
earnings, inheritance, loan, land and market management’.4 Taking into account
the protest of ulemas and other religious political parties, Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina assured that these rights will be subjected to Shariah law.
The Ulema
also feared that the Hasina government may engage in "anti-Islam[ic]
activities", especially after the Supreme Court in 2010 declared the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution that made sweeping change to the 1973 secular
constitution, as illegal. There were apprehensions, that, as a result of this
decision, the government may restore the 1973 Constitution and place a ban on
religious political parties. While the government restored secularism and some
other original articles through the 15th Amendment, fearing backlash from the
Islamists, it allowed the continuation of Islam as the state religion.
In 2013,
the HeI proved that it is a force to reckon with, when thousands of madrassa
students marched to Dhaka with a 13-point charter of demands. These included a demand for death sentence
for those committing blasphemy, declaring Qadianis as non-Muslims and
implementing other stringent Islamic laws.5 The government, sensing trouble,
ordered a midnight raid in which some madrassa students were killed. Though Hefazat
swore to take revenge and not forget the blood shed by the students who were
labelled as ‘martyrs’, it entered into negotiations with the government, asking
for compensation for those who were killed and withdrawal of criminal cases
against its cadres.
Realising
the potential of the group to disrupt, especially at a time when the Shahbag
protests were going on and war crime trials against those who collaborated with
Pakistani regime against the liberation were being conducted, the government
tried to win the Hefazat over to its side. It arrested bloggers under Section
54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Information and Communication
Technology Act of Bangladesh, 2006, for “hurting religious sentiments”.6 The
government sought help from the party-affiliated Ulema League and
Anjumaan-e-Baiyanat, to counter the HeI.
Interestingly,
the head of Anjuman al-Baiyanat, Allama Muhammad Mahbub Alam, had not only
announced rewards to kill the apostates, but also submitted a list of 84
bloggers to the government in 2013, demanding punishment for their involvement
in anti-Islamic activities.7 The Hefazat was even successful in seeing that
there is no publication that is critical of Islam. In fact, following the
hacking of around 12 activists, bloggers, publishers and writers by Islamic
terrorist groups in 20158, the Bangla Academy that organises the Ekushey Boi
mela (an annual book fair) to commemorate language martyrs, started
scrutinising the books that are sold or displayed in the fair for its content.9
Many accuse
the Hefazat of benefitting monetarily by collaborating with the government. It
received donations from the people associated with the AL. To strengthen the
hand of Shafi and his son, Anas Madani — who favoured HeI’s relations with AL,
the government leased 33 acres of railway land for expansion of the Hathazari
madrassa in Chittagong. To appease the Islamists, it asked the bloggers to
refrain from criticising Islam and passed a stringent Digital Security Act to
prevent online activities that may not go down well with the Islamists.
In 2017,
when the government introduced the same text books that are taught in the
regular schools for the madrassas, Hefazat asked for removal of certain poems
and other essays from the secondary school textbook. Appeasing the HeI, the
government removed 17 popular poems and stories by non-Muslim and secular
writers.10 These included Darwin’s theory of evolution, as Hefazat considers
such writings to promote atheism.11 The government was in fact forced to change
many Christian and Hindu-sounding names and replace them with Islamic names.12
The group
went to the extent of demanding that the government replace Prof Narayan
Chandra Saha, a Hindu, from the position of Chairman of National Curriculum and
Textbook Board (NCTB).13 Though the government did not accede to their demand,
they were successful in the removal of his name from the textbook which states
he is the chairman of the NCTB. Giving in to the Hefazat’s demand, in 2017, the
government removed the statue of the Greek goddess, Themis, from the Supreme
Court premises. In 2018, perhaps keeping an eye on the elections that year, the
government passed a bill recognising a top Quawmi madrassa degree,
Dawra–e–Hadith, as equivalent to a Master’s degree in Islamic studies and
Arabic. This was considered a major victory for the Quawmi madrassas. The
mutually beneficial relation between the AL and the HeI helped the latter’s
political rise.
Power Struggle
to Control Hefazat-e-Islam
After the
failed agitation in Dhaka’s Shapla Chottor on May 5, 2013, there were
differences of opinion within the HeI. Babu Nagori, who was then the General
Secretary of the organisation, was opposed to Shafi’s close contacts with the
AL government, especially after the brutal police action in Dhaka on the
protesters in 2013. The differences of opinion came to a head when Ahmad Shafi
decided to honour Prime Minister Hasina for passing the bill recognising the
madrasa degree. Junaid Babunagori’s uncle, Mohibullah Babunagori, resigned from
his position as the Secretary General of the organisation on October 3, along
with other leaders, for not being consulted over the issue. Several leaflets
were circulated by unidentified people against the function. Many of the senior
leaders stayed away from the thanksgiving ceremony, where Hasina was declared
the Quawmi mother by Ahmad Shafi. This coming together of AL and HeI though was
a crucial factor that helped in the AL’s 2014 and 2018 electoral victories.
The death
of HeI supremo Shafi has brought the power tussle for succession between Anas
Madani, Shafi’s son and Junaid Babunagori, out in the open. Since 2019, the
rivalry between senior Nayeb–e–Ameer, Mohibullah Babunagari and Anas Madani,
came to the fore. A day before Ahmed Shafi’s death, he resigned from the
position of Rector of the madrassa, following student unrests over a host of
issues that afflicted the functioning of the Hathazari madrassa. Before
resigning, he also sacked his son, a contender for succession, for
mismanagement and corruption in the Quawmi Madrassa Education Board, which
controls over 25,000 madrassas. Many also think that this resignation was stage
managed by a group of people close to Juniad Babunagori, who were opposed to
Shafi’s succession plan.14
The
leadership of HeI is now firmly in the hands of Juniad Babunagori, who had
fallen out with Shafi in October 2018. On June 17, 2020, Juniad Babunagari, who
was close to his uncle, was relieved of duty as assistant director by the Shura
committee of Madrassas. Instead, Maulana Sheikh Ahmed, a senior teacher of the
madrassa, was given the responsibility of the associate director. Hundreds of
students demonstrated on Chattogram-Khagrachhari Road and vandalised the
offices of Anas Madani and Shafi against the decision.
It was
apparent before the death of his father that Anas Madani was losing out in the
group’s internal power struggle. Powerful ulemas from Dhaka and Chittagong
supported Juniad Babunagori. Not surprisingly, after the death of Ahmed Shafi,
Juniad Babunagori constituted a new Shura and got himself elected as the Amir
of HeI and Maulana Nur Hossain Kasemi, Naib-e-Amir, became the new secretary
general. Kasemi was earlier the general secretary of Jamiat-e-Ulama-ye-Islam
and had resigned from that party. The factionalism within Hefazat continues
which may have implications for the cohesion of the group, which was held
tightly by Ahmed Shafi for the last ten years.15 The all- powerful Shura committee
which Juniad Babunagori heads makes appointments to various important
positions. Both Juniad Babunagori and Kasemi have been close to the BNP in the
past. This brings forth the question, what is the future of HeI and ulema
politics in Bangladesh?
Future of
Islamist Politics
After his
election as Amir of HeI, Juniad Babunagori stated that the group will work
towards establishing Islam and to uproot anti-Islamic forces. He even asserted
that the group would shed blood to protect Islam.16 Hefazat is aiming to occupy the Islamist
political space which is organisationally vacant at the moment due to
de-registration of JeI and the government’s continued action against the party
which has crippled its functioning. The Jamaat has been lying low politically since
the arrest and hanging of its leaders on charges of committing war crimes. It
tried to bring Hefazat to its side in 2013 to orchestrate anti-government
demonstrations.
Interestingly,
the AL also tried to win over the Hefazat as well, to deny political space to
the BNP-aligned Islamic political parties, mainly the Jamaat. It was also
necessary, as any confrontation with Islamists, especially Hefazat, which has
demonstrable street power, would have led to political instability. Moreover,
the government also wanted some Islamic political parties to be on its side to
maintain its Islamic credentials as well as to prevent unity among the
Islamists.
The big
question is whether Hefazat has a political agenda to remain relevant in
Bangladesh politics. After successfully gaining recognition for its Quawmi
madrassa degree, it has moved forth with its other social agendas. Not only HeI
but the BNP-led Somomona Islami Dal (similar thinking Islamic Parties),
organised a large-scale demonstration in Dhaka against the French President
Emanuel Macron for his recent remarks on the cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed.
HeI is
gaining larger traction among political parties who are vying for public space.
There were reports that even some of JeI leaders were present at the funeral of
former Ahmed Shafi. Jamaat was embittered by the HeI’s reluctance to fight
against the government, after its cadres were killed in 2013. Though there are
theological differences between Jamaat and ulemas, JeI has always benefited
from the politics of religion and both the JeI and ulema leaders had entered
into co-habitation with each other. The BNP enjoys close relations with some of
the constituent parties of HeI. In 2012, the IoJ had left the BNP saying that
the ulemas needed to be united to charter an independent policy.
The
government is currently bothered by the opposition to the installation of a
statue of Mujib in Dhaka’s Dholaipar Square, which the Hefazat terms as
un-Islamic and harmful. Some ministers have said that the government will
initiate criminal cases against Hefazat activists for indulging in violence in
their demonstration at Shapla Chattor. A sculpture of Mujib in Khustia was
broken.
In the last
few years, the AL strengthened the HeI by accommodating its demands, while
moderate Islamic forces have remained alienated. Fundamentally though, the
ideologies of the AL and HeI stand opposed to each other. The takeover of HeI
by more radical leaders opposed to the government only reflects the limitation
of the latter’s appeasement policy. While the Ulema may not be electorally
successful; their street power and ideological commitment to their
interpretation of religion will push the government to further Islamise the
social sphere. That will pave the way for the ultimate political success of the
Islamists.
-----
1. Islami Shashonotantra
Andolan, Khelafat Majlis, Islami Bastobayan (Islamic Law Implementation)
Committee, Nezami Islam Party were some of the constituents of that front.
2. Ahmed Shariful Huque
and Mohammad Yeha Akhtar, “The ubiquity of Islam: Religion and society in
Bangladesh”, Pacific Affairs, 60(2), 1987, p. 206.
3. Islami Oikya Jote,
Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish, Khelafat Andolan, Islami Andolan Bangladesh,
Islami Oikya Andolan, Jamiatul Ulama Islam are some of the religious political
parties that are now part of Hefazat.
4. Kaberi Gayen, “'Equal
property right': Much ado about nothing”, The Daily Star, March 08, 2019.
5.“Hefazat demands”, The
Daily Star, April 6, 2013.
6. Md. Sanaul Islam Tipu,
“Court indicts 4 bloggers”, Dhaka Tribune, September 9, 2013.
7.“‘Atheist’ bloggers to
‘repent’”, March 31, 2013.
8. For details, See Smruti
S Pattanaik, “Growing radicalism in Bangladesh: Assessing state response”, in
S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha ed., Terrorism: Emerging Trends (New Delh: Pentagon
Press, 2016), p. 229.
9. See Maliha Khan,
“Censorship and the Boi Mela”, The Daily Star, February 9, 2020.
10. See Mahadi Al Hasnat ,
“Corrections, but no changes in school textbooks”, Dhaka Tribune, July 21,
2017.
11.“পাঠ্যবই থেকে বিবর্তনবাদ তত্ত্ব বাদ দেওয়ার দাবি বাবুনগরীর,” Bangla Tribune, July 12, 2019.
12. Ellen Barry and
Julfikar Ali Manik, “To secular Bangladeshis, textbook changes are a
harbinger”, The New York Times, January 22, 2017.
13.Ibid
14.Rashidul Hasan and F.M.
Mizanur Rahaman, “A battle brewing over Hefazat helm,” The Daily Star,
September 20, 2020.
15.A.F. M. Khalid Hossein,
“হেফাজতের নতুন নেতৃত্ব চ্যালেঞ্জ ও প্রত্যাশা”, (Challenges and expectation before Hefazat's new
leadership), Naya Diganta, November 22, 2020.
16.“হেফাজতের নতুন আমির বাবুনগরী, কাসেমী মহাসচিব,” (Hefazat’s New Amir Babunagori, Kasemi General
Secretary), Bangla Tribune, November 15, 2020.
------
Smruti
S. Pattanaik is Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile
Original
Headline: Hefazat-e-Islami and the Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh
Source: Manohar Parrikar Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses
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